1 It has to be kept in view that the sarvastitvavadins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (kshamkatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.
2 Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.
3 In consequence of which no release could take place.
4 The Brahmavidyabhara/za explains the last clause—from kshazzikatva/fc fa —somewhat differently: Api fa paramazzunam api kshamkatvabhyupagam&n melanazzz na sambhavati, paramazzunaw melanazzz paramazzukriyadhinam, tatha fa svakriyazzz prati paramazzunazzz kara/zatvat kriyapurvakshazze paramamibhir bhavyam, kriya D d 2 (And in the latter case we are not further advanced than before.)—For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.
19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates maybe explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality; we say ‘ No/ because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links). Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the formation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality 1 of Nescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.
The series beginning with Nescience comprises the fol¬ lowing members: Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six, touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like 2. All these terms conjrayataya kriyaksha^e^pi tesham avasthanam apekshitam eva m melanakshane*pi, nahi melanajrayasyabhave melanarupa pravrz'ttir upapadyate, tatha ka, sthiraparamamisadhyfi melanarftpa pravn'tti^ katha m tesham ksha^ikatve bhavet.—Ananda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.
1 The karaTzatv&t of -Sankara explains the pratyayatvat of the Sutra; \axyam praty ayate ^anakatvena gakkhaX\. 2 The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the terms of this series.—The following is the substance of the comment of the Brahmavidyabhara^a: Nescience is the error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure, &c. — Impression (affection, sa^skara) comprises desire, aversion, &c., and the activity caused by them. — Knowledge (vign&na) is the self-consciousness (aham ity alayavi^Mnasya vrfftilabha^) springing up in the embryo.—Name and form is the rudimentary flake- or bubble-like condition of the embryo.—The stitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover, all acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the followers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like water¬ wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on could not take place.
This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggre¬ gates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown—when examining the VaLeshika doctrine—that the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in abode of the six (sha^/ayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses.— Touch (spai\ya) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo’s part.—Feeling (vedana) the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.—Desire (trzsh/za) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones.—Activity (upadana) is the effort resulting from desire.—Birth is the passing out from the uterus.—Species (g&ti) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.—Decay (^ara).—Death (marazzam) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (mumftrsha).—Grief (soka) the frustration of wishes connected therewith.—Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that ac¬ count.—Pain (du^kha) is such pain as caused by the five senses.— Durmanas is mental affliction.—The ‘ and the like ’ implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.
which the adrzsh/a abides 1; how much less then are aggre¬ gates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i. e. souls), and that which abides in them (the adrzsh/a).—Let us then assume (the Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate.—But how—we ask—can they be the cause of that without which —as their abode—they themselves are not capable of exist¬ ence? Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sawsara the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system.—Moreover, that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is. according to your doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself A # A A A # A A 1 Ananda Giri and Go. Ananda explain: Ajrayajrayibhftteshv iti bhoktrzVkeshazzam adrzsh/ajrayeshv ity artha^.—The Brahmavidyabharazza says: Nityeshv ajrayajrayibhftteshv azzushv abhyupagamyamaneshu bhoktrzshu ^a satsv ity anvaya^. Ajrayajrayibhftteshv ity asyopakaryopakarakabhavaprapteshv ity arthaA—And with regard to the subsequent ajrayajrayijftnyeshu: ajrayajrayitvajftnyeshu, ayazzz bhava^, sthireshu paramazzushu yadanvaye paramazzftnazzz saz/zghatapatti^ yadvyatireke ^a na tad upakarakam upakarya h paramazzava/fc yena tatkrz’to bhoga^ prarthyate sa tatra karteti grahituzzz jakyate, kshazzikeshu tu paramazzushu anvayavyatirekagrahasyanekakshazzasadhyasyasazzzbhavan nopakaryopakarakabhavo nirdharayitu m jakya^.—Ananda Giri remarks on the latter: Adrzsh/ajrayakartrzrahityam ahajrayeti. Another reading appears to be ajayajrayajftnyeshu.
only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoy¬ ment and release, and that would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.—There may therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates.
20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.
We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they can¬ not be made to account for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.
Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment 1 enters into being the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.—Let it then be said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.—That also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected with a second moment (which contra¬ dicts the doctrine of universal momentariness).—Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity constitute its 1 Bauddhanaw kshawapadena gha/adir eva padartho vyavahriyate na tu tadatirikta/^ ka^it ksha^o nama kalo*sti. Brahmavidylbh.
causal energy.—That assumption also is fruitless, because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not imbued with the nature of the cause (i. e. in which the nature of the cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the cause does continue to exist in the effect is im¬ possible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus necessitate the abandon¬ ment of the doctrine of general non-permanency.—Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases \— Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing’s own form or another state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing, it would follow that the word ‘ thing 5 and the words ‘ origination 5 and ‘ cessation ’ are interchangeable (which is not the case).—Let then, secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in consequence of which the terms ‘ origination ’ and 6 cessa¬ tion ’ may denote the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is called thing.—In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz.
the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned. —Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo is from a horse.—That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we under¬ stood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.—Hence 1 And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material causes such as clay, &c.?
we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.
21. On the supposition of there being no (cause; while yet the effect takes place), there results con¬ tradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).
It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non¬ permanency, the former momentary existence, as having already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.—Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no cause.—That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes 1. Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate at any time.—If, on the other hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things 2 are momentary merely.
1 These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipatipratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (alambanapratyaya).—-I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyabharawa: Adhipatir indriya/ra tad dhi ^akshuradirfipam utpannasya gnanasya rupadivishayata^ niyakMati niyamaka^ ^a lokeadhipatir ity u^yate. SahaMri &\oka/i. Samanantarapratyaya^ purva^/zanam,bauddhamate hi kshamka^anasa/fttatau purva^anam uttara^anasya karanaw tad eva ha mana ity ukyate. Alambana/rc gha/adiA Etan hetfin pratiya pr&pya ^akshuradi^anyam ity adi.
2 Sa/flskara iti, tanmate purvaksha^a eva hetubhfita^ sa^skaro vasaneti ha vyavahriyate kavyam tu tadvishayataya karmavyutpattya sa/rcskara^, tatha ha karyakara^atmaka^ sarva/rc bhavarupa/rc kshamkam iti prati^artha^. Brahmavidyabharawa.
4io vedanta-sCtras.
22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption. The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on constantly, assume that £ whatever forms an object of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced (samskrzta) and momentary/ To the triad there mentioned they give the names £ cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind/ £ cessation not dependent on such an act/ and ‘space.’ This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all positive characteristics. By £ cessation dependent on a sub¬ lative act of the mind/ we have to understand such destruc¬ tion of entities as is preceded by an act of thought 1; by £ cessation not so dependent 5 is meant destruction of the opposite kind 2; by ‘ space ’ is meant absence in general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three non-existences £ space ’ will be refuted later on (Sfttra 24); the two other ones are refuted in the present Sutra.
Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, £ on account of the absence of interruption/ For both kinds of cessation must have reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the single members constituting the series.—The former alternative is impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted 3 *.—The latter 1 As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so.
2 I. e. the insensible continual decay of things.—Viparita iti pratiksha«a/ft gha/adinazra yuktya sadhyamano * kmalair avagantum asakyah sukshmo vina.ro *pratisawkhyanirodha^. Brahmav.
3 A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence), since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence 1. And in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues to exist without any interrup¬ tion.—For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.
23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case. The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the ‘path’ 2. As therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatis¬ factory.
exist, since the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadana/zasawgraha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.
1 Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground.—Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.
2 The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.
24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non¬ entity). We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-sa/^khyavirodha and aprati 0 ) cannot be shown to be such; we now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, akasa).
With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of space no less than in the case of the two socalled non-entities treated of in the preceding Sutras. That space is a real thing follows in the first place from certain scriptural passages, such as ‘ space sprang from the Self. 5 — To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the other qualities.—Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow that while one bird is flying—whereby space is occupied— there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering bodies —Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, ‘ On what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?’), in which the following 1 What does enable us to declare that there is avara^abhava in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore is some¬ thing real.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 25.
question occurs, ‘ On what is the air founded?’ to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the sup¬ position of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation.—Further, there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of nega¬ tive entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non¬ eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and the like are. not a mere undefinable negation.
25. And on account of remembrance. The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdhrz) also; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance which is con¬ sequent on the original perception. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who pre¬ viously made the perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences, ‘ I saw that thing, and now I see this thing,’ if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every one; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be, ‘I remember; another person made the observation.’ But no such state of consciousness does arise.—When, on the other hand, such a state of consciousness does arise, then every¬ body knows that the person who made the original observa¬ tion, and the person who remembers, are different persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, ‘ I remember that that other person saw that and that.’— 4*4 4*4 In the case under discussion, however, the Vainai*ika him¬ self—whose state of consciousness is, ‘ I saw that and that ’ —knows that there is one thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is hot and gives light.
As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the VainsLrika has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentari¬ ness. And if he further recognises all his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being momentary only), w T e reply that the cognition of similarity is based on two things, and that for that reason the advo¬ cate of universal momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity of two successive momen¬ tary existences, he would thereby admit that one entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of universal momentariness.—Should it be said that the cog¬ nition ‘this is similar to that’ is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark that the fact of different terms—viz. ‘ this 5 and ‘ that ’— being used points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression ‘this is similar to that’ would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of ‘similarity’ only.—Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the con¬ scious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.— For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be rejected.
26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not being observed. The system of the Vainankas is objectionable for this reason also that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, ‘ On account of the mani¬ festation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the cause).’ For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at once, 4 i 6 as then no specification would be required l. Hence, as we see that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from non-entity.
To this Bauddha tenet we reply, (‘ Entity does) not (spring) from non-entity, on account of that not being observed.’ If entity did spring from non-entity, the as¬ sumption of special causes would be purportless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i. e. non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns of hares, &c.—a thing certainly not actually observed.—If, again, it should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having special distinctions—just as, for instance, blueness and the like are special qualities of lotuses and so on— we point out that in that case the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the non-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no case non¬ existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.—Further, if existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely positive entities distinguished by their various special characteristics. Nor 2 does any one 1 If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the effects of which it is'capable.—Cp. on this point the Sarvadarrazzasazzzgraha.
2 This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.