1 What does enable us to declare that there is avara^abhava in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore is some¬ thing real.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 25.
413 question occurs, ‘ On what is the air founded?’ to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the sup¬ position of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation.—Further, there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of nega¬ tive entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non¬ eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and the like are. not a mere undefinable negation.
25. And on account of remembrance.
The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdhrz) also; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance which is con¬ sequent on the original perception. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who pre¬ viously made the perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences, ‘ I saw that thing, and now I see this thing,’ if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every one; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be, ‘I remember; another person made the observation.’ But no such state of consciousness does arise.—When, on the other hand, such a state of consciousness does arise, then every¬ body knows that the person who made the original observa¬ tion, and the person who remembers, are different persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, ‘ I remember that that other person saw that and that.’— 4*4 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
In the case under discussion, however, the Vainai*ika him¬ self—whose state of consciousness is, ‘ I saw that and that ’ —knows that there is one thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is hot and gives light.
As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the VainsLrika has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentari¬ ness. And if he further recognises all his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being momentary only), w T e reply that the cognition of similarity is based on two things, and that for that reason the advo¬ cate of universal momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity of two successive momen¬ tary existences, he would thereby admit that one entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of universal momentariness.—Should it be said that the cog¬ nition ‘this is similar to that’ is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark that the fact of different terms—viz. ‘ this 5 and ‘ that ’— being used points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression ‘this is similar to that’ II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 26.
415 would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of ‘similarity’ only.—Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the con¬ scious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.— For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be rejected.
26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not being observed.
The system of the Vainankas is objectionable for this reason also that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, ‘ On account of the mani¬ festation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the cause).’ For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at once, 4 i 6 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
as then no specification would be required l. Hence, as we see that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from non-entity.
To this Bauddha tenet we reply, (‘ Entity does) not (spring) from non-entity, on account of that not being observed.’ If entity did spring from non-entity, the as¬ sumption of special causes would be purportless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i. e. non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns of hares, &c.—a thing certainly not actually observed.—If, again, it should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having special distinctions—just as, for instance, blueness and the like are special qualities of lotuses and so on— we point out that in that case the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the non-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no case non¬ existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.—Further, if existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely positive entities distinguished by their various special characteristics. Nor 2 does any one 1 If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the effects of which it is'capable.—Cp. on this point the Sarvadarrazza- sazzzgraha.
2 This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 27.
417 think that things of the nature of clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the like; but every¬ body knows that things of the nature of clay are the effects of clay only. — The Bauddha’s tenet that nothing can become a cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is false; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are always recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes of effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of the sub¬ sequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole undergoes decomposition).—Hence as we see on the one hand that no entities ever originate from non¬ entities such as the horns of a hare, and on the other hand that entities do originate from entities such as gold and the like, the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from non-existence has to be rejected.—We finally point out that, according to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the atoms; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus needlessly perplex the mind of every one?
27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of ends) in the case of non¬ active people also.
If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy inactive people also would obtain their purposes, since { non-existence ’ is a thing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves even if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver too [34] e e 418 vedAnta-sOtras.
lazy to weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is absurd and not maintained by anybody.—Thus the doctrine of the origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.
28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them).
There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting for the existence of aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vi^dna) exist.—The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things; but it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions alone are real.
According to this latter doctrine the process, whose con¬ stituting members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the result of knowledge \ is an altogether internal one, existing in so far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from consciousness, we reply that we base our 1 According to the vig-Mnava,din the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhasa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is power is ma,na, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is pramatrf, knowing subject.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 28.
419 doctrine on the impossibility of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-dififerent from the atoms 1.—In the same way we can show that the external things are not universals and so on 2, Moreover, the cognitions—which are of a uniform nature only in so far as they are states of consciousness—undergo, according to their objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external things becomes altogether gratuit¬ ous. From the fact, moreover, of our always being con¬ scious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain that there are no outward things.— 1 If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non- different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies.
2 Avayavavayavirfipo vahyo^rtho nasti £en m& bhfid ^ativyaktya- dirfipas tu syad ity a^ankyaha evam iti. (-ratyadmazra vyaktyadinam ^atyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasangad atyantabhinnatve tadvade- vatadbhavad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhe- dava^ gativyaktyadibhedo*pi nastity artha^.
Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although there is all the while no external object; hence we conclude that the ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are like¬ wise independent of external objects; for they also are simply ideas.—If we be asked how, in the absence of ex¬ ternal things, we account for the actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained from the impressions left by previous ideas *. In the beginningless sawsara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows, moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments: we both (the Vedantins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental im¬ pressions, without any external object; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental impressions.—Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things exist.
To all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply.— The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing cor¬ responding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists, 1 Vasan&, above translated by mental impression, strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the present actual idea.
II ADHyAyA, 2 PAD A, 28.
421 any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?—If the Bauddha should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the out¬ ward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of their perceptions. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears also from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an internal object of cognition appears like something external. For they practically accept the general consciousness which testifies to the existence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to refute it they speak of the external things as 4 like something external/ If they did not them¬ selves at the bottom acknowledge the existence of the ex¬ ternal world, how could they use the expression ‘like something external? 5 No one says, ‘ Vishmimitra appears like the son of a barren mother/ If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us as something external, not like something external.—But—the Bauddha may reply —we conclude that the object of perception is only like something external because external things are impossible. —This conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of right knowledge; while, on the other hand, the operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things are, 422 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
according to their nature, apprehended by all the instru¬ ments of knowledge; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or non-difference from atoms?—- Nor, again, does the non-existence of objects follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as the objects; for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the forms of the objects, and the objects are actually appre¬ hended as external.—For the same reason (i. e. because the distinction of thing and idea is given in consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea and thing has to be con¬ sidered as proving only that the thing constitutes the means of the idea, not that the two are identical. Moreover, when we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of cloth, consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness; just as when we see at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction of the two perceptions is due to the varying blackness and whiteness while the generic character of the cow remains the same. The difference of the one per¬ manent factor (from the two—or more—varying factors) is proved throughout by the two varying factors, and vice versa the difference of the latter (from the permanent factor) by the presence of the one (permanent factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view is to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a jar; there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct while the jar is one and the same; in the same way as when conscious of the smell of milk and the taste of milk we are conscious of the smell and taste as different things but of the milk itself as one only.
Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and pass away as soon as they have become objects of consciousness cannot apprehend—or be apprehended by —each other. From this it follows that certain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld; so the doctrine that ideas are different from each other; the doctrine that everything is momentary, void, &c.; the doc¬ trine of the distinction of individuals and classes; the II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 28.
423 doctrine that a former idea leaves an impression giving rise to a later idea; the doctrine of the distinction, owing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and non-existence; the doctrine of bondage and release (de¬ pending on absence and presence of right knowledge) \ Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must admit that we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you rejoin that we are conscious of the idea on its own account because it is of a luminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is not so; we reply that by main¬ taining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make your¬ self guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire burns itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept the common and altogether rational opinion that we are conscious of the external thing by means of the idea different from the thing! Indeed a proof of extraordinary philosophic insight!—It cannot, moreover, be asserted in any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of our consciousness; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea is to be apprehended by some¬ thing different from it, that something also must be appre¬ hended by something different and so on ad infinitum. And, moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cogni¬ tion is of an essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a further cognition is uncalled for; for as they are both equally illuminating the one cannot give light to the other.—But both these objections are unfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently no necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self which witnesses the idea (is conscious of the idea), there re¬ sults no regressus ad infinitum. And the witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation of knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witness- 1 For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in addition to the transitory ideas.
424 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
ing Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied.— Moreover, if you maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea itself implies consciousness; we reply that, as observation shows, the lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on (while our Self is one and permanent).— We thus have proved that an idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render it manifest.
29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream.
We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike.—The two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the difference of their character. They differ as follows.— The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. 4 1 wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man; no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30.
425