things would happen; they would either not be in the con¬ dition of inequality on account of the absence of an opera¬ tive cause; or else, if they were in that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine would again be open to the objection stated before 1.
io. And moreover (the Sankhya doctrine) is ob¬ jectionable on account of its contradictions.
The doctrine of the Sankhyas, moreover, is full of contra¬ dictions. Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, some¬ times eleven 2. In some places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great prin¬ ciple, in other places again that they proceed from selfconsciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, sometimes of one only 3. That their doctrine, more¬ over, contradicts Sruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and Smrzti, based on vSruti, is well known.—For these reasons also the Sankhya system is objectionable.
Here the Sankhya again brings a countercharge.—The system of the Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes suffering 4 are different classes of things (and thereby renders futile the well-established dis¬ tinction of causes of suffering and suffering beings). For 1 Anantaro dosho mahadddikaryotpadayoga^. An. Gi. 2 In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.
3 Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, ahankara, and manas.
4 Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places.—The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, IO.
those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of every¬ thing and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its meaning. For—to adduce a parallel case—a lamp as long as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving heat and light. And if the Vedantin should adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam, &C. 1, we remark that there also the waves, &c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently, although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and light.—That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experi¬ ence. For (to consider the matter from a more general point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired 2 are understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would already essen¬ tially be established in him (belong to him). The latter state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.
1 In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.
2 ‘ Artha/ a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.
(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), ‘ object of desire' and ‘ desiring person, 5 imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the object of desire are separate.—The same holds good with regard to what is not desired (object of aversion; anartha)and the non-desiring person (anarthin). An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the de¬ siring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvan¬ tage; with both one person enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, £ object of aversion. 5 Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term < causes of suffering, 5 while by the term ‘ sufferer 5 we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i. e. the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is im¬ possible.—But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.
All this reasoning—we, the Vedantins, reply—is futile, because on account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the suf¬ ferer cannot exist (in the Self).—Our doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and sub¬ ject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it is one only; how can the II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO.
one unchangeable Brahman enter with reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer?—Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed (which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?—That, we reply, is not difficult to see 1. The living body which is the object of the action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of suffering (burning).—But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent body; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for means to make it cease.—But it is likewise not observed, we reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and suffers pain.—Nor would you (the Sankhya) also assume that the affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit 2 a real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the soul 3. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer and the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain that the sattva-gu«a is that which suffers, and the gu?za called passion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the intelligent principle (the soul) can¬ not be really connected with these two 4. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because it leans towards 5 6 the sattva-gu^a, we point out that the employment of the phrase, ‘as it were,’shows that the soul does not really suffer.
1 In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.
2 In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.
3 And that would be against the Sankhya dogma of the soul’s essential purity.
4 So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.
6 Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti jankate sattveti. An. Gi.
If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to the phrase ‘ as it were V For the amphisbena also does not become venomous because it is ‘ a serpent as it were 5 ( £ like a serpent 5 ), nor does the serpent lose its venom because it is ‘like an amphisbena. 5 You must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit that, then my (the Veddntic) doctrine also is free from objections 1 2.
But perhaps you (the Sankhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on the part of the soul) is real 3. In that case, however, the impossibility of release is all the more unde¬ niable 4, especially as the cause of suffering (viz. the pra¬ dhana) is admitted to be eternal.—And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that, although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two —which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul— and that hence, when that reason no longer exists, the con¬ junction of the two comes to an absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu^a, called Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.
1 For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance. 2 The Sankhya Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.—The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sankhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.
3 Not only ‘ suffering as it were/ as it had been called above.
4 For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which—according to the Sankhya also—release depends.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. 38 1 And as 1 there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and sinking of the influence of the particular gu/zas, there is also no fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the conjunction of soul and pradhana (i. e. non-dis¬ crimination); hence the disjunction of the two is uncer¬ tain, and so the Sankhyas cannot escape the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine. To the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it.
Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhana to be the cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory. We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the upholders of Brahman.—The VaLreshikas argue as follows: The qualities which inhere in the substance con¬ stituting the cause originate qualities of the same kind in the substance constituting the effect; we see, for instance, that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not observe what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a piece of cloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelli¬ gent Brahman is assumed as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence inherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the case, and consequently the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. —This reasoning the Sutrakara shows to be fallacious, on the ground of the system of the VaLreshikas themselves.
11. Or (the world may originate from Brahman) 1 This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of soul and pradhana may come to an end when the influence of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.
as the great and the long originate from the short and the atomic. The system of the VaLeshikas is the following:—The atoms which possess, according to their special kind 1, the qualities of colour, &c., and which are of spherical form 2, subsist during a certain period 3 without producing any effects 4. After that, the unseen principle (adrzsh/a), &c. 5, acting as operative causes and conjunction constituting the non-inherent cause 6, they produce the entire aggregate of effected things, beginning with binary atomic compounds. At the same time the qualities of the causes (i.e. of the simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus, when two atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities belonging to the simple atoms, such as white colour, &c., produce a corresponding white colour in the binary compound. One special quality, however, of the simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce cor¬ responding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of extension belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (a^utva) and shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining produce a quaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c., inherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the quaternary compounds; with the exception, however, of the two qualities of minuteness and shortness. For it is 1 I. e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air. 2 Parima^d/ala, spherical is the technical term for the specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small spheres. Cp. Vais*. Sut. VII, 1, 20.
3 Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the atoms are isolated and motionless.
4 When the time for a new creation has come.
5 The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.
6 The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the constituent atoms, the non-inherent cause the conjunction of those atoms, the operative causes the adr/sh/a and the Lord’s activity which make them enter into conjunction.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I I.
admitted that the forms of extension belonging to quater¬ nary compounds are not minuteness and shortness, but bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens 1 when many simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple atom and a binary compound combine to produce new effects. Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary compounds are produced, which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are big and long, but not anything spherical; or as from binary compounds, which are minute and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which are big and long, not minute and short; so this non-intelligent world may spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a doctrine to which you—the Vai^eshika—cannot, on your own principles, object.
Here the VaLreshika will perhaps come forward with the following argumentation 2. As effected substances, such as binary compounds and so on, are engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the causal substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz. sphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects. The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any quality contrary to intelligence owing to which the intelli¬ gence inherent in the cause should not be able to originate a new intelligence in the effect. For non-intelligence is not a quality contrary to intelligence, but merely its negation. As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to itself.
This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the qualities of sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce corresponding effects, so it is with 1 I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).
2 In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a funda¬ mental Vaheshika principle.
vedanta-sOtras.
intelligence also; so that the two cases are parallel so far. Nor can the circumstance of the effects being engrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to them¬ selves; for the power of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another form of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the substance pro¬ duced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon only (i. e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist. Nor, again, can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on originating other forms of extension 1 2 * *, and therefore do not originate forms of exten¬ sion belonging to the same class as their own; for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other causes; as the Sutras of Kazzabhu^* (Ka/zada) themselves declare (Va is. Sut. VII, 1, 9, ‘Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation; 5 * * * * * * * * * * VII, 1, 10, ‘The con¬ trary of this (the big) is the minute; 5 VII, 1, 17, ‘ Thereby length and shortness are explained 25 ).—Nor, again, can it be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new quality is origin- 1 I. e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.
2 The first of the three Sfttras quoted comprises, in the present text of the Vaheshika-sfitras, only the following words, ‘ Kdrazzabahutva^ >6a the kz, of the Sutra implying, according to the commentators, mahattva and pra^aya.—According to the Vaheshikas the form of extension called ami, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.—The form of extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting ‘big 5 thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms.
In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to pra^aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upask&ra on Va is. Sht. VII, 1, 9; 10.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II.
ated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same rela¬ tion of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with regard to intelli¬ gence 1. Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction (sawyoga) there originate substances, &c. be¬ longing to a class different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows that the doctrine of effects belong¬ ing to the same class as the causes from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz. Brah¬ man), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. con¬ junction) as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general. Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities. Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a substance (Vary. Sut. IV, 2, 2, ‘On account of the conjunction of things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body is not com¬ posed of five elements ’). Just as the conjunction which inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible, would itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is perceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here conjunction is a quality and the body a substance.—The origin of effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already treated of under II, 1, 6.—Well then, this being so, the matter has been settled there already (why then is it again discussed here?)—Because, we reply, there we argued 1 I.e. if the Vabeshikas have to admit that it is the nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedantin also may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the nonintelligent world.
[34] C c against the Sankhya, and at present we have to do with the Vabeshika.—But, already once before (II, i, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sankhya are equally valid against the Vabeshika?) — Because here, we reply, at the beginning of the examina¬ tion of the Vabeshika system we prefer to discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of the Vabeshikas.
12. In both cases also (in the cases of the adrzsh/a inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya). The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause of the world.—This doctrine arises in the following manner. We see that all ordinary sub¬ stances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunc¬ tion co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from those substances with which it is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction co¬ operating. That thing now at which the distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into minuter parts is the atom.—This whole world, with its mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is composed of parts it has a beginning and an end 1; an effect may not be assumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the world. Such is Ka/zada’s doctrine.—As we observe four elementary substances con¬ sisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind), we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts can- 1 Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of parts. not be divided themselves; hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms. This motion which is due to the unseen principle 1 joins the atom in which it resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are pro¬ duced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads.—Such, in short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka;zada.
This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.—It must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction; for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is brought about; for unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the time, im¬ possible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For the quality of the soul called endeavour origi¬ nates when the soul is connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world has taken place, and cannot therefore be the 1 Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.—Adrzsh/apeksham adnsh/avatkshetra^«asa/^yogapeksham iti yavat. An. Gi.
C c 2 3§8 C c 2 3§8 causes of the original action (by which the world is produced).—If, in the second place, the unseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in the soul or in the atom? In both cases it can¬ not be the cause of motion in the atoms, because it is nonintelligent. For, as we have shown above in our examina¬ tion of the Sankhya system, a non-intelligent thing which is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle of the adrzsh/a because at the time of pralaya its intelligence has not yet arisen 1. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is supposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you say that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of connexion 2, continuity of action, as there is no other restricting principle.—Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original action cannot take place in the atoms; there being no action, conjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place; there being no con¬ junction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the formation of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.
How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial conjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place, and consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it would be contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place between substances having parts (prade^a). If the latter, it would follow that the atoms are composed of parts.—Let then the atoms be imagined to consist of parts.—If so, imagined things being unreal, the conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the non- 1 According to the Vafreshikas intelligence is not essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when the soul is joined to an internal organ.
2 The soul being all-pervading. inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes effected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate. And just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms leading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause of such motion; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action could take place leading to their separation, since for that occur¬ rence also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen principle be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect enjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to bring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to effect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither conjunc¬ tion nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither creation nor pralaya of the world.—For these reasons the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.
13. And because in consequence of samaviya being admitted a regressus in infinitum results from parity of reasoning. You (the Vabeshika) admit that a binary compound which originates from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with them by the relation of inherence; but on that assumption the doctrine of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, £ because parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.’ For just as a binary compound which is absolutely different from the two con¬ stituent atoms is connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavaya), so the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence would have to be assumed and so on ad infinitu m.—But—the Vabeshika is supposed to reply—we are conscious of the so-called samavaya relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists, not as either non-connected with them or as depending on another connexion; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into a regressus in infinitum.— Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it would involve the admission that conjunction (sa;/zyoga) also as being eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavaya, not require another connexion 1. If you say that conjunc¬ tion does require another connexion because it is a different thing 2, we reply that then samavaya also requires another connexion because it is likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a quality (gu/za), and samavaya does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference) the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both cases 3, and not that which is technically called £ quality 5 is the cause (of another connexion being required) 4. —For these reasons those who acknowledge samavaya to be a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infini¬ tum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be accounted for.—For this reason also the atomic doctrine is inadmissible.
14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity).