astikayas (‘existing bodies,’ i.e. categories), viz. the cate¬ gories of soul (^lva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space (akai*a). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful ways l.—To all things they apply the following method of reasoning, which they call the saptabhanginaya: somehow it is; somehow it is not; somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescrib¬ able; somehow it is and is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable.
To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions as that of unity and eternity 2.
This doctrine we meet as follows.—Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible ‘ on account of the impossibility in one thing.’ That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in the words ‘they either are such or not such ’ results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself some¬ thing, falls as such under the alternative predications ‘some¬ how it is,’ ‘ somehow it is not,’ and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthakara (Cina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether 1 Cp. translation of Sarvadarrazzasaffzgraha, p. 59. 2 And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.
indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doc¬ trine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman.— Again, if we apply the China reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact, they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person.—If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied in such statements will result in nobody’s acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release.
And, moreover, it follows from your doctrine that soul, non¬ soul, and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indeter¬ mination.—As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories —being excluding non-being and vice versa non-being ex¬ cluding being—the doctrine of the Arhat must be rejected, —The above remarks dispose likewise of the assertions made by the Chinas as to the impossibility of deciding whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or non-separateness, and so on.—The China doctrine that a gg re g ates are formed from the atoms—by them called pudgalas—we do not undertake to refute separately as its refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given in a previous part of this work.
34. And likewise (there results from the (Taina doctrine) non-universality of the Self.
We have hitherto urged against the Gaina doctrine an objection resulting from the sy&dvada, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it would follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not omnipresent.—The Gainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size as the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar things. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different size, it might happen that the soul of a man—which is of the size of the human body—when entering, in consequence of its former deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul being relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to the successive stages of one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old age.—But why, the Gaina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of under¬ going compression in a small body and dilatation in a big one?—Do you, we ask in return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul may occupy the same place or not?—If you do not admit it, it follows that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of limited dimensions.—If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle only, the extension of all the par¬ ticles together will remain inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of the body).
You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body of limited size contains an infinite number of soul par¬ ticles.
Well then, the Gaina may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the soul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw from it whenever it enters a small body.—To this hypothesis the next Sfitra furnishes a reply.
35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c. (of the soul).
Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive accession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve the soul’s undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of parts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is liable to change it follows that it is non¬ permanent, like the skin and similar substances. From that, again, it follows that the £aina doctrine of bondage and release is untenable; according to which doctrine ‘ the soul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of works and sunk in the ocean of sa^sara, rises when its bonds are sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is freed from the encumbering clay 1.’— Moreover, those particles which in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently remaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determine which are the permanent and which the temporary parts.—We have further to ask from whence those particles originate when they accede to the soul, and into what they are merged when they detach themselves from it. They cannot spring from the material elements and re-enter the elements; for the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the existence of some other, general or special, reservoir of soul-particles.—Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion the soul would be of in¬ definite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and departing is itself indefinite.—On account of all these and similar difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns attach themselves to, and detach them¬ selves from, the soul.
The Sfitra may be taken in a different sense also. The preceding Sutra has proved that the soul if of the same size as the body cannot be permanent, as its entering into bigger and smaller bodies involves its limitation. To this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent, just as the stream of water is permanent (al¬ though the water continually changes). An analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of the stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth and so on, are non-permanent.—To this rejoinder our Sutra replies that if the stream is not real we are led back to the doctrine of a general void, and that, if it is something real, the difficulties connected with the soul's changing, &c. present themselves and render the Caina view impossible.
36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no difference (of size, at any time).
Moreover, the Fainas themselves admit the permanency of the final size of the soul which it has in the state of release. From this it follows also that its initial size and its intervening sizes must be permanent 1, and that hence 1 The inference being that the initial and intervening sizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul, like its final size.
[ 34 ] Ff there is no difference between the three sizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different bodies of the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies.—Or else (to explain the Sfitra in a somewhat different way) from the fact that the final size of the soul is permanent, it follows that its size in the two previous conditions also is perma¬ nent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always of the same size—whether minute or infinite—and not of the varying size of its bodies.—For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.
37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the inappropriateness (of that doc¬ trine). The Sutrak&ra now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine, according to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as he is the general ruler.—But how do you know that that is the purport of the Sutra (which speaks of the Lord ‘without any qualification 5 )?—From the circumstance, we reply, that the teacher himself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the present Sutra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general, the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory, and the Sutrakdra would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore must assume that the purport of the present Sutra is to make an energetic attack on the doctrine of those who main¬ tain that the Lord is not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause of the world; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedantic tenet of the unity of Brahman.
The theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vedanta are of various nature. Some taking their stand on the Sankhya and Yoga systems assume that the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the pradh&na and of the souls, and that pradMna, soul, and Lord are of mutually different nature.—The Mihe^varas (Saivas) maintain that the five categories, viz. effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain, were taught by the Lord Pajupati (Siva) to the end of breaking the bonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Pa^upati is, according to them, the Lord, the operative cause.—Similarly, the Vaueshikas and others also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow the operative cause of the world.
Against all these opinions the Sutra remarks ‘ the Lord, on account of the inappropriateness., I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the ruler of the pradhana and the soul should be the cause of the world, on account of the inap¬ propriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is supposed to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low, intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it follows that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on, is hence like one of us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming that he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of the living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be considered in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is not removed by the con¬ sideration that the works of living beings and the result¬ ing dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has no beginning; for in past time as well as in the present mutual interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is, moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyayikas themselves that ‘ imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action’ (Nyaya Sutra I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else, are impelled to action by some imperfection.
And even if it is admitted that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with pity).—Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it follows that he must be devoid of all activity.
38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the pradhana). Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhana and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a certain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be con¬ junction (sawyoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhcina and the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not settled as yet 1.—How, then, it may be asked, do you—the Ved&ntins—establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord and the world)?—There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the connexion we assume is that of identity (tad&tmya). The adherent of Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets throughout conformable to observation. Our adver¬ sary, on the other hand, who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances furnished by experience, 1 The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and the pradhana and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world considered as the effect of the pradhana acted upon by the Lord; for that the world is the effect of the pradhana is a point which the Vedantins do not accept as proved.
may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the VedAntin; for that would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.— For all these reasons the Sankhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.
39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the Lord). The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an un¬ tenable hypothesis, for the following reason also.—Those philosophers are obliged to assume that by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhana, &c. just as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be admitted; for the pradhana, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and therefore not an object of percep¬ tion, is on that account of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord’s action.
40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhana is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.
Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the pradhana in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the other organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not objects of perception.
This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs). But we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c. caused 43§ by the pradh&na. If the analogy between the pradh&na and the bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.
Or else the two preceding Sutras may be explained in a different way. Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of countries, are never without some material abode, i. e. a body; hence, if we wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve as the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid of a material substratum; for experience teaches us that action requires a material substrate. — Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even previously to creation). —This assumption also will not do; for if the Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary transmigratory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.
41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on the Lord’s part).
The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the following reason also.—They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of infinite duration, and like¬ wise that the pradhana, as well as the individual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord either defines the measure of the pradhana, the souls, and himself, or does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doc¬ trine under discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of finite duration; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of definite extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist. The numerical measure of pradhana, souls, and Lord is defined by their constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient). The number of the souls is a high one \ From among this limited number of souls some obtain release from the sa^sara, that means their sa^sara comes to an end, and their subjection to the sawsara comes to an end. Gra¬ dually all souls obtain release, and so there will finally be an end of the entire sa^sara and the sa/^sara state of all souls. But the pradh&na which is ruled by the Lord and which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by sa^sara. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for the Lord to rule, and his om¬ niscience and ruling power have no longer any objects. But if the pradMna, the souls, and the Lord, all have an end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general void.—Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions, maintain the second alternative, i. e. that the measure of the Lord himself, the pradhana, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.—But that also is impossible, because it would compel us to aban¬ don a tenet granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.
For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers, according to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears unacceptable. 42. On account of the impossibility of the ori¬ gination (of the individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas cannot be accepted).
We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative cause of the world. We are now 1 I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient Lord knows its measure.
going to refute the doctrine of those according to whom he is the material as well as the operative cause.—But, it may be objected, in the previous portions of the present work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i. e. a Lord who is the material, as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on the basis of Scripture, and it is a recog¬ nised principle that Smrzti, in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative; why then should we aim at controverting the doctrine stated?—It is true, we reply, that a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the Vedanta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy; another part of the system, how¬ ever, is open to objection, and that part we intend to attack.
The so-called Bhagavatas are of opinion that the one holy (bhagavat) Vasudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and that he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in four forms (vyuha), as Vasudeva, Sankarsha/za, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vasudeva denotes the highest Self, Sankarshazza the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind (manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (ahankara). Of these four Vasudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, of which the three others are the effects.—The believer after having worshipped Vasudeva for a hundred years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana), procuring of things to be offered (upadana), oblation (i^ya), recitation of prayers, &c. (svadhyaya), and devout meditation (yoga), passes beyond all affliction and reaches the highest Being.
Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the doctrine that Naraya/za, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple ways; for various scriptural passages, such as ‘ He is one¬ fold, he is threefold’ ( Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentra¬ tion of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhagavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach, &c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well from Smrzti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the doctrine that Sankarshaz/a springs from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from Sankarshazza, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from Vasudeva, i.e. the highest Self, there should originate Sankarshazza, i.e. the individual soul; for if such were the case, there would attach to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imper¬ fections which belong to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the highest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by entering into its cause.—That the soul is not an originated thing, the teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhagavata hypothesis is unacceptable.
43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent* The Bhigavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman. But the Bhagavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed Sankarsha/za, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent another instrument, viz. the ahankara termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with any scriptural passage in their favour.