44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Visudeva, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i. e. the objection raised in Shtra 42).
Let us then—the Bhagavatas may say—understand by Sankarshazza, and so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c., but rather Lords, i. e. powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory.
All these are Vasudevas free from faults, without a sub¬ stratum (not sprung from pradhana), without any imper¬ fections. Hence the objection urged in Sutra 42 does not apply.
Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the‘non-exclusion of that/ i. e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of origination, can be established.—Do you, in the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords, Vasudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self?—If so, you commit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby against your own principle, according to which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vasu¬ deva.—Or do you perhaps mean to say that from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing equal attributes?—In that case the objection urged in Sfitra 42 remains valid. For Sankarsha/za cannot be produced from Vdsudeva, nor Pradyumna from Sankarsha^a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause— as, for instance, in the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than the effect)—and that without such superiority the relation is simply impossible. But the followers of the Pa^aratra do not acknowledge any difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between Vasudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of Vasudeva, without any special distinc¬ tions. The forms of Vasudeva cannot properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme Being.
45. And on account of contradictions.
Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhagavata system, with reference to the assumption of qualities and their bearers. Eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory are enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place spoken of as Selfs, holy Vasudevas, and so on.—Moreover, we meet with passages contradictory of the Veda. The follow¬ ing passage, for instance, blames the Veda, ‘ Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas Sa^ilya studied this •rastra.’—For this reason also the Bhagavata doctrine can¬ not be accepted.
SECOND ADHYAYA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
i. Ether 1 (does) not (originate), on account of the absence of scriptural statement. In the Vedanta-texts we meet in different places with different statements concerning the origination of various things. Some of those passages declare that ether origi¬ nated; some do not. Some record the origination of air; others do not. Other passages again make analogous statements concerning the individual soul and the vital airs.—Similarly we observe that other scriptural texts con¬ tradict one another concerning order of succession and the like.—Now, as we ourselves have inferred the worthless¬ ness of other philosophical doctrines from their mutual contradictions, a suspicion might arise that our doctrine is equally worthless, owing to its intrinsic contradictions. Hence a new discussion is begun in order to clear from all doubt the sense of all those Vedanta-texts which refer to creation, and thus to remove the suspicion alluded to.
Here we have to consider in the first place the question 1 Here, as generally in the preceding parts of this translation, akjua is rendered by ‘ ether.’ There is no doubt that occasionally the appropriate—and in some cases the only possible—rendering is not * ether ’ but ‘ space; ’ but the former rendering, after all, best agrees with the general Vedantic view of aka^a. The Vedantins do not clearly distinguish between empty space and an exceedingly fine matter filling all space, and thus it happens that in many cases where we speak of the former they speak of aka^a, i.e. the all-pervading substratum of sound; which howsoever attenuated is yet one of the material elements, and as such belongs to the same category as air, fire, water, and earth.
B 2 vedanta-sOtras. whether ether has an origin or not.—The purvapakshin maintains that ether does not originate, since there is no scriptural statement to that effect. For in the chapter which treats of the origin (of the world) ether is not mentioned at all. In the passage ‘ In the beginning there was that only which is, one only, without a second* the iTMndogya at first introduces Brahman as the general subject-matter, by means of the clause ‘that which is,' and thereupon (in the passages ‘ It thought,* c It sent forth fire,* &c.) records the origin of three elements, viz. fire, water, and earth; giving the first place to fire which (ordinarily) occupies the middle place among the five elements 1. Now, as scriptural statement is our (only) authority in the origination of the knowledge of supersensuous things, and as there is no scriptural statement declaring the origin of ether, ether must be considered to have no origin.
2. But there is (a scriptural statement of the origination of ether). The conjunction 6 but 5 indicates the adoption of another alternative.—The origin of ether may not be stated in the A^Mndogya; but it is stated in other scriptural passages. For the text of the Taittiriyakas, after having introduced Brahman as the general subject-matter,—in the words, ‘ The true, knowledge, without end is Brahman,’—goes on to say, ‘From that Self sprang ether’ (Taitt. Up. II, i).—Hence there arises a conflict of scriptural passages, the creation sometimes being said to begin with fire, sometimes with ether.—But may we not appropriately assume the two scriptural passages to form one syntactical whole?—It would be well indeed if we could do so, but a unity of the kind desired cannot be admitted, because the creator who is mentioned only once—in the passage c he sent forth fire* —cannot be connected with two things to be created, as if the construction were ‘ He sent forth fire, he sent forth ether.*—But—an objection may be raised—we see that sometimes an agent, although mentioned once only, is yet 1 The usual order being ether, air, fire, water, earth. connected with two objects; as when we say c after having cooked broth he now cooks rice.’ We therefore may combine the two scriptural sentences into one, ‘ Brahman having created ether created fire.’—Such a combination of sentences, we reply, is not admissible here, because the.Oandogya intimates that fire was created first, while the Taittiriyaka assigns the same position to ether, and be¬ cause it is impossible that both should have been created first.—The same remarks apply to a further contradiction involved in the other scriptural passage, ‘ From that Self sprang ether,’ &c.; for there also the material cause and the fact of origination, being mentioned only once, cannot be connected with fire as well as ether, so as to effect a sentence of the following kind, 4 from that there sprang ether, from that there sprang fire.’ Moreover the Taittiri¬ yaka states separately that 4 fire (sprang) from air V—With regard to this conflict of statements somebody now main¬ tains the following view.
3. (The Vedic statement concerning the origination of ether) has a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of the origination of ether). The ether does not originate on account of the absence of scriptural statement.—That other passage which (ap¬ parently) declares the origination of the ether must be taken as having a secondary (figurative) meaning.—Why? —On account of the impossibility. The origination of ether cannot be shown to be possible as long as there exist followers of the opinion of the reverend Ka^abhu^ (Ka;zada). For the latter deny the origination of ether on the ground that it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of the required apparatus of causes. Whatever is originated, they say, is originated from inherent causes, non-inherent causes, and operative causes. Of a substance the inherent causes are substances belonging to the same class and more than one in number. But for ether there are no such originating substances, belonging to the same 1 While the jOand. says that fire sprang from the Self.
class and more than one in number, from which, as its inherent cause, it could originate, and consequently there also exists no non-inherent cause of ether; for the latter would have to be looked for in the conjunction of the primary substances. And as thus there exist no inherent cause and no non-inherent cause, there is absolutely no room for an operative cause; for the only function of the latter is to assist the two other causes. Those elements moreover which have an origin, as fire and the like, we may conceive to exist in different conditions at an earlier and a later time; we may conceive e. g. that fire, pre¬ viously to its origination, did not give light or produce any other effects, while it does do so subsequently to its origination. Of the ether, on the other hand, no such difference between an earlier and a later period can be conceived; for, we ask, would it be possible to maintain that before its alleged origination there were no large, minute, and atomic spaces?—That ether is without an origin further follows from its characteristic qualities, such as all-pervadingness and so on, which altogether distinguish it from earth and the other elements.—Hence, as the word ‘ ether ’ (aka.ra) is used in a secondary sense in such phrases as ‘ make room ’ ( 4 kl?a), 4 there is room/ and as space although one only is designated as being of different kinds when we speak of the space of a jar, the space of a house, &c.—a form of expression met with even in Vedic passages such as ‘he is to place the wild animals in the spaces’ (aka^eshu) ’—we conclude that those Vedic passages also which speak of its origination must be supposed to have a secondary meaning.
4. And on account of the word (of the Veda).
The word of the Veda also proclaims the non-originatedness of ether; for it declares that ‘air and ether (antariksha) are immortal 5 (B ri. Up. II, 3, 3), and what is immortal cannot have an origin. Another scriptural passage (‘ omni¬ present and eternal like ether’), by comparing two attri¬ butes of Brahman, viz. omnipresence and eternity with the other, intimates that those qualities belong to the ether also; in which case no beginning can be attributed to it. Other passages to be quoted in this connexion are, ‘ As this ether is infinite, so the Self is to be known as infinite; * and ‘ Brahman has the ether for its body, the ether is the Self.’ For if the ether had a beginning, it could not be predicated of Brahman (as is done in the last passage), as we predicate blueness of a lotus (‘ the lotus is blue ’). Hence we understand that the eternal Brahman is of the same nature as ether.
5. The one (word ‘sprang’) may be (taken in its secondary as well as in its primary sense), like the word ‘ Brahman.’
This Sutra contains the reply to a doubt.—If we admit the opinion maintained hitherto, how can one and the same word 4 sprang ’ from that Self sprang the ether ’) be used, in the same chapter, in its primary (real) meaning with regard to fire and so on, and in a secondary meaning with regard to ether?—The answer to this objection is that the one word ‘ sprang ’ may, according to the nature of the things to which it refers, be used in its primary as well as its secondary sense, just as the word ‘Brahman’ is used. For the one word ‘ Brahman’ is, in the passage Taitt. Up. Ill, 2-6 (‘ Try to know Brahman by penance, for penance is Brahman ’), used in a secondary sense with regard to food, &c., and in its primary sense with regard to bliss; and the same word Brahman is, in the way of figurative identification (bhakti), applied to penance, which is merely the means of knowing Brahman, and again directly to Brahman as the object of knowledge.—But how—to raise another question—can we, on the supposition of ether having no beginning, uphold the validity of the statement made in the clause ‘ one only, without a second? ’ For if ether is a second entity (co-existing with Brahman from eternity), it follows that Brahman has a second. And if so, how can it be said that when Brahman is known everything is known? ( Kh. Up. VI, 1).—The word ‘one,’ the purvapakshin replies, may be used with reference to (the absence of) effects. As in ordinary life a person, who on a certain vedanta-sOtras.
day sees in a potter’s house a lump of clay, a staff, a wheel and so on, and on the following day a number of finished vessels, might say, ‘Yesterday there was only clay,’ mean¬ ing thereby only that on the preceding day there were no things made of clay, not that there were no staff, wheel and the like; so the passage under discussion also is to be understood.—The term ‘ without a second 5 (does not ex¬ clude the existence from eternity of ether, but) excludes the existence of any other superintending being (but Brahman). While there is a superintending potter in addi¬ tion to the material cause of the vessels, i. e. the clay, there is no other superintendent in addition to Brahman, the material cause of the world. Nor does the existence of ether as a second entity involve Brahman’s being associated with a second (and therefore not being of a simple nature). For diversity is founded on difference of characteristic attributes, and before the origin (of the creation) no differ¬ ence of attributes separating Brahman and ether exists; the two being mixed like water and milk, and having the common attributes of all-pervadingness, immateriality and so on. At the time of creation however a certain diver¬ sity of the two determines itself, Brahman putting forth energy in order to produce the world, while the ether re¬ mains immoveable.—And also from the passages quoted above—such as ‘ Brahman has the ether for its body ’—it follows that the two are identical. Thence again it follows that through the knowledge of Brahman everything is known.—Moreover every effect, which is produced, is pro¬ duced in such a way as not to be separated from ether in place as well as in time, and ether itself is non-separated in place and time from Brahman; hence, if there are known Brahman and its effects, the ether also is known. The case is similar to that of a few drops of water poured into a jug full of milk. Those drops are taken when the milk is taken; the taking of the drops does not constitute something additional to the taking of the milk. Analo¬ gously the ether, as being non-separate in place and time from Brahman and its effects, is comprised within Brahman, and consequently we have to understand the passages about the origin of the ether in a secondary sense.—To this argumentation we make the following reply.
6. The non-abandonment of the promissory state¬ ments (results only) from the non-difference (of the entire world from Brahman), according to the words of the Veda.
In all the Vedanta-texts we meet with promissory statements of the following nature:—‘ That by which we hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not known 5 {Kh. Up. VI, i, 3); ‘When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known’ (B ru Up. IV, 5, 6); c Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known? 5 (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3); f Outside that which is there is no knowledge/ These promissory statements are not abandoned, i. e. not stultified, only if the entire aggregate of things is non-different from Brahman, the object of knowledge; for if there were any difference, the affirmation that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known, would be contradicted thereby. Non-difference again of the two is possible only if the whole aggregate of things originates from the one Brahman. And we understand from the words of the Veda that that affirmation can be established only through the theory of the non-difference of the material cause and its effects. For the affirmation contained in the clause ‘ That by which we hear what is not heard,’ &c., is proved by the analogous instances of clay, &c., which all aim at showing the identity of effect and cause. In order to establish this, the subsequent clauses also (‘ Being only, my dear, this was in the begin¬ ning, one only, without a second; it thought; it sent forth fire,’ &c.) at first state that the aggregate of effects belongs to Brahman, and then declare its identity with Brahman, viz. from the passage ‘ In it all that exists has its Self’ (VI, 8, 7), up to the end of the prapa/^aka.—If, now, the ether were not one of the effects of Brahman, it could not be known by Brahman being known, and that would involve an abandonment of a (previous) affirmation; an IO alternative which, as invalidating the authoritativeness of the Veda, is of course altogether unacceptable.—Similarly in all the Vedanta-texts certain passages are to be found which, by means of various instances, make the same affirmation, so e. g. 4 This everything, all is that Self ’ ( Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); ‘Brahman alone is that Immortal before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, ii).—H ence, like fire and the other sub¬ stances, the ether also is a product.—The averment made by the purvapakshin that on account of the ab¬ sence of scriptural statements the ether is not a product is unfounded, since a scriptural passage referring to the origin of ether has already been pointed out, viz. ‘ from that Self sprang ether. 5 —True,—the purvapakshin may reply,—such a statement has indeed been pointed out, but it is contradicted by another statement, viz. 4 It sent forth fire,’ &c. Should it be alleged that there can be no con¬ tradiction, because all scriptural passages form one whole, the reply is that all non-contradictory passages form a whole; in the present case, however, a contradiction has been shown to exist, because the creator, who is mentioned only once, cannot be connected with two things created; because two things cannot both be created first; and because an option is, in that case, inadmissible 1.—This reply, we rejoin, is without force. It is indeed true that it is impossible to explain the passage of the Taittiriyaka in any modified sense; for it distinctly declares that fire was produced in the third place, 4 From that Self sprang the ether, from ether air, from air fire. 5 But, on the other hand, it is possible to give a different turn to the passage from the iTMndogya, which may be explained to mean that 4 Brahman, after having created ether and air, created fire. 5 For as the purport of this passage is to relate the origin of fire, it cannot at the same time impugn the account of the origin of ether given in another passage; according to the principle that to one and the same sen¬ tence a double purport must not be ascribed. As, on the 1 For we cannot maintain that optionally either the one or the other was created first.
I I other hand, one creator may successively create more than one thing, and as on that ground the combination of the two passages into one syntactical whole is possible, we are not obliged to disregard any scriptural statement on account of its meaning being contradicted (by other scrip¬ tural passages). Nor do we mean to say that a creator mentioned only once is to be connected with two created things; for the other (second) created thing is supplied from another scriptural passage. And, in the same way as the fact of the whole aggregate of things being produced from Brahman—which is stated directly in the passage ‘ Let a man meditate with calm mind on that as begin¬ ning, ending and breathing in it 5 ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1)— does not impugn the order of creation stated elsewhere to begin with fire; so also the statement as to fire being pro¬ duced from Brahman has no force to impugn the order of creation which, in another scriptural passage, is said to begin with ether.
But, it may be objected, the passage ‘ Let a man meditate with calm mind/ &c. has the purpose of enjoin¬ ing calmness, and does not state anything with regard to creation; it need not therefore adapt itself to the order (of creation) established by another passage 1. On the other hand, the passage c It sent forth fire 5 refers to the creation, and we must therefore accept the order exactly as stated there.—This objection we refute by the remark that it is not legitimate to abandon, from deference to the circumstance of fire occupying the first place (in the Kh. Up.), the thing, viz. the ether which is known (to have been created) from another passage; for order of succession is a mere attribute of things (and therefore subordinate to the latter). Moreover, in the passage c It sent forth fire ’ we meet with no word directly indicating the order of succession; but we merely infer the latter from the sense, and this (merely inferred) order is impugned by the order established by another direct scriptural state- 1 Yatpara^ jabda^ sa jabdartho na >£aya m jabda^ srfsh/iparo*to na prasiddhaw kramam badhitum alam iti. An. Gi.
ment, viz. ‘ From air there sprang fire/ Now with regard to the question whether ether or fire were created first, neither option nor addition are permissible, because the former is impossible in itself, and the latter non-admitted by the texts \ Hence the two scriptural passages are not contradictory.—Moreover, in order to justify the promise made in the ATMndogya in the beginning of the chapter (‘ That instruction by which we hear what is not heard ’), we have to count the ether, although ‘ not heard 5 (i. e. not mentioned in the text) among the things produced; how much more impossible then is it for us not to accept the statement actually made about the ether in the Taittiriyaka!—To the assertion, made above by the purvapakshin, that the ether as occupying the same space with everything is known together with Brahman and its effects, and that thus the assertion (of everything being known through Brahman) is not contradicted; and that moreover the scriptural passage ‘ one only, without a second ’ is not contradicted, because Brahman and the ether may be con¬ sidered as non-separate, like milk and water, we make the following reply. That knowledge of everything through the knowledge of one thing (of which scripture speaks) cannot be explained through the analogy of milk mixed with water, because we understand from the parallel instance of a piece of clay being brought forward ( Kh. Up. VI, i, 4) that the knowledge of everything has to be ex¬ plained through the relation of the material cause and the material effect (the knowledge of the cause implying the knowledge of the effect). Moreover, the knowledge of every¬ thing, if assumed to be analogous to the case of the know¬ ledge of milk and water, could not be called a perfect knowledge (samyag-vi^ana), because the water which is 1 An optional proceeding, i.e. the doctrine that either ether or fire was the first product is impossible because only actions to be done, not existing things, fall within the sphere of option; addition, i.e. the fact of fire and ether together being the first creation is not admitted by scripture, which teaches a successive creation of the elements.
apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk (with which it is mixed) is not grasped by perfect knowledge h Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be viewed, like ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, un¬ truth, and deceit 1 2 *. And we should do violence to the emphatic assertion made in the passage ‘ one only, without a second,’ if we explained it according to the analogy of milk mixed with water.—Nor must we explain the cog¬ nition of everything (through one thing), and the assertion as to the one without a second, as referring only to a part of existing things, viz. the avowed effects of Brahman (to the exclusion of ether), on the ground that such is the case in the parallel instances of clay and the like. For what is said about clay and the like is not something altogether new and independent; but has to be understood in con¬ nexion with the previous passage ‘ vSVetaketu, as you are so conceited/ &c. We therefore must conclude that the ‘ knowledge of everything ’ has all things whatever for its objects, and is here introduced with a view to showing that everything is the effect of Brahman.