1 For we cannot maintain that optionally either the one or the other was created first.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 6.
I I other hand, one creator may successively create more than one thing, and as on that ground the combination of the two passages into one syntactical whole is possible, we are not obliged to disregard any scriptural statement on account of its meaning being contradicted (by other scrip¬ tural passages). Nor do we mean to say that a creator mentioned only once is to be connected with two created things; for the other (second) created thing is supplied from another scriptural passage. And, in the same way as the fact of the whole aggregate of things being produced from Brahman—which is stated directly in the passage ‘ Let a man meditate with calm mind on that as begin¬ ning, ending and breathing in it 5 ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1)— does not impugn the order of creation stated elsewhere to begin with fire; so also the statement as to fire being pro¬ duced from Brahman has no force to impugn the order of creation which, in another scriptural passage, is said to begin with ether.
But, it may be objected, the passage ‘ Let a man meditate with calm mind/ &c. has the purpose of enjoin¬ ing calmness, and does not state anything with regard to creation; it need not therefore adapt itself to the order (of creation) established by another passage 1. On the other hand, the passage c It sent forth fire 5 refers to the creation, and we must therefore accept the order exactly as stated there.—This objection we refute by the remark that it is not legitimate to abandon, from deference to the circumstance of fire occupying the first place (in the Kh. Up.), the thing, viz. the ether which is known (to have been created) from another passage; for order of succession is a mere attribute of things (and therefore subordinate to the latter). Moreover, in the passage c It sent forth fire ’ we meet with no word directly indicating the order of succession; but we merely infer the latter from the sense, and this (merely inferred) order is impugned by the order established by another direct scriptural state- 1 Yatpara^ jabda^ sa jabdartho na >£aya m jabda^ srfsh/iparo*to na prasiddhaw kramam badhitum alam iti. An. Gi.
12 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
ment, viz. ‘ From air there sprang fire/ Now with regard to the question whether ether or fire were created first, neither option nor addition are permissible, because the former is impossible in itself, and the latter non-admitted by the texts \ Hence the two scriptural passages are not contradictory.—Moreover, in order to justify the promise made in the ATMndogya in the beginning of the chapter (‘ That instruction by which we hear what is not heard ’), we have to count the ether, although ‘ not heard 5 (i. e. not mentioned in the text) among the things produced; how much more impossible then is it for us not to accept the statement actually made about the ether in the Taitti- riyaka!—To the assertion, made above by the purvapak- shin, that the ether as occupying the same space with everything is known together with Brahman and its effects, and that thus the assertion (of everything being known through Brahman) is not contradicted; and that moreover the scriptural passage ‘ one only, without a second ’ is not contradicted, because Brahman and the ether may be con¬ sidered as non-separate, like milk and water, we make the following reply. That knowledge of everything through the knowledge of one thing (of which scripture speaks) cannot be explained through the analogy of milk mixed with water, because we understand from the parallel instance of a piece of clay being brought forward ( Kh. Up.
VI, i, 4) that the knowledge of everything has to be ex¬ plained through the relation of the material cause and the material effect (the knowledge of the cause implying the knowledge of the effect). Moreover, the knowledge of every¬ thing, if assumed to be analogous to the case of the know¬ ledge of milk and water, could not be called a perfect knowledge (samyag-vi^ana), because the water which is 1 An optional proceeding, i.e. the doctrine that either ether or fire was the first product is impossible because only actions to be done, not existing things, fall within the sphere of option; addition, i.e. the fact of fire and ether together being the first creation is not admitted by scripture, which teaches a successive creation of the elements.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7.
13 apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk (with which it is mixed) is not grasped by perfect knowledge h Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be viewed, like ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, un¬ truth, and deceit 1 2 *. And we should do violence to the emphatic assertion made in the passage ‘ one only, without a second,’ if we explained it according to the analogy of milk mixed with water.—Nor must we explain the cog¬ nition of everything (through one thing), and the assertion as to the one without a second, as referring only to a part of existing things, viz. the avowed effects of Brahman (to the exclusion of ether), on the ground that such is the case in the parallel instances of clay and the like. For what is said about clay and the like is not something altogether new and independent; but has to be understood in con¬ nexion with the previous passage ‘ vSVetaketu, as you are so conceited/ &c. We therefore must conclude that the ‘ knowledge of everything ’ has all things whatever for its objects, and is here introduced with a view to showing that everything is the effect of Brahman.
The next Sutra replies to the assertion, made by the purvapakshin, that the passage which speaks of the origin of ether is to be understood in a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of ether having an origin).
7. But wherever there are effects, there is division; as in ordinary life.
The conjunction 4 but ’ is meant to exclude the suspicion of impossibility.—We must not imagine the origin of ether to be impossible, because wherever we observe effects (modifications of a substance), such as jars, pots and urns, or bracelets, armlets and earrings, or needles, arrows and swords, we also observe division; while, on the other hand, 1 For the water, although mixed with the milk, yet is different from it.
2 But the promise that through the knowledge of one thing every¬ thing becomes known is to be taken in its full literal meaning.
vedanta-s6tras.
H nothing which is not an effect is seen to be divided \ Now, we apprehend ether as divided from earth and so on; hence ether also must be an effect. Thereby (i. e. by the circum¬ stance of their being divided) place (dL), time, mind (manas) and the atoms also are shown to be effects.
But—an objection may be raised—the Self also is divided from ether and so on, and hence it follows that it is an effect like jars and the like.—This objection we refute by pointing to the scriptural statement that ‘ ether sprang from the Self’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1). For if the Self also were a mere modification (of something else), it would follow that all effects such as the ether and so on are without a Self 1 2; for scripture mentions nothing beyond the Self, and that Self itself would (on the supposition stated) be a mere effect. And thus we should be driven to the hypothesis of a general void (i-unyavada). Just because it is the Self, it is impos¬ sible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. For the (knowledge of the) Self is not, in any person’s case, adventitious, not established through the so- called means of right knowledge; it rather is self-established. The Self does indeed employ perception and the other means of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously non-established objects of knowledge; for nobody assumes such things as ether and so on to be self-established inde¬ pendently of the means of right knowledge. But the Self, as being the abode of the energy that acts through the means of right knowledge, is itself established previously to that energy. And to refute such a self-established entity is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be re¬ futed, but not that which is the essential nature (of him who attempts the refutation); for it is the essential nature of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted (i. e. sublated) by the fire itself.—Let us further consider the relation expressed in the following clauses: 4 1 know at the present moment whatever is present; I knew (at former moments) the nearer and the remoter past; I shall know 1 Whatever is divided, is an effect, as jars, pots, &c. Whatever is not an effect, is not divided, as the Self.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7.
15 (in the future) the nearer and the remoter future/ Here the object of knowledge changes according as it is some¬ thing past or something future or something present; but the knowing agent does not change, since his nature is eternal presence. And as the nature of the Self is eternal presence, it cannot undergo destruction even when the body is reduced to ashes; nay we cannot even conceive that it ever should become something different from what it is.—It thus follows from the essential irrefutability of its nature that the Self is not an effect. The ether, on the other hand, falls under the category of effected things.
To the objection, raised above by the purvapakshin, that there is no plurality of homogeneous substances out of which the ether could originate, we reply that it is not an absolute law that effects should originate only from things belonging to the same genus, not from such as belong to different genera. Threads for instance and the conjunc¬ tions of threads 1 do not belong to the same genus, the former being admitted to belong to the genus ‘substance/ the latter to the genus £ quality. 5 Nor again is there a binding rule that the operative causes such as the shuttle, the loom and so on should belong to the same genus.— Well then let the doctrine that the causes must belong to the same genus extend to the inherent causes only, not to the other causes 2.—But here also there is no absolute rule. For we see that one and the same rope is made of things belonging to different genera, such as threads and cow- hair, and several kinds of cloth are woven of vegetable thread and wool.—If it were assumed that the postulate of the inherent causes belonging to the same genus refers only to the genera of essentiality, substantiality, &c., the rule would be a superfluous one; for in that sense every inherent cause belongs to the same genus as every other 3 *.
1 Threads are the inherent cause of a piece of cloth; the con¬ junction of the threads constitutes the non-inherent cause; the loom, shuttle, &c. are the operative causes.
2 So much only was in fact insisted upon by the pflrvapakshin, n, 3> 3- 8 An inherent cause is always a substance (dravya), and as such i6 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
—Nor again is there an absolute rule that only a plurality of inherent causes, not one such cause, is able to originate an effect. For it is admitted that an atom as well as the mind (manas) originate their first activity; i. e. one atom by itself, and also the mind by itself, give rise to their primary actions, without being in conjunction with other substances.—And, should it be said that there is an absolute rule as to several causes only having originating power in the case of the origination of substances only (not in the case of the origination of actions, &c.), we again deny that, because it is admitted that there is such a thing as change (transformation). An absolute rule, such as maintained by you, would exist if substances did originate other sub¬ stances, only when assisted by conjunction (a non-inherent cause). But, as a matter of fact, one and the same sub¬ stance, when passing over into a different state distin¬ guished by peculiar characteristic marks, is admitted to be an effect. In some cases more substances than one undergo the change, as when a young plant springs from seed and earth; in other cases one substance only changes, as when milk turns into curds.—In short it is none of the Lord’s laws that only several causes in conjunction should produce an effect. We therefore decide, on the authority of scrip¬ ture, that the entire world has sprung from the one Brah¬ man, ether being produced first and later on the other elements in due succession. A statement to that effect has already been made above (II, i, 24).
The further assertion made by the purvapakshin, that on the assumption of ether having had an origin it is impos¬ sible to conceive a difference between the former and later periods (the time before and after the origination of ether) is likewise unfounded; for we have to understand that that very specialising difference 3, from which we ascertain at present that there is a thing such as ether, different from earth and the other elements, did not exist before the always falls under the notion of essentiality (satta), which constitutes the summum genus for substances, qualities, and actions.
1 Viz. the quality of sound.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 7.
17 origination of ether. And just as Brahman’s nature does not participate in the nature of earth and the other ele¬ ments characterised by grossness and similar qualities,— according to such scriptural passages as ‘ It is not gross, it is not subtle,’—so also it does not participate in the nature of ether, as we understand from the passage ‘ it is without ether’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8). It therefore remains a settled conclusion that, before ether was produced, Brahman existed without ether.
The inference, drawn by the pftrvapakshin, that ether has no beginning, because it differs in nature from those substances which avowedly have a beginning, such as earth and so on, is without any value; for, as it is contradicted by scripture, it must be considered fallacious. We, on our part, have brought forward arguments showing that ether is an originated thing; and we may moreover reason as follows: Ether is non-eternal, because it is the substratum of a non-eternal quality, viz. sound, just as jars and other things, which are the substrata of non-eternal qualities, are themselves non-eternal.—Nor is there any danger of this latter reasoning being extended to the Self also, for the philosopher who takes his stand on the Upanishads does not admit that the Self is the substratum of non-eternal qualities. Moreover, those who teach ether to have an origin do not consider it proved that it is all-pervading and so on.
In reply to the remarks made under II, 3, 4 we point out that those scriptural passages which speak of the ‘immortality of ether’ are to be understood in the same way as the analogous statements about the immortality of the gods \ since the origin and destruction of the ether have been shown to be possible. And if it is said of Brahman that c it is omnipresent and eternal like ether,’ Brahman is there compared to ether, whose greatness is well known, merely in order to indicate its supereminent greatness, not in order to maintain its being equal to ether. Similarly, when we say that the sun moves with the speed of an 1 I.e. as referring to a relative immortality only.
arrow, we merely mean that he moves fast, not that he moves at the same rate as an arrow. This remark explains that scriptural passage also in which Brahman is declared to be infinite like ether.—On the other hand, such passages as 4 It is greater than ether 5 prove that the extent of ether is less than that of Brahman; passages like 4 there is no image of him ’ (Sve. Up. IV, 19) show that there is nothing to compare Brahman to; and passages like 4 Everything else is of evil’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 4, 2) show that everything different from Brahman such as ether, &c. is of evil.—All which serves to refute the assertion that the passage which declares ether to have originated has to be taken in a secondary sense, as the word Brahman actually has to be taken in some passages. Scripture and reasoning in com¬ bination rather show that ether has an origin, and the final conclusion therefore is that ether is an effect of Brahman.
8. Hereby air (also) is explained.
The present Sutra extends the reasoning concerning ether to the air of which the ether is the abode.—The different views about air also are to be arranged in an analogous manner. The purvapakshin maintains that the air is not a product, because it is not mentioned in that chapter of the A 7 /andogya which treats of the origination of things.— The opposite opinion is, that the air is mentioned in the parallel chapter of the Taittiriyaka ( 4 from the ether sprang the air ’).—The two scriptural passages being of a conflict¬ ing nature, the purvapakshin maintains that the passage which declares the air to have originated must be taken in a secondary sense; firstly on account of the impossibility (of the literal sense being adopted), as shown (in the adhi- kara;za treating of the ether); secondly on account of that passage which denies that it ever sets, 4 Vctyu (the air) is the deity that never sets’ (B ru Up. I, 5, 22); and thirdly on account of those passages which declare it to be immortal. The final opinion on the other hand is, that air is a pro¬ duct; in the first place because this conclusion is conform¬ able to the general tendency of scripture; and, in the second place, because it is generally admitted that whatever II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 9.
19 is divided is an effect.—The denial of its ever setting refers to the lower knowledge (apara vidya J ) and is merely a relative one, Vayu not setting in the same way as fire, &c. The statement as to the immortality, &c. of air has already received its reply (in the adhikara^a treating of the ether).—Here it may be asked why, ether and air being equally mentioned and not mentioned in the chapters treating of the origin of the world, one adhikara;/a is not considered to suffice for both, and why instead of that there is made a formal extension of the former reasoning to the latter case, although there is no difference between the two cases.—To this w r e reply that there is indeed some reason for the question; that, however, the formal extension is made for the purpose of removing any doubts which might possibly be engendered in the minds of slow-witted people by mere words 1 2. For as, in the S a varga vidya and other passages, the glory of Vayu is referred to as an object of worship; and as scripture says that he never sets, &c., some men might think that he is eternal.
9. But there is no origin of that which is (i.e. of Brahman), on account of the impossibility (of such an origin).
Somebody, who has learned from scripture that ether and air, although not in themselves likely to have originated, yet actually are things with a beginning, might feel inclined to suspect that Brahman itself has sprung from something else.—And further somebody, who has learned from scripture that from ether and the other elements which are themselves mere effects further effects are produced, might think that also Brahman, from which ether has sprung, is a mere effect. —In order to remove this doubt the Sutra declares that Brah¬ man, whose Self is Being, must not be suspected to have sprung from anything else ‘ on account of the impossibility/ Brahman which is mere Being cannot spring from mere 1 In which Brahman is spoken of as to be meditated upon under the form of Vayu.
2 -Sabdanurodhiny eva janka na vastvanurodhiniti. An. Gi.
20 vedanta-sOtras.
being, since the relation of cause and effect cannot exist without a certain superiority (on the part of the cause). Nor again can Brahman spring from that which is some¬ thing particular, since this would be contrary to experience. For we observe that particular forms of existence are pro¬ duced from what is general, as, for instance, jars and pots from clay, but not that what is general is produced from particulars. Nor again can Brahman spring from that which is not (asat), for that which is not is without a Self 1, and moreover scripture expressly rejects that view, in the pas¬ sage f How could that which is spring from that which is not?’ (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 2). Another passage, moreover, expressly denies that Brahman has any progenitor, £ He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither progenitor nor lord’ (SVe. Up. VI, 9).—With regard to ether and air the possibility of an origin has been shown; but in Brahmans case there is no such possibility; hence the cases are not parallel. Nor does the fact of other effects springing from effects imply that Brahman also must be an effect; for the non-admission of a fundamental causal substance would drive us to a retrogressus in infinitum. And that fundamental causal substance which as a matter of fact is generally acknowledged to exist, just that is our Brahman.—Thus there is not any contradiction.
10. Fire (is produced) thence (i.e. from air); for thus (the text) declares.
In the TTMndogya it is said that fire has for its source that which is (Brahman), in the Taittiriyaka that it has the air for its source. There being thus a conflict of scriptural passages with regard to the origin of fire, the pur- vapakshin maintains that fire has Brahman for its source. —Why?—Because the text, after having stated at the outset that there existed only that which is, teaches that it sent forth fire; and because the assertion of everything being known through Brahman is possible only in case of every- 1 And cannot therefore constitute a cause; for a cause is the Self of its effects.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, IO.
21 thing being produced from Brahman; and because the scriptural statement as to the ‘ Tag^alan ’ ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, x) specifies no difference 1; and because another scrip¬ tural passage (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) teaches that everything without exception is born from Brahman. The Taittiriyaka also makes a statement about the entire world without any exception, ‘after having brooded he sent forth all whatever there is’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6). Hence the statement that ‘fire was produced from air 5 (Taitt. Up. II, 1) must be considered to teach the order of succession only ‘ fire was produced subsequently to air/ To this the Sutra replies that fire was produced thence, i. e. from air, because the text declares it to be so—‘ from air sprang fire/ For if fire had sprung directly from Brah¬ man and not from air, the scriptural statement that ‘ fire sprang from air ’ would be contradicted thereby. That that statement should intimate the order of succession merely, as maintained by the purvapakshin, we cannot admit. For as in the preceding sentence (‘from that Self sprang ether ’) the fifth case (atmana^) denotes the Self as that from which the origination proceeds, and as the same verb ( c sprang ’) governs our sentence also, and as in the following sentences also—such as ‘ from earth the herbs ’—the fifth case (pnthivya/z) denotes that from which something pro¬ ceeds, we understand that in our sentence also the fifth case (vayo^) denotes that from which fire proceeds. Moreover, if we should explain our sentence to mean ‘ after air fire was produced,’ we should have to supply some preposition (or adverb as ‘after,’ ‘subsequently’), while that construction which rests on the proper sense of the fifth case-affix is ready made at hand and does not require anything to be supplied. The passage therefore intimates that fire springs from air.—But, it may be said, the other scriptural passage (‘it sent forth fire’) intimates that fire springs from Brahman. —Not so, we reply; for this latter passage remains uncon¬ tradicted, even if we assume that fire sprang from Brahman only through intermediate links (not directly).
1 But implies the whole world to have sprung from Brahman.
22 vedanta-sOtras.
Even the supposition that Brahman, after having created ether and air, assumed the form of air and thus created fire would not be opposed to fire having sprung from Brahman; for we may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that curds come from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow. There is, moreover, a scriptural passage declaring that Brah¬ man abides as the Self of its effects, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 7, 4 That made itself its Self.’ And analogously Smrzti—in the passage beginning £ Cognition, knowledge, steadiness of mind’ (Bha. Gi. X, 4) — says about the Lord, ‘From me only spring the manifold states of the beings.’ For although cognition and so on are observed to spring directly from their immediate causes, yet (the assertion made in the passage quoted holds good), since the entire aggregate of beings is, directly or indirectly, derived from the Lord.—Thereby those scriptural passages are accounted for which speak of the creation (on the whole) without specifying the order of succession 1; for they may be ex¬ plained anyhow, while on the other hand the passages specifying the order of creation cannot be turned in any other way (i.e. not away from their direct sense). The general assertion, moreover, of everything springing from Brahman requires only that all things should ultimately proceed from that which is, not that they should be its immediate effects.—Thus there remains no difficulty.
11. Water (is produced from fire).
We have to supply from the preceding Sutra the words ‘ thence ’ and ‘ for thus the text declares.’—Water is pro¬ duced from fire; for the text says, ‘ it sent forth water ’ (Kk. Up. VI, 2, 3), and c from fire (sprang) water’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1). These explicit statements allow no room for doubt 2. The Sutrakara, however, having explained the creation of fire, and being about to explain the creation of 1 I.e. it appears from the preceding discussion that those passages have to be explained in such a way as to agree with those other passages which state the order of the created beings.
2 So that the Sfitra might possibly be looked upon as not called for.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 12.
23 earth, propounds this Sutra in order to insert water (and thus to point out its position in the srzsh/ikrama).
12. The earth (is meant by the word 'anna'), on account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other passages.
We read, 4 Water thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth food (anna) ’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 2, 4).— Here a doubt arises, whether the word ‘ anna 5 denotes things fit to be used as food, such as rice, barley and the like; or cooked food; or else the earth.
The purvapakshin maintains that the word is to be understood in the former sense; for, he says, the word ‘ anna ’ means ‘ food ’ in ordinary language, and is moreover confirmed in that sense by the complementary passage, ‘ Therefore whenever it rains anywhere, most food is then produced; 5 for when it rains, rice, barley and the like, but not earth, are produced in abundance.
To this we reply that by the word ‘ anna 5 we have to understand earth as being produced from water.—Why?— On account of the subject-matter, on account of the colour, and on account of other passages.—The subject-matter, in the first place, is clearly connected with the elements, as we see from the preceding passages, ‘ it sent forth fire, it sent forth water.’ It would therefore be improper to pass over a further element, viz. earth, when its turn has come, and to assume without reason that rice and the like are meant by the word 4 anna. 5 —In the second place, we find that in a complementary passage there is mentioned a colour which agrees with earth, 4 the black colour (of fire) is the colour of anna. 5 Eatable things on the other hand, such as cooked dishes, and rice, barley and the like, are not necessarily black.—But earth too is not necessarily black; for the soil of some fields has a whitish colour like milk, and that of others looks red like glowing coals!—True, but that does not affect our argument, since what we have to look to is the predominant colour. Now the predominant colour of earth is black, not either white or red. The Pauramkas also designate the colour of the earth by the term ‘ night 5 24 VEDANTA-stlTRAS.