(jarvarf); now the night is black, and we therefore conclude that black is the colour of earth also.—In the third place other scriptural passages also, which refer to the same subject, declare that 4 from water (sprang) earth ’ (Taitt. Up. II, i), and that 4 what was there as the froth of the water, that was hardened and became the earth ’ (B ri. Up. I, 2, 2)4 On the other hand the text declares that rice and the like were produced from the earth, ‘ From earth sprang herbs, from herbs food ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1).—As, thus, the general subject-matter as well as other arguments clearly proves that the word 4 anna ’ here denotes earth, we can in no way accept the view that rice and the like are referred to. The common use of language to which the purvapakshin appeals is of no avail against the arguments favouring our interpre¬ tation. The complementary passage also ( 4 whenever it rains,’ &c.) is to be viewed as pointing out that, owing to the earthy nature of food (rice, &c.), earth itself mediately springs from water.—For all these reasons the word 4 anna 5 denotes this earth.
13. But on account of the indicatory mark supplied by their reflecting (i.e. by the reflection^ attributed to the elements), he (i.e. the Lord is the creative principle abiding within the elements).
A doubt here arises whether ether and the other elements do themselves send forth their effects, or if the highest Lord abiding within certain Selfs produces, after reflection, certain effects.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the elements them¬ selves send forth, because the texts speak of them as acting independently; compare, for instance, 'from ether sprang air, from air fire,’ &c. The objection that non-intelligent beings cannot enter on independent activity is invalidated by the fact that the elements also are spoken of in the sacred texts as endowed with intelligence, cf. for instance, 4 fire thought/ 4 water thought ’ (Kk. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4).
To this we reply that the highest Lord himself abiding within certain Selfs sends forth, after reflection, certain effects.—Why?—On account of the indicatory marks. For II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4.
25 texts such as * he who dwells in the earth, and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is and who rules the earth within 5 show that the elements enter on their activity only if presided over by an intelligent principle. Texts such as ‘ He became sat and tyat ’ (which occurs in the passage, ‘ he wished may I be many, may I grow forth/ Taitt. Up. II, 6) and ‘ It made itself its Self’ (i. e. the Self of everything which exists; II, 7) show that he (the highest Lord) is the Self of everything. The thinking and hearing which the texts attribute to water and fire must be viewed as due to the fact of the highest Lord having entered them; for the passage, ‘ there is no other seer but he/ denies there being any other seer (thinker), and that which is (i.e. Brahman), in the character of seer (or thinker), constitutes the subject-matter of the whole chapter; as we conclude from the introductory passage, f It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth ’ (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3).
14. The order (in which the elements are retracted into Brahman) is the reverse of that (i.e. the order in which they are created); this is proved (by its agreement with observation).
Having considered the order of the creation of the elements we now proceed to consider the order of their retractation.—The question here is whether their retracta¬ tion takes place in an indefinite order, or in the order of the creation, or in the inverse order. That the origin, the subsistence and the retractation of the elements all depend on Brahman, scripture declares ‘ That from whence these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death/ The purvapakshin maintains that the retractation of the elements is not bound to any definite order, because scrip¬ ture contains no specific information on the point. Or else, he says, let him who wishes to know the order of the re¬ tractation accept the order of creation, since the latter is expressly mentioned in the texts.
To this we reply that the order of retractation must be viewed as the reverse of the order of creation. For we see 26 VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
in ordinary life that a man who has ascended a stair has, in descending, to take the steps in the reverse order. More¬ over we observe that things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, &c., on being destroyed pass back into clay, and that things which have originated from water, such as snow and hailstones, again dissolve into water. Hence we rightly assume that earth which has (according to scripture) sprung from water passes back into water when the period of its subsistence comes to an end, and that water which has sprung from fire passes back into fire. In this way each particular effect passes back into its immediately antece¬ dent cause—each cause being of a subtler nature than its effect—until in the end the last cause is refunded into Brahman, the ultimate and most subtle of all causes. It certainly would be irrational to assume that an effect, pass¬ ing over its immediate cause, should at once refund itself into the cause of the cause. Smrz'ti also declares that the order of retractation is the order of origination inverted, ‘ The earth, the basis of the world, is dissolved into water, O divine Ri: shi, the water into fire, the fire into air/ The order of creation is indeed stated in the sacred texts, but that statement refers to creation only, and can therefore not be extended to retractation. We, moreover, cannot even desire to apply the order in which the elements are created to their retractation also since it is clearly unsuit¬ able in the latter case. For, as long as an effect subsists, it is impossible to assume the dissolution of the cause, since on the dissolution of the latter the effect also cannot exist. On the other hand, we may assume a continued existence of the cause although the effect be destroyed; for that is actually observed in the case of clay (and the things made of it).
15. If it be said that between (Brahman and the elements) the intellect and mind (are mentioned; and that therefore their origination and retractation are to be placed) somewhere in the series, on account of there being inferential signs (whereby the order of the creation of the elements is broken); we II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 5.
27 deny that, on account of the non-difference (of the organs and the elements).
In what precedes we have said that the creation and the retractation of the elements take place in direct and reverse order; further that the creation proceeds from the Self, and that the retractation terminates in the Self.—Now *Sruti as well as Smrzti enlightens us concerning the exist¬ ence of the mind (manas) together with the senses, and of the intellect (buddhi); compare, for instance, the indicatory marks contained in the passage, Ka.Up. 1,3, 3.4, ‘ Know the intellect to be the charioteer and the mind the reins; the senses they call the horses/ &c. And as the whole aggre¬ gate of beings avowedly springs from Brahman, we must assume that the mind, the intellect and the senses also originate from it and are again merged in it in due order, occupying a definite place among the things created and retracted. Moreover the Atharvazza (Muzz^aka), in the chapter treating of the creation, mentions the organs between the Self and the elements, ‘ From him is born breath, mind and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water and the earth the support of all ’ (II, 1, 3). And from this there results a break in the previously stated order of the creation and the retractation of the elements.
This we deny, on account of the non-difference (of the organs from the elements). If the organs themselves are of the nature of the elements, their origination and retracta¬ tion are the same as those of the elements, and we therefore have not to look out in their case for a different order. And that the organs are of the nature of the elements, for that we have inferential marks, in passages such as the following, 4 for mind, my child, consists of earth, breath of water, speech of fire 5 ( Kh. Up. VI, 6, 5). That the organs (although in reality belonging to the elements) are some¬ times mentioned separately from them, is to be understood in the same way as when the Parivra^akas (mendicant Brahmazzas) are spoken of separately from the Br&hmazzas. And supposing even that the organs are not of the nature of the elements, still the order of the origin of the elements 28 VEDANTA-Stj'TRAS.
would not be interfered with by the organs; for we might assume either that the organs are produced first and the elements last; or else that the elements are produced first and the organs last. In the Atharva^a-upanishad quoted above we have merely a serial enumeration of the organs and the elements, not a statement as to the order of their origination. Similarly in other places also the series of the organs is recorded apart from the series of the elements; so, for instance, in the following passage, £ Pra^apati indeed was all this in the beginning, he reflected on himself; he sent forth mind; there was mind only; mind reflected on itself; it sent forth speech,’ &c.—Hence the origination of the organs does not cause a break in the order of the origination of the elements.
16. But the designation (as being born and dying) abides in the (bodies of beings) moving and non¬ moving; it is secondary (metaphorical) if applied to the soul, as the existence (of those terms) depends on the existence of that (i.e. the body).
On account of certain popular modes of expression such as £ Devadatta is born,’ £ Devadatta has died,’ and the like, and on account of certain ceremonies such as the Gataka- karman, some people might fall into the error of thinking that the individual soul has a beginning, and in the end undergoes destruction. This error we are going to dispel. —The individual soul has no beginning and is not subject to dissolution, since thus only it can be connected with the results of actions, as the 6astra teaches. If the individual soul perished after the body, there would be no sense in the religious injunctions and prohibitions referring to the enjoyment and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant things in another body (another birth). And scripture says, £ This body indeed dies when the living soul has left it, the living soul does not die’ (Kh. Up. VI, n, 3).—But it has been pointed out above that ordinary language speaks of the birth and the death of the individual soul!—True; but the terms £ birth ’ and £ death,’ if applied to the soul, have to II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7.
29 be taken in a secondary sense.—What then is that thing to which those words apply in their primary sense, and with reference to which we can speak of a secondary sense?— They apply, we answer, to whatever moves and whatever does not move. The words ‘ birth ’ and ‘ death ’ have refer¬ ence to the bodies of moving and non-moving beings; for such beings are born (produced) and die. To them the terms ‘birth' and ‘death' apply in their primary sense; while they are used metaphorically only with reference to the soul dwelling in them. For their existence (i. e. their being used) depends on the existence of the body; i. e. the words ‘ birth ’ and ‘ death ’ are used where there take place the manifestation and disappearance of bodies, not where they are absent. For nobody ever observes a soul being born or dying, apart from its connexion with a body. That the words ‘ birth ’ and ‘ death ’ have reference to the conjunction with—and separation from—a body merely, is also shown by the following passage: ‘ On being born that person assuming his body, &c.; when he passes out (of the body) and dies,’ &c. (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 8). The ^ata-ceremony also is to be viewed as having reference to the manifestation of the body only; for the soul is not manifested.—Whether the individual soul is produced from the highest Self like ether, &c. or not, will be discussed in the next Sutra; the present Sutra merely states that the gross origination and dissolution which belong to the body do not affect the soul.
17. The (living) Self is not (produced) as there is no scriptural statement, and as it is eternal according to them (i. e. scriptural passages).
There is a Self called the living one (the individual soul), which rules the body and the senses, and is connected with the fruits of actions. With regard to that Self the con¬ flict of scriptural passages suggests the doubt, whether it is produced from Brahman like ether and the other elements, or if, like Brahman itself, it is unproduced. Some scrip¬ tural passages, by comparing it to sparks proceeding from a fire and so on, intimate that the living soul is produced 30 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
from Brahman; from others again we learn that the highest Brahman, without undergoing any modification, passes, by entering into its effects (the elements), into the condition of the individual soul. These latter passages do not thus record an origination of the individual soul.
The purvapakshin maintains that the individual soul is produced, because on that view the general promissory statement is not contradicted. For the general assertion that 4 by one thing being known all this is known ’ is not contradicted, only if the entire aggregate of things springs from Brahman; while it would be contradicted by the assumption of the individual soul being a thing of a dif¬ ferent kind. Nor can the individual soul be conceived as mere unmodified highest Self, on account of the difference of their respective characteristics. For the highest Self is characterised by freedom from sin and so on, while the individual soul possesses the opposite attributes. That it is an effect, follows moreover from its being divided. For ether and all other things, in so far as divided, are effects, and we have concluded therefrom that they have an origin. Hence the soul also, which is distributed through all the bodies, doing good and evil and experiencing pleasure and pain, must be considered to originate at the time when the entire world is produced. We have moreover the fol¬ lowing scriptural passage, ‘As small sparks come forth from fire, thus from that Self all vital airs/ &c. (B ri. Up. II, i, 20). This text teaches first the creation of the aggregate of objects of fruition, beginning with the vital airs, and then (in the words, ‘all the Selfs’) separately teaches the creation of all the enjoying souls. Again we have the passage, ‘As from a blazing fire sparks, being of the same nature as fire, fly forth a thousandfold, thus are various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, my friend, and return hither also ’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 1); a passage descriptive of the origin and the retractation of the souls, as we infer from the statement about the sameness of nature 1.
1 That the word bhava h ‘ beings' here means ‘ individual souls/ we conclude from their being said to have the same nature as the Imperishable.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7.
31 For the individual souls are of the same nature as Brahman, because they are endowed with intelligence. Nor can the fact that in some places (as, for instance, in the accounts of the creation of the elements) the creation of the soul is not mentioned, invalidate what is stated about it in other places; it being a general principle of interpretation that whatever new, and at the same time non-contradictory, matter is taught in some scriptural passage has to be com¬ bined with the teaching of all other passages. Hence that passage also which speaks of the Self entering (into its effects and thus becoming ^iva) must be explained as stating the Self’s passing over into an effect (viz. the soul), analogously to such passages as ‘that made itself its Self,’ &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 7).—From all which it follows that the individual soul is a product.
To all this we reply, that the individual soul is not a product.—Why?—On account of the absence of scriptural statement. For in the chapters which treat of the creation, the production of the soul is, in most cases, not mentioned. —But, it was admitted above that the circumstance of some¬ thing not being stated in some places does not invalidate the statements made about it elsewhere.—True, that was admitted; but we now declare that the production of the soul is not possible.—Why?—‘ On account of the eternity, &c., resulting from them’ (i. e. the scriptural passages). The word ‘ &c.’ implies non-originatedness and similar attributes. For we know from scriptural passages that the soul is eternal, that it has no origin, that it is unchanging, that what constitutes the soul is the unmodified Brahman, and that the soul has its Self in Brahman. A being of such a nature cannot be a product. The scriptural passages to which we are alluding are the following:— ‘The living Self dies not’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 11, 3); ‘ This great unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 25); ‘ The knowing Self is not born, it dies not’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); ‘The Ancient is unborn, eternal, everlasting ’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); ‘ Having sent forth that he entered into it’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6); ‘Let me now enter those with this living Self and let me then 32 VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.
evolve names and forms ’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2); £ He entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails ’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 7); ‘ Thou art that ’ [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); £ I am Brahman ’ (B ri. Up.I,4,io); £ This Self is Brahman knowing all* (Bn.Up. II, 5,19).—All these texts declare the eternity of the soul, and thus militate against the view of its having been pro¬ duced.—But it has been argued above that the soul must be a modification because it is divided, and must have an origin because it is a modification!—It is not, we reply, in itself divided; for scripture declares that £ there is one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings’ (Sve. Up. VI, 11); it only appears divided owing to its limiting adjuncts, such as the mind and so on, just as the ether appears divided by its connexion with jars and the like. Scripture (viz. B ri. Up. IV, 4, 5, £ that Self is indeed Brahman, made up of knowledge, mind, life, sight, hearing,’ &c.) also declares that the one unmodified Brah¬ man is made up of a plurality of intellects (buddhi), &c. By Brahman being made up of mind and so on is meant, that its nature is coloured thereby, while the fact of its being entirely separate from it is non-apparent. Analogously we say that a mean, cowardly fellow is made up of womanishness.— The casual passages which speak of the soul’s production and dissolution must therefore be interpreted on the ground of the soul’s connexion with its limiting adjuncts; when the adjunct is produced or dissolved, the soul also is said to be produced or dissolved. Thus scripture also declares, £ Being altogether a mass of knowledge, having risen from out of these elements it again perishes after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge’ (B ru Up. IV, 5,13). What is meant there, is only the dissolution of the limiting adjuncts of the Self, not the dissolution of the Self itself 1. The text itself explains this, in reply to Maitreyfs ques- 1 Hence the phrase, £ there is no more knowledge,’—which seems to contradict the term £ a mass of knowledge,’—only means that, on the limiting adjuncts being dissolved, there is no longer any knowledge of distinctions.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8.
33 tion ( £ Here, Sir, thou hast landed me in utter bewilder¬ ment. Indeed I do not understand him, that when he has departed there is no more knowledge 5 ), in the words, £ I say- nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable and of an indestructible nature. But it enters into contact with the sense organs. 5 — Non-contradiction moreover of the general assertion (about everything being known through one) results only from the acknowledgment that Brahman is the individual soul. The difference of the attributes of both is also owing to the limiting adjuncts only. Moreover the words e Speak on for the sake of final deliverance 5 (uttered by Canaka with reference to the in¬ struction he receives from Ya^avalkya about the vi^ana- maya atman) implicitly deny that the Self consisting of knowledge (i.e. the individual soul) possesses any of the attributes of transitory existence, and thus show it to be one with the highest Self.—From all this it follows that the individual soul does not either originate or undergo destruction.
18. For this very reason (the individual soul is) intelligent.
Owing to the conflicting views of the philosophical schools there arises a doubt whether, as the followers of Ka//ada think, the soul is in itself non-intelligent, so that its intelligence is merely adventitious; or if, as the Sankhyas think, eternal intelligence constitutes its very nature.
The purvapakshin maintains that the intelligence of the Self is adventitious, and is produced by the conjunction of the Self with the mind (manas),just as, for instance, the quality of redness is produced in a jar by the conjunction of the jar with fire. For if the soul were of eternal (essential) intel¬ ligence, it would remain intelligent in the states of deep sleep, swoon, and possession, while as a matter of fact, men when waking from sleep and so on declare in reply to questions addressed to them that they were not conscious of anything. Men in their ordinary state, on the other hand, are seen to be (actively) intelligent. Hence, as intelli- 34 VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
gence is clearly intermittent, we conclude that the Self’s intelligence is adventitious only.
To this we reply that the soul is of eternal intelligence, for that very reason that it is not a product but nothing else but the unmodified highest Brahman which, owing to the contact with its limiting adjuncts, appears as individual soul. That intelligence constitutes the essential nature of the highest Brahman, we know from scriptural passages such as ‘Brahman is knowledge and bliss’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 28, 7); ‘Brahman is true, knowledge, infinite’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ‘Having neither inside nor outside, but being altogether a mass of knowledge’ (B ri. Up. IV, 5, 13). Now, if the individual soul is nothing but that highest Brahman, then eternal intelligence constitutes the soul’s essential nature also, just as light and heat constitute the nature of fire. In the chapter treating of that which con¬ sists of knowledge, there are, moreover, passages (directly declaring that the individual soul is of the nature of self- luminous intelligence), ‘ He not asleep himself looks down upon the sleeping (senses)’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 11); ‘That person is self-illuminated 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14); ‘For there is no intermission of the knowing of the knower’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 30). That the soul’s nature is intelligence, follows moreover from the passage (. Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 4) where it is represented as connected with knowledge through all sense-organs, ‘ He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self,’ &c. &c.—From the soul’s essential nature being intelligence it does not follow that the senses are useless; for they serve the purpose of determining the special object of each sense, such as smell and so on. This is expressly declared by scripture, ‘ Smell is for the purpose of per¬ ceiving odour’ (. Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 4).—The objection that sleeping persons are not conscious of anything is refuted by scripture, where we read concerning a man lying in deep sleep, ‘And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing though he does not see. For there is no inter¬ mission of the seeing of the seer, because it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from him that he could see’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 23). That means: II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9.
35 The absence of actual intelligising is due to the absence of objects, not to the absence of intelligence; just as the light pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature. —The reasoning of the VaLreshikas and others is, as contra¬ dicting scripture, merely fallacious, and we therefore decide that eternal intelligence is the essential nature of the soul.
19. (On account of the scriptural declarations) of (the souls) passing out, going and returning, (the soul is of atomic size).
We now have to consider of what size the soul is, whether of atomic size or of a medium size, or of great (infinite) size.—But, it has been shown above that the soul is not a product and that eternal intelligence constitutes its nature, whence it follows that it is identical with the highest Self. Now the infinity of the highest Self is clearly stated in scripture; what need then is there of a discussion of the soul’s size?—True, we reply; but certain scriptural passages which speak of the soul’s passing out, going and returning, establish the prima facie view that the soul is of limited size, and moreover in some places scripture expressly declares it to be of atomic size. The present discussion is therefore begun for the purpose of clearing up this doubtful point.
The purvapakshin maintains that, on account of its being said to pass out, go and return, the soul must be held to be of limited, atomic size. Its passing out is mentioned (Kau. Up. Ill, 3), ‘And when he passes out of this body he passes out together with all these; ’ its going (Kau. Up. I, 2), ‘All who depart from this world go to the moon; * its returning (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6), ‘ From that world he returns again to this world of action.’ From these statements as to the soul’s passing out, going and re¬ turning it follows that it is of limited size. For motion is impossible in the case of an all-pervading being. And a limited size being once admitted, we have to conclude more especially that the size is atomic, since the hypothesis D 2 36 VEDANTA-SfJTRAS.
of the soul being of the same size as the body has already been refuted in our examination of the Arhata-system.
20. And on account of the two latter (i.e. going and returning) being connected with their Self (i.e. the agent), (the soul is of atomic size).
We admit that ‘passing out’ might possibly be at¬ tributed to the soul even if it does not move, viz. if that expression be taken to mean the soul’s ceasing to be the ruler of the body, in consequence of the results of its former actions having become exhausted; just as some¬ body when ceasing to be the ruler of a village may be said to ‘go out.’ But the two latter activities, viz. going and returning, are not possible in the case of something which does not move; for they are both connected with the own Self (of the agent), going (and coming back) being activi¬ ties abiding in the agent 1. Now going and coming are possible for a being that is not of medium size, only if it is of atomic size. And as going and coming must be taken in their literal sense, we conclude that the passing out also means nothing but the soul’s actual moving out of the body. Tor the soul cannot go and return without first having moved out of the body. Moreover certain parts of the body are mentioned as the points from which the soul starts in passing out, viz. in the following passage, ‘ Either from the eye or from the skull or from other places of the body (the Self passes out) ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 2). Other passages mention that the embodied soul goes and comes within the body also; so, for instance, ‘ He taking with him those elements of light descends into the heart ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 1); ‘ Having assumed light he again goes to his place* (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 11).—Thereby the atomic size of the soul is established as well.
21. If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, on account of scriptural statements about what is not that (i.e. what is opposed to atomic size); we deny 1 Going is known to be an activity inherent in the agent, from the fact of its producing effects inherent in him, such as his con¬ junction with—or disjunction from—other things.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2 2.
37 that, on account of the other one (the highest Self) being the subject-matter (of those passages).
Nevertheless, it may be objected, the soul cannot be of atomic size, because there are scriptural statements of what is not that, i.e. because there are scriptural statements of its size being the opposite of atomic size. So that by accepting the alternative of atomic size we should place ourselves in opposition to scriptural passages such as the following, 4 He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by the Pranas, the ether within the heart ’ (B ru Up. IV, 4, 22); 4 Like the ether he is omni¬ present, eternal‘Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’ (Taitt. Up. II. 1).
This objection, the purvapakshin replies, is not valid ‘on account of the other one forming the subject of dis¬ cussion. 5 For those statements about a size different (from the atomic one) occur under the heading of the highest Self which on account of its pre-eminence constitutes the general object of knowledge in all Vedanta-texts; and moreover the passage, ‘ It is spotless, beyond the ether ’ (Bn. Up. IV, 4, 20), specially proves that the highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (in the passage quoted above from the Bri. Up.). Thus with regard to the other passages also.—But from the expressions, ‘consisting of knowledge, surrounded by the pranas,’ it appears that the embodied Self only (not the highest Self) is designated as connected with greatness.—That designation, the purva¬ pakshin replies, is founded on an intuition, vouched for by scripture, as in the case of Vamadeva 1.—As therefore the statements of a different size refer to the highest Self (pra^Tza), they do not militate against the view of the in¬ dividual soul being of atomic size.
22. And also on account of direct statement, and of inference.
The soul is of atomic size for that reason also that scripture contains a direct statement to that effect, ‘ By 1 Who ‘ paramarthadr/sh/ya ’ identifies himself with everything in the universe. (Afrg-veda Sa^hita IV, 26. 1 ff.).
38 vedanta-sCtras.