thought is to be known that atomic Self into which breath has entered fivefold 5 (Mu. Up. Ill, i, 9). That the Self spoken of there as atomic is the living Self, i.e. the individual soul, we see from its connexion with breath.— Inference also favours the conclusion that the soul is of atomic size; i.e. we infer that from such passages as ‘ That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times ’ (vSVe. Up. V, 9), and, c That lower one also is seen small even like the point of a goad.’—But, an objection may here be raised, if the soul is assumed to be of atomic size, and therefore to occupy one point of the body only, the fact of sensation extending over the whole body would appear contrary to reason. And yet it is a matter of experience that men bathing in the Ganges or in a pond experience the sen¬ sation of cold over their whole bodies, and again that in summer people feel hot all over the body.—To this ob¬ jection the following Sutra replies.
23. There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandal-ointment.
Just as a drop of sandal-ointment, although in actual contact with one spot of the body only, yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body; so the soul, although abiding in one point of the body only, may be the cause of a perception extending over the entire body. And as the soul is connected with the skin (which is the seat of feeling), the assumption that the soul’s sensations should extend over the whole body is by no means contrary to reason. For the connexion of the soul and the skin abides in the entire skin, and the skin extends over the whole body.
24. If it be said (that the two cases are not parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode (present in the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in the case of the soul); we deny that, on account of the acknowledgment (by scripture, of a special place of the soul), viz. within the heart.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 25.
39 Here it may be objected that the argumentation relied upon in the last Sutra is not admissible, because the two cases compared are not parallel. If it were a settled mfetter that the soul dwells in one point of the body, the drop of sandal-ointment might be adduced as a parallel instance. But, as a matter of fact, we know from per¬ ception that the drop of sandal-ointment is in contact with one spot of the body only, just as we know that it refreshes the whole body; while in the case of the soul observation tells us only that it is percipient all over the body, but not that it abides in one spot.—Should it be said that the latter point must be settled by inference, we reply that inference is here of no use, because it is not capable of removing the doubt whether the perception extending over the whole body belongs to a soul which extends over the whole body like the skin and the sense of touch inhering in it, or to a soul which is all-pervading like ether, or to a soul which, like a drop of ointment, is minute and abides in one spot only h This objection, the purvapakshin replies, is unfounded ‘on account of the acknowledgment of a speciality of abode,’ an abiding in one spot of the body being admitted in the case of the soul no less than in the case of a drop of ointment. For we read in the Vedanta-texts that the soul abides within the heart; cp. for instance, the information given (in Pr. Up. Ill, 6), ‘ The Self is in the heart( Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 3), ‘That Self abides in the heart(Bn. Up. IV, 3, 7), ‘ Who is that Self?—He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pranas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge.’—As therefore the two cases compared are not devoid of parallelism, the argumentation resorted to in Sutra 23 is unobjectionable.
25. Or on account of (its) quality (viz. intelligence), as in cases of ordinary experience.
1 We cannot reason as follows, ‘ The soul is atomic because it produces effects extending (over the whole body), like a drop of sandal-ointment; ’ for that reasoning would apply to the sense of touch (the skin) also, which we know not to be of atomic size.
40 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
That the soul although atomic produces effects extend¬ ing over the whole body, is not contrary to reason, on account of the pervadingness of intellect which is its quality. From ordinary experience we know that luminous things, such as lamps or gems, although occupying only one spot of a chamber, produce, by means of their light which fills the chamber, an effect in every part of the chamber.—This Sutra has the purpose of removing the doubts of those who might object that sandal-ointment, because consisting of parts, may perhaps refresh the entire body by the diffusion of imperceptible particles; that, however, the soul as a mere atom does not possess any parts by means of which it could diffuse itself through the whole body.—But how can a quality extend beyond that in which it inheres, and abide elsewhere? We certainly do not see that the whiteness which is the quality of a piece of cloth extends beyond that piece of cloth to other places. Nor must you say that the case of the soul is analogous to that of the light diffused from a lamp; for that light itself is admitted to be (not a quality but) a sub¬ stance. The flame of a lamp is substantial light with its particles crowded close to one another; the light diffused from that flame is substantial light whose particles are thin and scattered.—The reply to this objection is given in the next Sutra.
26. The extending beyond is as in the case of odour.
Just as odour, although a quality, extends beyond the odorous substance—as appears from the fact of our per¬ ceiving odour even without actually grasping flowers which are the seat of odour—so the quality of intelligence also may extend beyond the soul although the latter be atomic. It therefore is an undue stretch of inference to maintain that a quality, such as colour and the like, cannot separate itself from the substratum in which it inheres, because it is a quality; for we see that odour although a mere quality does separate itself from its substratum.—The ob¬ jection that odour also separates itself from its substance II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 27. 41 only with the substance (i. e. parts of the substance) we do not admit, because that would involve the dwindling away of the fundamental substance from which the separation of parts takes place. But that it does not so dwindle away, we conclude from its remaining in its former condition; otherwise it would lose the heaviness and other qualities belonging to it in its former state.—Well, but perhaps the separation of the particles in which odour resides is not noticed on account of their minuteness. Nevertheless the fact may be that minute odorous atoms spreading in all directions enter the cavity of the nose and there produce the sensation of smell.—This we cannot admit, because the atoms are suprasensible, and because in some cases, as, for instance, from the blossoms of the nagakei-ara-tree, a very strong odour is perceived \ According to the generally pre¬ vailing idea, moreover, it is not the odorous substance which is smelled, but ordinary people rather think that they smell the odour only.—The objection that, because we do not perceive colour and so on to extend beyond their sub¬ stratum, we have no right to assume that odour does so, we cannot admit, because there is no room for that conclusion 1 2, on account of the (actually existing) per¬ ception (of the smell apart from the odorous substance). Logicians must shape their inferences in such a way as to make them agree with ordinary observation, not in any other way. For, to quote another instance, the circum¬ stance that one of the qualities, viz. taste, is perceived by the tongue, certainly does not entitle us to draw the general inference that colour and the other qualities also are per¬ ceived by means of the tongue.
27. And thus (scripture also) declares.
Scripture also, after having signified the soul’s abiding in the heart and its atomic size, declares by means of such 1 Single atoms could not produce any sensations; trasarewus, i.e. combinations of three atoms even could not produce lively sensations.
2 Viz. that smell cannot exist apart from the odorous substance, because it is a quality like colour.
42 vedanta-sOtras.
passages as ‘Up to the hairs, up to the tips of the nails’ (Kau. Up. IV, 20; B ri. Up. I. 4, 7), that the soul pervades the entire body by means of intelligence which is its quality.
28. On account of the separate statement (of soul and intelligence).
From the passage ‘ Having by knowledge taken possession of the body ’ which represents the soul and intelligence as separate, viz. as respectively the agent and the instrument of action, we understand that the soul pervades the body only by means of intelligence, its quality. Again the pas¬ sage ‘ Then (the intelligent person) having through the intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence’ (B ri. Up. II, 1, 17) shows intelligence to be different from the agent, i. e. the embodied soul, and so likewise confirms our view.—The reply to all this is as follows.
29. But it is designated thus (i.e. as atomic), on account of its having for its essence the qualities of that (i.e. the buddhi); as in the case of the intelli¬ gent Self (i.e. Brahman).
The word ‘but ’ is meant to set aside the opinion main¬ tained hitherto.—The soul is not of atomic size, since scripture does not declare it to have had an origin. On the contrary, as scripture speaks of the highest Brahman entering into the elements and teaches that it is their Self, the soul is nothing else but the highest Brahman. And if the soul is the highest Brahman, it must be of the same extent as Brahman. Now scripture states Brahman to be all-pervading. Therefore the soul also is all-pervading.— On that view all the statements about the all-pervadingness of the soul made in Sruti and Smrzti are justified, so, for in¬ stance, the passage, ‘ He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by the pra/zas &c.’ (Brz.Up. IV, 4, 22). Nor again could the soul, if it were of atomic size, experience sensations extending over the whole body. If it be said that that is possible owing to the soul’s connexion II ADHYAYA, 3 PA DA, 29.
43 with the sense of touch (the skin), we deny that assertion. For from that it would follow that, when we tread on a thorn, the sensation extends over the whole body, since the connexion of the thorn and the skin abides in the entire skin, and the skin extends over the whole body. While as a matter of fact, when treading on a thorn we experience a sensation in the sole of the foot only.—Nor again is it possible that a quality of an atom should diffuse itself beyond the atom. For qualities occupy the same place with the substances of which they are qualities, and a quality not abiding in its substance would no longer be a quality. Concerning the light emitted from a lamp we have already shown that it is, not a quality, but rather a different kind of substance. Hence odour also, being avowedly a quality, can exist in so far only as it inheres in its substance; other¬ wise it would cease to be odour. Thus the reverend Dvai- payana also says, ‘ Having perceived odour in water some unthinking people ascribe it to the latter; but know that it is in the earth only, and (merely) passes over into air and water.’ If the intelligence of the soul pervades the whole body, the soul cannot be atomic; for intelligence consti¬ tutes the soul’s proper nature, just as heat and light con¬ stitute that of fire. A separation of the two as quality and that which is qualified does not exist. Now it has already been shown (II, 2, 34) that the soul is not of the same size as the body; the only remaining alternative therefore is that it is all-pervading (infinite). But why then, our opponent asks, is the soul designated (in some scriptural passages) as being of atomic size, &c.?—It is designated as such ‘ on account of being of the nature of the essence of that (i.e. the buddhi).’—The Self is here said to be of the nature of the essence of the mind’s (buddhi) qualities, because those qualities, such as desire, aversion, pleasure, pain and so on, constitute the essence, i.e. the principal characteristics of the Self as long as it is impli¬ cated in transmigratory existence. Apart from the quali¬ ties of the mind the mere Self does not exist in the saz/zsara state; for the latter, owing to which the Self appears as an agent and enjoyer, is altogether due to the circumstance of 44 VEDANTA-S(JTRAS.
the qualities of the buddhi and the other limiting adjuncts being wrongly superimposed upon the Self. That the non-transmigrating eternally free Self which neither acts nor enjoys is declared to be of the same size as the buddhi, is thus due only to its having the qualities of the buddhi for its essence (viz. as long as it is in fictitious connexion with the buddhi). Moreover we have the scriptural passage, 4 That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair, divided a hundred times, and yet it is to be infinite ’ ( 5 ve. Up. V, 9), which at first states the soul to be atomic and then teaches it to be infinite. Now this is appropriate only in the case of the atomicity of the soul being metaphorical while its infinity is real; for both statements cannot be taken in their primary sense at the same time. And the infinity certainly cannot be under¬ stood in a metaphorical sense, since all the Upanishads aim at showing that Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul. —The other passage also (Sve. Up. V, 8) which treats of the measure of the soul, ‘ The lower one, endowed with the quality of mind and the quality of body, is seen small even like the point of a goad,’ teaches the soul’s small size to depend on its connexion with the qualities of the buddhi, not upon its own Self. The following passage again, ‘ That small (a//u) Self is to be known by thought ’ (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 9), does not teach that the soul is of atomic size, since the subject of the chapter is Brahman in so far as not to be fathomed by the eye, &c., but to be apprehended by the serene light of knowledge, and since moreover the soul cannot be of atomic size in the primary sense of the word. Hence the statement about a;zutva (smallness, subtlety) has to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of knowing the soul, or else to its limiting adjuncts. Similarly such passages as ‘ Having by knowledge taken possession of the whole body ’ (Kau. Up. Ill, 6), which mention a difference (between the soul and knowledge), must be under¬ stood to mean that the soul takes possession of the whole body through the buddhi, its limiting adjunct; or else they must be considered as mere modes of expression, as when we speak of the body of a stone statue. For we have II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 30.
45 already shown that the distinction of quality and thing qualified does not exist in the case of the soul.—The state¬ ments as to the soul abiding in the heart are likewise to be explained on the ground of the buddhi abiding there.— That also the soul’s passing out and so on depend on the limiting adjuncts, is shown by the passage, ‘What is it by whose passing out I shall pass out, and by whose staying I shall stay? He sent forth prazza,’ &c. (Pr. Up. VI, 3, 4). For where there is no passing out, no going and returning are known; for what has not left the body cannot go and return l.—As thus the soul (as long as involved in the saz/zsara) has for its essence the qualities of its limiting adjuncts, it is spoken of as minute. The case is analogous to that of Brahman (pra^zza). Just as in those chapters whose topic is the meditation on the qualified Brahman, the highest Self is spoken of as possessing relative minuteness and so on, because it has the qualities of its limiting adjuncts for its essence (cp. t Smaller than a grain of rice or barley ‘ He who consists of mind, whose body is prazza,’ &c., Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2; 3); so it is also with the individual soul.— Very well, let us then assume that the transmigratory con¬ dition of the soul is due to the qualities of the buddhi form¬ ing its essence. From this, however, it will follow that, as the conjunction of buddhi and soul—which are different entities—must necessarily come to an end, the soul when disjoined from the buddhi will be altogether undefinable and thence non-existing or rather non-existing in the sazzzs&ra state 2.—To this objection the next Sutra replies.
30. The objection (raised above) is not valid, since (the connexion of the soul with the buddhi) exists as long as the soul; it being thus observed (in scripture).
We need not fear that the objection formulated above can be proved.—Why?—‘ On account of the existence of the connexion of the soul with the buddhi, as long as the 1 So that the distinction insisted on in Sutra 20 is not valid.
2 Katham asattvazzz svarupena sattvad ity asankhyaha sazzzsaritvazra veti. An. Gi.
46 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
soul exists.’ That means: as long as this Self is in the sawsara-state, as long as the sa^sara-state is not brought to an end by means of perfect knowledge, so long the con¬ nexion of the soul with the buddhi does not cease. And as long as its connexion with the buddhi, its limiting adjunct, lasts, so long the individual soul remains indi¬ vidual soul, implicated in transmigratory existence. In reality, however, there is no individual soul but in so far as it is fictitiously hypostatized by the buddhi, its limiting adjunct. For in attempting to determine the object of the Vedanta-texts we meet with no other intelligent substance but the one omniscient Lord whose nature is eternal free¬ dom. This appears from innumerable texts, such as the following:—‘ There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, there is no other knower but he’ (Bn. Up. Ill, 7, 23); ‘ There is nothing that sees, hears, perceives, knows but it ’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 8,11); ‘Thou art that’ (. Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); ‘I am Brahman’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10).—How again is it known that the soul is connected with the buddhi as long as it exists?—We reply: because that is seen (viz. in scripture). For scripture makes the following declaration: ‘ He who is within the heart, consisting of knowledge, sur¬ rounded by the pranas, the person of light, he remaining the same wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as if moving’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the term ‘consisting of knowledge ’ means ‘ consisting of buddhi,’ as we infer from another passage, viz. ‘ The Self consisting of know¬ ledge, mind, life, sight, hearing’ ( Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5), where knowledge is enumerated among mind and so on h By ‘ being made up of buddhi 5 is meant ‘ having for one’s essence the qualities of buddhi.’ Similarly a phrase like ‘ Devadatta is made up of womanishness,’ which may be made use of in ordinary language, means that in Devadatta feminine attributes such as softness of voice and the like prevail. Moreover, the passage, ‘ He remaining the same wanders along the two worlds,’ declares that the Self, even 1 And therefore has to be understood in the sense of buddhi.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 31.
47 when going to another world, is not separated from the buddhi, &c. For if we ask whereby it does remain the same, the answer, based on proximity *, is ‘ by means of the buddhi.’—Further, such modes of expression, ‘ as if thinking/ ‘ as if moving/ lead us to the same conclusion; for they mean that the Self does not think and move on its own account, but thinks as it were and moves as it were, because the buddhi to which it is joined really moves and thinks.—Moreover, the connexion of the Self with the buddhi, its limiting adjunct, depends on wrong knowledge, and wrong knowledge cannot cease except through perfect knowledge; hence as long as there does not rise the cog¬ nition of Brahman being the universal Self, so long the connexion of the soul with the buddhi and its other limit¬ ing adjuncts does not come to an end. Thus scripture also says, ‘ I know that great person of sunlike lustre beyond the darkness. A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go 5 (Sve. Up. Ill, 8).
But, an objection is raised, in the states of deep sleep and retractation (pralaya) no connexion of the Self with the buddhi can be acknowledged, since scripture declares that { then he becomes united with the True, he is gone to his own’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1), and as then all modifications have avowedly passed away. How then can it be said that the connexion with the buddhi exists as long as the Self?—To this objection the following Sutra replies.
31. On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that (connexion) which exists (potentially); like virile power.
As in ordinary life virile power and so on, existing potentially only in young children, and being then looked upon as non-existing, become manifest at the time of puberty—and do not originate at that time from previous non-existence, because in that case they might originate in eunuchs also—; so the connexion of the soul with the 1 I.e. on the proximity of terms clearly indicating the buddhi, viz. vi£-«ana-maya^ praweshu.
buddhi exists potentially merely during deep sleep and the period of general retractation, and again becomes manifest at the time of waking and the time of creation.— This explanation is appropriate, because nothing can be assumed to spring up unless from something else; other¬ wise we should have to suppose that effects spring up without causes. That the rising from deep sleep is due to the existence of potential avidya, scripture also declares, 4 Having become merged in the True they know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf/ &c. ( Kh. Up. VI, 9, 2; 3).—It is therefore a proved matter that the connexion of the soul with the buddhi and the other adjuncts lasts as long as the soul (in its sawsdra-state).
32. Otherwise (if no manas existed) there would result either constant perception or constant non¬ perception, or else a limitation of either of the two (i.e. of the soul or of the senses).
The internal organ which constitutes the limiting ad¬ junct of the soul is called in different places by different names, such as manas (mind), buddhi (intelligence), vi^w&na (knowledge), £itta (thought). This difference of nomen¬ clature is sometimes made dependent on the difference of the modifications of the internal organ which is called manas when it is in the state of doubt, &c., buddhi when it is in the state of determination and the like.—Now we must necessarily acknowledge the existence of such an internal organ; because otherwise there would result either per¬ petual perception or perpetual non-perception. There would result perpetual perception whenever there is a con¬ junction of the soul, the senses and the objects of sense—the three together constituting the instruments of perception; or else, if on the conjunction of the three causes the effect did not follow, there would take place perpetual non¬ perception. But neither of these two alternatives is actually observed.—Or else we should have to assume that there are obstacles in the way of the energy either of the Self or the sense-organs. But the former is not possible, as the II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34.
49 Self is not capable of any modification; nor the latter, as we cannot assume that the energy of the sense-organ which is non-obstructed in the preceding and the following mo¬ ment should, without any cause, be obstructed (in the intervening moment). Hence we have to acknowledge the existence of an internal organ through whose attention and non-attention perception and non-perception take place. Thus scripture declares, ‘ My mind was elsewhere, I did not see; my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear; for a man sees with his mind and hears with his mind ’ (B ri. Up. I, 5, 3). Scripture moreover shows that desire and similar states are modifications of the mind, £ Desire, repre¬ sentation, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness, shame, reflection, fear, all this is mind.’ The explanation given in Sutra 29 is therefore an appropriate one.
33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of scripture having a purport (thereby).
In connexion with the doctrine that the soul possesses for its essence the qualities of the buddhi, another attribute of the soul is set forth.—The individual soul is an agent, because thus scripture has a purport. For only on that assumption scriptural injunctions (such as ‘ He is to sacrifice,’ ‘ He is to make an oblation into the fire,’ ‘ He is to give,’ &c.) acquire a purport; otherwise they would be purport¬ less. For they all teach special acts to be done by agents; which would not be possible if the soul did not possess the quality of being an agent.—On that supposition a meaning belongs to the following passage also, £ For it is he who sees, hears, perceives, conceives, acts, he the person whose Self is knowledge ’ (Pr. Up. IV, 9).
34. And on account of (the text) teaching its wandering about.
The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the soul for that reason also, that, in a chapter treating of the soul, the text declares it to wander about in the state of sleep, ‘ The immortal one goes wherever he likes ’ (B ri. Up. [38] E 50 vedanta-sCtras.
IV, 3, 12); and again, ‘ He moves about, according to his pleasure, within his own body' ( Bri. Up. II, 1,18).
35. On account of its taking.
The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the soul for that reason also that in the same chapter treating of the soul the text speaks of the soul taking its instru¬ ments, ‘ Having taken, through the intelligence of the senses, intelligence/ and ‘ having taken the senses * (Bri. Up. II, 1, 18; 17).
36. (The soul is an agent) also because it is designated as such with regard to actions; if it were not such, there would be a change of designation.
The quality of being an agent belongs to the soul for that reason also that the sacred texts speak of its agency in sacred and secular actions, ‘Understanding performs the sacrifice, it performs all acts’ (Taitt. Up. II, 5).—But, an objection may here be raised, we have seen that the word c understanding * applies to the buddhi; how then can it indicate the circumstance of the soul being an agent? —The soul only, we reply, is designated there, not the buddhi. If the soul were not meant to be designated, there would be a change in the designation, i. e. the passage would run, ‘ through understanding it performs/ &c. For we see that in another passage where the buddhi is meant the word c understanding ’ is exhibited in the instrumental form, ‘ Having through the understanding (intelligence) of these senses taken all understanding’ (Bri. Up. II, 1, 17). In the passage under discussion, on the other hand, the word ‘ understanding ’ is given in the case characteristic of the agent (viz. the nominative), and therefore indicates the Self which is distinct from the buddhi. Hence your ob¬ jection is not valid.—Another objection is raised. If the soul in so far as distinct from the buddhi were the agent, it would, because it is independent, bring about exclusively what is pleasant and useful to itself, not the opposite. We, however, observe that it does bring about the opposite also. But such an unrestricted proceeding does not become II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 38.
5 1 the independent Self.—To this objection the following Sutra replies.
37. The absence of restriction is as in the case of perception.
Just as this Self, although free with regard to perception, yet perceives unrestrictedly what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant, so we assume that it also brings about what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant.—The objection that in the act of perception also the soul is not free because it depends on the employment of the causes of perception (i.e. the sense-organs), we invalidate by the remark that the use of the causes of perception is merely to present the objects of perception, that however in the act of perception the soul because endowed with intelli¬ gence does not depend on anything else 1.—Moreover in actions also the soul is not absolutely free, as it depends on differences of place, time, and efficient causes. But an agent does not cease to be so because he requires assistance. A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking although he requires fuel, water, and so on. The presence of a plurality of co-operating factors is therefore not opposed to the activity of the soul unrestrictedly extending to actions productive of pleasant as well as unpleasant results.
38. On account of the reversal of power.
The soul distinct from ‘ understanding ’ has to be viewed as an agent for the following reason also. If the buddhi which is denoted by the term ‘understanding 5 were the agent, there would take place a reversal of power, i. e. the instrumental power which appertains to the buddhi would have to be set aside, and to be replaced by the power of an agent. But if the buddhi has the power of an agent, it must be admitted that it is also the object of self-conscious- 1 ATakshuradina/rc vishayopanayakatvat tadupalabdhau Htmana^ ^etanatvena svatantryad udahara«asiddhir ity aha neti. An. Gi.
ness (ahampratyaya) 1, since we see that everywhere activity is preceded by self-consciousness//go, / come, / eat, / drink,’ &c. But if the buddhi is endowed with the power of an agent and effects all things, we have to assume for it another instrument by means of which it effects everything. For we see that agents although themselves capable of acting yet become really active only through making use of instruments.—Hence the whole dispute is about a name only, and there is no real difference, since in either case that which is different from the instrument of action is admitted to be the agent.
39. And on account of the impossibility of medi¬ tation (samadhi).