Moreover the meditation taught in the Vedanta-texts, whose aim is the realisation of the Self as represented by the Upanishads, is possible only if the Self is the agent 2 *. Compare the following passages, 4 Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 5); ‘The Self we must seek out, we must try to understand’ (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1); ‘Meditate on the Self as Om’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 6).—Therefrom also it follows that the Self is an agent.
40. And as the carpenter, in double fashion.
That the embodied Self is an agent, has been proved by the reasons set forth in Sutra 33, &c. We now have to consider whether this agency depends on the fundamental nature of the Self, or is due to its limiting adjuncts.—If here it be maintained that for the same reasons which were employed to prove the Self’s being an agent its agency must be held to be natural, there being no reasons to the contrary, we reply as follows.
1 And that would virtually identify the buddhi with the g-iva, the individual soul.
2 The Self which enjoys the fruit of final release must be the agent in the meditation which is instrumental in bringing about final release.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40.
53 The Self’s being an agent cannot be founded on its real nature, because (if it were so) the impossibility of final release would follow. For if being an agent belongs to the soul’s nature, it can never free itself from it—no more than fire can divest itself of heat,—and as long as man has not freed himself from activity he cannot obtain his highest end, since activity is essentially painful.—But, an objection will be raised, the end of man may be obtained, even as long as the potentiality of activity remains, viz. by man avoiding the effects of activity, and this he may accomplish by avoid¬ ing its occasions, just as fire, for instance, although endowed with the potentiality of burning, does, if fuel is withheld from it, not produce its natural effect, i. e. burning.—This objection we invalidate by the remark that the occasions, because connected (with the soul) by means of the peculiar connexion called ‘ potentiality 5 (power), cannot be avoided absolutely 1.—Nor can it be said that release will be obtained through the means effecting it being employed, because whatever depends on means to be employed is non-eternal. Scripture moreover declares that release results from the instruction about the eternally pure, intel¬ ligent, free Self. Now instruction of this nature would not be possible, if the agentship of the Self formed part of its nature. The agentship of the Self is therefore due to the attributes of its adjuncts being ascribed to it, and does not form part of its nature. Hence scripture says of the Self,‘ As if thinking, as if moving’ (B ru Up. IV, 3, 7), and ‘He (the Self) when in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, is called the enjoyer by wise people’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 4); which passages show that the Self passes into the special condition of being an enjoyer, &c., only through its 1 Kartr/tvasya dharmadini nimittani tesha/# ^ananivartyatve muktav api sambhavat kart/Ytvazra syat £ 7 /anena tannivr/ttau tesham a^anak&ryatvat kn'tam kartrftvam api tatha syat, ^akte^ ka. jakta- j'akyasapekshataya sanimittakriyalaksha/maky apekshakatvad anir- mokshas tasman nimittapariharasya duranush/^anatvan na ^aktivade muktir iti. An. Gi.
Aakta^akyajraya jakti^ svasattayava^yaw jakyam akshipati. Bha.
54 vedanta-sOtras.
connexion with the limiting adjuncts. For to the discern¬ ing there is no Self called the living Self and being either agent or enjoyer, apart from the highest Self; according to the scriptural passage 6 There is no other seer but he/ &c. (B ri. Up. III. 7, 23). Nor must we suppose that, if there were no intelligent individual Soul, different from the highest Self and distinct from the aggregate consisting of buddhi, &c., it would follow that the highest Self is involved in the sawsara-state as agent and enjoyer. For the condi¬ tions of being agent and enjoyer are presented by Nescience merely. Scripture also, after having declared (in the passage, 4 For where there is duality, as it were, there one sees the other/ &c., B ri. Up. IV, 5, 15) that the conditions of being an agent and an enjoyer belong to the state of Nescience only, excludes them from the state of knowledge, ‘ But where the Self only is all this, how should he see another?’ And again, after having declared that the Self, in the states of w T aking and of dreaming, suffers weariness owing to the contact with its limiting adjuncts, like a falcon flying about in the air, scripture teaches that that fatigue ceases in deep sleep when the soul is embraced by the intelligent (highest) Self. 4 This indeed is his true form in which his wishes are fulfilled, in which the Self only is his wish, in which no wish is left,— free from any sorrow ’—up to 4 This is his highest goal, this is his highest success, this is his highest world, this is his highest bliss’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 21-32).—This the teacher intimates in the Sutra, c and as the carpenter in both ways.’
4 And ’ is here used in the sense of ‘ but.’ It is not to be supposed that the agentship of the Self belongs to its true nature, as heat belongs to the nature of fire. But just as in ordinary life a carpenter as long as working with his axe and other tools undergoes pain, while on the other hand he enjoys ease and leisure after having finished his work, laid his tools aside and returned to his home; so the Self also, as long as it is joined with duality presented by Nescience and is an agent in the states of waking and dreaming, undergoes pain; but as soon as, for the purpose of shaking off its weariness, it enters into its own highest Self, it frees itself from the complex of effects and instruments, and enjoys full ease in II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40.
55 the state of deep sleep. And in the state of final release also, the Self, having dispelled the darkness of ignorance by the light of knowledge, and having reached the state of absolute isolation and rest, enjoys full ease.—The case of the carpenter must be considered as being parallel to the following extent. The carpenter is, in certain kinds of work, such as cutting wood, &c., an agent with regard to certain definite tools, such as the axe and so on, but a non¬ agent with his mere body; so this Self also is an agent in all its functions with regard to its instruments, such as the mind, &c., but is a non-agent by its own Self. On the other hand, the Self has no parts corresponding to the hands and other limbs of the carpenter, by means of which it could take up or put aside its instruments, as the car¬ penter takes up and puts aside his tools.
In reply to the reasons brought forward in favour of the soul's agentship being natural, as, for instance, the reason based on scripture having a purport, we remark that the scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts presuppose an agentship established somehow, but do not themselves aim at establishing the (direct) agentship of the Self. Now we have shown that the agentship of the Self does not consti¬ tute part of its real nature because scripture teaches that its true Self is Brahman; we therefore conclude that the Vedic injunctions are operative with reference to that agent- ship of the soul which is due to Nescience. Such scrip¬ tural passages also as 4 The agent, the person whose Self is understanding 9 (Pr. Up. IV, 9), must be assumed, because being of the nature of anuvadas 1, to refer to an agentship already established elsewhere, and being the product of Nescience.
The preceding remarks refute also the reasons founded on 4 the wandering about 5 and the 4 taking ’ (Sfitras 34,35), as the statements about them also are mere anuvadas.—But, an objection may be raised, the passage which teaches that the soul while its instruments are asleep, 4 moves about, 1 I.e. being only incidental remarks about matters established or taught elsewhere.
56 VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
according to its pleasure, within its own body* (Bn. Up. II. i, 18), clearly implies that the pure Self is an agent. And in the passage relative to the taking (‘ (the purusha) having through the intelligence of the senses absorbed all intel¬ ligence 5 ), the fact of the instruments appearing in the objective and instrumental cases likewise intimates that the pure Self is the agent.—To this we reply that even in the state of dream the instruments of the Self are not altogether at rest; for scripture states that even then it is connected with the buddhi, ‘Having become a dream, together with buddhi it passes beyond this world. 5 Smrz'ti also says, ‘When, the senses being at rest, the mind not being at rest is occupied with the objects, that state know to be a dream. 5 And scripture says that desire, &c., are modifications of the mind (cp. Bri. Up. I, 5, 3). Now these are observed in dreams; therefore the Self wanders about in dreams together with the mind only. That wandering about moreover is founded on the mental impressions (vasana) only, is not real. Thus scripture also in describ¬ ing our doings in dreams qualifies them by an c as it were: 5 ‘ As it were rejoicing together with women, or laughing as it were, or seeing terrible sights 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 13). Ordinary people also describe their dreams in the same manner, ‘I ascended as it were the summit of a moun¬ tain, 5 ‘I saw a tree as it were. 5 —And although it is true that, in the statement about the taking, the instruments are exhibited in the objective and instrumental cases, still the agentship of the Self must be considered as connected with those instruments, since we have shown that the pure Self cannot be an agent.
In ordinary language also we meet with similar variations of expression; the two sentences, for instance, ‘ the warriors fight 5 and ‘ the king fights by means of his warriors, 5 really have the same meaning. Moreover, the statement about the taking means to express only the cessation of activity on the part of the instruments, not the independent activity of any one.—The passage referred to above, ‘ understanding performs the sacrifice, 5 establishes the agentship of the buddhi merely, as the word ‘understanding’ is known to have that sense, and as the mind is mentioned close by, and as in the passage, ‘ Faith is its head/ &c., faith and so on are declared to be the members of the Self which con¬ sists of understanding, and as faith, &c., are known to be attributes of the buddhi. Another reason is furnished by the complementary sentence, ‘All gods worship under¬ standing as the oldest, as Brahman 5 (Taitt. Up. II, 5), for buddhi is known to be the oldest, i. e. the first produced h Another scriptural passage also avers that that sacrifice is accomplished by means of speech and buddhi, ‘ The sacrifice is what results from speech and mind.’ Nor can it rightly be maintained (cp. Siitra 38) that to view the instruments as agents would lead to an exchange of power on the part of the buddhi; for all instruments must neces¬ sarily be considered as agents in regard of their special functions 1 2. But with reference to perception (upalabdhi) those instruments are (not agents, but) mere instruments, and perception belongs to the Self. Nor can agentship be ascribed to the Self on account of perception, since permanent perception constitutes its nature (and hence can¬ not be viewed as a mere transitory activity). Nor can the agentship which has self-consciousness for its antecedent belong to the perceiving principle (upalabdhrz); for self- consciousness itself is an object of perception (on the part of the upalabdh ri, i. e. the pure, isolated, intelligent Self).
And on this doctrine there is no occasion for assuming a further instrument, as we maintain the buddhi itself to be the instrument.
The objection founded on the impossibility of meditation (Sfitra 39) is already refuted by the fact, pointed out above, of scripture having a purport, meditation being enjoined by scripture with reference to such agentship as is already established by other passages.—The result of all this is 1 According to the.sruti: mahad yaksham prathamaga/rc veda yo ha vai gyeshtham ka sresh/ham ka veda.
2 Wood, for instance, is an ‘ agent' in regard of the function of burning, while it is a mere instrument with reference to the action of cooking.
5* VEDANTA-S0TRAS.
that the agentship of the Self is due to its limiting adjuncts only.
41. But from the highest (Lord there result sa/^sara and moksha), because scripture teaches that.
We now enter on the discussion whether the agentship, characterising the individual soul in the state of Nescience and founded on its limiting adjuncts, is independent of the Lord or dependent on him.
The purvapakshin maintains that the soul as far as it is an agent does not depend on the Lord, because the assumption of such a dependence would serve no purpose. For as the individual soul has motives in its own im¬ perfections, such as passion, aversion, and so on, and is furnished with the whole apparatus of the other con¬ stituents of action x, it is able to occupy on its own account the position of an agent; and what then should the Lord do for it? Nor does ordinary experience show that in addition to the oxen which are required for such actions as ploughing and the like the Lord also is to be depended upon. Moreover (if all activity depended on the Lord) it would follow that the Lord is cruel because imposing on his creatures activity which is essentially painful, and at the same time unjust because allotting to their activities unequal results.—But it has already been shown (II, 1, 34) that the Lord cannot be taxed with cruelty and in¬ justice, on account of his dependence.—True, that has been shown, but only on the condition of the dependence on the Lord being possible. Now such dependence is possible only if there exist religious merit and demerit on the part of the creatures, and these again exist if the soul is an agent; if then the agentship of the soul again depends on the Lord, whereupon will the Lord's dependence depend? And (if we should assume the Lord to determine the souls without reference to their merits and demerits) it would follow that the souls have to undergo 1 I.e. the constituents of action such as instrument, object, &c., exclusive of the agent.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42.
59 consequences not due to their actions.—Hence the soul’s activity is independent.
Setting aside this prima facie view by means of the word ‘ but/ the Sutrakara asserts ‘ from the highest.' For the soul which in the state of Nescience is blinded by the darkness of ignorance and hence unable to distinguish itself from the complex of effects and instruments, the sa^Sclra-state in which it appears as agent and enjoyer is brought about through the permission of the Lord who is the highest Self, the superintendent of all actions, the witness residing in all beings, the cause of all intelligence; and we must therefore assume that final release also is effected through knowledge caused by the grace of the Lord.
Why so?—‘ Because scripture teaches that.’ For al¬ though the soul has its own imperfections, such as passion and so on, for motives, and is furnished with the whole apparatus of action, and although ordinary experience does not show that the Lord is a cause in occupations such as ploughing and the like, yet we ascertain from scripture that the Lord is a causal agent in all activity. For scrip¬ ture says, ‘ He makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kau. Up. Ill, 8); and again, ‘He who dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within' (Sat Br. XIV, 6, 7, 30).
But if causal agency thus belongs to the Lord, it follows that he must be cruel and unjust, and that the soul has to undergo consequences of what it has not done.—This objection the following Sutra refutes.
42. But with a view to the efforts made (by the soul) (the Lord makes it act), on account of the (otherwise resulting) purportlessness of the injunc¬ tions and prohibitions, &c.
The word ‘but' removes the objections started.—The Lord makes the soul act, having regard to the efforts made by it, whether meritorious or non-meritorious. Hence 6 o VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
there is no room for the objections raised. Having regard to the inequality of the virtuous and vicious actions of the souls, the Lord, acting as a mere occasional cause, allots to them corresponding unequal results. An analogous case is furnished by rain. As rain constitutes the common occasional cause for shrubs, bushes, corn, and so on, which belong to different species and spring each from its par¬ ticular seed—for the inequality of their sap, flowers, fruits, and leaves results neither when rain is absent nor when the special seeds are absent—; so we also must assume that the Lord arranges favourable or unfavourable circum¬ stances for the souls with a view to their former efforts.— But if the activity of the soul is dependent on something else, this having regard (on the part of the Lord) to former effort is inappropriate.—By no means, we reply; for although the activity of the soul is not independent, yet the soul does act. The Lord indeed causes it to act, but it acts itself. Moreover, the Lord in causing it to act now has regard to its former efforts, and he caused it to act in a former existence, having regard to its efforts previous to that existence; a regressus against which, con¬ sidering the eternity of the sawsara, no objections can be raised.—But how is it known that the Lord has regard to the efforts made (in former existences)?—The Sutra replies: from the purportlessness, &c., of injunctions and prohibitions. For thus (i. e. if the Lord has regard to former actions) injunctions such as ‘he who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice, 5 and prohibitions such as ‘ a Brahma^a must not be killed, 5 are not devoid of purport. On the other alternative they would be without purport, and the Lord would in fact be enjoined in the place of injunctions and prohibitions 1 9 since the soul would be absolutely dependent. And then the Lord might requite with good those who act according to the injunctions, and with evil men doing what is forbidden; which would 1 Irvara eva vidhinishedhayo^ sthane niyu^yeta yad vidhinishedha- yo h phala m tad uvarewa tatpratipaditadharmadharmanirapekshe«a kn’tam iti. Bha.
subvert the authoritativeness of the Veda. Moreover, if the Lord were absolutely without any regard, it would follow that also the ordinary efforts of men are without any purport; and so likewise the special conditions of place, time, and cause. And also the difficulty mentioned above 1 would present itself.—All these latter difficulties the Sutrakara comprises in his ‘ &c.’
43. (The soul is) a part of the Lord, on account of the declarations of difference, and (because) in a different way also some record that (Brahman) is of the nature of slaves, fishers, and so on.
We have shown that the individual soul and the Lord stand to each other in the relation of what is being acted upon and what is acting upon. This relation is observed in ordinary life to exist only between things connected, such as a master and a servant, or a fire and its sparks. Now as the soul and the Lord also are acknowledged to stand in the relation of what is acted upon and what is acting, a doubt arises whether their connexion is analogous to that of a master and a servant, or to that of a fire and its sparks.
The purvapakshin maintains that either the matter is to be considered as undetermined, or that the connexion is like that of master and servant, because that connexion only is well known to be the relation of ruler (Lord) and subject ruled.
To this the Sutra replies that the soul must be con¬ sidered a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of the fire. By ‘ part ’ we mean ‘ a part as it were/ since a being not composed of parts cannot have parts in the literal sense.—Why, then, do we not view the Lord, who is not composed of parts, as identical with the soul?— c On account of the declarations of difference.’ For such scrip¬ tural passages as ‘That (self) it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand ’ ( Kh. Up.
1 I.e. the objectionable assumption that men have to undergo consequences not resulting from their own former actions.
62 vedanta-sCtras.
VIII, 7); ‘He who knows him becomes a muni’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22); ‘ He who dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within' (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 23); which all of them refer to a difference (between the highest and the individual Self) would be inappropriate, if there were no difference.— But, it may be said, these statements of difference would agree better with a relation similar to that of master and servant.—Hence the sutrakara adds, ‘and otherwise also.’ That the soul is a part (of the Lord) we learn not only from the passages declaring their difference, but there are other statements also which teach their non-difference. The members of a certain jakha of the Atharva-veda record in a Brahma-sukta that ‘ Brahman are the fisher¬ men, Brahman the slaves, Brahman these gamblers,' &c. Here low creatures such as fishermen, and slaves de¬ pending on their masters, and gamblers are called Brah¬ man; whence it appears that all individual souls which have entered into aggregates of effects and instruments (i. e. bodies) depending on name and form are Brah¬ man. The same view is set forth in other passages such as ‘ Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff, thou art born with thy face turned everywhere ’ ( 5 ve. Up. IV, 3), and 5 The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by their names)' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7). Passages such as ‘ There is no other seer but he ’ and other similar ones establish the same truth.—Non-differenced intelligence belongs to the soul and the Lord alike, as heat belongs to the sparks as well as the fire.—From these two views of difference and non-difference there results the comprehensive view of the soul being a part of the Lord.—The following Sutra supplies a further reason.
44. And on account of the mantra.
A mantra also intimates the same view. ‘ Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person. One foot of it are all beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven’ (Kh. Up. Ill, 12, 6). Here the word ‘beings' II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 46. 63 denotes all moving and non-moving things, among which the souls occupy the first place; in accordance with the use of the word in the following passage/ Not giving pain to any being (bhfita) except at the tirthas’ ( Kh. Up. VIII, 35). Herefrom also we conclude that the individual soul is a part of the Lord.—And again from the following reason.
45. Moreover it is so stated in Smrzti.
In the l^varagitas (Bhagavad-gita) also it is said that the soul is a part of the Lord, £ an eternal part of me becomes the individual soul in the world of life 9 (Bha. Gi. XV, J 7 ). With regard to the assertion made above, viz. that in ordi¬ nary life the relation of ruler and ruled is known to hold good in the case of master and servant &c. only, we remark that, although that may be the case in ordinary life, we ascertain from scripture that the relation of part and whole and that of ruler and ruled may go together. Nor is there anything contradictory in assuming that the Lord who is provided with superexcellent limiting adjuncts rules the souls which are connected with inferior adjuncts only.
Here the purvapakshin raises another objection. If we admit that the souls are parts of the Lord, it follows that the Lord also, whose part the soul is, will be afflicted by the pain caused to the soul by its experience of the sa^sara- state; as we see in ordinary life that the entire Devadatta suffers from the pain affecting his hand or foot or some other limb. Herefrom it would follow that they who obtain Brahman obtain a greater pain 1; so that the former saw- sara-condition would be preferable, and complete knowledge be devoid of purpose.—To this the following Sutra replies.
46. (As the soul is affected by pleasure and pain) not so the highest (Lord); as in the case of light and so on.
We maintain that the highest Lord does not feel the pain of the sa^sara-state in the same way as the soul does. The soul being engrossed by Nescience identifies itself as it were 1 Viz. by participating in all pain.
64 vedanta-s£jtras.
with the body and so on, and imagines itself to be affected by the experience of pain which is due to Nescience, ‘I am afflicted by the pain due to the bodythe highest Lord, on the other hand, neither identifies himself with a body, nor imagines himself to be afflicted by pain. The pain of the individual soul also is not real, but imaginary only, caused by the error consisting in the non-discrimination of (the Self from) the body, senses, and other limiting adjuncts which are due to name and form, the effects of Nescience. And as a person feels the pain of a burn or cut which affects his body by erroneously identifying himself with the latter, so he feels also the pain affecting others, such as sons or friends, by erroneously identifying himself with them, entering as it were into them through love, and imagining £ I am the son, I am the friend/ Wherefrom we infer with certainty that the feeling of pain is due merely to the error of false imagi¬ nation. At the same conclusion we arrive on the ground of negative instances. Let us consider the case of many men, each of whom possesses sons, friends, &c., sitting together, some of them erroneously imagining that they are connected with their sons, friends, &c., while others do not. If then somebody calls out ‘ the son has died/ ‘ the friend has died/ grief is produced in the minds of those who are under the imagination of being connected with sons and friends, but not in the minds of religious mendicants who have freed themselves from that imagination. From this it appears that perfect knowledge is of use even to an ordinary man; of how much greater use then will it be to him (i.e. the Lord) whose nature is eternal pure intelligence, who sees nothing beside the Self for which there are no objects. Hence it follows that perfect knowledge is not purposeless. —To illustrate this view the Sutra introduces a comparison 4 like light,’ &c. Just as the light of the sun or the moon which pervades the entire space becomes straight or bent as it were when the limiting adjuncts with which it is in contact, such as a finger, for instance, are straight or bent, but does not really become so; and just as the ether, although imagined to move as it were when jars are being moved, does not really move; and as the sun does not tremble, II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 47.
65 although its image trembles when you shake the cup filled with water in which the sun’s light is reflected; thus the Lord also is not affected by pain, although pain be felt by that part of him which is called the individual soul, is presented by Nescience, and limited by the buddhi and other adjuncts. That also the soul’s undergoing pain is due to Nescience only, we have already explained. Accord¬ ingly the Vedanta-texts teach that, when the soul’s individual state, due to Nescience, is sublated, it becomes Brahman, ‘ Thou art that &c.’—Thus there is no occasion to conclude that the highest Self is affected by the pain of the individual soul.
47. And the Smmis state (that).