The case is analogous to that of the ‘ mental ’ (cup). On the tenth day of the Soma sacrifices occupying twelve days —which day is termed avivakya—a soma cup is offered mentally, the earth being viewed as the cup, the sea as the Soma and Pra^apati as the divinity to which the offering is made. All rites connected with that cup, viz. taking it up, putting it down in its place, offering the liquid in it, taking up the remaining liquid, the priests inviting one another to drink the remainder, and the drinking, all these rites the text declares to be mental only, i.e. to be done in thought only 2. Yet this mental quasi-cup, as standing under the heading of a sacrificial act, forms part of that act.—The same then holds good with regard to the quasi-agnis made of mind and so on.
46. And on account of the transfer (of particulars).
That those agnis enter into the sacrificial action follows 1 I.e. of the agni made of bricks which is the outcome of the agni/fcayana.—An. Gi. explains vikalpavkesha by prakarabheda.
2 Cp. Tazz^ya Brah. IV, 9; Taitt. Sazzzh. VII, 3, 1. moreover from the fact that the text extends to them (the injunctions given about the agni made of bricks). Com¬ pare the passage, ‘Thirty-six thousand shining Agnis; each one of them is as large as the previously mentioned Agni.’ Such extension of injunctions is possible only where there is general equality. The text therefore by extending the determinations relative to the previous agni, i.e. the agni built of bricks, which forms a constituent element of the sacrificial action, to the fanciful agnis, intimates thereby that they also form part of the sacrificial performance.
47. But (the agnis rather constitute) a vidya, on account of the assertion (made by the text).
The word c but 5 sets aside the purvapaksha.—The agnis built of mind and so on are to be viewed not as comple¬ mentary to a sacrificial action, but as independent and con¬ stituting a vidya of their own. For the text expressly asserts that ‘ they are built of knowledge (vidya) only,’ and that ‘ by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows.’
48. And because (indicatory marks of that) are seen (in the text). And that there are to be observed indicatory marks leading to the same conclusion, has already been declared in Siltra 44.—But, under Sutra 45, it was shown that indicatory marks unaided by other reasons cannot be admitted as proving anything, and it was consequently determined that, owing to the influence of the leading subject-matter, the Agnis form part of the sacrificial action!—To this objection the next Sutra replies.
49. (The view that the agnis constitute an inde¬ pendent vidya) cannot be refuted, owing to the greater force of direct enunciation and so on.
Our opponent has no right to determine, on the ground of prakara/za, that the agnis are subordinate to the sacri¬ ficial action, and so to set aside our view according to which they are independent. For we know from the Purva Mimazzzsa that direct enunciation (Sruti), indicatory mark (linga), and syntactical connexion (vakya) are of greater force than leading subject-matter (prakara^a), and all those three means of proof are seen to confirm our view of the agnis being independent. In the first place we have the direct enunciation, ‘These agnis are indeed knowledge-piled only.’ In the second place we have the indicatory mark supplied by the passage,‘All beings ever pile for him sleeping/ &c. And in the third place we have the sentence, ‘By know¬ ledge indeed those (agnis) are piled for him who thus knows. 5 In the first of these passages the emphatical expression, ‘built by knowledge only/ would be contradicted if we ad¬ mitted that the agnis form part of the sacrificial action.— But may this emphatical phrase not merely have the pur¬ pose of indicating that those agnis are not to be accom¬ plished by external means?—No, we reply, for if that were intended, it would be sufficient to glorify the fact of know¬ ledge constituting the character of the agnis by means of the word ‘knowledge-piled/ and the emphatical assertion (implied in the addition of the word ‘only’) would be useless. For it is the nature of such agnis to be accom¬ plished without any external means. But, although the agnis are clearly to be accomplished without external means, yet it might be supposed that, like the mental cup, they form part of the sacrificial action, and the object of the emphatical assertion implied in ‘ only’ is to discard that suspicion.—So likewise (to pass over to linga) the continuity of action implied in the passage, ‘ For him who thus knows whether sleeping or waking all beings always pile these agnis, ’ is possible only on the supposition of those agnis being independent. The case is analogous to that of the imaginary agnihotra consisting of speech and breath, with reference to which the text says at first, ‘He offers his breath in his speech, he offers his speech in his breath/ and then adds, ‘ These two endless and immortal oblations he offers always whether waking or sleeping ’ (Kau. Up. II, 6).—If, on the other hand, the imaginary agnis were parts of the sacrificial action it would be impossible for them to be accomplished continually, since the accomplishment of the sacrificial action itself occupies only a short time.—Nor may we suppose the passage (which contains the linga) to be a mere arthavada-passage (in which case, as the purvapakshin avers, the linga would be unable to refute prakara/za). For in those cases where we meet with an unmistakeable injunctory passage— marked out as such by the use of the optative or imperative form—there indeed we may assume a glorificatory passage (met with in connexion with that injunctory passage) to be an arthavada. In the present case, however, we observe no clear injunctory passage, and should therefore be obliged to construct one enjoining the knowledge of the various fanciful agnis, merely on the basis of the arthavadapassage. But in that case the injunction can be framed only in accordance with the arthavada, and as the arthavada speaks of the continual building of the agnis, the latter item would have to appear in the injunction also. But, if so, it follows (as shown above) that the mental construction of those agnis constitutes an independent vidya (and does not form part of the actual agni^ayana).—The same argument¬ ation applies to the second linga-passage quoted above, ‘Whatever those beings conceive in their minds,' &c.—And the sentence finally shows, by means of the clause, ‘ For him who thus knows/ that those agnis are connected with a special class of men (viz. those who thus know), and are therefore not to be connected with the sacrificial action.— For all these reasons the view of those agnis constituting an independent vidya is preferable.
50. On account of the connexion and so on (the agnis built of mind, &c. are independent); in the same way as other cognitions are separate. And there is seen (another case of something having to be withdrawn from the leading subject-matter); this has been explained (in the Purva Mima^sa-sutras).
Independence has, against the general subject-matter, to be assumed for the fire-altars built of mind and so on, for that reason also that the text connects the constituent members of the sacrificial action with activities of the mind, &c.; viz. in the passage, ‘ With mind only they are established, with mind only they are piled, with mind only the cups were taken, with mind the udgatrzs praised, with mind the hotris recited; whatever work is done at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial work, was done as consisting of mind, by mind only, at those fire-altars made of mind, piled by mind,’ &c. For that connexion has for its result an imaginative combination (of certain mental en¬ ergies with the parts of the sacrifice), and the obtainment of the parts of the sacrifice which are objects of actual perception cannot be made dependent on such imaginative combination \ Nor must it be supposed that, because here also, as in the case of the meditation on the udgitha, the vidya is connected with members of the sacrificial action, it enters into that action as a constituent part; for the state¬ ments of the text differ in the two cases. For in our case scripture does not say that we are to take some member of a sacrificial action and then to superimpose upon it such and such a name; but rather takes six and thirty thousand different energies of the mind and identifies them with the fire-altars, the cups, and so on, just as in some other place it teaches a meditation on man viewed as the sacrifice. The number given by the text is originally observed as belonging to the days of a man’s life, and is then transferred to the mental energies connected therewith.—From the con¬ nexion (referred to in the Sutra) it therefore follows that the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent.—The clause £ and so on ’ (met with in the Sutra) must be explained as comprehending ‘transference’ and the like as far as possi¬ ble. For if the text says, ‘Each of those Agnis is as great as that prior one,’ it transfers the glory of the fire-altar consisting of the work (i.e. the real altar piled of bricks) to the altars consisting of knowledge and so on, and thereby 1 Kimartham idam anubandhakarawaw tad aha, sampad iti, upastyartho hy anubandhas tathapi mana^idadinam akriyangatve kim ayata/ra tad aha, na £eti, teshaw kriyangatve sakshad evadhanadiprasiddher anarthika sampad ity artha^. An. Gi.
expresses want of regard for the work. Nor can it be said that if there is connexion (of all the agnis) with the sacri¬ ficial action, the later ones (i.e. those made of mind) may optionally be used instead of the original agnis made of bricks (as was asserted by the purvapakshin in Sutra 45). For the later agnis are incapable of assisting the sacrificial action by means of those energies with which the original agni assists it, viz.by bearing the ahavaniya fire and so on.— The assertion, again, made by the purvapakshin (Sutra 46) that‘transference’strengthens his view in so far as transfer¬ ence is possible only where there is equality, is already refuted by the remark that also on our view transference is possible, since the fanciful fire-altars are equal to the real fire-altar in so far as both are fire-altars.—And that direct enunciation and so on favour our conclusion has been shown.—From con¬ nexion and so on it therefore follows that the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent.—‘ As in the case of the separateness of other cognitions.’ As other cognitions, such as e. g. the vSa^</ilya-vidya, which have each their own parti¬ cular connexion, separate themselves from works and other cognitions and are independent; so it is in our case also.— Moreover ‘there is seen’ an analogous case of independence from the leading subject-matter. The offering called avesh/i which is mentioned in the sacred texts under the heading of the ra^asuya-sacrifice, is to be taken out from that heading because it is connected with the three higher castes, while the ragasuya can be offered by a member of the warrior caste only. This has been explained in the first section (i.e. in the Purva MimcL^sa-sutras).
51. Not also on account of its resembling (the manasa cup) (can the fires constitute parts of an action); for it is observed (on the ground of » 5 ruti, &c., that they are independent); as in the case of death; for the world does not become (a fire) (because it resembles a fire in some points).
Against the allegation made by the purvapakshin that the present case is analogous to that of the manasa cup, we remark that the fire-altars made of mind and so on cannot be assumed to supplement a sacrificial action although they may resemble the manasa cup, since on the ground of direct enunciation &c. they are seen to subserve the purpose of man only (not the purpose of some sacrificial action). Anything indeed may resemble anything in some point or other; but in spite of that there remains the individual dissimilarity of each thing from all other things. The case is analogous to that of death. In the passages, ‘The man in that orb is death indeed’ (Sat. Bra. X, 5, 2, 3),and ‘Agni indeed is death ’ (Taitt. Samh. V, 1, io, 3), the term ‘death ’ is applied equally to Agni and the man in the sun; all the same the two are by no means absolutely equal. And if the text says in another place, ‘ This world is a fire indeed, O Gotama; the sun is its fuel,’ &c. ( Kh. Up. V, 4, 1), it does not follow from the similarity of fuel and so on that the world really is a fire. Thus also in our case.
52. And from the subsequent (Brahma/za) it follows that being of that kind (i. e. injunction of a mere vidya) (is the aim) of the text. The connexion (of the fanciful agnis with the real one) is due to the plurality (of details of the real agni which are imaginatively connected with the vidya).
With regard to a subsequent Brihmazza also, viz. the one beginning, ‘ That piled agni is this world indeed,’ we appre¬ hend that what is the purpose of the text is ‘ being of that kind,’ i.e. injunction of a mere vidya, not injunction of the member of a mere action. For we meet there with the fol¬ lowing sloka, ‘ By knowledge they ascend there where all wishes are attained. Those skilled in works do not go there, nor those who destitute of knowledge do penance.’ This verse blames mere works and praises knowledge. A former Brahmazza also, viz. the one beginning, ‘ What that orb leads’ (Sat. Bra. X, 5, 2, 23), concludes with a statement of the fruit of knowledge (‘Immortal becomes he whose Self is death ’), and thereby indicates that works are not the chief thing.—The text connects the vidya (of the agnis built of mind) with the real agni built of bricks, not because those agnis are members of the act of building the real agni, but because many of the elements of the real agni are imaginatively combined with the vidya.
All this establishes the conclusion that the fire-altars built of mind and so on constitute a mere vidya. 53. Some (maintain the non-existence) of a (separate) Self, on account of the existence (of the Self) where a body is (only).
At present we will prove the existence of a Self different from the body in order to establish thereby the qualifica¬ tion (of the Self) for bondage and release. For if there were no Self different from the body, there would be no room for injunctions that have the other world for their result; nor could it be taught of anybody that Brahman is his Self.— But, an objection is raised, already in the first pada which stands at the head of this Sastra (i. e. the first pada of the Purva Mima^sa-sutras) there has been declared the exist¬ ence of a Self which is different from the body and hence capable of enjoying the fruits taught by the Sastra.—True, this has been declared there by the author of the bhashya, but there is in that place no Sutra about the existence of the Self. Here, on the other hand, the Sutrakara himself establishes the existence of the Self after having disposed of a preliminary objection. And from hence the teacher vSabara Svamin has taken the matter for his discussion of the point in the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge. For the same reason the reverend Upavarsha remarks in the first tantra—where an opportunity offers itself for the discussion of the existence of the Self—‘ We will discuss this in the Sariraka,’ and allows the matter to rest there. Here, where we are engaged in an inquiry into the pious meditations which are matter of injunction, a discussion of the existence of the Self is introduced in order to show that the whole Sastra depends thereon.
Moreover, in the preceding adhikara/za we have shown that passages may be exempted from the influence of the leading subject-matter, and that for that reason the firealtars built of mind and so on subserve the purpose of man (not of the sacrifice). In consequence thereof there naturally arises the question who that man is whose purposes the different fire-altars subserve, and in reply to it the existence of a Self which is separate from the body is affirmed.—The first Sutra embodies an objection against that doctrine; according to the principle that a final refutation of objec¬ tions stated in the beginning effects a stronger conviction of the truth of the doctrine whose establishment is aimed at.
Here now some materialists (lokayatika), who see the Self in the body only, are of opinion that a Self separate from the body does not exist; assume that consciousness (^aitanya), although not observed in earth and the other external elements—either single or combined—may yet appear in them when transformed into the shape of a body, so that consciousness springs from them; and thus maintain that knowledge is analogous to intoxicating quality (which arises when certain materials are mixed in certain proportions), and that man is only a body qualified by consciousness. There is thus, according to them, no Self separate from the body and capable of going to the heavenly world or obtaining release, through which con¬ sciousness is in the body; but the body alone is what is conscious, is the Self. For this assertion they allege the reason stated in the Sutra, ‘ On account of its existence where a body is/ For wherever something exists if some other thing exists, and does not exist if that other thing does not exist, we determine the former thing to be a mere quality of the latter; light and heat, e. g. we determine to be qualities of fire. And as life, movement, consciousness, remembrance and so on—which by the upholders of an independent Self are considered qualities of that Self—are observed only within bodies and not outside bodies, and as an abode of those qualities, different from the body, cannot be proved, it follows that they must be qualities of the body only. The Self therefore is not different from the body.— To this conclusion the next Sutra replies.
54. There is separation (of the Self from the body) because its existence does not depend on the existence of that (viz. the body), but there is not (non-separation); as in the case of perceptive con¬ sciousness.
The assertion that the Self is not separate from the body cannot be maintained. The Self rather must be something separate from the body, ‘ because the existence (of the Self) does not depend on the existence of that (i. e. the body)/ For if from the circumstance that they are where the body is you conclude that the qualities of the Self are qualities of the body, you also must conclude from the fact that they are not where the body is that they are not qualities of the body, because thereby they show themselves to be different in character from the qualities of the body. Now the (real) qualities of the body, such as form and so on, may be viewed as existing as long as the body exists; life, movement, &c., on the other hand, do not exist even when the body exists, viz. in the state of death. The qualities of the body, again, such as form and so on, are perceived by others; not so the qualities of the Self, such as conscious¬ ness, remembrance, and so on. Moreover, we can indeed ascertain the presence of those latter qualities as long as the body exists in the state of life, but we cannot ascertain their non-existence when the body does not exist; for it is possible that even after this body has died the qualities of the Self should continue to exist by passing over into another body. The opposite opinion is thus precluded also for the reason of its being a mere hypothesis.—We further must question our opponent as to the nature of that consciousness which he assumes to spring from the elements; for the materialists do not admit the existence of anything but the four elements. Should he say that consciousness is the perception of the elements and what springs from the elements, we remark that in that case the elements and their products are objects of consciousness and that hence the latter cannot be a quality of them, as it is contradictory that anything should act on itself. Fire is hot indeed but does not burn itself, and the acrobat, well trained as he may be, cannot mount on his own shoulders. As little could consciousness, if it were a mere quality of the elements and their products, render them objects of itself. For form and other (undoubted) qualities do not make their own colour or the colour of something else their objects; the elements and their products, on the other hand, whether external or belonging to the Self (the organism) are rendered objects by consciousness. Hence in the same way as we admit the existence of that per¬ ceptive consciousness which has the material elements and their products for its objects, we also must admit the separateness of that consciousness from the elements. And as consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the Self must be distinct from the body. That consciousness is permanent, follows from the uniformity of its character (and we therefore may conclude that the conscious Self is permanent also; as also follows) from the fact that the Self, although connected with a different state, recognises itself as the conscious agent—a recognition expressed in judgments such as ‘ I saw this/—and from the fact of remembrance and so on being possible *.
The argumentation that consciousness is an attribute of the body because it is where a body is, is already refuted by the reasons stated above. Moreover, perceptive con¬ sciousness takes place where there are certain auxiliaries such as lamps and the like, and does not take place where those are absent, without its following therefrom that per¬ ception is an attribute of the lamp or the like. Analogously 1 The ‘nityatva/zz kaJ of the text might perhaps be connected directly with ‘ atmano/ Ananda Giri on the entire passage: Bhavatu tarhi bhutebhyo * tirikta svatantryopalabdhis tathapi katham atmasiddhis tatraha upalabdhiti, ksha/zikatvat tasya nityatmarftpatvam ayuktam ity a^ankyag-anatas tadbhedabhavad vishayoparagat tadbhanad asav eva nityopalabdhir ity aha nityatvaw £eti, Ywi ka. sthuladehabhimanahmasya svapne pratyabhi^/zanad atiriktatmasiddhir ity aha aham iti, svapne sthuladehantarasyaivopalabdhrztvam ity a^ankyaha smrztyaditi, upalabdhr/smartror bhede saty anyopalabdhe^nyasya smntir i^adaya^ ka. neti na tayor anyatety artha^.
the fact that perception takes place where there is a body, and does not take place where there is none, does not imply that it is an attribute of the body; for like lamps and so on the body may be used (by the Self) as a mere auxiliary. Nor is it even true that the body is absolutely required as an auxiliary of perception; for in the state of dream we have manifold perceptions while the body lies motionless.— The view of the Self being something separate from the body is therefore free from all objections.
55. But the (meditations) connected with members (of sacrificial acts are) not (restricted) to (particular) ■Sakhas, according to the Veda (to which they belong). The above occasional discussion being terminated, we return to the discussion of the matter in hand.—We meet in the different Sakhas of each Veda with injunctions of vidyas connected with certain members of sacrificial acts, such as the udgitha and the like. Cp. e.g. ‘Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgitha ’ (Kk. Up. I, 1, 1); ‘Let a man meditate on the fivefold Saman as the five worlds' (Kk. Up. II, 2, 1); ‘People say: “Hymns, hymns! ” the hymn is truly this earth ’ (Ait. Ar. II, 1,2, 1); ‘ The piled up fire-altar truly is this world ’ (Sat. Bra. X, 5, 4. 1). A doubt here arises whether the vidyas are enjoined with reference to the udgitha and so on as belonging to a certain Sakha only or as belonging to all Sakhas. The doubt is raised on the supposition that the udgitha and so on differ in the different Sakhas because the accents, &c. differ.