Here the purvapakshin maintains that the vidyas are enjoined only with reference to the udgitha and so on which belong to the particular Sctkha (to which the vidyd belongs). —Why?—On account of proximity. For as such general injunctions as ‘ Let a man meditate on the udgitha’ are in need of a specification, and as this need is satisfied by the specifications given in the same Sakha which stand in immediate proximity, there is no reason for passing over that Sakha and having recourse to specifications enjoined in other Sakhas. Hence the vidyas are to be held apart, according to the Sakhas to which they belong. To this the Sutra replies ‘but those connected with members/ &c.—The word ‘ but 5 discards the prima facie view. The meditations are not restricted to their own Sakhas according to the Veda to which they belong, but are valid for all Sakhas.—Why?—Because the direct state¬ ments of the texts about the udgitha and so on enounce no specification. For to such general injunctions as £ Let a man meditate on the udgitha’—which say nothing about specifications—violence would be done, if on the ground of proximity we restricted them to something special belong¬ ing to its own Sakha, and that would be objectionable because direct statement has greater weight than proximity. There is, on the other hand, no reason why the vidya should not be of general reference. We therefore conclude that, although the Vakhas differ as to accents and the like, the vidyas mentioned refer to the udgitha and so on belong¬ ing to all 6akhas, because the text speaks only of the udgitha and so on in general.
56. Or else there is no contradiction (implied in our opinion); as in the case of mantras and the like. Or else we may put the matter as follows. There is no reason whatever to suspect a contradiction if we declare certain vidyas enjoined in one Sakh& to be valid for the udgitha and so on belonging to other Sakhas also; for there is no more room for contradiction than in the case of mantras. We observe that mantras, acts, and qualities of acts which are enjoined in one Sakha are taken over by other Sakhas also. So e. g. the members of certain Ya^urveda Sakhas do not exhibit in their text the mantra, £ Thou art the ku/aru V which accompanies the taking of the stone (with which the rice-grains are ground); all the same we meet in their text with the following injunction of applica¬ tion, £ Thou art the cock, with this mantra he takes the stone; or else with the mantra, Thou art the ku/aru. 5 T [ 38 ] 2 74 Again, the text of some 5 akha does not contain a direct injunction of the five offerings called pray&£*as which are made to the fuel and so on, but it contains the injunction of secondary matters connected with the pray^as, viz. in the passage, 4 the seasons indeed are the praya^*as; they are to be offered in one and the same spot V—Again, the text of some vSakha does not contain an injunction as to the species of the animal to be sacrificed to Agnishomau— such as would be 4 a he-goat is sacrificed to Agnishomau 1 2 3 —but in the same vSakha we meet with a mantra which contains the required specification, 4 Hot ri, recite the anuvakya, for the fat of the omentum of the he-goat V Similarly mantras enjoined in one Veda only, such as 4 O Agni, promote the hautra, promote the sacrifice/ are seen to be taken over into other Vedas also. Another example (of the transference of mantras) is supplied by the hymn, 4 He who as soon as born showed himself intelligent/ &c. (Rik. Sa/^h. II, 12), which although read in the text of the Bahvr/^as is employed in the Taittiriya Veda also, according to Taitt. Sa^h. VII, 5, 5, 2, 4 The Sa£*aniya hymn is to be recited.’—Just as, therefore, the members of sacri¬ ficial actions on which certain vidyas rest are valid every¬ where, so the vidyas themselves also which rest on those members are valid for all 5 akhas and Vedas.
57. There is pre-eminence of the (meditation on) plenitude (i.e. Agni Vairvanara in his aggregate form), as in the case of sacrifices; for thus scripture shows.
In the legend beginning 4 Pra^inaj-ala Aupamanyava/ the text speaks of meditations on VaLrvanara in his dis- 1 As this passage states the number of the prayag-as (viz. five, which is the number of the seasons) and other secondary points, we conclude that the injunction of the offering of the praya^as, which is given in other Aakhas, is valid also for the -Sakha referred to in the text (the Maitrayamyas, according to the commentators).
2 But only says ‘they offer an animal to Agnishomau/ 3 Wherefrom we infer that not any animal may be offered to Agnishomau, but only a he-goat.
tributed as well as his aggregate condition. References to him in his distributed state are made in the passage, ‘ Aupamanyava, whom do you meditate on as the Self? He replied: Heaven only, venerable king. He said: The Self which you meditate on is the VaLsvanara Self called Sute^as; 5 and in the following passages (. Kh. Up. V, 12-17). A meditation on him in his aggregate state, on the other hand, is referred to in the passage (V, 18), ‘Of that Vauvanara Self the head is Sute^as, the eye Visv arupa, the breath Przthagvartman, the trunk Bahula, the bladder Rayi, the feet the earth/ &c.—A doubt here arises whether the text intimates a meditation on VaLrvanara in both his forms or only in his aggregate form.
The purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with meditations on Vauyvanara in his distributed form, firstly because the text exhibits a special verb, viz. ‘ you meditate on,’ with reference to each of the limbs, Sute^as and so on; and secondly because the text states special fruits (con¬ nected with each special meditation) in the passage, ‘Therefore every kind of Soma libation is seen in your house,’ and the later similar passages.
To this we make the following reply. We must sup¬ pose that the entire section aims at intimating ‘ the pre¬ eminence,’ i. e. at intimating as its pre-eminent subject, a meditation on ‘plenitude,’ i. e. on Vauvanara in his aggre¬ gate state, who comprises within himself a plurality of things; not a number of special meditations on the limbs of VaLsvanara. ‘ As in the case of sacrifices.’ In the same way as the Vedic texts referring to sacrifices such as the danrapun/amasa aim at enjoining the performance of the entire sacrifice only, i. e. of the chief sacrificial action to¬ gether with its members—and not in addition the perform¬ ance of single subordinate members such as the praya^as, nor again the performance of the chief action together with some of its subordinate members; so it is here also.— But whence do you know that c plenitude ’ is the pre¬ eminent topic of the passage?—It is shown by scripture, we reply, since we apprehend that the entire section forms a connected whole. For on examining the connexion of T 2 the parts we find that the entire section has for its subject the knowledge of VaLfvanara. The text at first informs us that six Rzshis —Pr^inaj'ala, &c., up to Uddalaka— being unable to reach a firm foundation in the knowledge of VaLswanara, went to the king Awapati Kaikeya; goes on to mention the object of each Ri shi’s meditation, viz.
the sky and so on; determines that the sky and so on are only the head and so on of VaLs, v 4 nara—in the passage 4 he said: that is but the head of the Self/ and the later similar passages;—and thereupon rejects all meditations on Vahvctnara in his distributed form, in the passage, 4 Your head would have fallen if you had not come to me/ and so on. Finally having discarded all distributed meditation it turns to the meditation on the aggregate Vauvanara and declares that all results rest on him only, 4 he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs/—That the text mentions special fruits for the special meditations on Sute^as and so on we have, in accordance with our view, to explain as meaning that the results of the subordinate meditations are to be connected in their aggregate with the principal meditation. And that the text exhibits a special verb— 4 you do meditate ’—in connexion with each member is not meant to enjoin special meditations on those members, but merely to make additional remarks about something which has another purpose (i. e. about the medi¬ tation on the aggregate Vai^vanara).—For all these reasons the view according to which the text enjoins a meditation on the aggregate VaLrvanara only is preferable.
Some commentators here establish the conclusion that the meditation on the aggregate VaLsvanara is the prefer¬ able alternative, but assume, on the ground of the Sutra employing the term 4 pre-eminence 5 only, that the Sutrakara allows also the alternative of distributed meditation. But this is inadmissible, since it is improper to assume a ‘split of the sentence' (i.e. to ascribe to a passage a double meaning), as long as the passage may be under¬ stood as having one meaning only. Their interpretation, moreover, contradicts those passages which expressly blame distributed meditations; such as 4 Thy head would have fallen.' And as the conclusion of the section clearly in¬ timates a meditation on the aggregate VaLvanara, the negation of such meditation could not be maintained as purvapaksha 1. The term ‘ pre-eminence ’ which the Sutra employs may moreover be explained as meaning (not mere preferability, but exclusive) authoritativeness.
58. (The vidyds are) separate, on account of the difference of words and the like.
In the preceding adhikarazza we have arrived at the con¬ clusion that a meditation on Vahvanara as a whole is the pre-eminent meaning of the text, although special results are stated for meditations on Sute^as and so on. On the ground of this it may be presumed that other medita¬ tions also which are enjoined by separate scriptural texts have to be combined into more general medita¬ tions. Moreover, we cannot acknowledge a separation of vidyas (acts of cognition; meditations) as long as the object of cognition is the same; for the object constitutes the character of a cognition in the same way as the material offered and the divinity to which the offering is made constitute the character of a sacrifice. Now we understand that the Lord forms the only object of cog¬ nition in a number of scriptural passages, although the latter are separate in enunciation; cp. e. g. ‘ He con¬ sisting of mind, whose body is pra/za 5 ( Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2); ‘Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha * ( Kh. Up. IV, 10, 5); ‘ He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' {Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 3). Analogously one and the same Pra/za is referred to in different texts; cp. ‘ Prazza indeed is the end of all ’ ( Kh. Up. IV, 3, 3); ‘ Prazza indeed is the oldest and the best’ {Kh. Up. V, 1, 1); ‘ Prazza is father, Prazza is mother' {Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1). And from the unity of the object of cognition there follows unity of cognition. Nor 1 Yadobhayatropastisiddhantas tada vyastopastir evatra samastopastir eva va purvapaksha^ syan nadya ity aha, spash/e £eti, dvittya^ to tatrayukto vakyopakramasthavyastopastidhivirodhat. An. Gi.
can it be said that, on this view, the separateness of the different scriptural statements would be purposeless, since each text serves to set forth other qualities (of the one pradh&na which is their common subject). Hence the different qualities which are enjoined in one’s own and in other.Sakhas, and which all belong to one object of know¬ ledge, must be combined so that a totality of cognition may be effected.
To this conclusion we reply, ‘ Separate/ &c. Although the object of cognition is one, such cognitions must be considered as separate ‘ on account of the difference of words and the like. 5 —For the text exhibits a difference of words such as ‘he knows,’ ‘let him meditate,’ ‘let him form the idea’ (cp. Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). And difference of terms is acknowledged as a reason of difference of acts, according to Purva Mima^sa-sutras II, 2, 1.—The clause ‘and the like’ in the Sutra intimates that also qualities and so on may be employed, according to circumstances, as reasons for the separateness of acts.—But, an objection is raised, from passages such as ‘ he knows ’ and so on we indeed apprehend a difference of words, but not a difference of sense such as we apprehend when meeting with such clauses as ‘ he sacrifices ’ and the like (ya^ate, £*uhoti, dadati). For all these words (viz. veda, upasita, &c.)
denote one thing only, viz. a certain activity of the mind, and another meaning is not possible in their case 1, How then does difference of vidya follow from difference of words?—This objection is without force, we reply; for although all those words equally denote a certain activity of the mind only, yet a difference of vidya may result from a difference of connexion. The Lord indeed is the only object of meditation in the passages quoted, but according to its general purport each passage teaches different qualities of the Lord; and similarly, although one and the same Pra^a is the object of meditation in the other series 1 Vedopasitetyadkabdanaw kvakig gna.na.rn kva^id dhyanam ity arthabhedam a^ankya ^anasyavidheyatvad vidhiyamanam upasanam evety aha arthantareti. An. Gi.
of passages, yet one of his qualities has to be meditated upon in one place and another in another place. From difference of connexion there thus follows difference of injunction, and from the latter we apprehend the separate¬ ness of the vidyas. Nor can it be maintained (as the purvapakshin did) that one of those injunctions is the injunction of the vidya itself, while the others enjoin mere qualities; for there is no determining reason (as to which is the vidya -vidhi and which the gu//avidhis), and as in each passage more than one quality are mentioned it is impossible that those passages should enjoin qualities with reference to a vidya established elsewhere 1. Nor should, in the case of the purvapakshin’s view being the true one, the qualities which are common to several passages, such as ‘having true wishes,’ be repeated more than once. Nor can the different sections be combined into one syntactical whole, because in each one a certain kind of meditation is en¬ joined on those who have a certain wish, whence we understand that the passage is complete in itself 2. Nor is there in the present case an additional injunction of a meditation on something whole—such as there is in the case of the cognition of the VaLrvanara—owing to the force of which the meditations on the single parts which are contained in each section would combine themselves into a whole. And if on the ground of the object of cog¬ nition being one we should admit unity of vidya without any restriction, we should thereby admit an altogether im¬ possible combination of all qualities (mentioned anywhere in the Upanishads). The Sutra therefore rightly declares the separateness of the vidyas.—The present adhikara^a being thus settled, the first Sutra of the pada has now to be considered 3.
1 For to enjoin in one passage several qualities—none of which is established already—would involve an objectionable vakyabheda.
2 A sentence is to be combined with another one into a larger whole only if the sentences are not complete in themselves but evince an akanksha, a desire of complementation.
3 I.e. the present adhikarawa ought in reality to head the entire pada.
59. There is (restriction to) option (between the vidyas), on account of their having non-differing results.
The difference of the vidyas having been determined, we now enter on an inquiry whether, according to one’s liking, there should be cumulation of the different vidyas or option between them; or else restriction to an optional proceed¬ ing (to the exclusion of cumulation). For restriction to cumulation (which might be mentioned as a third alterna¬ tive) there is no reason, because the separation of the vidyas has been established.—But we observe that in the case of the sacrifices, agnihotra, darcapur/zamasa and so on, there is restriction to cumulation (i. e. that those sacrifices have all of them to be performed, not optionally one or the other) although they are different from each other.—True; but the reason for the obligatory cumulation of those sacrifices lies therein that scripture teaches them to be of absolute obligation. No scriptural passage, on the other hand, teaches the absolute obligatoriness of the vidyas, and it cannot therefore be a rule that they must be cumulated. —Nor can it be a rule that there must be option between them, because a person entitled to one vidya cannot be excluded from another vidya. It therefore only remains to conclude that one may proceed as one likes.—But—an objection is raised—we must rather conclude that option between them is the rule, because their fruits are nondifferent. For vidyas such as ‘ He who consists of mind, whose body is prd^a;’ ‘ Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha ‘ He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true,’ have all of them equally the obtaining of the Lord for their fruit. —This does not affect our conclusion; for we see that it is allowed to proceed as one likes also with regard to certain sacrificial acts which are the means of obtaining the heavenly world, and thus have all of them the same result. It therefore remains a settled conclusion that in the case of vidyas one may proceed as one likes.
To this we reply as follows. There must be option between the vidyas, not cumulation, because they have the 28l same fruit. For the fruit of all of them is the intuition of the object meditated upon, and when this object, e. g. the Lord, has once been intuited through one meditation a second meditation would be purposeless. It would, more¬ over, be impossible even to effect an intuition through the cumulation of several meditations, since that would cause distraction of attention. And that the fruit of a vidya is to be effected through intuition various scriptural passages declare; cp. Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4, 4 He who has this faith and no doubt; ’ Bri. Up. IV, 1,3,* Having become a god he goes to the gods/ and others. Also Smrzti-passages such as Bha. Gita VIII, 6, and others.—One therefore has to select one of those vidyas the fruit of which is the same, and to remain intent on it until, through the intuition of the object to be meditated upon, the fruit of the vidya is obtained.
60. But (vidyas) connected with wishes may, according to one’s liking, be cumulated or not; on account of the absence of the former reason. The above Sutra supplies a counter-instance to the preceding Sutra.—We have, on the other hand, vidyas connected with definite wishes; as e. g. Kh. Up. Ill, 15, 2, 4 He who knows that the wind is the child of the regions never weeps for his sons;’ Kh. Up. VII, 1, 5, 4 He who meditates on name as Brahman, walks at will as far as name reaches.’ In these vidyas which, like actions, effect their own special results by means of their 4 unseen ’ Self, there is no reference to any intuition, and one therefore may, according to one’s liking, either cumulate them or not cumulate them; 4 on account of the absence of the former reason,’ i. e. because there is not the reason for option which was stated in the preceding Sutra.
61. With the (meditations on) members (of sacri¬ ficial acts) it is as with their abodes.
Are those meditations—enjoined in the three Vedas— which rest on members of sacrificial actions such as the udgitha to be superadded to each other, or may we proceed with regard to them as we like?—To this doubt the Sutra replies, ‘ it is according to the abodes/ As the abidingplaces of those meditations, viz. the Stotra and so on, are combined (for the performance of the sacrifice), so those meditations also. For a meditation is subject to what it rests on.
62. And on account of the teaching. As the Stotra and the other members of the sacrifice on which the meditations under discussion rest are taught in the three Vedas, so also the meditations resting on them. The meaning of this remark is that also as far as the mode of information is concerned there is no difference between the members of a sacrificial act and the meditations refer¬ ring to them.
63. On account of the rectification.
The passage, ‘From the seat of the Hot ri he sets right any mistake committed in the udgitha' ( Kh. Up. I, 5 > 5 )> declares that, owing to the might of the meditation on the unity of pra;zava and udgitha, the Hot ri sets right any mistake he may commit in his work, by means of the work of the Hot ri.
Now, as a meditation mentioned in one Veda is con¬ nected (with what is mentioned in another Veda) in the same way as a thing mentioned in another Veda, the above passage suggests the conclusion that all meditations on members of sacrificial acts—in whatever Veda they may be mentioned—have to be combined 1.
64. And because the text states a quality (of the vidya) to be common (to the three Vedas).
The text states that the syllable Om which is a quality, 1 A ‘ thing’ belonging to the AVg-veda, viz. the pra^ava, is, accord¬ ing to the ATMndogya-passage, connected with the Sama-veda meditation on the udgitha. Hence meditations also which belong to different Vedas may be combined; for there is no difference between them and things as far as connexion is concerned.
i.e. the abode of a meditation, is common to the three Vedas, ‘ By that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds. With Om the Adhvaryu gives orders, with Om the Hot ri recites, with Om the Udgatrz sings.’ This suggests that, as the abode of the vidya (viz. the O/^kara) is common, the vidyas which abide in it are common also.—Or else the Sutra may be explained as follows. If the udgitha and so on, which are matters qualifying the sacrificial action, were not all of them common to all sacrificial performances, the vidyas resting on them would not go together. But the scriptural passages which teach the sacrificial performances and extend over all subordinate matters, state that the udgitha and so on are common to all performances. As thus the abodes of the vidyas go together, the vidyas abiding in them go together likewise.
65. (The meditations on members of sacrificial actions are) rather not (to be combined), as the text does not state their going together. The words 1 rather not’ discard the purvapaksha. The meditations resting on members of actions are not to be treated like what they rest on, because scripture does not state their going together. Scripture actually states the going together of the Stotras and other subordinate members of sacrificial action which are enjoined in the three Vedas; cp. passages such as ‘After the taking of the graha or the raising of the ^amasa he performs the Stotra; ’ 6 After the Stotra he recites; ’ £ Prastotrz sing the Saman;’ £ Hot ri recite the Yd^ya for this;’ and so on. But, on the other hand, there are no analogous texts expressly teaching the going together of the meditations.— But the going together of the meditations is established by those texts which intimate the successive performance of the different constituent members of a sacrifice!—By no means, we reply. The meditations subserve the end of man, while the texts referred to by you establish only the going together of the udgitha and the like which subserve the purpose of the sacrifice. That the medita¬ tions on the udgitha and so on—although resting on VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
members of sacrificial acts—yet subserve the end of man only in the same way as the godohana vessel does, we have already explained under III, 3, 42.—And this very difference between members of sacrificial action and the meditations resting on them, viz. that the former subserve the purpose of the sacrifice while the latter subserve the end of man, is founded on the express teaching of scripture 1.—And the further two indicatory marks (pointed out by the purvapakshin in Sutras 63 and 64) supply no reason for the going together of the meditations, because no direct scriptural statement may be constructed from them. Nor 2 does the fact that in each sacrificial perform¬ ance all foundations of meditations are comprised, enable us to conclude that the meditations founded on them are to be combined also; for the meditations are not caused by what they rest on. The meditations, as resting on their foundations, would, it may be admitted, not exist if those foundations did not exist. But therefrom it does not follow that the going together of the foundations implies a necessary going together of the meditations; for as to this we have no direct scriptural statement.—From all this it results that the meditations may be performed according to one’s liking.
66. And because (scripture) shows it. Scripture moreover shows that the meditations do not go together, viz. in the following passage, ‘A Brahman priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the priests’ ( Kh. Up. IV, 17, 10). For if all meditations were to be combined, all priests would know them all, and the text could not specially announce that the Brahman priest possessing a certain knowledge thereby saves the others.—The meditations may there¬ fore, according to one’s liking, be either combined or optionally employed.
1 A remark refuting the averment made in Sfitra 62.
2 And this is meant to refute the second interpretation given of Sutra 64.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 2.
2 85 Reverence to the highest Self!
1. The purpose of man (is effected) thence (i. e. through the mere knowledge of Brahman), thus B&daraya na. opines. The Sutrakara at present enters on an inquiry whether the knowledge of the Self which is derived from the Upanishads, is connected with works through him who is entitled to perform the works 1, or is an independent means to accomplish the purpose of man. He begins by stating the final view in the above Sutra, ‘Thence’ &c. The teacher Badaraya//a is of opinion that thence, i. e. through the independent knowledge of Brahman enjoined in the Vedanta-texts, the purpose of man is effected.—Whence is this known?—‘From scripture/ which exhibits passages such as the following: ‘He who knows the Self overcomes grief’ ( Kh. Up. Ill, 4, 1); ‘ He who knows that highest Brahman becomes even Brahman ’ (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9); ‘ He who knows Brahman attains the Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); ‘ For him who has a teacher there is delay only so long as he is not delivered; then he will be perfect ’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2); ‘ He who has searched out and under¬ stands the Self which is free from sin, &c. &c., obtains all worlds and all desires’ (Kh. Up. VIII, J, 1); ‘The Self is to be seen ’ &c. up to ‘ Thus far goes immortality ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 5, 6-15). These and similar texts declare that mere knowledge effects the purpose of man.—Against this the opponent raises his voice as follows.
2. On account of (the Self) standing in a supple¬ mentary relation (to action), (the statements as to 1 The purvapakshin (see next Sutra) maintains that the know¬ ledge of the Self is subordinate to (sacrificial) action through the mediation of the agent, i. e. in so far as it imparts to the agent a certain qualification.
the fruits of the knowledge of the Self) are artha¬ vadas, as in other cases, thus Gaimini opines. As the Self, in consequence of its being the agent, stands in a supplementary relation to action, the knowledge of the Self also is connected with action through the mediation of its object, analogously to the case of the sprinkling of the rice-grains with water; hence as the purpose of the know¬ ledge of the Self is understood thereby, the statements of the text about the fruits of that knowledge are mere artha¬ vadas. Such is the opinion of the teacher Gaimini 1. The case is analogous to that of other textual statements as to the fruits of certain materials, sa^skaras and works; which statements have likewise to be understood as arthavadas. Cp. the passage, ‘ He whose sacrificial ladle is made of par;za-wood hears no evil sound; 5 c By anointing his eye he wards off the eye of the enemy; ’ ‘ By making the praya^a and anuya^a-oblations he makes an armour for the sacrifice, an armour for the sacrificer so that he over¬ comes his enemies 2 /—But how can it be supposed that 1 The contention of the purvapakshin—Gaimini—is that the knowledge of the Self has no independent fruit of its own, because it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. This rela¬ tion is mediated by the Self-—the object of knowledge—which is the agent in all action, and therefore itself stands in a subordinate relation to action. By learning that his Self will outlive the body the agent becomes qualified for actions, the fruit of which will only appear after death. The qualification the Self thus acquires is analogous to that which the rice-grains acquire by being sprinkled with water; for only through this latter act of ceremonial modifica¬ tion (or purification, sawskara) they become fit to be used in the sacrifice.—As the knowledge of the Self thus has no independent position, it cannot have an independent fruit of its own, and con¬ sequently the passages which state such fruits cannot be taken as ‘injunctions of fruits/ but merely as arthavadas, making some additional statement about the fruit of the sacrificial actions to which the knowledge of the Self is auxiliary.
2 The material, i. e. the ladle made of par^a-wood, is auxiliary to the sacrifice, and the fruit which the text ascribes to it (viz. hearing no evil sound) therefore has to be viewed as a fruit of