to it. For the only work enjoined on him by his Israma is the state of being firmly grounded in Brahman, wherein he is strengthened by restraint of the senses and so on— just as sacrifices and the like are prescribed for the other dramas—and loss he incurs only by neglecting that work. In agreement herewith texts from scripture and Smrzti declare that for him who is grounded in Brahman there are no works. Compare ‘ Renunciation is Brahman; for Brahman is the highest; for the highest is Brahman; above those lower penances, indeed, there rises renuncia¬ tion; * ‘ Those anchorites who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the Vedanta and have purified their nature by the Yoga of renunciation ’ (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 6); and similar scriptural passages. And Smrzti-texts to the same effect, such as ‘ They whose minds are fixed on him, who have their Self in him, their stand on him, their end in him’ (Bha. Gita V, 17). All these passages teach that for him who is founded on Brahman there are no works. From this there also follows the non-validity of the second objection raised above, viz. that the mendicant’s reaching immortality through the mere stage of life in which he stands would imply the uselessness of knowledge. —In this way we understand that, although there is a reference to the other stages of life, that which is indicated by the quality of being grounded in Brahman is the state of the wandering mendicant.
This whole discussion has been carried on by the teacher without taking into account the text of the Uabalas, which enjoins the other stage of life. But there exists that text which directly enjoins the other stage, ‘ Having completed his studentship he is to become a householder; having been a householder he is to become a dweller in the forest; having been a dweller in the forest he is to wander forth; or else he may wander forth from the student’s state; or from the house; or from the forest.’ Nor can this text be interpreted as referring to those who are not qualified for works; for it states no difference, and there is a separate injunction (of the parivra^ya-state) for those who are not qualified, viz. in the passage, £ May he have taken vows upon himself or not, may he be a snataka or not, may he be one whose fire has gone out or one who has no fire/ &c. That the text does not refer to such only as are not qualified for works, further follows from the fact that the state of the mendicant is meant to subserve the development of the knowledge of Brahman 1, as scripture declares, ‘The wandering mendicant, with colourless dress, shaven, wifeless, pure, guileless, living on alms, qualifies himself for the intuition of Brahman.’—From all this it follows that the stages of life for which chastity is obligatory are established by scripture, and that know¬ ledge—because enjoined on persons who have entered on those stages—is independent of works.
21. If it be said that (texts such as the one about the udgitha are) mere glorification, on account of their reference (to parts of sacrifices); we deny that, on account of the newness (of what they teach, if viewed as injunctions).
‘That udgitha is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the highest place, the eighth’ (Kk. Up. I, 1, 3); ‘This earth is the Rik, the fire is Saman’ (Kk. Up. I, 6, 1); ‘This world in truth is that piled-up fire-altar’ (.Sat. Bra. X, 1, 2, 2); ‘That hymn is truly that earth’ (Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 1); with reference to these and other similar passages a doubt arises whether they are meant to glorify the udgitha and so on, or to enjoin devout meditations.
The purvapakshin maintains that their aim is glorifica¬ tion, because the text exhibits them with reference to subordinate members of sacrificial actions, such as the udgitha and so on. They are, he says, analogous to passages such as ‘ This earth is the ladle; ’ ‘ the sun is the tortoise; ’ ‘ the heavenly world is the Ahavaniya,’ whose 1 Which has to be acquired in the regular prescribed way of Brahmanical studentship. aim it is to glorify the ladle and so on. To this the Sutrakara replies as follows. We have no right to consider the purpose of those passages to be mere glorification, on account of the newness. If they aim at injunction, a new matter is enjoined by them; if, on the other hand, they aimed at glorification they would be devoid of meaning. For, as explained in the Pu. Mim. Sfi., glorificatory passages are of use in so far as entering into a comple¬ mentary relation to injunctive passages; but the passages under discussion are incapable of entering into such a relation to the udgitha and so on which are enjoined in altogether different places of the Veda, and would there¬ fore be purposeless as far as glorification is concerned. Passages such as ‘ This earth is the ladle ’ are not analogous because they stand in proximity to injunctive passages.—Therefore texts such as those under discussion have an injunctive purpose.
22. And on account of the words expressive of becoming.
Moreover the text exhibits words of clearly injunctive meaning, in connexion with the passages quoted above, viz. ‘Let him meditate on the udgitha’ ( Kh. Up. I, 1, i); ‘Let him meditate on the S&man 9 (Kh. Up. II, 2, i); ‘Let him think: I am the hymn’ (Ait. Ar. II, i, 6). Now these injunctive forms would be rendered futile by the assumption of the texts under discussion aiming at glorification only. Compare the following saying of those who know Ny&ya, ‘ Let him do, let it be done, it is to be done, let it become, let it be; these forms are in all Vedas the settled signs of injunction/ What they mean thereby is that injunction is the sense of all potential, imperative, &c., verbal forms.—Moreover in each of the sections to which the passages under discussion belong the text states special fruits, ‘He becomes indeed a fulfiller of desires’ ( Kh. Up. I, i, 7); ‘He is able to obtain wishes through his song’ [Kh. Up. I, 7, 9); ‘The worlds in an ascending and a descending line belong to him* [Kh. Up. II, 2, 3). For this reason also the texts about the udgitha and so on are meant to enjoin devout meditations.
23. (The stories told in the Upanishads) are for the purpose of the pariplava; we deny this on account of (certain stories only) being specified. ‘ Ya^vzavalkya had two wives, Maitreyi and Katyayani’ (B ri. Up. IV, 5, 1); ‘ Pratardana, forsooth, the son of Divodasa came to the beloved abode of Indra 5 (Kau. Up. Ill, 1); ‘There lived once upon a time Ganairuti Pautraya^a, who was a pious giver, giving much and keeping open house’ ( Kh. Up. IV, 1,1); with regard to these and similar stories met with in the Vedanta portions of scripture there arises a doubt whether they are meant to subserve the performance of the pariplava 1, or to introduce the vidyas standing in proximity to them.
The purvapakshin maintains that those scriptural stories subserve the pariplava because they are stories like others, and because the telling of stories is enjoined for the pari¬ plava. And from this it follows that the Vedanta-texts do not chiefly aim at knowledge, because like mantras they stand in a complementary relation to sacrificial per¬ formances.
This conclusion we deny ‘ on account of the specifica¬ tion.’ Under the heading ‘he is to recite the pariplava, 5 scripture specifies certain definite stories such as that of ‘Manu Vivasvat’s son the king.’ If, now, for the reason that all tales as such are alike, all tales were admitted for the pariplava, the mentioned specification would be devoid of meaning. We therefore conclude that those scriptural stories are not meant to be told at the pariplava.
24. This follows also from the connexion (of the stories with the vidyas) in one coherent whole.
And as thus the stories do not subserve the pariplava it 1 I.e. have to be recited at stated intervals during the year occupied by the ajvamedha sacrifice.
is appropriate to assume that they are meant to bring nearer to our understanding the approximate vidyas with which they are seen to form connected wholes; for they serve to render the latter more acceptable and facilitate their comprehension. In the Maitreyi-brahmazza we see that the story forms a whole with the vidya beginning, ‘ The Self indeed is to be seen,’ &c.; in the account of Pratardana with the vidya, T am prazza, the conscious Self;' in the legend of Cana^ruti with the vidya, ‘Air indeed is the end of all.’ The case of all these stories is analogous to that of stories met with in scriptural texts referring to works, whose purpose is the glorification of injunctions standing in proximity; as e.g. ‘ He cut out his own omentum.’—The stories under discus¬ sion therefore do not subserve the pariplava.
25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire and so on.
The expression ‘ For this very same reason ’ must be viewed as taking up Sutra III, 4, 1, because thus a satis¬ factory sense is established. For this very same reason, i.e. because knowledge subserves the purpose of man, the lighting of the sacrificial fire and similar works which are enjoined on the different asramas are not to be observed, since man’s purpose is effected through knowledge.
The Sutrakara thus sums up the result of the first adhikarazza, intending to make some further remarks. 26. And there is need of all (works), on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like; as in the case of the horse.
We now consider whether knowledge has absolutely no need of the works enjoined on the different asramas, or whether it has some need of them. Under the preceding Sutra we have arrived at the conclusion that as knowledge effects its own end the works enjoined on the asramas are absolutely not required. With reference to this point the present Sutra now remarks that knowledge has regard for all works enjoined on the a^ramas, and that there is not absolute non-regard.—But do not the two Sutras thus contradict each other?—By no means, we reply. Know¬ ledge having once sprung up requires no help towards the accomplishment of its fruit, but it does stand in need of something else with a view to its own origination.—Why so?—On account of the scriptural statements of sacrifices and so on. For the passage, ‘ Him Brahma^as seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22), declares that sacrifices and so on are means of knowledge, and as the text connects them with the ‘seeking to know, 5 we conclude that they are, more especially, means of the origination of knowledge. Similarly the passage, ‘What people call sacrifice that is really brahma^arya’ ( Kh. Up. VIII, 5, 1), by connecting sacrifices and so on with brahma^arya which is a means of knowledge, intimates that sacrifices &c. also are means of knowledge. Again the passage, ‘That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances proclaim, desiring which men live as religious students, that word I tell thee briefly, it is Om 5 (Ka. Up. I, 2, 15), likewise intimates that the works enjoined on the a^ramas are means of knowledge. Similarly Smriti says, ‘ Works are the washing away of uncleanliness, but knowledge is the highest way. When the impurity has been removed, then knowledge begins to act.’
The phrase, ‘as in the case of the horse, 5 supplies an illustration on the ground of suitability. As the horse, owing to its specific suitability, is not employed for dragging ploughs but is harnessed to chariots; so the works enjoined on the a^ramas are not required by know¬ ledge for bringing about its results, but with a view to its own origination.
27. But all the same he (who is desirous of know¬ ledge) must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the senses, &c., since those (states) are enjoined as auxiliaries to that (viz. knowledge), and must (on that account) necessarily be accomplished.
x 2 3°8 Perhaps somebody might think that we have no right to look upon sacrifices and the like as means of knowledge because there is no injunction to that effect. For a passage like ‘ By sacrifice they seek to know ’ is of the nature of an anuvada, and therefore does not aim at enjoining sacrifices but rather at glorifying knowledge, ‘ so glorious is know¬ ledge that they seek to obtain it through sacrifices and the like/ But even should this be so the seeker for knowledge must possess calmness of mind, must subdue his senses and so on; for all this is enjoined as a means of knowledge in the following scriptural passage, ‘Therefore he who knows this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, sees self in Self 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 23). And what is enjoined must necessarily be carried out.—But in the above passage also we observe only a statement as to something actually going on—‘ Having become calm, &c., he sees/ not an injunction!—Not so, we reply. The introductory word ‘ therefore 5 which expresses praise of the subject under discussion makes us understand that the passage has an injunctive character 1.
Moreover the text of the Madhyandinas directly reads ‘let him see 5 (not ‘he sees’). Hence calmness of mind and so on are required even if sacrifices, &c., should not be required.—Sacrifices and so on, however, are required likewise, because (as said in Sutra 26) scripture teaches them.—But it has been said that in the passage, ‘ Him they seek to know by sacrifices/ no injunction is observed!— True; but nevertheless we must assume the passage to be an injunction, because the connexion of the search for knowledge with sacrifices and so on is something new; i.e. is not established by another text, and therefore the 1 For if there were no injunction, the praise would be without meaning. The ‘ therefore 5 connects the passage with the pre¬ ceding clause, ‘ he is not sullied by any evil deed. 5 The sense then is, ‘ Because he who knows the Self as described before is not sullied by any evil deed, therefore let him, after having become calm, &c., see the Self, and so on/ passage under discussion cannot be an anuvada referring to it. The case is analogous to that of passages such as ‘ therefore Pushan 1 receives a well-crushed share of food, for he is toothless.’ There also no injunction is directlystated; but as the matter of the passage is new we assume an injunction and understand that the grains for Pushan are to be crushed at all vikrztis of the danrapur/zamasa; as was explained in the Purva Mimciz^sa.
An analogous conclusion was arrived at under Sutra 20.—Smrztis also such as the Bhagavadgita explain that sacrifices and the like if undertaken without a view to their special results become for him who is desirous of final release a means of knowledge. Hence sacrifices and the like, on the one hand, and calmness of mind and so on, on the other hand, according to the airamas, i.e. all works enjoined on the a^ramas must be had regard to with a view to the springing up of knowledge. Calmness of mind, &c., are, on account of the expression ‘ he who knows this ’ connecting them with knowledge, to be viewed as approxi¬ mate—direct—means of knowledge, while sacrifices and so on which scripture connects with the search of knowledge are to be looked upon as remote—indirect—means.
28. And there is permission of all food, (only) in the case of danger of life; on account of this being shown (by scripture).
In the colloquy of the pranas the AVzandogas record, 4 To him who knows this there is nothing which is not food’ (Kh. Up. V, 1, 2); and the Va^asaneyins,‘ By him nothing is eaten that is not food, nothing is received that is not food * (B ri. Up. VI, 1, 14). The sense of the two passages is that anything may be eaten by him.—A doubt here arises whether the texts enjoin the permission of eating anything 1 The passage quoted occurs in the Veda under the heading of the danrapfirzzamasa. But as Pushan has no share in the funda¬ mental form of that sacrifice, we conclude that the injunction implied in the passage is valid for those vikntis of the dampurzzamasa in which offerings are made to Pfishan.
3 i° vedanta-s£jtras. as an auxiliary to knowledge—as calmness of mind, &c., are—or mention them for the purpose of glorification.— The purvapakshin maintains that the passages are injunc¬ tions because thus we gain an instruction which causes a special kind of activity. What, therefore, the text teaches is the non-operation of a definite rule, in so far as auxiliary to the knowledge of the prazzas in proximity to which it is taught.—But this interpretation implies the sublation of the scriptural rules as to the distinction of lawful and unlawful food!—Such sublation, we reply, is possible, because the present case is one of general rule and special exception. The prohibition of doing harm to any living creature is sublated by the injunction of the killing of the sacrificial animal; the general rule which distinguishes between such women as may be approached and such as may not, is sublated by the text prescribing, with reference to the knowledge of the Vamadevya, that no woman is to be avoided (‘ Let him avoid no woman, that is the vow,’ Kh. Up. II, 13, 2 ); analogously the passage which enjoins, with reference to the knowledge of the prazzas, the eating of all food may sublate the general rule as to the distinction of lawful and unlawful food.
To this we reply as follows. The permission to eat any food whatever is not enjoined, since the passages do not contain any word of injunctive power; for the clause, ‘To him who knows this there is nothing,’ &c., expresses only something actually going on. And where the conception of an injunction does not naturally arise we may not assume one from the mere wish of something causing a special line of activity. Moreover the text says that ‘ for him who knows this there is nothing that is not food,’ only after having said that everything even unto dogs and the like is food for the Prazza. Now food such as dogs and the like cannot be enjoyed by the human body; but all this can be thought of as food of the Prazza. From this it follows that the passage is an arthavada meant to glorify the knowledge of the food of the Prazza, not an injunction of the permission of all food.—This the Sutra indicates in the words, ‘ and there is permission of all food in danger of life.’ That means: Only in danger of life, in cases of highest need, food of any kind is permitted to be eaten. 4 On account of scripture showing this.’ For scripture shows that the rishi iTakraya^a when in evil plight proceeded to eat unlawful food. In the brahma^a beginning, 4 when the Kurus had been destroyed by hail¬ stones/ it is told how the rishi iTakraya^a having fallen into great wretchedness ate the beans half eaten by a chief, but refused to drink what had been offered on the ground of its being a mere leaving; and explained his proceeding as follows: 4 I should not have lived if I had not eaten them; but water I can drink wherever I like.’ And again on the following day he ate the stale beans left by himself and another person. Scripture, in thus showing how the stale leaving of a leaving was eaten, intimates as its principle that in order to preserve one’s life when in danger one may eat even unlawful food. That, on the other hand, in normal circumstances not even a man possessing knowledge must do this, appears from K& kraya^a’s refusing to drink.—From this it follows that the passage, 4 For to him who knows this/ &c., is an arthavada.
29. And on account of the non-sublation.
And thus those scriptural passages which distinguish lawful and unlawful food,—such as Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2, 4 When the food is pure the whole nature becomes pure/— are non-sublated.
30. And this is said in Smrz’ti also. That in cases of need both he who knows and he who does not know may eat any food Smrzti also states; compare e.g. 4 He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.’—On the other hand, many passages teach that unlawful food is to be avoided. 4 Intoxicating liquor the Brahma^a must permanently forego; 5 4 Let them pour boiling spirits down the throat of the Brahma^a who drinks spirits; ’ 4 Spirit-drinking worms grow in the mouth of the spirit-drinking man, because he enjoys what is unlawful. 5 31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according to liking.
There is also a scriptural passage prohibiting unlawful food, the purpose of which it is to stop procedure therein according to one’s liking, viz. in the Sa^hita of the Ka/Zzas, ‘ Therefore a Brahma;za is not to drink spirits. 5 This text also is more appropriate if we take the passage, ‘To him who knows this,’ as an arthavada.—Hence passages of that kind are arthavadas, not injunctions.
32. The works of the airamas (are incumbent on him) also (who does not desire release); because they are enjoined. Under Sutra 26 it has been proved that the works enjoined on the a^ramas are means of knowledge. Now we will consider whether those works have to be performed also by him who does not desire final release and therefore takes his stand on his ajrama merely without wishing for knowledge.—Here the purvapakshin maintains that as the works incumbent on the a^ramas are enjoined as means of knowledge by the passage, ‘ Him the Br&hma/zas seek to know by the study of the Veda’ &c., the works of per¬ manent obligation are not to be performed by him who, not desirous of knowledge, wishes for some other fruit. Or else they are to be performed by him also; but then they cannot be means of knowledge, since it would be contradictory to attribute to them a permanent and a non¬ permanent connexion k Against this conclusion the Sutrakara remarks that the works of permanent obligation are to be performed by 1 I. e. we must not think that because they enjoin the ‘ nityata ’ of certain works, other passages may not enjoin the same works as mere means of knowledge.
3 T 3 him only who, not desirous of release, takes his stand on the ajramas merely, because they are enjoined by texts such ‘ as long as his life lasts he is to offer the agnihotra.’ For to such texts no excessive weight must be ascribed.— The next Sutra replies to the objection raised above in the words, ‘ but then they cannot be means of knowledge. 5 33. And through the co-operativeness (of the works towards the origination of knowledge).
Those works are also co-operative with knowledge just because they are enjoined as such, viz. in passages such as 4 Him the Brahma/zas seek to know by the study of the Veda, 5 &c. This has been explained under Sutra 26. Nor must you think that the texts stating the co-operation of the works of the a^ramas towards knowledge refer to the fruit of knowledge, as e. g. the offerings called praya^as co-operate towards the fruit of the danrapurzzamasa of which they are auxiliary members; for knowledge is not charac¬ terised by injunction, and the fruit of knowledge is not to be effected by means. Means characterised by injunctions such as the danrapur/zamasa-sacrifice which aim at bringing about certain fruits such as the heavenly world require other (subordinate) means co-operating towards the fruit (such as the praya^as). But not so knowledge. Compare on this point Sutra 25. Therefore texts stating the co¬ operation of works (with knowledge) have to be interpreted as stating that works are means for the origination of knowledge.—Nor need we fear that thus there arises a contradiction of permanent and non-permanent connexion. For there may be difference of connexion even where there is no difference of work. One connexion is permanent, resting on the texts about the life-long performance of the agnihotra and so on; of this knowledge is not the result. The other connexion is non-permanent, resting on texts such as f Him the Brahmazzas seek to know, 5 &c.; of this knowledge is the result. The case is analogous to that of the one khadira, which through a permanent connexion serves the purpose of the sacrifice, and through a non¬ permanent connexion the purpose of man.
3 H vedanta-s6tras.
34. In any case the same (duties have to be per¬ formed) on account of the twofold indicatory marks.
In any case, i. e. whether viewed as duties incumbent on the a^ramas or as co-operating with knowledge, the very same agnihotra and other duties have to be performed.— What, it may be asked, does the teacher wish to preclude by the emphatic expression ‘the very same?’—The sus¬ picion, we reply, that those works might be separate works 1. In the ayana of the Ku^apayins indeed the injunctive statement, ‘ They offer the agnihotra for a month 2 / enjoins a sacrifice different from the permanent (ordinary) agnihotra; but in our present case there is no analogous separation of works.—Why?—On account of the twofold indicatory mark; i. e. on account of both scripture and Smrzti supplying indicatory marks. In the first place, the scriptural passage, c Him the Brahma^as seek to know through the study of the Veda,' &c., directs that sacrifices and the like—as things already established and the form of which is already in existence (viz. through previous in¬ junctions)—are to be employed as means in the search for knowledge; and does not originate a new form of those works, while the passage quoted above, ‘ They offer the agnihotra for a month/ does originate a new separate sacrifice.—In the second place the Smrzti-passage, ‘ He who performs the work to be done without aiming at the fruit of the work/ shows that the very same work which is already known as something to be performed subserves the origination of knowledge. Moreover the Smrzti-passage, ‘ He who is qualified by those forty-eight purifications/ &c., refers to the purifications required for Vedic works, with a view to the origination of knowledge in him who has undergone those purifications.—The Sutrak&ra therefore rightly emphasizes the non-difference of the works.
1 That the works referred to in the Upanishads as means of knowledge, might be works altogether different from those enjoined in the karmaka^a as means of bringing about certain special results such as the heavenly world.
35. And scripture also declares that (those per¬ forming works) are not overpowered (by passion and the like).
This Sutra points out a further indicatory mark fortifying the conclusion that works co-operate towards knowledge. Scripture also shows that he who is furnished with such means as Brahma^arya, &c., is not overpowered by such afflictions as passion and the like. Compare the passage, £ That Self does not perish which they find out by Brahma-£arya ’ (Kk. Up. VIII, 5, 3).—It is thus a settled conclusion that sacrifices and so on are works incumbent on the asramas as well as co-operative towards knowledge.
36. But also (persons standing) between (are qualified for knowledge); for that is seen (in scrip¬ ture). A doubt arises whether persons in want who do not possess means, &c., and therefore are not able to enter one or the other of the ajramas, standing between as it were, are qualified for knowledge or not.—They are not qualified, the purvapakshin maintains. For we have ascer¬ tained that the works incumbent on the asramas are the cause of knowledge, and those persons have no opportunity to perform those works.—To this the Sutrakara replies, 4 But also between/ Even a person who because he does not belong to an asrama stands between, as it were, is qualified for knowledge. ‘ For that is seen.’ For we meet with scriptural passages declaring that persons of that class—such as Raikva and the daughter of Va^aknu— possessed the knowledge of Brahman (Kh. Up. IV, 1; Bri. Up. Ill, 6, 8).
37. This is stated in Smnti also.
It is recorded in itihasas also how Sa?/zvarta and others who paid no regard to the duties incumbent on the asramas, in going naked and so on, became great Yogins all the same.—But the instances quoted from scripture and Smrz’ti furnish merely indicatory marks; what then is 3*6 vedanta-s£jtras.
the final conclusion?—That conclusion is stated in the next Sutra.
38. And the promotion (of knowledge is bestowed on them) through special acts. Also for widowers, &c., the favour of knowledge is possible through special acts of duty, such as praying, fasting, propitiation of divinities, &c., which are not opposed to their ajrama-less condition and may be performed by any man as such. Thus Smrzti says, ‘ By mere prayer no doubt the Brahmam perfects himself. May he perform other works or not, the kindhearted one is called Brahmae’ (Manu Sa;/zh. II, 87), which passage shows that where the works of the airamas are not possible prayer qualifies for knowledge. Moreover knowledge may be promoted by Israma works performed in previous births. Thus Smrz’ti also declares, c Perfected by many births he finally goes the highest way’ (Bha. Gita VI, 45); which passage shows that the aggregate of the different purifi¬ catory ceremonies performed in former births promotes knowledge. — Moreover knowledge—as having a seen result (viz. the removal of ignorance)—qualifies any one who is desirous of it for learning and so on, through the mere absence of obstacles *. Hence there is no contra¬ diction in admitting qualification for knowledge on the part of widowers and the like.
39. Better than this is the other (state of be¬ longing to an airama), on account of the indicatory marks. ‘Than this/ i. e. ‘than standing between/ a better means of knowledge it is to stand within one of the a^ramas, since this is confirmed by Nruti and Smrz'ti. For scripture supplies an indicatory mark in the passage, c On that path goes whoever knows Brahman and who has done holy 1 I.e. any one who wishes to learn may do so, if only there is no obstacle in the way. No special injunction is wanted.
works (as prescribed for the asramas) and obtained splen¬ dour’ (B ru Up. IV, 4, 9); and Smrzti in the passage, ‘Let a Brahma^a stay not one day even outside the cLsrama; having stayed outside for a year he goes to utter ruin. 5 40. But of him who has become that (i.e. entered on a higher asrama) there is no becoming not that (i.e. descending to a lower one), according to (Taimini also, on account of restrictive rule, absence of such like (i.e. statements of descent), and non¬ existence (of good custom).
It has been established that there are stages of life for which chastity is obligatory. A doubt here arises whether one who has entered them may for some reason or other fall from them or not.—The purvapakshin main¬ tains that as there is no difference a person may descend to a lower stage, either from the wish of well performing the duties of that stage, or influenced by passion and the like.—To this we reply as follows, ‘ Of him who has become that,’ i. e. of him who has reached the stages for which chastity is obligatory, there is no ‘becoming not that,’ i.e. descending thence.—Why?—‘ On account of restrictive rule, absence of such like, and non-existence.’