Anseltn. In four ways can God create man, viz., either of man and woman, in the common way; or neither of man nor woman, as he created Adam; or of man without woman, as he made Eve; or of woman CUR DEUS HOMO. 249 without man, which thus far he has never done. Wherefore, in order to show that this last mode is also under his power, and was reserved for this very purpose, what more fitting than that he should take that man whose origin we are seeking from a woman without a man? Now whether it be more worthy that he be born of a virgin, or one not a virgin, we need not discuss, but must affirm, beyond all doubt, that the God-man should be born of a virgin.
Boso. Your speech gratifies my heart.
Anselm. Does what we have said appear sound, or is it unsubstantial as a cloud, as you have said infidels declare?
Boso. Nothing can be more sound.
Anselm. Paint not, therefore, upon baseless empti- ness, but upon solid truth, and tell how clearly fitting it is that, as man's sin and the cause of our condemna- tion sprung from a woman, so the cure of sin and the source of our salvation should also be found in a woman. And that women may not despair of attain- ing the inheritance of the blessed, because that so dire an evil arose from woman, it is proper that from woman also so great a blessing should arise, that their hopes may be revived. Take also this view. If it was a virgin which brought all evil upon the human race, it is much more appropriate that a virgin should be the occasion of all good. And this also. If woman, whom God made from man alone, was made of a vir- gin (de virgine), it is peculiarly fitting for that man also, who shall spring from a woman, to be born of a woman without man. Of the pictures which can be superadded to this, showing that the God-man ought to be born of a virgin, we will say nothing. These are sufficient.
250 ANSELM.
Boso. They are certainly very beautiful and rea- sonable.
CHAPTER IX.
How of necessity the Word only can nnite in one person with man.
Anselm. Now must we inquire further, in what person God, who exists in three persons, shall take upon himself the nature of man. For a plurality of persons cannot take one and the same man into a unity of person. Wherefore in one person only can this be done. But, as respects this personal unity of God and man, and in which of the Divine persons this ought to be effected, I have expressed myself, as far as I think needful for the present inquiry, in a let- ter on the Incarnation of the Word, addressed to my lord, the Pope Urban.
Boso. Yet briefly glance at this matter, why the person of the Son should be incarnated rather than that of the Father or the Holy Spirit.
Anselm. If one of the other persons be incarnated, there will be two sons in the Trinity, viz., the Son of God, who is the Son before the incarnation, and he also who, by the incarnation, will be the son of the virgin; and among the persons which ought always to be equal there will be an inequality as respects the dignity of birth. For the one born of God will have a nobler birth than he who is born of the virgin. Like- wise, if the Father become incarnate, there will be two grandsons in the Trinity; for the Father, by as- suming humanity, will be the grandson of the parents v: of the virgin, and the Word, though having nothing to do with man, will yet be the grandson of the vir- gin, since he will be the son of her son. But all these CUR DEUS HOMO. 25 1 CUR DEUS HOMO. 25 1 tilings are incongruous and do not pertain to the in- carnation of the Word. And there is yet another rea- son which renders it more fitting for the Son to be- come incarnate than the other persons. It is, that for the Son to pray to the Father is more proper than lor any other person of the Trinity to supplicate his fellow. Moreover, man, for whom he was to pray, and the devil, whom he was to vanquish, have both put on a false likeness to God by their own will. Wherefore they have sinned, as it were, especially against the person of the Son, who is believed to be the very image of God. Wherefore the punishment or pardon of guilt is with peculiar propriety ascribed to him upon whom chiefly the injury was inflicted. Since, therefore, infallible reason has brought us to this necessary conclusion, that the Divine and human natures must unite in one person, and that this is evi- dently more fitting in respect to the person of the Word than the other persons, we determine that God the Word must unite with man in one person.
Boso. The way by which you lead me is so guarded by reason that I cannot deviate from it to the right or left.
Aiwlm. It is not I who lead you, but he of whom we are speaking, without whose guidance we have no power to keep the way of truth.
CHAPTER X.
How this man dies not of debt; and in what sense he can or can- not sin; and how neither he nor an angel deserves praise for their holiness, if it is impossible for them to sin.
Anselm. We ought not to question whether this i»ftn was about to die as a debt, as all other men do.
252 ANSELM.
For, if Adam would not have died had he not com- mitted sin, much less should this man suffer death, in whom there can be no sin, for he is God.
Boso. Let me delay you a little on this point. For in either case it is no slight question with me whether it be said that he can sin or that he cannot. For if it be said that he cannot sin, it should seem hard to be believed. For to say a word concerning him, not as of one who never existed in the manner we have spoken hitherto, but as of one whom we know and whose deeds we know; who, I say, will deny that he could have done many things which we call sinful? < For, to say nothing of other things, how shall we say that it was not possible for him to commit the sin of lying? For, when he says to the Jews, of his Father: "If I say that I know him not, I shall be a liar, like unto you," and, in this sentence, makes use of the words: "I know him not," who says that he could not have uttered these same four words, or express- ing the same thing differently, have declared, " I know him not?" Now had he done so, he would have been a liar, as he himself says, and therefore a sinner. Therefore, since he could do this, he could sin.
Anselm. It is true that he could say this, and also that he could not sin.
Boso, How is that?
Anselm. All power follows the will. For, when I say that I can speak or walk, it is understood, if I choose. For, if the will be not implied as acting, there is no power, but only necessity. For, when I say that I can be dragged or bound unwillingly, this is not my power, but necessity and the power of an- other; since I am able to be dragged or bound in no other sense than this, that another can drag or bind CUR DEUS HOMO. 253 me. So we can say of Christ, that he could lie, so long as we understand, if he chose to do so. And, since he could not lie unwillingly and could not wish to lie, none the less can it be said that he could not lie. So in this way it is both true that he could and could not lie.
Boso. Now let us return to our original inquiry with regard to that man, as if nothing were known of him. I say, then, if he were unable to sin, because, according to you, he could not wish to sin, he main* tains holiness of necessity, and therefore he will not be holy from free will. What thanks, then, will he de- serve for his holiness? For we are accustomed to say that God made man and angel capable of sinning on this account, that, when of their own free will they maintained holiness, though they might have aban- doned it, they might deserve commendation and re- ward, which they would not have done had they been necessarily holy.
Anselm. Are not the angels worthy of praise, though unable to commit sin?
Boso. Doubtless they are, because they deserved this present inability to sin from the fact that when they could sin they refused to do so, Anselm. What say you with respect to G'xl, who cannot sin, and yet has not deserved thi», by refuting to sin when he had the power? Mu*t not he be praised for his holiness?
Boso. I should like to have yon answer that /jije*- tion for me; lor HI say that he de*>ef v * no \ttnw. f 1 know that I speak fairly. If, on the tAhtt hnuA, 1 say that he does deserve ptziv, J *m uU*ri o\ to- validating my reasoning with n+p+j.i \o th* nn^U.
Anselm. The aisgeh are w/4 to \m pttwl lot iUwt 254 ANSELM.
holiness because they could si»> but because it is owing to themselves, in a certain sense, that now they cannot sin. And in this respect are they in a measure like God, who has,, from himself, whatever be pos- sesses. For a person is said to give a thing,, who does, not take it away when he can; and to do a thing is but the same as not to prevent it, when that is in one's power. When, therefore, the angel could depart from holiness and yet did not, and could make, himself un- holy yet did not, we say with propriety that he con- ferred virtue upon himself and made himself holy. In this sense, therefore, has he holiness of himself (for the creature cannot have it of himself in any other way), and, therefore, should be praised for his holi- ness, because he is not holy of necessity but freely; for that is improperly called necessity which involves neither compulsion nor restraint. Wherefore, since whatever God has he has perfectly of himself, he is most of all to be praised for the good things which he possesses and maintains not by any necessity, but, as before said, by his own infinite unchangeableness. Therefore, likewise, that man who will be also God, since every good thing which he possesses comes from himself, will be holy not of necessity but voluntarily, and, therefore, will deserve praise. For, though hu- man nature will have what it has from the Divine na- ture, yet it will likewise have it from itself, since the two natures will be united in one person.
Boso. You have satisfied me on this point; and I see clearly that it is both true that he could not sin, and yet that he deserves praise for his holiness. But now I think the question arises, since God could make such a man, why he did not create angels and our CUR DEUS HOMO. 255 first parents so as to be incapable of sin, and yet praiseworthy for their holiness?
Anselm. Do you know what you are saying?
Boso. I think I understand, and it is therefore I ask why he did not make them so.
Anselm. Because it was neither possible nor right for any one of them to be the same with God, as we say that man was. And if you ask why he did not bring the three persons^ or at least the Word, into unity with men at that time, I answer: Because rea- son did not at all demand any such thing then, but wholly forbade it, for God does nothing without rea- son.
Boso. I blush to have asked the question. Go on with what you have to say. j Anselm. We must conclude, then, that he should not be subject to death, inasmuch as be will not be a sinner.
Boso. I must agree with you.
CHAPTER XI.
How Christ dies of his own power, and how mortality does not in- here in the essential nature of man.
Anselm. Now, also, it remains to inquire whether, as man's nature is, it is possible for that man to die?
Boso. We need hardly dispute with regard to this, since he will be really man, and every man is by na- ( ture mortal.
Anselm. I do not think mortality inheres in the essential nature of man, but only as corrupted. Since, had man never sinned, and had his immortality been unchangeably confirmed, he would have been as really man; and, when the dying rise again, incorruptible, 256 ANSELM.
they will no less be really men. For, if mortality was an essential attribute of human nature, then he who was immortal could not be man. Wherefore, neither corruption nor incorruption belong essentially to hu- man nature, for neither makes nor destroys a man; but happiness accrues to him from the one, and misery from the other. But since all men die, mortality is included in the definition of man, as given by philos- ophers, for they have never even believed in the pos- sibility of man's being immortal in all respects. And so it is not enough to prove that that man ought to be subject to death, for us to say that he will be in all respects a man.
Boso. Seek then for some other reason, since I know of none, if you do not, by which we may prove that he can die.
Anseltn. We may not doubt that, as he will be God, he will possess omnipotence.
Boso. Certainly. Arts elm. He can, then, if he chooses, lay down his life and take it again.
Boso. If not, he would scarcely seem to be omnip- otent.
Anselm. Therefore is he able to avoid death if he chooses, and also to die and rise again. Moreover, whether he lays down his life by the intervention of no other person, or another causes this, so that he ' lays it down by permitting it to be taken, it makes no difference as far as regards his power.
Boso. There is no doubt about it.
Anselm. If, then, he chooses to allow it, he could be slain; and if he were unwilling to allow it, he could not be slain.
CUR DEUS HOMO. 257 Boso. To this we are unavoidably brought by i son.
Anselm. Reason has also taught us that the gift which he presents to God, not of debt but freely, ought to be something greater than anything in the possession of God.
Boso. Yes.
Anselm. Now this can neither be found beneath him nor above him.
Boso. Very true.
Anselm. In himself, therefore, must it be found.
Boso. So it appears.
Anselm. Therefore will he give himself, or some- thing pertaining to himself.
Boso. I cannot see how it should be otherwise.
Anselm. Now must we inquire what sort of a gift this should be? For he may not give himself to God, or anything of his, as if God did not have what was his own. For every creature belongs to God.
Boso. This is so.
Anselm. Therefore must this gift be understood in ' this way, that he somehow gives up himself, or some- ^y thing of his, to the honor of God, which he did not owe as a debtor.
Boso. So it seems from what has been already said.
Anselm. If we say that he will givo himndf to God by obedience, so as, by steadily mttintninijiK holineiw, to render himself subject to hi* will, tliU will not bo giving a thing not demanded of lilin by God an hia due. For every reasonable titling owe* hi* obedience to God.
Boso. This cannot be dftiiMi Anselm. Therefore fnuot it lie in «ome other way 258 ANSELM.
that he gives himself, or something belonging to him, to God.
Boso. Reason urges us to this conclusion.
Anslem. Let us see whether, perchance, this may be to give up his life or to lay down his life, or to de- liver himself up to death for God's honor. For God will not demand this of him as a debt; for, as no sin will be found, he ought not to die, as we have already said.
Boso. Else I cannot understand it.
Anselm. But let us further observe whether this is according to reason.
Boso. Speak you, and I will listen with pleasure.
AnselmJL If man sinned with ease, is it not fitting for him to atone with difficulty? And if he was over- come by the devil in the easiest manner possible, so as to dishonor God by sinning against him, is it not right that man, in making satisfaction for his sin, should honor God by conquering the devil with the greatest possible difficulty? Is it not proper that, since man has departed from God as far as possible in his sin, he should make to God the greatest pos- sible satisfaction? ) Boso. Surely, there is nothing more reasonable.
Anselm. Now, nothing can be more severe or diffi- cult for man to do for God's honor, than to suffer death voluntarily when not bound by obligation; and man cannot give himself to God in any way more truly than by surrendering himself to death for God's honor.
Boso. All these things are true.
Anselm. Therefore, he who wishes to make atone- ment for man's sin should be one who can die if he chooses.
Boso. I think it is plain that the man whom we CUR DEUS HOMO. 259 seek for should not only be one who is not necessarily subject to death on account of his omnipotence, and one who does not deserve death on account of his sin, but also, one who can die of his own free will, for this will be necessary.
Anselm. There are also many other reasons why it is peculiarly fitting for that man to enter into the common intercourse of men, and maintain a likeness to them, only without sin. And these things are more easily and clearly manifest in his life and actions than they can possibly be shown to be by mere reason without experience. For who can say how necessary and wise a thing it was for him who was to redeem mankind, and lead them back by his teaching from the way of death and destruction into the path of life and eternal happiness, when he conversed with men, and when he taught them by personal intercourse, to set them an example himself of the way in which they ought to live? But how could he have given this ex- ample to weak and dying men, that they should not deviate from holiness because of injuries, or scorn, or tortures, or even death, had they not been able to recognise all these virtues in himself?
CHAPTER XII.
How, though he share in our weakness, he is not therefore miser- able.
Boso. All these things plainly show that he ought to be mortal and to partake of our weaknesses. But all these things are our miseries. Will he then be miserable?
Anselm. No, indeed! For as no advantage which one has apart from his choice constitutes happiness, 26o ANSELM.
so there is no misery in choosing to bear a loss, when the choice is a wise one and made without compul- sion.
Boso. Certainly, this must be allowed.
CHAPTER XIII.
How, along with our other weaknesses, he does not partake of our ignorance.
Boso. But tell me whether, in this likeness to men which he ought to have, he will inherit also our ignor- ance, as he does our other infirmities?
Anselm. Do you doubt the omnipotence of God?
Boso. No! but, although this man be immortal in /y respect to his Divine nature, yet will he be mortal in his human nature. For why will he not be like them ^ in their ignorance, as he is in their mortality?
Anselm. That union of humanity with the Divine person will not be effected except in accordance with the highest wisdom; and, therefore, God will not take anything belonging to man which is only useless, but even a hindrance to the work which that man must accomplish. For ignorance is in no respect useful, but very prejudicial. How can he perform works, so many and so great, without the highest wisdom? Or, how will men believe him if they find him ignorant? And if he be ignorant, what will it avail him? If noth- ing is loved except as it is known, and there be no good thing which he does not love, then there can be no good thing of which he is ignorant. But no one perfectly understands good, save he who can distin- guish it from evil; and no one can make this distinc- tion who does not know what evil is. Therefore, as he of whom we are speaking perfectly comprehends CUR DEUS HOMO. 26 1 what is good, so there can be no evil with which he is unacquainted. Therefore must he have all knowl- edge, though he do not openly show it in his inter- course with men.
Boso. In his more mature years, this should seem to be as you say; but, in infancy, as it will not be a fit time to discover wisdom, so there will be no need, and therefore no propriety, in his having it.
Anselm. Did not I say that the incarnation will be made in wisdom? But God will in wisdom assume that mortality, which he makes use of so widely, be- v cause for so great an object. But he could not wisely assume ignorance, for this is never useful, but always injurious, except when an evil will is deterred from acting, on account of it. But, in him an evil desire never existed. For if ignorance did no harm in any other respect, yet does it in this, that it takes away the good of knowing. And to answer your question in a word: that man, from the essential nature of his being, will be always full of God; and, therefore, will never want the power, the firmness or the wisdom of God.
Boso. Though wholly unable to doubt the truth of this with respect to Christ, yet, on this very account, have I asked for the reason of it. For we are often "\ certain about a thing, and yet cannot prove it by rea- ' son.
CHAPTER XIV.
How his death outweighs the number and greatness of our sins.
Boso. Now I ask you to tell me how his death can outweigh the number and magnitude of our sins, when the least sin we can think of you have shown to be so monstrous that, were there an infinite number of >p 262 ANSELM.
worlds as full of created existence as this, they could not stand, but would fall back into nothing, sooner than one look should be made contrary to the just will of God.
Anseltn. Were that man here before you, and you v*. knew who he was, and it were told you that, if you did not kill him, the whole universe, except God, would perish, would you do it to preserve the rest of creation?
Boso. No! not even were an infinite number of worlds displayed before me.
Anseltn. But suppose you were told: "If you do not kill him, all the sins of the world will be heaped upon you."
Boso. I should answer, that I would far rather bear all other sins, not only those of this world, past and future, but also all others that can be conceived of, than this alone. And I think I ought to say this, not only with regard to killing him, but even as to the slightest injury which could be inflicted on him.
Anseltn. You judge correctly; but tell me why it is that your heart recoils from one injury inflicted upon him as more heinous than all other sins that can be thought of, inasmuch as all sins whatsoever are committed against him?
Boso. A sin committed upon his person exceeds beyond comparison all the sins which can be thought of, that do not affect his person.
Anseltn. What say you to this, that one often suf- fers freely certain evils in his person, in order not to suffer greater ones in his property?
Boso. God has no need of such patience, for all things lie in subjection to his power, as you answered a certain question of mine above.
CUR DEUS HOMO. 263 Anselm. You say well; and hence we see that no enormity or multitude of sins, apart from the Divine person, can for a moment be compared with a bodily injury inflicted upon that man.
Boso. This is most plain.
Anselm. How great does this good seem to you, if the destruction of it is such an evil?
Boso. If its existence is as great a good as its de- struction is an evil, then is it far more a good than those sins are evils which its destruction so far sur- passes.
Anselm. Very true. Consider, also, that sins are as hateful as they are evil, and that life is only amiable in proportion as it is good. And, therefore, it follows that that life is more lovely than sins are odious.
Boso. I cannot help seeing this.
Anselm. And do you not think that so great a good in itself so lovely, can avail to pay what is due for the sins of the whole world?
Boso. Yes! it has even infinite value.
Anselm. Do you see, then, how this life conquers all sins, if it be given for them?
Boso. Plainly.
Anselm. If, then, to lay down life is the same as to suffer death, as the gift of his life surpasses all the sins of men, so will also the suffering of death.
CHAPTER XV.
How this death removes even the sins of his murderers.
Boso. This is properly so with regard to all sins not affecting the person of the Deity. But let me ask you one thing more. If it be as great an evil to slay him as his life is a good, how can his death overcome 264 ANSELM.
and destroy the sins of those who slew him? Or, if it destroys the sin of any one of them, how can it not also destroy any sin committed by other men? For we believe that many men will be saved, and a vast many will not be saved.
Anselm. The Apostle answers the question when he says: "Had they known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. " For a sin knowingly committed and a sin done ignorantly are so different that an evil which they could never do, were its full extent known, may be pardonable when done in ignor- ance. For no man could ever, knowingly at least, slay the Lord; and, therefore, those who did it in ignorance did not rush into that transcendental crime with which none others can be compared. For this crime, the magnitude of which we have been consider- ing as equal to the worth of his life, we have not looked at as having been ignorantly done, but know- ingly; a thing which no man ever did or could do.
Boso. You have reasonably shown that the murder- ers of Christ can obtain pardon for their sin.
Anselm. What more do you ask? For now you see how reason of necessity shows that the celestial state must be made up from men, and that this can only be by the forgiveness of sins, which man can never have but by man, who must be at the same time Divine, and reconcile sinners to God by his own death. Therefore have we clearly found that Christ, whom we confess to be both God and man, died for us; and, when this is known beyond all doubt, all things which he says of himself must be acknowledged as true, for God cannot lie, and all he does must be received as wisely done, though we do not understand the reason of it.
CUR DEUS HOMO. 265 Boso. What you say is true; and I do not for a moment doubt that his words are true, and all that he does reasonable. But I ask this in order that you may disclose to me, in their true rationality, those things in Christian faith which seem to infidels im- proper or impossible; and this, not to strengthen me in the faith, but to gratify one already confirmed by the knowledge of the truth itself.
CHAPTER XVI.
How God took that man from a sinful substance, and yet without sin; and of the salvation of Adam and Eve.
Boso. As, therefore, you have disclosed the reason of those things mentioned above, I beg you will also explain what I am now about to ask. First, then, how does God, from a sinful substance, that is, of human species, which was wholly tainted by sin, take a man without sin, as an unleavened lump from that which is leavened? For, though the conception of this man be pure, and free from the sin of fleshly gratification, yet the virgin herself, from whom he sprang, was conceived in iniquity, and in sin did her mother bear her, since she herself sinned in Adam, in whom all men sinned.
Anselm. Since it is fitting for that man to be God, and also the restorer of sinners, wc doubt not that he is wholly without sin; yet will this avail nothing, un- less he be taken without sin and yet of a sinful sub- stance. But if we cannot comprehend in what man- ner the wisdom of God effects this, we should be sur- prised, but with reverence should allow of a thing of so great magnitude to remain hidden from us. For the restoring of human nature by God is more wonder- \ 266 ANSELM.
\ 266 ANSELM.
ful than its creation; for either was equally easy for God; but before man was made he had not sinned, so that he ought not to be denied existence. But after man was made he deserved, by his sin, to lose his existence together with its design; though he never has wholly lost this, viz., that he should be one capable of being punished, or of receiving God's com- passion. For neither of these things could take effect if he were annihilated. Therefore God's restoring man is more wonderful than his creating man, inasmuch as it is done for the sinner contrary to his deserts; while the act of creation was not for the sinner, and was not in opposition to man's deserts. How great a thing it is, also, for God and man to unite in one person, that, while the perfection of each nature is preserved, the same being may be both God and man! Who, then, will dare to think that the human mind can discover how wisely, how wonderfully, so incomprehensible a work has been accomplished?
Boso. I allow that no man can wholly discover so great a mystery in this life, and I do not desire you to do what no man can do, but only to explain it ac- cording to your ability. For you will sooner convince me that deeper reasons lie concealed in this matter, by showing some one that you know of, than if, by saying nothing, you make it appear that you do not understand any reason.
Anselm. I see that I cannot escape your importun- ity; but if I have any power to explain what you wish, let us thank God for it. But if not, let the things above said suffice. For, since it is agreed that God ought to become man, no doubt He will not lack the wisdom or the power to effect this without sin.
Boso. This I readily allow.
CUR DEUS HOMO. 267 Anseltn. It was certainly proper that that atone- N. ment which Christ made should benefit not only those/ who lived at that time but also others. For, suppose there were a king against whom all the people of his provinces had rebelled, with but a single exception of those belonging to their race, and that all the rest were irretrievably under condemnation. And suppose that he who alone is blameless had so great favor with the king, and so deep love for us, as to be both able and willing to save all those who trusted in his guidance; and this because of a certain very pleasing service which he was about to do for the king, accord- ing to his desire; and, inasmuch as those who are to be pardoned cannot all assemble upon that day, the king grants, on account of the greatness of the service performed, that whoever, either before or after the day appointed, acknowledged that he wished to ob* tain pardon by the work that day accomplished, and to subscribe to the condition there laid down, should be freed from all past guilt; and, if they sinned after this pardon, and yet wished to render atonement and to be set right again by the efficacy of this plan, they should again be pardoned, only provided that no one enter his mansion until this thing be accomplished by which his sins are removed. In like manner, since all who are to be saved cannot be present at the sacri- fice of Christ, yet such virtue is there in his death that its power is extended even to those far remote in place or time. But that it ought to benefit not merely those present is plainly evident, because there could not be so many living at the time of his death as are necessary to complete the heavenly state, even if all who were upon the earth at that time were admitted to the benefits of redemption. For the number of evil 268 ANSELM.
angels which must be made up from men is greater than the number of men at that time living. Nor may we believe that, since man was created, there was ever a time when the world, with the creatures made for the use of man, was so unprofitable as to contain no human being who had gained the object for which he was made. For it seems unfitting that God should even for a moment allow the human race, made to complete the heavenly state, and those creatures which he made for their use, to exist in vain.
Boso. You show by correct reasoning, such as 1 nothing can oppose, that there never was a time since y \ man was created when there has not been some one who was gaining that reconciliation without which every man was made in vain. So that we rest upon this as not only proper but also necessary. For if this is more fit and reasonable than that at any time there should be no one found fulfilling the design for which God made man, and there is no further objec- tion that can be made to this view, then it is neces- sary that there always be some person partaking of this promised pardon. And, therefore, we must not doubt that Adam and Eve obtained part in that for- giveness, though Divine authority makes no mention of this.
Anseltn. It is also incredible that God created them, and unchangeably determined to make all men from them, as many as were needed for the celestial state, and yet should exclude these two from this design.
Boso. Nay, undoubtedly we ought to believe that God made them for this purpose, viz., to belong to the number of those for whose sake they were created.
Anselm. You understand it well. But no soul, be- fore the death of Christ, could enter the heavenly CUR DEUS HOMO. 269 kingdom, as I said above, with regard to the palace of the king.
Boso. So we believe.
Anscltn. Moreover, the virgin, from whom that man was taken of whom we are speaking, was of the number of those who were cleansed from their sins before his birth, and he was born of her in her purity.
Boso. What you say would satisfy me, were it not that he ought to be pure of himself, whereas he ap- pears to have his purity from his mother and not from himself.
Anscltn. Not so. But as the mother's purity, which he partakes, was only derived from him, he also was pure by and of himself.
CHAPTER XVII.
How he did not die of necessity, though he could not be born, ex- cept as destined to suffer death.