Hence, if it has seen light and truth, it has seen! thee; if it has not seen thee, it has not seen light and) truth. Or, is what it has seen both light and truth; and still it has not yet seen thee, because it has seen thee only in part, but has not seen thee as thou art? Lord my God, my creator and renewer, speak to the desire of my soul, what thou art other than it hath seen, that it may clearly see what it desires. It strains to see thee more; and sees nothing beyond this which it hath seen, except darkness. Nay, it does not see darkness, of which there is none in thee; but it sees that it cannot see farther, because of its own dark- ness. / Why is this, Lord, why is this? x Is the eye of the soul darkened by its infirmity, or dazzled by thy glory? Surely it is both darkened in itself, and daz- zled by thee. Doubtless it is both obscured by itsL own insignificance, and overwhelmed by thy infinity. ) Truly, it is both contracted by its own narrowness/ and overcome by thy greatness.
For how great is that light from which shines every truth that gives light to the rational mind? How great is that truth in which is everything that is 22 ANSELM.
true, and outside which is only nothingness and the false? How boundless is the truth which sees at one glance whatsoever has been made, and by whom, and through whom, and how it has been made from noth- ing? What purity, what certainty, what splendor where it is? Assuredly more than a creature can con- ceive.
V CHAPTER XV.
V CHAPTER XV.
V ' r He is greater than can be conceived.
- Therefore, O Lord, thou art not only that than which a greater cannot be conceived, but thou art a ;_ being greater than can be conceived. For, since it V' can be conceived that there is such a being, if thou J art not this very being, a greater than thou can be conceived. But this is impossible.
CHAPTER XVf* This is the unapproachable light wherein he dwells.
Truly, O Lord, this is the unapproachable light in which thou dwellest; for truly there is nothing else which can penetrate this light, that it may see thee there. Truly, I see it not, because it is too bright for f me. And yet, whatsoever I see, I see through it, as „'the weak eye sees what it sees through the light of ^ the sun, which in the sun itself it cannot look upon.
My understanding cannot reach that light, for it shines too bright. It does not comprehend it, nor does the eye of my soul endure to gaze upon it long.
It is dazzled by the brightness, it is overcome by the greatness, it is overwhelmed by the infinity, it is dazed by the largeness, of the light.
O supreme and unapproachable light! O whole PROSLOGIUM. 23 and blessed truth, how far art thou from me, who am so near to thee! How far removed art thou from my vision, though I am so near to thine! Everywhere thou art wholly present, and I see thee not. In thee I move, and in thee I have my being; and I cannot come to thee. Thou art within me, and about me, and I feel thee not.
CHAPTER XVII.
In God is harmony, fragrance, sweetness, pleasantness to the touch, beauty, after his ineffable manner.
Still thou art hidden, O Lord, from my soul in thy light and thy blessedness; and therefore my soul still walks in its darkness and wretchedness. For it looks, and does not see thy beauty. It hearkens, and does not hear thy harmony. It smells, and does not perceive thy fragrance. It tastes, and does not recog- nise thy sweetness. It touches, and does not feel thy pleasantness. For thou hast these attributes in thy- - self, Lord God, after thine ineffable manner, who hast, given them to objects created by thee, after their j sensible manner; but the sinful senses of my soul have grown rigid and dull, and have been obstructed by their long listlessness.
CHAPTER XVIII.
CHAPTER XVIII.
God is life, wisdom, eternity, and every true good. — Whatever is composed of parts is not wholly one; it is capable, either in fact or in concept, of dissolution. In God wisdom, eternity, etc., are not parts, but one, and the very whole which God is, or unity itself, not even in concept divisible.
And lo, again confusion; lo, again grief and mourn- ing meet him who seeks for joy and gladness. My 24 ANSELM.
soul now hoped for satisfaction; and lo, again it is overwhelmed with need. I desired now to feast, and lo, I hunger more. I tried to rise to the light of God, and I have fallen back into my darkness. Nay, not only have I fallen into it, but I feel that I am envel- oped in it. I fell before my mother conceived me. Truly, in darkness I was conceived, and in the cover of darkness I was born. Truly, in him we all fell, in whom we all sinned. In him we all lost, who kept easily, and wickedly lost to himself and to us that which when we wish to seek it, we do not know; when we seek it, we do not find; when we find, it is not that which we seek.
Do thou help me for thy goodness' sake! Lord, I sought thy face; thy face, Lord, will I seek; hide not thy face far from me (Psalms xxvii. 8). Free me from myself toward thee. Cleanse, heal, sharpen, enlighten the eye of my mind, that it may behold thee. Let my soul recover its strength, and with all its under- standing let it strive toward thee, O Lord. What art thou, Lord, what art thou? What shall my heart con- ceive thee to be?
Assuredly thou art life, thou art wisdom, thou art truth, thou art goodness, thou art blessedness, thou art eternity, and thou art every true good. Many are these attributes: my straitened understanding can- not see so many at one view, that it may be gladdened by all at once. How, then, O Lord, art thou all these things? Are they parts of thee, or is each one of these rather the whole, which thou art? For, what- ever is composed of parts is not altogether one, but is in some sort plural, and diverse from itself; and either in fact or in concept is capable of dissolution.
But these things are alien to thee, than whom PROSLOGIUM. 25 aowk\x\g better can be conceived of. Hence, there ate ti p ar t s i n thee, Lord, nor art thou more than one. B ut thou art so truly a unitary being, and so identical with thyself, that in no respect art thou un- like thyself; rather thou art unity itself, indivisible by any conception. Therefore, life and wisdom and the rest are not parts of thee, but all are one; and each of these is the whole, which thou art, and which all the rest are.
In this way, then, it appears that thou hast noj parts, and that thy eternity, which thou art, is no- ^ where and never a part of thee or of thy eternity. But 1 everywhere thou art as a whole, and thy eternity ex- J ists as a whole forever.
CHAPTER XIX. He does not exist in place or time, but all things exist in him.
But if through thine eternity thou hast been, and art, and wilt be; and to have been is not to be des- tined to be; and to be is not to have been, or to be destined to be; how does thine eternity exist as a whole forever? Or is it true that nothing of thy eter- nity passes away, so that it is not now; and that noth- ing of it is destined to be, as if it were not yet?
Thou wast not, then, yesterday, nor wilt thou be to-morrow; but yesterday and to-day and to-morrow thou art; or, rather, neither yesterday nor to-day nor to-morrow thou art; but simply, thou art, outside all time. For yesterday and to-day and to-morrow have no existence, except in time; but thou, although") nothing exists without thee, nevertheless dost not ex- > ist in space or time, but all things exist in thee. For } nothing contains thee, but thou containest all. ^ 26 ANSELM.
CHAPTER XX.
•He exists before all things and transcends all things, even the eter- nal things. — The eternity of God is present as a whole with him; while other things have not yet that part of their eter- nity which is still to be, and have no longer that part which is past.
Hence, thou dost permeate and embrace all things. Thou art before all, and dost transcend all. And, of a surety, thou art before all; for before they were /made, thou art. But how dost thou transcend all? In what way dost thou transcend those beings which will have no end? Is it because they cannot exist at all without thee; while thou art in no wise less, if they should return to nothingness? For so, in a cer- tain sense, thou dost transcend them. Or, is it also because they can be conceived to have an end; but thou by no means? For so they actually have an end, in a certain sense; but thou, in no sense. And certainly, what in no sense has an end transcends what is ended in any sense. Or, in this way also I dost thou transcend all things, even the eternal, be- ( cause thy eternity and theirs is present as a whole < with thee; while they have not yet that part of their / eternity which is to come, just as they no longer have V^that part which is past? For so thou dost ever tran- • scend them, since thou art ever present with thyself, and since that to which they have not yet come is ever present with thee.
PROSLOGIUM. 27 CHAPTER XXI.
Is this the age of the age, or ages of ages? — The eternity of God contains the ages of time themselves, and can be called the age of the age or ages of ages.
Is this, then, the age of the age, or ages of ages? For, as an age of time contains all temporal things,:> so thy eternity contains even the ages of time them-,' selves. And these are indeed an age, because of their indivisible unity; but ages, because of their endless immeasurability. And, although thou art so great, O Lord, that all things are full of thee, and exist in thee; yet thou art so without all space, that neither midst, nor half, nor any part, is in thee.
CHAPTER XXII.
He alone is what he is and who he is. — All things need God for their being and their well-being.
Therefore, thou alone, O Lord, art what thou "j art; and thou art he who thou art. For, what is one ( thing in the whole and another in the parts, and in I which there is any mutable element, is not altogether/ what it is. And what begins from non-existence, and can be conceived not to exist, and unless it subsists through something else, returns to non-existence; and what has a past existence, which is no longer, or a future existence, which is not yet, — this does not properly and absolutely exist.
But thou art what thou art, because, whatever thou art at any time, or in any way, thou art as a whole and forever. And thou art he who thou art, properly and simply; for thou hast neither a past ex- 2& AXSELMistence nor a future, but only a present existence; nor canst thou be conceived as at any time non-exist- ent. But thou art life, and light, and wisdom, and blessedness, and many goods of this nature. And yet thou art only one supreme good; thou art all-suffi- cient to thyself, and needest none; and thou art he whom all things need for their existence and well- being.
CHAPTER XXIII.
This good is equally Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit. And this is a single, necessary Being, which is every good, and wholly good, and the only good. — Since the Word is true, and is truth itself, there is nothing in the Father, who utters it, which is not accomplished in the Word by which he expresses himself. Neither is the love which proceeds from Father and Son un- equal to the Father or the Son, for Father and Son love them- selves and one another in the same degree in which what they are is good. Of supreme simplicity nothing can be born, and from it nothing can proceed, except that which is this, of which it is born, or from which it proceeds.
This good thou art, thou, God the Father; this is thy Word, that is, thy Son. For nothing, other than what thou art, or greater or less than thou, can be in the Word by which thou dost express thyself; for thy Word is true, as thou art truthful. And hence it is truth itself, just as thou art; no other truth than thou; and thou art of so simple a nature, that of thee nothing can be born other than what thou art. This very good is the one love common to thee and to thy Son, that is, the Holy Spirit proceeding from both. For this love is not unequal to thee or to thy Son; seeing that thou dost love thyself and him, and he, thee and himself, to the whole extent of thy being and his. 'Nor is there aught else proceeding from PROSLOGIUM. 29 thee and from him, which is not unequal to thee and to him. Nor can anything proceed from the supreme simplicity, other than what this, from which it pro- ceeds, is.
But what each is, separately, this is all the Trinity at once, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; seeing that each separately is none other than the supremely simple unity, and the supremely unitary simplicity, which can neither be multiplied nor varied. More- over, there is a single necessary Being. Now, this is that single, necessary Being, in which is every good; nay, which is every good, and a single entire good, and the only good.
CHAPTER XXIV.
Conjecture as to the character and the magnitude of this good. — If the created life is good, how good is the creative life!
And now, my soul, arouse and lift up all thy un- derstanding, and conceive, so far as thou canst, of what character and how great is that good. For, if individual goods are delectable, conceive in earnest- ness how delectable is that good which contains the pleasantness of all goods; and not such as we have experienced in created objects, but as different as the Creator from the creature. For, if the created life is good, how good is the creative life! If the salvation given is delightful, how delightful is the salvation which has given all salvation! If wisdom in the knowl- edge of the created world is lovely, how lovely is the wisdom which has created all things from nothing! Finally, if there are many great delights in delectable things, what and how great is the delight in him who has made these delectable things.
30 ANSELM.
CHAPTER XXV.
What goods, and bow great, belong to those who enjoy this good. — Joy is multiplied in the blessed from the blessedness and joy of others.
Who shall enjoy this good? And what shall be- long to him, and what shall not belong to him? At any rate, whatever he shall wish shall be his, and whatever he shall not wish shall not be his. For, these goods of body and soul will be such as eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither has the heart of man conceived (Isaiah lxiv. 4; 1 Corinthians ii. 9).
Why, then, dost thou wander abroad, slight man, in thy search for the goods of thy soul and thy body? Love the one good in which are all goods, and it sufficeth. Desire the simple good which is every good, and it is enough. For, what dost thou love, my flesh? What dost thou desire, my soul? There, there is whatever ye love, whatever ye desire.
If beauty delights thee, there shall the righteous shine forth as the sun (Matthew xiii. 43). If swiftness or endurance, or freedom of body, which naught can withstand, delight thee, they shall be as angels of God, — because it is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body (1 Corinthians xv. 44) — in power cer- tainly, though not in nature. If it is a long and sound life that pleases thee, there a healthful eternity is, and an eternal health. For the righteous shall live for- ever (Wisdom v. 15), and the salvation of the righte- ous is of the Lord (Psalms xxxvii. 39). If it is satis- faction of hunger, they shall be satisfied when the glory of the Lord hath appeared (Psalms xvii. 15). If it is quenching of thirst, they shall be abundantly PROSLOGIUM. 31 '^-^isfied with the fatness of thy house (Psalms xxxvi. *^ - If it is melody, there the choirs of angels sing LC>: *'^, ver, before God. If it is any not impure, but pure, t>l^asure, thou shalt make them drink of the river of ^!*y pleasures, O God (Psalms xxxvi. 8).
If it is wisdom that delights thee, the very wisdom °f God will reveal itself to them. If friendship, they shall love God more than themselves, and one another as themselves. And God shall love them more than they themselves; for they love him, and themselves, aiicl one another, through him, and he, himself and them, through himself. If concord, they shall all have a single will.
If power, they shall have all power to fulfil their will, as God to fulfil his. For, as God will have power to do what he wills, through himself, so they will have poorer, through him, to do what they will. For, as tVxey will not will aught else than he, he shall will whatever they will; and what he shall will cannot fa.il to be. If honor and riches, God shall make his good and faithful servants rulers over many things (Luke xii. 42); nay, they shall be called sons of God, and gods; and where his Son shall be, there they shall " e also, heirs indeed of God, and joint-heirs with Christ (Romans viii. 17).
If true security delights thee, undoubtedly they S "*H be as sure that those goods, or rather that good, Wl tt never and in no wise fail them; as they shall be SUr ^ that they will not lose it of their own accord; anc i that God, who loves them, will not take it away * ro *x* those who love him against their will; and that n °thing more powerful than God will separate him k°ua them against his will and theirs.
But what, or how great, is the joy, where such and I 32 ANSELM.
so great is the good! Heart of man, needy heart, heart acquainted with sorrows, nay, overwhelmed with sorrows, how greatly wouldst thou rejoice, if thou didst abound in all these things! Ask thy inmost mind whether it could contain its joy over so great a blessedness of its own.
Yet assuredly, if any other whom thou didst love altogether as thyself possessed the same blessedness, thy joy would be doubled, because thou wouldst re- joice not less for him than for thyself. But, if two, or three, or many more, had the same joy, thou wouldst rejoice as much for each one as for thyself, if thou didst love each as thyself. Hence, in that perfect love of innumerable blessed angels and sainted men, where none shall love another less than himself, every one shall rejoice for each of the others as for himself.
If, then, the heart of man will scarce contain his joy over his own so great good, how shall it contain so many and so great joys? And doubtless, seeing that every one loves another so far as he rejoices in the other's good, and as, in that perfect felicity, each one should love God beyond compare, more than him- self and all the others with him; so he will rejoice beyond reckoning in the felicity of God, more than in his own and that of all the others with him.
But if they shall so love God with all their heart, and all their mind, and all their soul, that still all the heart, and all the mind, and all the soul shall not suf- fice for the worthiness of this love; doubtless they will so rejoice with all their heart, and all their mind, and all their soul, that all the heart, and all the mind, and all the soul shall not suffice for the fulness of their joy.
PROSLOGIUM. 33 CHAPTER XXVI.
Is this joy which the Lord promises made full? — The blessed shall rejoice according as they shall love; and they shall love ac- cording as they shall know.
My God and my Lord, my hope and the joy of my heart, speak unto my soul and tell me whether this is the joy of which thou tellest us through thy Son: Ask ancl ye shall receive, that your joy may be full (John xv i. 24). For I have found a joy that is full, and more than full. For when heart, and mind, and soul, and all the man, are full of that joy, joy beyond meas- ure will still remain. Hence, not all of that joy shall enter into those who rejoice; but they who rejoice shall wholly enter into that joy.
Show me, O Lord, show thy servant in his heart whether this is the joy into which thy servants shall enter, who shall enter into the joy of their Lord. But It* at joy, surely, with which thy chosen ones shall re- joice, eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of man (Isaiah lxiv. 4; 1 Cor- inthians ii. 9). Not yet, then, have I told or con- ceived, O Lord, how greatly those blessed ones of tnine shall rejoice. Doubtless they shall rejoice ac- cording as they shall love; and they shall love accord- 111 8 as they shall know. How far they will know thee, ^°rd, then! and how much they will love thee! Truly, e ^ hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it en- ured into the heart of man in this life, how far they ®***il know thee, and how much they shall love thee "^ that life.
I pray, O God, to know thee, to love thee, that I ^ay rejoice in thee. And if I cannot attain to full joy 34 ANSELM.
in this life, may I at least advance from day to day, until that joy shall come to the full. Let the knowl- edge of thee advance in me here, and there be made full. Let the love of thee increase, and there let it be full, that here my joy may be great in hope, and there full in truth. Lord, through thy Son thou dost command, nay, thou dost counsel us to ask; and thou dost promise that we shall receive, that our joy may be full. I ask, O Lord, as thou dost counsel through our wonderful Counsellor. I will receive what thou dost promise by virtue of thy truth, that my joy may be full. Faithful God, I ask. I will receive, that my joy may be full. Meanwhile, let my mind meditate upon it; let my tongue speak of it. Let my heart love it; let my mouth talk of it. Let my soul hunger for it; let my flesh thirst for it; let my whole being desire it, until I enter into thy joy, O Lord, who art the Three and the One God, blessed for ever and ever. Amen.
ANSELM'S MONOLOGIUM ON THE BEING OF GOD. PREFACE.
In this book Anselm discusses, under the form of a meditation, the Being of God, basing his argument not on the authority If of Scripture, but on the force of reason. It contains nothing J that is inconsistent with the writings of the Holy Fathers, and especially nothing that is inconsistent with those of St. Augustine. — The Greek terminology is employed in Chapter LXXVIII.. where it is stated that the Trinity may be said to consist of three substances, that is, three persons.
Certain brethren have often and earnestly en- treated me to put in writing some thoughts that I had offered them in familiar conversation, regarding med- itation on the Being of God, and on some other topics connected with this subject, under the form of a med- itation on these themes. It is in accordance with their wish, rather than with my ability, that they have prescribed such a form for the writing of this medita- tion; in order that nothing in Scripture should be urged on the authority of Scripture itself, but that whatever the conclusion of independent investigation should declare to be true, should, in an unadorned style, with common proofs and with a simple argu- ment, be briefly enforced by the cogency of reason, and plainly expounded in the light of truth. It was 36 ANSELlf.
their wish also, that I should not disdain to meet such simple and almost foolish objections as occur to me.
This task I have long refused to undertake. And, reflecting on the matter, I have tried on many grounds to excuse myself; for the more they wanted this work to be adaptable to practical use, the more was what they enjoined on me difficult of execution. Overcome at last, however, both by the modest importunity of their entreaties and by the not contemptible sincerity of their zeal; and reluctant as I was because of the difficulty of my task and the weakness of my talent, I entered upon the work they asked for. But it is with pleasure inspired by their affection that, so far as I was able, I have prosecuted this work within the limits they set.
I was led to this undertaking in the hope that whatever I might accomplish would soon be over- whelmed with contempt, as by men disgusted with some worthless thing. For I know that in this book I have not so much satisfied those who entreated me, as put an end to the entreaties that followed me so urgently. Yet, somehow it fell out, contrary to my hope, that not only the brethren mentioned above, but several others, by making copies for their own use, condemned this writing to long remembrance. And, after frequent consideration, I have not been able to find that I have made in it any statement which is inconsistent with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, or especially with those of St. Augustine. Wherefore, if it shall appear to any man that I have offered in this work any thought that is either too novel or discordant with the truth, I ask him not to denounce me at once as one who boldly seizes upon new ideas, or as a maintainer of falsehood; but let MONOLOGIUM. 37 him first read diligently Augustine's books on the Trinity, and then judge my treatise in the light of those.
In stating that the supreme Trinity may be said to consist of three substances, I have followed the Greeks, who acknowledge three substances in one Essence, in the same faflft wherein we acknowledge three persons in one Substance. For they designate by the word substance that attribute of God which we designate by the word person.
Whatever I have said on that point, however, is Put in the mouth of one debating and investigating in solitary reflection, questions to which he had given n o attention before. And this method I knew to be 1X * accordance with the wish of those whose request I was striving to fulfil. But it is my prayer and earnest entreaty, that if any shall wish to copy this work, he shall be careful to place this preface at the beginning °f tlx e book, before the body of the meditation itself. ' or 1 believe that one will be much helped in under- standing the matter of this book, if he has taken note ^tri e intention, and the method according to which 11! ^ discussed. It is my opinion, too, that one who j* as first seen this preface will not pronounce a rash J u d|?ment, if he shall find offered here any thought that is contrary to his own belief.
CHAPTER I.
Th&x- e | s a b e i n g w hich is best, and greatest, and highest of all Existing beings.
If any man, either from ignorance or unbelief, has no knowledge of the existence of one Nature which is the highest of all existing beings, which is also suffi- \ 38 ANSELlf.
cient to itself in its eternal blessedness, and which confers upon and effects in all other beings, through its omnipotent goodness, the very fact of their exist- ence, and the fact that in any way their existence is good; and if he has no knowledge of many other things, which we necessarily believe regarding God and his creatures, he still believes that he can at least convince himself of these truths in great part, even if his mental powers are very ordinary, by the force of reason alone.
And, although he could do this in many ways, I shall adopt one which I consider easiest for such a man. For, since all desire to enjoy only those things which they suppose to be good, it is natural that this man should, at some time, turn his mind's eye to the examination of that cause by which these things are good, which he does not desire, except as he judges them to be good. So that, as reason leads the way and follows up these considerations, he advances ra- tionally to those truths of which, without reason, he has no knowledge. And if, in this discussion, I use any argument which no greater authority adduces, I wish it to be received in this way: although, on the grounds that I shall see fit to adopt, the conclusion is reached as if necessarily, yet it is not, fof this reason, said to be absolutely necessary, but merely that it can appear so for the time being.
It is easy, then, for one to say to himself: Since there are goods so innumerable, whose great diversity we experience by the bodily senses, atfd discern by our mental faculties, must we not believe that there is some one thing, through which all goods whatever are good? Or are they good, one through one thing, and another through another? To be sure, it is most MONOLOGIUM. 39 MONOLOGIUM. 39 certain and clear, for all who are willing to see, that whatsoever things are said to possess any attribute in such a way that in mutual comparison they may be said to possess it in greater, or less, or equal degree, are said to possess it by virtue of some fact, which is not understood to be one thing in one case and an- other in another, but to be the same in different cases, whether it is regarded as existing in these cases in equal or unequal degree. For, whatsoever things are said to be just, when compared one with another, whether equally, or more, or less, cannot be under- stood as just, except through the quality of justness, which is not one thing in one instance, and another in another.
Since it is certain, then, that all goods, if mutually compared, would prove either equally or unequally good, necessarily they are all good by virtue of some- thing which is conceived of as the same in different goods, although sometimes they seem to be called good, the one by virtue of one thing, the other by virtue of another. For, apparently it is by virtue of one quality, that a horse is called good, because he is strong, and by virtue of another, that he is called good, because he is swift. For, though he seems to be called good by virtue of his strength, and good by virtue of his swiftness, yet swiftness and strength do not appear to be the same thing.
But if a horse, because he is strong and swift, is therefore good, how is it that a strong, swift robber is bad? Rather, then, just as a strong, swift robber is bad, because he is harmful, so a strong, swift horse is good, because he is useful. And, indeed, nothing is ordinarily regarded as good, except either for some utility — as, for instance, safety is called good, and 4<3 ANSELM.
those things which promote safety — or for some honor- able character — as, for instance, beauty is reckoned to be good, and what promotes beauty.
But, since the reasoning which we have observed is in no wise refutable, necessarily, again, all things, whether useful or honorable, if they are truly good, are good through that same being through which all goods exist, whatever that being is. But who can doubt this very being, through which all goods exist, to be a great good? This must be, then, a good through itself, since every other good is through it.
It follows, therefore, that all other goods are good through another being than that which they them- selves are, and this being alone is good through itself. Hence, this alone is supremely good, which is alone good through itself. For it is supreme, in that it so surpasses other beings, that it is neither equalled nor excelled. But that which is supremely good is also supremely great. There is, therefore, some one be- ing which is supremely good, and supremely great, that is, the highest of all existing beings.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER II.
The same subject continued.
But, just as it has been proved that there is a be- ing that is supremely good, since all goods are good through a single being, which is good through itself; so it is necessarily inferred that there is something supremely great, which is great through itself. But I do not mean physically great, as a material object is great, but that which, the greater it is, is the better or the more worthy, — wisdom, for instance. And MONOLOGIUM. 41 since there can be nothing supremely great except what is supremely good, there must be a being that is greatest and best, i. e., the highest of all existing be- ings.
CHAPTER III.
There is a certain Nature through which whatever is exists, and which exists through itself, and is the highest of all existing beings.
Therefore, not only are all good things such through something that is one and the same, and all great things such through something that is one and the same; but whatever is, apparently exists through something that is one and the same. For, everything that is, exists either through something, or through nothing. But nothing exists through nothing. For it is altogether inconceivable that anything should not exist by virtue of something.
Whatever is, then, does not exist except through something. Since this is true, either there is one be- ing, or there are more than one, through which all things that are exist. But if there are more than one, either these are themselves to be referred to some one being, through which they exist, or they exist separately, each through itself, or they exist mutually through one another.
But, if these beings exist through one being, then all things do not exist through more than one, but rather through that one being through which these exist.
If, however, these exist separately, each through itself, there is, at any rate, some power or property of existing through self {exist endi per se), by which 4? ANSELM.
they are able to exist each through itself. But, there can be no doubt that, in that case, they exist through this very power, which is one, and through which they are able to exist, each through itself. More truly, then, do all things exist through this very be- ing, which is one, than through these, which are more than one, which, without this one, cannot exist.
But that these beings exist mutually through one another, no reason can admit; since it is an irrational conception that anything should exist through a being on which it confers existence. For not even beings of a relative nature exist thus mutually, the one through the other. For, though the terms master and servant are used with mutual reference, and the men thus designated are mentioned as having mutual re- lations, yet they do not at all exist mutually, the one through the other, since these relations exist through the subjects to which they are referred.
Therefore, since truth altogether excludes the sup- position that there are more beings than one, through which all things exist, that being, through which all exist, must be one. Since, then, all things that are exist through this one being, doubtless this one being exists through itself. Whatever things there are else, then, exist through something other than themselves, and this alone through itself. But whatever exists through another is less than that, through which all things are, and which alone exists through itself. Therefore, that which exists through itself exists in the greatest degree of all things.
There is, then, some one being which alone exists in the greatest and the highest degree of all. But that which is greatest of all, and through which exists whatever is good or great, and, in short, whatever MONOLOGIUM. 43 has s*_ny existence — that must be supremely good, and supremely great, and the highest of all existing be ings- CHAPTER IV. The same subject continued.
Furthermore, if one observes the nature of things he perceives, whether he will or no, that not all are embraced in a single degree of dignity; but that cer- tain among them are distinguished by inequality of degree. For, he who doubts that the horse is supe- rior in its nature to wood, and man more excellent than the horse, assuredly does not deserve the name °f man. Therefore, although it cannot be denied that some natures are superior to others, nevertheless reason convinces us that some nature is so preeminent among these, that it has no superior. For, if the dis- tinction of degrees is infinite, so that there is among them no degree, than which no higher can be found, °ur course of reasoning reaches this conclusion: that *" e multitude of natures themselves is not limited by an y bounds. But only an absurdly foolish man can * ai l to regard such a conclusion as absurdly foolish. There is, then, necessarily some nature which is so superior to some nature or natures, that there is none m Comparison with which it is ranked as inferior.