Now, this nature which is such, either is single, or there are more natures than one of this sort, and th^y are of equal degree.
But, if they are more than one and equal, since they cannot be equal through any diverse causes, but oti\y through some cause which is one and the same, that one cause, through which they are equally so 44 ANSELM.
great, either is itself what they are, that is, the very essence of these natures; or else it is another than what they are.
But if it is nothing else than their very essence it- self, just as they have not more than one essence, but a single essence, so they have not more than one na- ture, but a single nature. For I here understand na- ture as identical with essence.
If, however, that through which these natures are so great is another than that which they are, then, certainly, they are less than that through which they are so great. For, whatever is great through some- thing else is less than that through which it is great. Therefore, they are not so great that there is nothing else greater than they.
But if, neither through what they are nor through anything other than themselves, can there be more such natures than one, than which nothing else shall be more excellent, then in no wise can there be more than one nature of this kind. We conclude, then, that there is some nature which is one and single, and which is so superior to others that it is inferior to none. But that which is such is the greatest and best of all existing beings. Hence, there is a certain nature which is the highest of all existing beings. This, however, it cannot be, unless it is what it is through itself, and all existing beings are what they are through it.
For since, as our reasoning showed us not long since, that which exists through itself, and through which all other things exist, is the highest of all exist- ing beings; either conversely, that which is the high- est exists through itself, and all others through it; or, there will be more than one supreme being. But it MONOLOGIUM. 45 is manifest that there cannot be more than one su- preme being. There is, therefore, a certain Nature, or Substance, or Essence, which is through itself good and great, and through itself is what it is; and through which exists whatever is truly good, or great, or has any existence at all; and which is the supreme good being, the supreme great being, being or subsisting as supreme, that is, the highest of all existing beings.
CHAPTER V.
CHAPTER V.
Just as this Nature exists through itself, and other beings through it, so it derives existence from itself, and other beings from it.
Seeing, then, that the truth already discovered has been satisfactorily demonstrated, it is profitable to examine whether this Nature, and all things that have any existence, derive existence from no other source than it, just as they do not exist except through it.
But it is clear that one may 'say, that what derives existence from something exists through the same thing; and what exists through something also de- rives existence from it. For instance, what derives existence from matter, and exists through the artificer, may also be said to exist through matter, and to de- rive existence from the artificer, since it exists through both, and derives existence from both.. That is, it is endowed with existence by both, although it exists through matter and from the artificer in another sense than that in which it exists through, and from, the artificer.
It follows, then, that just as all existing beings are what they are, through the supreme Nature, and as that Nature exists through itself, but other beings through another than themselves, so all existing be- 4D ANSELM.
ings derive existence from this supreme Nature. And therefore, this Nature derives existence from itself, but other beings from it.
CHAPTER VI.
This Nature was not brought into existence with the help of any external cause, yet it does not exist through nothing, or derive existence from nothing. — How existence through self, and de- * rived from self, is conceivable.
Since the same meaning is not always attached to the phrase, "existence through " something, or, to the phrase, "existence derived from " something, very diligent inquiry must be made, in what way all exist- ing beings exist through the supreme Nature, or de- rive existence from it. For, what exists through it- self, and what exists through another, do not admit the same ground of existence. Let us first consider, separately, this supreme Nature, which exists through self; then these beings which exist through another.
Since it is evident, then, that this Nature is what- ever it is, through itself, and all other beings are what they are, through it, how does it exist through itself? For, what is said to exist through anything apparently exists through an efficient agent, or through matter, or through some other external aid, as through some instrument. But, whatever exists in any of these three ways exists through another than itself, and it is of later existence, and, in some sort, less than that through which it obtains existence.
But, in no wise does the supreme Nature exist through another, nor is it later or less than itself or anything else. Therefore, the supreme Nature could be created neither by itself, nor by another; nor could MONOLOGIUM. 47 i 1 or any other be the matter whence it should be ^cUed; nor did it assist itself in any way; nor did "~j thing assist it to be what it was not before.
What is to be inferred? For that which cannot : «ve come into existence by any creative agent, or r >m any matter, or with any external aids, seems ":t 1ier to be nothing, or, if it has any existence, to #1 x ist through nothing, and derive existence from noth- ing- And although, in accordance with the observa- tion ras I have already made, in the light of reason, re- -".arding the supreme Substance, I should think such pr o positions could in no wise be true in the case of tn ^ supreme Substance; yet, I would not neglect to give a connected demonstration of this matter.
For, seeing that this my meditation has suddenly brought me to an important and interesting point, I ar ** unwilling to pass over carelessly even any simple or almost foolish objection that occurs to me, in my ar gument; in order that by leaving no ambiguity in m y discussion up to this point, I may have the better assured strength to advance toward what follows; at *d in order that if, perchance, I shall wish to con- vince any one of the truth of my speculations, even 0I *e of the slower minds, through the removal of every °"stacle, however slight, may acquiesce in what it fix *ds here.
That this Nature, then, without which no nature e *ists, is nothing, is as false as it would be absurd to Sa 7 that whatever is is nothing. And, moreover, it ^°es not exist through nothing, because it is utterly ^conceivable that what is something should exist through nothing. But, if in any way it derives exist- ence from nothing, it does so through itself, or through another, or through nothing. But it is evident that 1 1 48 ANSELM.
in no wise does anything exist through nothing. If, then, in any way it derives existence from nothing, it does so either through itself or through another.
But nothing can, through itself, derive existence from nothing, because if anything derives existence from nothing, through something, then that through which it exists must exist before it. Seeing that this Being, then, does not exist before itself, by no means does it derive existence from itself.
But if it is supposed to have derived existence from some other nature, then it is not the supreme Nature, but some inferior one, nor is it what it is through itself, but through another.
Again: if this Nature derives existence from noth- ing, through something, that through which it exists was a great good, since it was the cause of good. But no good can be understood as existing before that good, without which nothing is good; and it is suffi- ciently clear that this good, without which there is no good, is the supreme Nature which is under discus- sion. Therefore, it is not even conceivable that this Nature was preceded by any being, through which it derived existence from nothing.
Hence, if it has any existence through nothing, or derives existence from nothing, there is no doubt that either, whatever it is, it does not exist through itself, or derive existence from itself, or else it is itself noth- ing. It is unnecessary to show that both these sup- positions are false. The supreme Substance, then, does not exist through any efficient agent, and does not derive existence from any matter, and was not aided in being brought into existence by any external causes. Nevertheless, it by no means exists through MONOLOGIUM. 49 nothing, or derives existence from nothing; since, through itself and from itself, it is whatever it is.
Finally, as to how it should be understood to exist through itself, and to derive existence from itself: it did not create itself, nor did it spring up as its own matter, nor did it in any way assist itself to become what it was not before, unless, haply, it seems best to conceive of this subject in the way in which one says tha.t the light lights or is lucent, through and from it- self. For, as are the mutual relations of the light and *** tight and lucent {lux, lucere, lucens), such are the relations of essence, and to be and being, that is, exist- ***£*- or subsisting. So the supreme Being, and to be in *fc*e highest degree, and being in the highest degree, b^ar much the same relations, one to another, as the iKgrAt and to light and lucent.
CHAPTER VII.
I** 'what way all other beings exist through this Nature and derive existence from it.
There now remains the discussion of that whole a ^siss of beings that exist through another, as to how fcfcfcey exist through the supreme Substance, whether P^cause this Substance created them all, or because *^ was the material of all. For, there is no need to ***quire whether all exist through it, for this reason, Namely, that there being another creative agent, or Another existing material, this supreme Substance has merely aided in bringing about the existence of all things: since it is inconsistent with what has al- ready been shown, that whatever things are should exist secondarily, and not primarily, through it.
First, then, it seems to me, we ought to inquire 50 ANSELM.
whether that whole class of beings which exist through another derive existence from any material. But I do not doubt that all this solid world, with its parts, just as we see, consists of earth, water, fire, and air. These four elements, of course, can be conceived of without these forms which we see in actual objects, so that their formless, or even confused, nature ap- pears to be the material of all bodies, distinguished by their own forms. — I say that I do not doubt this. But I ask, whence this very material that I have men- tioned, the material of the mundane mass, derives its existence. For, if there is some material of this ma- terial, then that is more truly the material of the phys- ical universe.
If, then, the universe of things, whether visible or invisible, derives existence from any material, cer- tainly it not only cannot be, but it cannot even be supposed to be, from any other material than from the supreme Nature or from itself, or from some third being — but this last, at any rate, does not exist. For, indeed, nothing is even conceivable except that high- est of all beings, which exists through itself, and the universe of beings which exist, not through them- selves, but through this supreme Being. Hence, that which has no existence at all is not the material of anything.
From its own nature the universe cannot derive existence, since, if this were the case, it would in some sort exist through itself and so through another than that through which all things exist. But all these suppositions are false.
Again, everything that derives existence from ma- terial derives existence from another, and exists later than that other. Therefore, since nothing is other MONOLOGIUM. 5 1 than itself, or later than itself, it follows that nothing derives material existence from itself.
But if, from the material of the supreme Nature itself, any lesser being can derive existence, the su- preme good is subject to change and corruption. But this it is impious to suppose. Hence, since every- thing that is other than this supreme Nature is less than it, it is impossible that anything other than it in this way derives existence from it.
Furthermore: doubtless that is in no wise good, through which the supreme good is subjected to change or corruption. But, if any lesser nature de- rives existence from the material of the supreme good, inasmuch as nothing exists whencesoever, except through the supreme Being, the supreme good is sub- jected to change and corruption through the supreme Being itself. Hence, the supreme Being, which is itself the supreme good, is by no means good; which is a contradiction. There is, therefore, no lesser na- ture which derives existence in a material way from the supreme Nature.
Since, then, it is evident that the essence of those things which exist through another does not derive existence as if materially, from the supreme Essence, nor from itself, nor from another, it is manifest that it derives existence from no material. Hence, seeing that whatever is exists through the supreme Being, nor can aught else exist through this Being, except by its creation, or by its existence as material, it fol- lows, necessarily, that nothing besides it exists, ex- cept by its creation. And, since nothing else is or has been, except that supreme Being and the beings created by it, it could create nothing at all through any other instrument or aid than itself. But all that 52 ANSELM.
it has created, it has doubtless created either from something, as from material, or from nothing.
Since, then, it is most patent that the essence of all beings, except the supreme Essence, was created by that supreme Essence, and derives existence from no material, doubtless nothing can be more clear than that this supreme Essence nevertheless produced from nothing, alone and through itself, the world of material things, so numerous a multitude, formed in such beauty, varied in such order, so fitly diversified.
CHAPTER VIII.
How it is to be understood that this Nature created all things from nothing.
But we are confronted with a doubt regarding this term nothing. For, from whatever source anything is created, that source is the cause of what is created from it, and, necessarily, every cause affords some assistance to the being of what it effects. This is so firmly believed, as a result of experience, by every one, that the belief can be wrested from no one by argument, and can scarcely be purloined by sophistry.
Accordingly, if anything was created from nothing, this very nothing was the cause of what was created from it. But how could that which had no existence assist anything in coming into existence? If, how- ever, no aid to the existence of anything ever had its source in nothing, who can be convinced, and how, that anything is created out of nothing?
Moreover, nothing either means something, or does not mean something. But if nothing is something, whatever has been created from nothing has been created from something. If, however, nothing is not MONOLOGIUM. 53 something; since it is inconceivable that anything should be created from what does not exist, nothing is created from nothing; just as all agree that noth- ing comes from nothing. Whence, it evidently fol- lows, that whatever is created is created from some- thing; for it is created either from something or from nothing. Whether, then, nothing is something, or nothing is not something, it apparently follows, that whatever has been created was created from some- thing.
But, if this is posited as a truth, then it is so pos- ited in opposition to the whole argument propounded in the preceding chapter. Hence, since what was nothing will thus be something, that which was some- thing in the highest degree will be nothing. For, from the discovery of a certain Substance existing in the greatest degree of all existing beings, my reason- ing had brought me to this conclusion, that all other "beings were so created by this Substance, that that irom which they were created was nothing. Hence, if that from which they were created, which I sup- posed to be nothing, is something, whatever I sup- posed to have been ascertained regarding the supreme Being, is nothing.
What, then, is to be our understanding of the term nothing? — For I have already determined not to neg- lect in this meditation any possible objection, even if it be almost foolish. — In three ways, then — and this suffices for the removal of the present obstacle — can the statement that any substance was created from nothing be explained.
There is one way, according to which we wish it to be understood, that what is said to have been cre- ated from nothing has not been created at all; just 54 ANSELM.
as, to one who asks regarding a dumb man, of what he speaks, the answer is given, "of nothing," that is, he does not speak at all. According to this interpre- tation, to one who enquires regarding the supreme Being, or regarding what never has existed and does not exist at all, as to whence it was created, the an- swer, "from nothing" may properly be given; that is, it never was created. But this answer is unin- telligible in the case of any of those things that actu- ally were created.
There is another interpretation which is, indeed, capable of supposition, but cannot be true; namely, that if anything is said to have been created from nothing, it was created from nothing itself {de nihilo ipso), that is, from what does not exist at all, as if this very nothing were some existent being, from which something could be created. But, since this is always false, as often as it is assumed an irreconcilable con- tradiction follows.
There is a third interpretation, according to which a thing is said to have been created from nothing, when we understand that it was indeed created, but that there is not anything whence it was created. Ap- parently it is said with a like meaning, when a man is afflicted without cause, that he is afflicted "over nothing."
If, then, the conclusion reached in the preceding chapter is understood in this sense, that with the ex- ception of the supreme Being all things have been created by that Being from nothing, that is, not from anything; just as this conclusion consistently follows the preceding arguments, so, from it, nothing incon- sistent is inferred; although it may be said, without inconsistency or any contradiction, that what has been MONOLOGIUM. 55 created by the creative Substance was created from nothing, in the way that one frequently says a rich man has been made from a poor man, or that one has recovered health from sickness; that is, he who was poor before, is rich now, as he was not before; and he who was ill before, is well now, as he was not be- fore.
In this way, then, we can understand, without in- consistency, the statement that the creative Being created all things from nothing, or that all were cre- ated through it from nothing; that is, those things which before were nothing, are now something. For, indeed, from the very word that we use, saying that it created them or that they were created, we under- stand that when this Being created them, it created something, and that when they were created, they were created only as something. For so, beholding a man of very lowly fortunes exalted with many riches and honors by some one, we say, "Lo, he has made that man out of nothing "; that is, the man who was before reputed as nothing is now, by virtue of that other's making, truly reckoned as something.
CHAPTER IX.
Those things which were created from nothing had an existence before their creation in the thought of the Creator.
But I seem to see a truth that compels me to dis- tinguish carefully in what sense those things which were created may be said to have been nothing be- fore their creation. For, in no wise can anything conceivably be created by any, unless there is, in the mind of the creative agent, some example, as it were, or (as is more fittingly supposed) some model, or like- 56 ANSELM.
56 ANSELM.
ness, or rule. It is evident, then, that before the world was created, it was in the thought of the su- preme Nature, what, and of what sort, and how, it should be. Hence, although it is clear that the beings that were created were nothing before their creation, to this extent, that they were not what they now are, nor was there anything whence they should be cre- ated, yet they were not nothing, so far as the creator's thought is concerned, through which, and according to which, they were created.
CHAPTER X.
This thought is a kind of expression of the objects created {locutio rerum), like the expression which an artisan forms in his mind for what he intends to make.
But this model of things, which preceded their creation in the thought of the creator, what else is it than a kind of expression of these things in his thought itself; just as when an artisan is about to make some- thing after the manner of his craft, he first expresses it to himself through a concept? But by the expres- sion of the mind or reason I mean, here, not the con- ception of words signifying the objects, but the gene- ral view in the mind, by the vision of conception, of the objects themselves, whether destined to be, or already existing.
For, from frequent usage, it is recognised that we can express the same object in three ways. For we express objects either by the sensible use of sensible signs, that is, signs which are perceptible to the bodily senses; or by thinking within ourselves insensibly of these signs which, when outwardly used, are sensible; or not by employing these signs, either sensibly or MONOLOGIUM. 57 insensibly, but by expressing the things themselves inwardly in our mind, whether by the power of im- agining material bodies or of understanding thought, according to the diversity of these objects themselves. For I express a man in one way, when I signify him by pronouncing these words, a man; in another, when I think of the same words in silence; and in another, when the mind regards the man himself, either through the image of his body, or through the reason; through the image of his body, when the mind imagines his visible form; through the reason, however, when it thinks of his universal essence, which is a rational, mortal animal.
Noy£, the first two kinds of expression are in the language of one's race. But the words of that kind of expression, which I have put third and last, when they concern objects well known, are natural, and are trhe same among all nations. And, since all other Avords owe their invention to these, where these are, no other word is necessary for the recognition of an object, and where they cannot be, no other word is of any use for the description of an object.
For, without absurdity, they may also be said to be the truer, the more like they are to the objects to which they correspond, and the more expressively * they signify these objects. For, with the exception of those objects, which we employ as their own names, in order to signify them, like certain sounds, the vowel a for instance — with the exception of these, I say, no other word appears so similar to the object to which it is applied, or expresses it as does that likeness which is expressed by the vision of the mind thinking of the object itself.
This last, then, should be called the especially 58 ANSELM.
proper and primary word, corresponding to the thing. Hence, if no expression of any object whatever so nearly approaches the object as that expression which consists of this sort of words, nor can there be in the thought of any another word so like the object, whether destined to be, or already existing, not with- out reason it may be thought that such an expression of objects existed with (apud} the supreme Substance before their creation, that they might be created; and exists, now that they have been created, that they may be known through it.
CHAPTER XI.
The analogy, however, between the expression of the Creator and the expression of the artisan is very incomplete.
But, though it is most certain that the supreme Substance expressed, as it were, within itself the whole created world, which it established according to, and through, this same most profound expression, just as an artisan first conceives in his mind what he afterwards actually executes in accordance with his mental concept, yet I see that this analogy is very in- complete.
For the supreme Substance took absolutely noth- ing from any other source, whence it might either frame a model in itself, or make its creatures what they are; while the artisan is wholly unable to con- ceive in his imagination any bodily thing, except what he has in some way learned from external objects, whether all at once, or part by part; nor can he per- form the work mentally conceived, if there is a lack of material, or of anything without which a work pre- meditated cannot be performed. For, though a man MONOLOGIUM. 59 can, by meditation or representation, frame the idea of some sort of animal, such as has no existence; yet, by no means has he the power to do this, except by > uniting in this idea the parts that he has gathered in; his memory from objects known externally.
Hence, in this respect, these inner expressions of the works they are to create differ in the creative sub- stance and in the artisan: that the former expression, without being taken or aided from any external source, but as first and sole cause, could suffice the Artificer for the performance of his work, while the latter is ^either first, nor sole, nor sufficient, cause for the in- ception of the artisan's work. Therefore, whatever ha.s been created through the former expression is only what it is through that expression, while what- ever has been created through the latter would not exist at all, unless it were something that it is not through this expression itself.
CHAPTER XII.
CHAPTER XII.
"^bis expression of the supreme Being is the supreme Being.
But since, as our reasoning shows, it is equally Certain that whatever the supreme Substance created, it created through nothing other than itself; and what- ever it created, it created through its own most inti- mate expression, whether separately, by the utterance of separate words, or all at once, by the utterance of one word; what conclusion can be more evidently necessary, than that this expression of the supreme Being is no other than the supreme Being? There- fore, the consideration of this expression should not, m my opinion, be carelessly passed over. But before it can be discussed, I think some of the properties 60 ANSBLM.
of this supreme Substance should be diligently and earnestly investigated.
CHAPTER XIII.
As all things were created through the supreme Being, so all live through it.
It is certain, then, that through the supreme Na- ture whatever is not identical with it has been created. But no rational mind can doubt that all creatures live and continue to exist, so long as they do exist, by the sustenance afforded by that very Being through whose creative act they are endowed with the existence that they have. For, by a like course of reasoning to that by which it has been gathered that all existing beings exist through some one being, hence that being alone exists through itself, and others through another than themselves — by a like course of reasoning, I say, it can be proved that whatever things live, live through some one being; hence that being alone lives through itself, and others through another than themselves.
But, since it cannot but be that those things which have been created live through another, and that by which they have been created lives through itself, necessarily, just as nothing has been created except through the creative, present Being, so nothing lives except through its preserving presence.
CHAPTER XIV.
This Being is in all things, and throughout all; and all derive ex- istence from it and exist through and in it.
But if this is true — rather, since this must be true, it follows that, where this Being is not, nothing is. It is, then, everywhere, and throughout all things, and MONOLOGIUM. 6l in all. But seeing that it is manifestly absurd that as any created being can in no wise exceed the immeasur- ableness of what creates and cherishes it, so the crea- tive and cherishing Being cannot, in any way, exceed the sum of the things it has created; it is clear that this Being itself, is what supports and surpasses, in- cludes and permeates all other things. If we unite this truth with the truths already discovered, we find it is this same Being which is in all and through all, and from which, and through which, and in which, all exist.
CHAPTER XV.
What can or cannot be stated concerning the substance of this Being.
Not without reason I am now strongly impelled to inquire as earnestly as I am able, which of all the statements that may be made regarding anything is substantially applicable to this so wonderful Nature. Fc% though I should be surprised if, among the names or words by which we designate things created from nothing, any should be found that could worthily be applied to the Substance which is the creator of all; yet, we must try and see to what end reason will lead this investigation.
As to relative expressions, at any rate, no one can doubt that no such expression describes what is essen- tial to that in regard to which it is relatively em- ployed. Hence, if any relative predication is made regarding the supreme Nature, it is not significant of its substance.
Therefore, it is manifest that this very expression, that this Nature, is the highest of all beings, or greater than those which have been created by it; or any 62 ANSELM.
other relative term that can, in like manner, be ap- plied to it, does not describe its natural essence.
For, if none of those things ever existed, in rela- tion to which it is called supreme or greater, it would not be conceived as either supreme or greater, yet it would not, therefore, be less good, or suffer detriment to its essential greatness in any degree. And this truth is clearly seen from the fact that this Nature ex- ists through no other than itself, whatever there be that is good or great. If, then, the supreme Nature can be so conceived of as not supreme, that still it shall be in no wise greater or less than when it is con- ceived of as the highest of all beings, it is manifest that the term supreme, taken by itself, does not de- scribe that Being which is altogether greater and better than whatever is not what it is. But, what these considerations show regarding the term supreme or highest is found to be true, in like manner, of other similar, relative expressions.
Passing over these relative predications, then, since none of them taken by itself represents the essence of anything, let our attention be turned to the discussion of other kinds of predication.
Now, certainly if one diligently considers sepa- rately whatever there is that is not of a relative na- ture, either it is such that, to be it is in general better than not to be it, or such that, in some cases, not to be it is better than to be it. But I here understand the phrases, to be it and not to be it, in the same way in which I understand to be true and not to be true, to be bodily and not to be bodily, and the like. Indeed, to be anything is, in general, better than not to be it; as to be wise is better than not to be so; that is, it is better to be wise than not to be wise. For, though one who MONOLOGIUM. 63 is just, but not wise, is apparently a better man than one who is wise, but not just, yet, taken by itself, it is not better not to be wise than to be wise. For, every- thing that is not wise, simply in so far as it is not wise, is less than what is wise, since everything that is not wise would be better if it were wise. In the same way, to be true is altogether better than not to be so, that is, better than not to be true; and just is better than not just; and to live than not to live.
But, in some cases, not to be a certain thing is bet- ter than to be it, as not to be gold may be better than to be gold. For it is better for man not to be gold, than to be gold; although it might be better for some- thing to be gold, than not to be gold — lead, for in- stance. For though both, namely, man and lead are not gold, man is something as much better than gold, as he would be of inferior nature, were he gold; while lead is something as much more base than gold, as it would be more precious, were it gold.
But, from the fact that the supreme Nature may he so conceived of as not supreme, that supreme is neither in general better than not supreme, nor not su- preme better, in any case, than supreme — from this fact rt is evident that there are many relative expressions which are by no means included in this classification. Whether, however, any are so included, I refrain from squiring; since it is sufficient, for my purpose, that undoubtedly none of these, taken by itself, describes the substance of the supreme Nature.
Since, then, it is true of whatever else there is, that, if it is taken independently, to be it is better than not to be it; as it is impious to suppose that the sub- stance of the supreme Nature is anything, than which what is not it is in any way better, it must be true that 64 ANSELM.
this substance is whatever is, in general, better than what is not it. For, it alone is that, than which there is nothing better at all, and which is better than all things, which are not what it is.
It is not a material body, then, or any of those things which the bodily senses discern. For, than all these there is something better, which is not what they themselves are. For, the rational mind, as tc which no bodily sense can perceive what, or of what character, or how great, it is — the less this rational mind would be if it were any of those things that are in the scope of the bodily senses, the greater it is than any of these. For by no means should this supreme Being be said to be any of those things tc which something, which they themselves are not, is superior; and it should by all means, as our reasoning shows, be said to be any of those things to which everything, which is not what they themselves are, is inferior.
Hence, this Being must be living, wise, powerful, and all-powerful, true, just, blessed, eternal, and what- ever, in like manner, is absolutely better than what ij not it. Why, then, should we make any further in- quiry as to what that supreme Nature is, if it is mani fest which of all things it is, and which it is not?
CHAPTER XVI.
For this Being it is the same to be just that it is to be justice; an< so with regard to attributes that can be expressed in the sami way: and none of these shows of what character, or ho\ great, but what this Being is.
But perhaps, when this Being is called just, o: great, or anything like these, it is not shown what i is, but of what character, or how great it is. Fo MONOLOGIUM. 65 every such term seems to be used with reference to qvxantity or magnitude; because everything that is just is so through justness, and so with other like cases, in the same way. Hence, the supreme Nature itself is not just, except through justness.