It is, therefore, evident that in any ordinary treat- ment of substance, this Substance cannot be included, from sharing in whose essence every nature is ex- cluded. Indeed, since every substance is treated either as universal, i. e., as essentially common to more than one substance, as being a man is common to individual men; or as individual, having a universal essence in common with others, as individual men have in com- mon with individual men the fact that they are men; does any one conceive that, in the treatment of other substances, that supreme Nature is included, which neither divides itself into more substances than one, MONOLOGIUM. 87 nor unites with any other, by virtue of a common c8s ^nce?
Yet, seeing that it not only most certainly exists, hit exists in the highest degree of all things; and s mce the essence of anything is usually called its sub- stance, doubtless if any worthy name can be given it, there is no objection to our calling it substance.
And since no worthier essence than spirit and body is known, and of these, spirit is more worthy than body, it must certainly be maintained that this Being is spirit and not body. But, seeing that one spirit has not any parts, and there cannot be more spirits than one of this kind, it must, by all means, be an in- divisible spirit. For since, as is shown above, it is neither compounded of parts, nor can be conceived of as mutable, through any differences or accidents, it is impossible that it is divisible by any form of division.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
This Spirit exists simply, and created beings are not comparable with him.
It seems to follow, then, from the preceding con- siderations, that the Spirit which exists in so wonder- fully singular and so singularly wonderful a way of its own is in some sort unique; while other beings which seem to be comparable with it are not so.
For, by diligent attention it will be seen that that Spirit alone exists simply, and perfectly, and abso- lutely; while all other beings are almost non-existent, and hardly exist at all. For, seeing that of this Spirit, because of its immutable eternity, it can in no wise be said, in terms of any alteration, that it was or will be, but simply that it is; it is not now, by muta- tion, anything which it either was not at any time, or 88 ANSELM.
will not be in the future. Nor does it fail to be now what it was, or will be, at any time; but, whatever it is, it is, once for all, and simultaneously, and inter- minably. Seeing, I say, that its existence is of this character, it is rightly said itself to exist simply, and absolutely, and perfectly.
But since, on the other hand, all other beings, in accordance with some cause, have at some time been, or will be, by mutation, what they are not now; or are what they were not, or will not be, at some time; and, since this former existence of theirs is no longer a fact; and that future existence is not yet a fact; and their existence in a transient, and most brief, and scarcely existing, present is hardly a fact — since, then, they exist in such mutability, it is not unreasonably denied that they exist simply, and perfectly, and ab- solutely; and it is asserted that they are almost non- existent, that they scarcely exist at all.
Again, since all beings, which are other than this Spirit himself, have come from non-existence to exist- ence, not through themselves, but through another; and, since they return from existence to non-existence, so far as their own power is concerned, unless they are sustained through another being, is it consistent with their nature to exist simply, or perfectly, or ab- solutely, and not rather to be almost non-existent And since the existence of this ineffable Spirit alone can in no way be conceived to have taken in- ception from non-existence, or to be capable of sus- taining any deficiency rising from what is in non- existence; and since, whatever he is himself, he is not through another than himself, that is, than what he is himself, ought not his existence alone to be con- ceived of as simple, and perfect, and absolute?
MONOLOGIUM. 89 MONOLOGIUM. 89 But what is thus simply, and on every ground, solely perfect, simple, and absolute, this may very certainly be justly said to be in some sort unique. -And, on the other hand, whatever is known to exist -through a higher cause, and neither simply, nor per- fectly, nor absolutely, but scarcely to exist, or to be almost non-existent — this assuredly may be rightly said to be in some sort non-existent.
According to this course of reasoning, then, the creative Spirit alone exists, and all creatures are non- existent; yet, they are not wholly non-existent, be- cause, through that Spirit which alone exists abso- lutely, they have been made something from nothing.
CHAPTER XXIX.
His expression is identical with himself, and consubstantial with him, since there are not two spirits, but one.
But now, having considered these questions re- garding the properties of the supreme Nature, which have occurred to me in following the guidance of rea- son to the present point, I think it reasonable to ex- amine this Spirit's expression (Jocutio), through which all things were created.
For, though all that has been ascertained regard- ing this expression above has the inflexible strength of reason, I am especially compelled to a more care- ful discussion of this expression by the fact that it is proved to be identical with the supreme Spirit him- self. For, if this Spirit created nothing except through himself, and whatever was created by him was created through that expression, how shall that expression be anything else than what the Spirit himself is?
Furthermore, the facts already discovered declare go ANSELM.
irrefutably that nothing at all ever could, or can, ex- ist, except the creative Spirit and its creatures. But it is impossible that the expression of this Spirit is included among created beings; for every created being was created through that expression; but that expression could not be created through itself. For nothing can be created through itself, since every creature exists later than, that through which it is cre- ated, and nothing exists later than itself.
The alternative remaining is, then, that this ex- pression of the supreme Spirit, since it cannot be a creature, is no other than the supreme Spirit. There- fore, this expression itself can be conceived of as noth- ing else than the intelligence (Jntelligentia) of this Spirit, by which he conceives of (intelligif) all things. For, to him, what is expressing anything, according to this kind of expression, but conceiving of it? For he does not, like man, ever fail to express what he conceives.
If, then, the supremely simple Nature is nothing else than what its intelligence is, just as it is identical with its wisdom, necessarily, in the same way, it is nothing else than what its expression is. But, since it is already manifest that the supreme Spirit is one only, and altogether indivisible, this his expression must be so consubstantial with him, that they are not two spirits, but one.
CHAPTER XXX.
This expression does not consist of more words than one, but is one Word.
Why, then, should I have any further doubt re- garding that question which I dismissed above as doubtful, namely, whether this expression consists of MONOLOGIUM. 9 1 more words than one, or of one? For, if it is so con- substantial with the supreme Nature that they are not two spirits, but one; assuredly, just as the latter is supremely simple, so is the former. It therefore does not consist of more words than one, but is one Word, through which all things were created.
CHAPTER XXXI.
CHAPTER XXXI.
This Word itself is not the likeness of created beings, but the real- ity of their being, while created beings are a kind of likeness of reality. — What natures are greater and more excellent than others.
But here, it seems to me, there arises a question that is not easy to answer, and yet must not be left in any ambiguity. For all words of that sort by which we express any objects in our mind, that is, conceive of them, are likenesses and images of the objects to which they correspond; and every likeness or image is more or less true, according as it more or less closely imitates the object of which it is the likeness.
What, then, is to be our position regarding the Word by which all things are expressed, and through which all were created? Will it be, or will it not be, the likeness of the things that have been created through itself? For, if it is itself the true likeness of mutable things, it is not consubstantial with supreme immutability; which is false. But, if it is not alto- gether true, and is merely a sort of likeness of mu- table things, then the Word of supreme Truth is not altogether true; which is absurd. But if it has no likeness to mutable things, how were they created after its example?
But perhaps nothing of this ambiguity will remain if — as the reality of a man is said to be the living 92 ANSELM.
man, but the likeness or image of a man in his pictured — so the reality of being is conceived of as in thes^ Word, whose essence exists so supremely that in a certain sense it alone exists; while in these things which, in comparison with that Essence, are in some sort non-existent, and yet were made something through, and according to, that Word, a kind of imi- tation of that supreme Essence is found.
For, in this way the Word of supreme Truth, which is also itself supreme Truth, will experience neither gain nor loss, according as it is more or less like its creatures. But the necessary inference will rather be, that every created being exists in so much the greater degree, or is so much the more excellent, the more like it is to what exists supremely, and is supremely great.
• For on this account, perhaps, — nay, not perhaps, but certainly, — does every mind judge natures in any way alive to excel those that are not alive, the sen- tient to excel the non-sentient, the rational the irra- tional. For, since the supreme Nature, after a certain unique manner of its own, not only exists, but lives, and is sentient and rational, it is clear that, of all ex- isting beings, that which is in some way alive is more like this supreme Nature, than that which is not alive at all; and what, in any way, even by a corporeal sense, cognises anything, is more like this Nature than what is not sentient at all; and what is rational, more than what is incapable of reasoning.
But it is clear, for a like reason, that certain na- tures exist in a greater or less degree than others. For, just as that is more excellent by nature which, through its natural essence, is nearer to the most ex- cellent Being, so certainly that nature exists in a MONOLOGIUM. 93 greater degree, whose essence is more like the su- preme Essence. And I think that this can easily be ascertained as follows. If we should conceive any substance that is alive, and sentient, and rational, to be deprived of its reason, then of its sentience, then of its life, and finally of the bare existence that re- mains, who would fail to understand that the sub- stance that is thus destroyed, little by little, is gradu- ally brought to smaller and smaller degrees of exist- ence, and at last to non-existence? But the attributes which, taken each by itself, reduce an essence to less and less degrees of existence, if assumed in order, lead it to greater and greater degrees.
It is evident, then, that a living substance exists in a greater degree than one that is not living, a sen- tient than a non-sentient, and a rational than a non- rational. So, there is no doubt that every substance exists in a greater degree, and is more excellent, ac- cording as it is more like that substance which exists supremely and is supremely excellent.
It is sufficiently clear, then, that in the Word, through which all things were created, is not their likeness, but their true and simple essence; while, in the things created, there is not a simple and absolute essence, but an imperfect imitation of that true Es- sence. Hence, it necessarily follows, that this Word is not more nor less true, according to its likeness to the things created, but every created nature has a higher essence and dignity, the more it is seen to ap- proach that Word.
94 ANSELM.
CHAPTER XXXII. The supreme Spirit expresses himself by a coeternal Word.
But since this is true, how can what is simple Truth be the Word corresponding to those objects, of which it is not the likeness? Since every word by which an object is thus mentally expressed is the like- ness of that object, if this is not the word correspond- ing to the objects that have been created through it, how shall we be sure that it is the Word? For every word is a word corresponding to some object. There- fore, if there were no creature, there would be no word.
Are we to conclude, then, that if there were no creature, that Word would not exist at all, which is the supreme self-sufficient Essence? Or, would the supreme Being itself, perhaps, which is the Word, still be the eternal Being, but not the Word, if noth- ing were ever created through that Being? For, to what has not been, and is not, and will not be, there can be no word corresponding.
But, according to this reasoning, if there were never any being but the supreme Spirit, there would be no word at all in him. If there were no word in him, he would express nothing to himself; if he ex- pressed nothing to himself, since, for him, expressing anything is the same with understanding or conceiv- ing of it (Jntelligcre)) he would not understand or con- ceive of anything \ if he understood or conceived of nothing, then the supreme Wisdom, which is nothing else than this Spirit, would understand or conceive of nothing; which is mo9t absurd.
MONOLOGIUM. 95 What is to be inferred? For, if it conceived of nothing, how would it be the supreme Wisdom? Or, if there were in no wise anything but it, of what would it conceive? Would it not conceive of itself? But how can it be even imagined that the supreme Wis- dom, at any time does not conceive of itself; since a rational mind can remember not only itself, but that supreme Wisdom, and conceive of that Wisdom and of itself? For, if the human mind could have no mem- ory or concept of that Wisdom or of itself, it would not distinguish itself at all from irrational creatures, and that Wisdom from the whole created world, in silent meditation by itself, as my mind does now.
Hence, that Spirit, supreme as he is eternal, is thus eternally mindful of himself, and conceives of himself after the likeness of a rational mind; nay, not after the likeness of anything; but in the first place that Spirit, and the rational mind after its likeness. But, if he conceives of himself eternally, he expresses himself eternally. If he expresses himself eternally, his Word is eternally with him. Whether, therefore, it be thought of in connection with no other existing being, or with other existing beings, the Word of that Spirit must be coeternal with him.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
He utters himself and what he creates by a single consubstantial Word.
But here, in my inquiry concerning the Word, by which the Creator expresses all that he creates, is sug- gested the word by which he, who creates all, ex- presses himself. Does he express himself, then, by one word, and what he creates by another; or does 96 ANSELM.
he rather express whatever he creates by the same word whereby he expresses himself?
For this Word also, by which he expresses him- self, must be identical with himself, as is evidently true of the Word by which he expresses his creatures. For since, even if nothing but that supreme Spirit ever existed, urgent reason would still require the ex- istence of that word by which he expresses himself, what is more true than that his Word is nothing else than what he himself is? Therefore, if he expresses himself and what he creates, by a Word consubstan- tial with himself, it is manifest that of the Word by which he expresses himself, and of the Word by which he expresses the created world, the substance is one.
How, then, if the substance is one, are there two words? But, perhaps, identity of substance does not compel us to admit a single Word. For the Creator himself, who speaks in these words, has the same sub- stance with them, and yet is not the Word. But, un- doubtedly the word by which the supreme Wisdom expresses itself may most fitly be called its Word on the former ground, namely, that it contains the per- fect likeness of that Wisdom.
For, on no ground can it be denied that when a rational mind conceives of itself in meditation the im- age of itself arises in its thought, or rather the thought of the mind is itself its image, after its likeness, as if formed from its impression. For, whatever object the mind, either through representation of the body or through reason, desires to conceive of truly, it at least attempts to express its likeness, so far as it is. able, in the mental concept itself. And the more truly it succeeds in this, the more truly does it think of thes object itself; and, indeed, this fact is observed more MONOLOG1UM. ' 97 clearly when it thinks of something else which it is not, and especially when it thinks of a material body. For, when I think of a man I know, in his absence, the vision of my thought forms such an image as I have acquired in memory through my ocular vision and this image is the word corresponding to the man I express by thinking of him.
The rational mind, then, when it conceives of it- self in thought, has with itself its image born of itself that is, its thought in its likeness, as if formed from its impression, although it cannot, except in thought alone, separate itself from its image, which image is its word.
Who, then, can deny that the supreme Wisdom, when it conceives of itself by expressing itself, begets a likeness of itself consubstantial with it, namely, its Word? And this Word, although of a subject so uniquely important nothing can be said with sufficient propriety, may still not inappropriately be called the image of that Wisdom, its representation, just as it is called his likeness.
But the Word by which the Creator expresses the created world is not at all, in the same way, a word corresponding to the created world, since it is not this world's likeness, but its elementary essence. It therefore follows, that he does not express the created world itself by a word corresponding to the created world. To what, then, does the word belong, whereby he expresses it, if he does not express it by a word belonging to itself? For what he expresses, he ex- presses by a word, and a word must belong to some- thing, that is, it is the likeness of something. But if he expresses nothing but himself or his created world 98 ANSELM.
he can express nothing, except by a word correspond- ing to himself or to something else.
So, if he expresses nothing by a word belonging to the created world, whatever he expresses, he ex- presses by the Word corresponding to himself. By one and the same Word, then, he expresses himself and whatever he has made.
CHAPTER XXXIV. How he can express the created world by his Word.
But how can objects so different as the creative and the created being be expressed by one Word, especially since that Word itself is coeternal with him who expresses them, while the created world is not coeternal with him? Perhaps, because he himself is supreme Wisdom and supreme Reason, in which are all things that have been created; just as a work which is made after one of the arts, not only when it is made, but before it is made, and after it is destroyed, is always in respect of the art itself nothing else than what that art is.
Hence, when the supreme Spirit expresses him- self, he expresses all created beings. For, both be- fore they were created, and now that they have been created, and after they are decayed or changed in any way, they are ever in him not what they are in them- selves, but what this Spirit himself is. For, in them- selves they are mutable beings, created according to immutable reason; while in him is the true first being, and the first reality of existence, the more like unto which those beings are in any way, the more really and excellently do they exist. Thus, it may reason- ably be declared that, when the supreme Spirit ex- MONOLOGIUM. 99 presses himself, he also expresses whatever has been created by one and the same Word.
CHAPTER XXXV.
Whatever has been created is in his Word and knowledge, life and truth.
But, since it is established that his word is con- substantial with him, and perfectly like him, it neces- sarily follows that all things that exist in him exist also, and in the same way, in his Word. Whatever ^as been created, then, whether alive or not alive, or howsoever it exists in itself, is very life and truth in hirti.
But, since knowing is the same to the supreme Spirit as conceiving or expressing, he must know all tr *ings that he knows in the same way in which he e3 £presses or conceives of them. Therefore, just as a H things are in his Word life and truth, so are they lr * his knowledge.
CHAPTER XXXVI.
** how incomprehensible a way he expresses or knows the objects created by him.
Hence, it may be most clearly comprehended that *^^w this Spirit expresses, or how he knows the cre- ^"^«d world, cannot be comprehended by human knowl- ^^ige. For none can doubt that created substances ^^ist far differently in themselves than in our knowl- ^*3ge. For, in themselves they exist by virtue of their c ^"Vrn being; while in our knowledge is not their being, "Xit their likeness.
We conclude, then, that they exist more truly in ^^emselves than in our knowledge, in the same degree \ IOO ANSELM.
in which they exist more truly anywhere by virtue of their own being, than by virtue of their likeness. Therefore, since this is also an established truth, that every created substance exists more truly in the Word, that is, in the intelligence of the Creator, than it does in itself, in the same degree in which the creative be- ing exists more truly than the created; how can the human mind comprehend of what kind is that expres- sion and that knowledge, which is so much higher and truer than created substances; if our knowledge is as far surpassed by those substances as their like- ness is removed from their being?
CHAPTER XXXVII.
Whatever his relation to his creatures, this relation his Word also sustains: yet both do not simultaneously sustain this relation as more than one being.
But since it has already been clearly demonstrated that the supreme Spirit created all things through his Word, did not the Word itself also create all things? For, since it is consubstantial with him, it must be the supreme essence of that of which it is the Word. But there is no supreme Essence, except one, which is the only creator and the only beginning of all things which have been created. For this Essence, through no other than itself, alone created all things from nothing. Hence, whatever the supreme Spirit creates, the same his Word also creates, and in the same way.
Whatever relation, then, the supreme Spirit bears to what he creates, this relation his Word also bears, and in the same way. And yet, both do not bear it simultaneously, as more than one, since there are not more supreme creative essences than one. Therefore, MONOLCGIUM. IOI just as he is the creator and the beginning of the world, so is his Word also; and yet there are not two, but one creator and one beginning.
CHAPTER XXXVIII. It cannot be explained why they are two, although they must be so.
Our careful attention is therefore demanded by a peculiarity which, though most unusual in other be- ings, seems to belong to the supreme Spirit and his "Word. For, it is certain that in each of these sepa- xately and in both simultaneously, whatever they are so exists that it is separately perfected in both, and jet does not admit plurality in the two. For although, taken separately, he is perfectly supreme Truth and Creator, and his Word is supreme Truth and Creator; yet both at once are not two truths or two creators.
But although this is true, yet it is most remarkably dear that neither he, whose is the Word, can be his own Word, nor can the Word be he, whose Word it is, although in so far as regards either what they are substantially, or what relation they bear to the cre- ated world, they ever preserve an indivisible unity. But in respect of the fact that he does not derive ex- istence from that Word, but that Word from him, they admit an ineffable plurality, ineffable, certainly, for although necessity requires that they be two, it can in no wise be explained why they are two.
For although they may perhaps be called two equals, or some other mutual relation may in like manner be attributed to them, yet if it were to be asked what it is in these very relative expressions with reference to which they are used, it cannot be expressed plurally, as one speaks of two equal lines, 102 ANSELM.
or two like men. For, neither are there two equal spirits nor two equal creators, nor is there any dual expression which indicates either their essence or their relation to the created world; and there is no dual expression which designates the peculiar relation of the one to the other, since there are neither two words nor two images.
For the Word, by virtue of the fact that it is a word or image, bears a relation to the other, because it is Word and image only as it is the Word and im- age of something; and so peculiar are these attri- butes to the one that they are by no means predicable of the other. For he, whose is the Word and image, is neither image nor Word. It is, therefore, evident that it cannot be explained why they are two, the su- preme Spirit and the Word, although by certain prop- erties of each they are required to be two. For it is the property of the one to derive existence from the other, and the property of that other that the first de- rives existence from him.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
This Word derives existence from the supreme Spirit by birth.
And this truth, it seems, can be expressed in no more familiar terms than when it is said to be the property of the one, to be born of the other; and of the other, that the first is born of him. For it is now clearly proved, that the Word of the supreme Spirit does not derive existence from him, as do those be- ings which have been created by him; but as Creator from Creator, supreme Being from supreme Being. And, to dispose of this comparison with all brevity, it is one and the same being, which derives existence MONOLOGIUM. 103 from one and the same being, and on such terms, that it in no wise derives existence, except from that be- ing.
Since it is evident, then, that the Word of the su- preme Spirit so derives existence from him alone, that it is completely analogous to the offspring of a parent; and that it does not derive existence from him, as if it were created by him, doubtless no more fitting sup- position can be entertained regarding its origin, than that it derives existence from the supreme Spirit by birth (nascendo).
For, innumerable objects are unhesitatingly said to be born of those things from which they derive ex- istence, although they possess no such likeness to those things of which they are said to be born, as off- spring to a parent. — We say, for instance, that the hair is born of the head, or the fruit of the tree, although the hair does not resemble the head, nor the fruit the tree.
If, then, many objects of this sort are without ab- surdity said to be born, so much the more fittingly may the Word of the supreme Spirit be said to derive existence from him by birth, the more perfect the re- semblance it bears to him, like a child's to its parent, through deriving existence from him.
CHAPTER XL.
He is most truly a parent, and that Word his offspring.
But if it is most properly said to be born, and is so like him of whom it is born, why should it be esteemed like, as a child is like his parent? why should it not rather be declared, that the Spirit is more truly a parent, and the Word his offspring, the more he 104 ANSELM.
alone is sufficient to effect this birth, and the more what is born expresses his likeness? For, among other beings which we know bear the relations of parent and child, none so begets as to be solely and without accessory, sufficient to the generation of offspring; and none is so begotten that without any admixture of unlikeness, it shows complete likeness to its pa- rent.
If, then, the Word of the supreme Spirit so de- rives its complete existence from the being of that Spirit himself alone, and is so uniquely like him, that no child ever so completely derives existence from its parent, and none is so like its parent, certainly the relation of parent and offspring can be ascribed to no beings so consistently as to the supreme Spirit and his Word. Hence, it is his property to be most truly parent, and its to be most truly his offspring.
CHAPTER XLI.
He most truly begets, and it is most truly begotten.
But it will be impossible to establish this proposi- tion, unless, in equal degree, he most truly begets, and it is most truly begotten. As the former supposi- tion is evidently true, so the latter is necessarily most certain. Hence, it belongs to the supreme Spirit most truly to beget, and to his Word to be most truly be- gotten.
CHAPTER XLII.
It is the property of the one to be most truly progenitor and Fa- ther, and of the other to be the begotten and Son.
I should certainly be glad, and perhaps able, now to reach the conclusion, that he is most truly the Fa- MONOLOGIUM. 105 ther, while this Word is most truly his Son. But I think that even this question should not be neglected: whether it is more fitting to call them Father and Son, than mother and daughter, since in them there is no distinction of sex.
For, if it is consistent with the nature of the one to be the Father, and of his offspring to be the Son, because both are Spirit (Spiritus, masculine); why is it not, with equal reason, consistent with the nature of the one to be the mother, and the other the daugh- ter, since both are truth and wisdom (veritas et sa- fientia, feminine)?
Or, is it because in these natures that have a dif- ference of sex, it belongs to the superior sex to be father or son, and to the inferior to be mother or daughter? And this is certainly a natural fact in most instances, but in some the contrary is true, as among certain kinds of birds, among which the female is always larger and stronger, while the male is smaller and weaker.
At any rate, it is more consistent to call the su- preme Spirit father than mother, for this reason, that the first and principal cause of offspring is always in the father. For, if the maternal cause is ever in some way preceded by the paternal, it is exceedingly incon- sistent that the name mother should be attached to that parent with which, for the generation of offspring, no other cause is associated, and which no other pre- cedes. It is, therefore, most true that the supreme Spirit is Father of his offspring. But, if the son is always more like the father than is the daughter, while nothing is more like the supreme Father than his off- spring; then it is most true that this offspring is not a daughter, but a Son.
106 ANSELM.
Hence, just as it is the property of the one most truly to beget, and of the other to be begotten, so it is the property of the one to be most truly progenitor, and of the other to be most truly begotten. And as the one is most truly the parent, and the other his offspring, so the one is most truly Father, and the other most truly Son.
CHAPTER XLIII.
Consideration of the common attributes of both and the individual properties of each.
Now that so many and so important properties of each have been discovered, whereby a strange plural- ity, as ineffable as it is inevitable, is proved to exist in the supreme unity, I think it most interesting to reflect, again and again, upon so unfathomable a mys- tery.
For observe: although it is so impossible that he who begets, and he who is begotten, are the same, and that parent and offspring are the same — so im- possible that necessarily one must be the progenitor and the other the begotten, and one the Father, the other the Son; yet, here it is so necessary that he who begets and he who is begotten shall be the same, and also that parent and offspring shall be the same, that the progenitor cannot be any other than what the be- gotten is, nor the Father any other than the Son.
And although the one is one, and the other an- other, so that it is altogether evident that they are two; yet that which the one and the other are is in such a way one and the same, that it is a most ob- scure mystery why they are two. For, in such a way is one the Father and the other the Son, that when I speak of both I perceive that I have spoken of two; MONOLOGIUM. 107 and yet so identical is that which both Father and Son are, that I do not understand why they are two of whom I have spoken.