SigPhi · Anselm of Canterbury

Proslogium, Monologium, and Cur Deus Homo (Deane)

Page 6 of 15

For, although the Father separately is the per- fectly supreme Spirit, and the Son separately is the perfectly supreme Spirit, yet, so are the Spirit-Father and the Spirit-Son one and the same being, that the Father and the Son are not two spirits, but one Spirit. For, just as to separate properties of separate beings, plurality is not attributed, since, they are not proper- ties of two things, so, what is common to both pre- serves an indivisible unity, although it belongs, as a whole, to them taken separately.

For, as there are not two fathers or two sons, but one Father and one Son, since separate properties belong to separate beings, so there are not two spirits, but one Spirit; although it belongs both to the Father, taken separately, and to the Son, taken separately, to be the perfect Spirit. For so qpposite are their rela- tions, that the one never assumes the property of the other; so harmonious are they in nature, that the one ever contains the essence of the other. For they are so diverse by virtue of the fact that the one is the Father and the other the Son, that the Father is never called the Son, nor the Son the Father; and they are so identical, by virtue of their substance, that the essence of the Son is ever in the Father, and the essence of the Father in the Son.

CHAPTER XLIV.

How one is the essence of the other.

Hence, even if one is called the essence of the other, there is no departure from truth; but the su- 108 ANSELM.

preme simplicity and unity of their common nature is thus honored. For, not as one conceives of a man's wisdom, through which man is wise, though he can- not be wise through himself, can we thus understand the statement that the Father is essence of the Son, and the Son the essence of the Father. We cannot understand that the Son is existent through the Fa- ther, and the Father through the Son, as if the one could not be existent except through the other, just as a man cannot be wise except through wisdom.

For, as the supreme Wisdom is ever wise through itself, so the supreme Essence ever exists through it- self. But, the perfectly supreme Essence is the Fa- ther, and the perfectly supreme Essence is the Son. Hence, the perfect Father and the perfect Son exist, each through himself, just as each is wise through himself.

For the Son is not the less perfect essence or wis- dom because he is an # essence born of the essence of the Father, and a wisdom born of the wisdom of the Father; but he would be a less perfect essence or wisdom if he did not exist through himself, and were not wise through himself.

For, there is no inconsistency between the subsist- ence of the Son through himself, and his deriving ex- istence from his Father. For, as the Father has es- sence, and wisdom, and life in himself; so that not through another's, but through his own, essence he exists; through his own wisdom he is wise; through his own life he lives; so, by generation, he grants to his Son the possession of essence, and wisdom, and life in himself, so that not through an extraneous es- sence, wisdom, and life, but through his own, he sub- sists, is wise, and lives; otherwise, the existence of MONOLOGIUM. 109 Father and Son will not be the same, nor will the Son be equal to the Father. But it has already been clearly proved how false this supposition is.

Hence, there is no inconsistency between the sub- sistence of the Son through himself, and his deriving existence from the Father, since he must have from the Father this very power of subsisting through him- self. For, if a wise man should teach me his wisdom, which I formerly lacked, he might without impropri- ety be said to teach me by this very wisdom of his. But, although my wisdom would derive its existence and the fact of its being from his wisdom, yet when my wisdom once existed, it would be no other essence than its own, nor would it be wise except through itself.

Much more, then, the eternal Father's eternal Son, who so derives existence from the Father that they are not two essences, subsists, is wise, and lives through himself. Hence, it is inconceivable that the Father should be the essence of the Son, or the Son the essence of the Father, on the ground that the one could not subsist through itself, but must subsist through the other. But in order to indicate how they share in an essence supremely simple and supremely one, it may consistently be said, and conceived, that the one is so identical with the other that the one possesses the essence of the other.

On these grounds, then, since there is obviously no difference between possessing an essence and be- ing an essence, just as the one possesses the essence of the other, so the one is the essence of the other, that is, the one has the same existence with the other.

IIO ANSELM.

CHAPTER XLV.

The Son may more appropriately be called the essence of the Father, than the Father the essence of the Son: and in like manner the Son is the virtue, wisdom, etc., of the Father.

And although, for reasons we have noted, this is true, it is much more proper to call the Son the es- sence of the Father than the Father the essence of the Son. For, since the Father has his being from none other than himself, it is not wholly appropriate to say that he has the being of another than himself; while, since the Son has his being from the Father, and has the same essence with his Father, he may most appropriately be said to have the essence of his Father.

Hence, seeing that neither has an essence, except by being an essence; as the Son is more appropriately conceived to have the essence of the Father than the Father to have the essence of the Son, so the Son may more fitly be called the essence of the Father than the Father the essence of the son. For this single explanation proves, with sufficiently emphatic brevity, that the Son not only has the same essence with the Father, but has this very essence from the Father; so that, to assert that the Son is the essence of the Father is the same as to assert that the Son is not a different essence from the essence of the Father nay, from the Father-essence.

In like manner, therefore, the Son is the virtue of the Father, and his wisdom, and justice, and what- ever is consistently attributed to the essence of the supreme Spirit.

MONOLOGIUM. Ill CHAPTER XLVI.

How some of these truths which are thus expounded may also be conceived of in another way.

Yet, some of these truths, which may be thus ex- pounded and conceived of, are apparently capable of another interpretation as well, not inconsistent with this same assertion. For it is proved that the Son is the true Word, that is, the perfect intelligence, con- ceiving of the whole substance of the Father, or per- fect cognition of that substance, and knowledge of it, and wisdom regarding it; that is, it understands, and conceives of, the very essence of the Father, and cog nises it, and knows it, and is wise (japit) regarding it.

If, then, in this sense, the Son is called the intelli- gence of the Father, and wisdom concerning him, and knowledge and cognition of him, and acquaintance with him; since the Son understands and conceives of the Father, is wise concerning him, knows and is acquainted with him, there is no departure from truth.

Most properly, too, may the Son be called the truth of the Father, not only in the sense that the truth of the Son is the same with that of the Father, as we have already seen; but in this sense, also, that in him no imperfect imitation shall be conceived of, but the complete truth of the substance of the Father since he is no other than what the Father is.

CHAPTER XLVII.

The Son is the intelligence of intelligence and the Truth of truth But if the very substance of the Father is intelli- gence, and knowledge, and wisdom, and truth, it is 112 ANSELM.

consequently inferred that as the Son is the intelli- gence, and knowledge, and wisdom, and truth, of the paternal substance, so he is the intelligence of intelli- gence, the knowledge of knowledge, the wisdom of wisdom, and the truth of truth.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

How the Son is the intelligence or wisdom of memory or the mem- ory of the Father and of memory.

But what is to be our notion of memory? Is the Son to be regarded as the intelligence conceiving of memory, or as the memory of the Father, or as the memory of memory? Indeed, since it cannot be de- nied that the supreme Wisdom remembers itself, noth- ing can be more consistent than to regard the Father as memory, just as the Son is the Word; because the Word is apparently born of memory, a fact that is more clearly seen in the case of the human mind.

For, since the human mind is not always thinking of itself, though it ever remembers itself, it is clear that, when it thinks of itself, the word corresponding to it is born of memory. Hence, it appears that, if it always thought of itself, its word would be always born of memory. For, to think of an object of which we have remembrance, this is to express it mentally; while the word corresponding to the object is the thought itself, formed after the likeness of that object from memory.

Hence, it may be clearly apprehended in the su- preme Wisdom, which always thinks of itself, just as it remembers itself, that, of the eternal remembrance of it, its coeternal Wotd is born. Therefore, as the Word is properly conceived of as the child, the mem- MONOLOGIUM. 113 ory most appropriately takes the name of parent. If, then, the child which is born of the supreme Spirit alone is the child of his memory, there can be no more logical conclusion than that his memory is himself. For not in respect of the fact that he remembers him- self does he exist in his own memory, like ideas that exist in the human memory, without being the mem- ory itself; but he so remembers himself that he is his own memory.

It therefore follows that, just as the Son is the in- telligence or wisdom of the Father, so he is that of the memory of the Father. But, regarding whatever the Son has wisdom or understanding, this he like- wise remembers. The Son is, therefore, the memory of the Father, and the memory of memory, that is, the memory that remembers the Father, who is mem- ory, just as he is the wisdom of the Father, and the wisdom of wisdom, that is, the wisdom wise regard- ing the wisdom of the Father; and the Son is indeed memory, born of memory, as he is wisdom, born of wisdom, while the Father is memory and wisdom born of none.

CHAPTER XLIX.

The supreme Spirit loves himself.

But, while I am here considering with interest the individual properties and the common attributes of Father and Son, I find none in them more pleasur- able to contemplate than the feeling of mutual love. For how absurd it would be to deny that the supreme Spirit loves himself, just as he remembers himself, and conceives of himself! since even the rational hu- man mind is convinced that it can love both itself and him, because it can remember itself and him, and can 114 ANSELM.

conceive of itself and of him; for idle and almost use- less is the memory and conception of any object, un- less, so far as reason requires, the object itself is loved or condemned. The supreme Spirit, then, loves him- self, just as he remembers himself and conceives of himself.

CHAPTER L. The same love proceeds equally from Father and Son.

It is, at any rate, clear to the rational man that he does not remember himself or conceive of himself because he loves himself, but he loves himself be- cause he remembers himself and conceives of himself; and that he could not love himself if he did not re- member and conceive of himself. For no object is loved without remembrance or conception of it; while many things are retained in memory and conceived of that are not loved.

It is evident, then, that the love of the supreme Spirit proceeds from the fact that he remember him- self and conceives of himself (se intelligit). But if, by the memory of the supreme Spirit, we understand the Father, and by his intelligence by which he con- ceives of anything, the Son, it is manifest that the love of the supreme Spirit proceeds equally from Father and Son.

CHAPTER LI.

Each loves himself and the other with equal love.

But if the supreme Spirit loves himself, no doubt the Father loves himself, the Son loves himself, and the one the other; since the Father separately is the supreme Spirit, and the Son separately is the su- MONOLOGIUM. 115 preme Spirit, and both at once one Spirit. And, since each equally remembers himself and the other, and conceives equally of himself and the other; and since what is loved, or loves in the Father, or in the Son, is altogether the same, necessarily each loves himself and the other with an equal love.

CHAPTER LII.

This love is as great as the supreme Spirit himself.

How great, then, is this love of the supreme Spirit, common as it is to Father and Son! But, if he loves himself as much as he remembers and conceives of himself; and, moreover, remembers and conceives of himself in as great a degree as that in which his es- sence exists, since otherwise it cannot exist; undoubt- edly his love is as great as he himself is.

CHAPTER LIII.

This love is identical with the supreme Spirit, and yet it is itself with the Father and the Son one spirit.

But what can be equal to the supreme Spirit, ex- cept the supreme Spirit? That love is, then, the su- preme Spirit. Hence, if no creature, that is, if noth- ing other than the supreme Spirit, the Father and the Son, ever existed; nevertheless, Father and Son would love themselves and one another.

It therefore follows that this love is nothing else than what the Father and the Son are, which is the supreme Being. But, since there cannot be more than one supreme Being, what inference can be more necessary than that Father and Son and the love of both are one supreme Being? Therefore, this love is Il6 ANSELM.

supreme Wisdom, supreme Truth, the supreme Good, and whatsoever can be attributed to the substance of the supreme Spirit.

CHAPTER LIV.

It proceeds as a whole from the Father, and as a whole from the Son, and yet does not exist except as one love.

It should be carefully considered whether there are two loves, one proceeding from the Father, the other from the Son; or one, not proceeding as a whole from one, but in part from the Father, in part from the Son; or neither more than one, nor one proceed- ing in part from each separately, but one proceeding as a whole from each separately, and likewise as a whole from the two at once.

But the solution of such a question can, without doubt, be apprehended from the fact that this love proceeds not from that in which Father and Son are more than one, but from that in which they are one. For, not from their relations, which are more than one, but from their essence itself, which does not ad- mit of plurality, do Father and Son equally produce so great a good.

Therefore, as the Father separately is the supreme Spirit, and the Son separately is the supreme Spirit, and Father and Son at once are not two, but one Spirit; so from the Father separately the love of the supreme Spirit emanates as a whole, and from the Son as a whole, and at once from Father and Son, not as two, but as one and the same whole.

MONOLOGIUM. 117 CHAPTER LV. This love is not their Son.

Since this love, then, has its being equally from Father and Son, and is so like both that it is in no wise unlike them, but is altogether identical with them; is it to be regarded as their Son or offspring? But, as the Word, so soon as it is examined, declares itself to be the offspring of him from whom it derives existence, by displaying a manifold likeness to its parent; so love plainly denies that it sustains such a relation, since, so long as it is conceived to proceed from Father and Son, it does not at once show to one who contemplates it so evident a likeness to him from whom it derives existence, although deliberate reason- ing teaches us that it is altogether identical with Father and Son.

Therefore, if it is their offspring, either one of them is its father and the other its mother, or each is its father, or mother, — suppositions which apparently contradict all truth. For, since it proceeds in pre- cisely the same way from the Father as from the Son, regard for truth does not allow the relations of Father and Son to it to be described by different words; therefore, the one is not its father, the other its mother. But that there are two beings which, taken separately, bear each the perfect relation of father or mother, differing in no respect, to some one being — of this no existing nature allows proof by any ex- ample.

Hence, both, that is, Father and Son, are not fa- ther and mother of the love emanating from them. It Il8 ANSELM.

therefore is apparently most inconsistent with truth that their identical love should be their son or off- spring.

CHAPTER LVI.

Only the Father begets and is unbegotten; only the Son is begot- ten; only love neither begotten nor unbegotten.

Still, it is apparent that this love can neither be said, in accordance with the usage of common speech, to be unbegotten, nor can it so properly be said to be begotten, as the Word is said to be begotten. For we often say of a thing that it is begotten of that from which it derives existence, as when we say that light or heat is begotten of fire, or any effect of its cause.

On this ground, then, love, proceeding from the supreme Spirit, cannot be declared to be wholly un- begotten, but it cannot so properly be said to be be- gotten as can the Word; since the Word is the most true offspring and most true Son, while it is manifest that love is by no means offspring or son.

He alone, therefore, may, or rather should, be called begetter and unbegotten, whose is the Word 5 since he alone is Father and parent, and in no wise derives existence from another; and the Word alone should be called begotten, which alone is Son and off- spring. But only the love of both is neither begotten nor unbegotten, because it is neither son nor offspring, and yet does in some sort derive existence from an — other.

MONOLOGIUM. 1 19 CHAPTER LVII.

This love is uncreated and creator, as are Father and Son; and yet it is with them not three, but one uncreated and creative being. And it may be called the Spirit of Father and Son.

But, since this love separately is the supreme Being, as are Father and Son, and yet at once Father and Son, and the love of both are not more than one, but one supreme Being, which alone was created by none, and created all things through no other than it- self; since this is true, necessarily, as the Father sep- arately, and the Son separately, are each uncreated and creator, so, too, love separately is uncreated and creator, and yet all three at once are not more than one, but one uncreated and creative being.

None, therefore, makes or begets or creates the Father, but the Father alone begets, but does not create, the Son; while Father and Son alike do not create or beget, but somehow, if such an expression may be used, breathe their love: for, although the su- premely immutable Being does not breathe after our fashion, yet the truth that this Being sends forth this, its love, which proceeds from it, not by departing from it, but by deriving existence from it, can perhaps be no better expressed than by saying that this Being breathes its love.

But, if this expression is admissible, as the Word of the supreme Being is its Son, so its love may fit- tingly enough be called its breath (JSpiritus). So that, though it is itself essentially spirit, as are Father and Son, they are not regarded as the spirits of anything, since neither is the Father born of any other nor the Son of the Father, as it were, by breathing; while 120 ANSELM.

that love is regarded as the Breath or Spirit of both, since from both breathing in their transcendent way it mysteriously proceeds.

And this love, too, it seems, from the fact that there is community of being between Father and Son, may, not unreasonably, take, as it were its own, some name which is common to Father and Son; if there is any exigency demanding that it should have a name proper to itself. And, indeed, if this love is actually designated by the name Spirit, as by its own name, since this name equally describes the Father and the Son: it will be useful to this effect also, that through this name it shall be signified that this love is iden- tical with Father and Son, although it has its being from them.

CHAPTER LVIII.

As the Son is the essence or wisdom pt the Father in the sense that he has the same essence or wisdom that the Father has: so likewise the Spirit is the essence and wisdom etc. of Father and Son.

Also, just as the Son is the substance and wisdom and virtue of the Father, in the sense that he has th& same essence and wisdom and virtue with the Father ^ so it may be conceived that the Spirit of both is the essence or wisdom or virtue of Father and Son, since it has altogether the same essence, wisdom, and virtue with these.

CHAPTER LIX.

The Father and the Son and their Spirit exist equally the one in the other.

It is a most interesting consideration that the Fa- ther, and the Son, and the Spirit of both, exist in one MONOLOGIUM. 121 atnother with such equality that no one of them sur- passes another. For, not only is each in such a way the perfectly supreme Being that, nevertheless, all three at once exist only as one supreme Being, but the same truth is no less capable of proof when each is taken separately.

For the Father exists as a whole in the Son, and in the Spirit common to them; and the Son in the Father, and in the Spirit; and the Spirit in the Fa- ther, and in the Son; for the memory of the supreme Being exists, as a whole, in its intelligence and in its love, and the intelligence in its memory and love, and the love in its memory and intelligence. For the su- preme Spirit conceives of (intelligif) its memory as a whole, and loves it, and remembers its intelligence as a whole, and loves it as a whole, and remembers its love as a whole, and conceives of it as a whole.

But we mean by the memory, the Father; by the intelligence, the Son; by the love, the Spirit of both. In such equality, therefore, do Father and Son and Spirit embrace one another, and exist in one another, that none of them can be proved to surpass another or to exist without it.

CHAPTER LX.

To none of these is another necessary that he may remember, con- ceive, or love: since each taken by himself is memory and in- telligence and love and all that is necessarily inherent in the supreme Being.

But, while this discussion engages our attention, I think that this truth, which occurs to me as I re- flect, ought to be most carefully commended to mem- ory. The Father must be so conceived of as memory, the Son as intelligence, and the Spirit as love, that it 122 ANSELM.

shall also be understood that the Father does not need the Son, or the Spirit common to them, nor the Son the Father, or the same Spirit, nor the Spirit the Fa- ther, or the Son: as if the Father were able, through his own power, only to remember, but to conceive only through the Son, and to love only through the Spirit of himself and his son; and the Son could only conceive or understand (Jntelligere) through himself, but remembered through the Father, and loved through his Spirit; and this Spirit were able through himself alone only to love, while the Father remembers for him, and the Son conceives or understands (Jntclligif) for him.

For, since among these three each one taken sep- arately is so perfectly the supreme Being and the su- preme Wisdom that through himself he remembers and conceives and loves, it must be that none of these three needs another, in order either to remember or to conceive or to love. For, each taken separately is essentially memory and intelligence and love, and all that is necessarily inherent in the supreme Being.

CHAPTER LXI.

Yet there are not three, but one Father and one Son and one Spirit.

And here I see a question arises. For, if the Fa- ther is intelligence and love as well as memory, and the Son is memory and love as well as intelligence, and the Spirit is no less memory and intelligence than love; how is it that the Father is not a Son and a Spirit of some being? and why is not the Son the Father and the Spirit of some being? and why is not this Spirit the Father of some being, and the Son of MONOLOGIUM. 1 23 ^ome being? For it was understood, that the Father Vas memory, the Son intelligence, and the Spirit love.

But this question is easily answered, if we consider the truths already disclosed in our discussion. For the Father, even though he is intelligence and love, is not for that reason the Son or the Spirit of any being; since he is not intelligence, begotten of any, or love, proceeding from any, but whatever he is, he is only the begetter, and is he from whom the other proceeds.

The Son also, even though by his own power he remembers and loves, is not, for that reason, the Fa- ther or the Spirit of any; since he is not memory as begetter, or love as proceeding from another after the likeness of his Spirit, but whatever being he has he is only begotten and is he from whom the Spirit pro- ceeds.

The Spirit, too, is not necessarily Father or Son, because his own memory and intelligence are suffi- cient to him; since he is not memory as begetter, or intelligence as begotten, but he alone, whatever he is, proceeds or emanates.

What, then, forbids the conclusion that in the su- preme Being there is only one Father, one Son, one Spirit, and not three Fathers or Sons or Spirits?

CHAPTER LXII.

How it seems that of these three more sons than one are born.

But perhaps the following observation will prove inconsistent with this assertion. It should not be doubted that the Father and the Son and their Spirit each expresses himself and the other two, just as each conceives of, and understands, himself and the other 124 ANSELM.

two. But, if this is true, are there not in the supreme Being as many words as there are expressive beings, and as many words as there are beings who are ex- pressed?

For, if more men than one give expression to some one object in thought, apparently there are as many words corresponding to that object as there are think- ers; since the word corresponding to it exists in the thoughts of each separately. Again, if one man thinks of more objects than one, there are as many words in the mind of the thinker as there are objects thought of.

But in the thought of a man, when he thinks of anything outside his own mind, the word correspond- ing to the object thought of is not born of the object itself, since that is absent from the view of thought, but of some likeness or image of the object which ex- ists in the memory of the thinker, or which is perhaps called to mind through a corporeal sense from the present object itself.

But in the supreme Being, Father and Son and their Spirit are always so present to one another — for each one, as we have already seen, exists in the others no less than in himself — that, when they express one another, the one that is expressed seems to beget his own word, just as when he is expressed by himself. How is it, then, that the Son and the Spirit of thet Son and of the Father beget nothing, if each begets his own word, when he is expressed by himself or by, another? Apparently as many words as can be proved to be born of the supreme Substance, so many Son^s according to our former reasoning, must there be b^= gotten of this substance, and so many spirits proceec3l ing from it.

MONOLOGIUM. 125 CHAPTER LXIII.

How among them there is only one Son of one Father, that is. one Word, and that from the Father alone.

On these grounds, therefore, there apparently are in that Being, not only many fathers and sons and beings proceeding from it, but other necessary attri- butes as well; or else Father and Son and their Spirit, of whom it is already certain that they truly exist, are not three expressive beings, although each taken sep- arately is expressive, nor are there more beings than one expressed, when each one expresses himself and the other two.

For, just as it is an inherent property of the su- preme Wisdom to know and conceive, so it is as- suredly natural to eternal and immutable knowledge and intelligence ever to regard as present what it Xcnows and conceives of. For, to such a supreme Spirit expressing and beholding through conception, sis it were, are the same, just as the expression of our Siuman mind is nothing but the intuition of the thinker. But reasons already considered have shown most convincingly that whatever is essentially inherent in the supreme Nature is perfectly consistent with the ^nature of the Father and the Son and their Spirit taken separately; and that, nevertheless, this, if at- tributed to the three at once, does not admit of plural- ity. Now, it is established that as knowledge and in- telligence are attributes of his being, so his knowing and conceiving is nothing else than his expression, that is, his ever beholding as present what he knows and conceives of. Necessarily, therefore, just as the Father separately, and the Son separately, and their * 126 ANSBLM.

Spirit separately, is a knowing and conceiving being, and yet the three at once are not more knowing and conceiving beings than one, but one knowing and one conceiving being: so, each taken separately is expres- sive, and yet there are not three expressive beings at once, but one expressive being.

Hence, this fact may also be clearly recognised, that when these three are expressed, either by them- selves or by another, there are not more beings than one expressed. For what is therein expressed except their being? If, then, that Being is one and only one, then what is expressed is one and only one; there- fore, if it is in them one and only one which expresses, and one which is expressed — for it is one wisdom which expresses and one substance which is expressed — it follows that there are not more words than one, but one alone. Hence, although each one expresses himself and all express one another, nevertheless there cannot be in the supreme Being another Word than that already shown to be born of him whose is the Word, so that it may be called his true image and his Son.

And in this truth I find a strange and inexplicable factor. For observe: although it is manifest that each one, that is, Father and Son, and the Spirit of Father and Son equally expresses himself and both the others, and that there is one Word alone among them; yet it appears that this Word itself can in no wise be called the Word of all three, but only of one.

For it has been proved that it is the image and Son of him whose Word it is. And it is plain that it cannot properly be called either the image or son of itself, or of the Spirit proceeding from it. For, neither of itself nor of a being proceeding from it, is it born, MONOLOGIUM. 1 27 nor does it in its existence imitate itself or a being proceeding from itself. For it does not imitate itself, or take on a like existence to itself, because imitation and likeness are impossible where only one being is concerned, but require plurality of beings; while it does not imitate the spirit, nor does it exist in his likeness, because it has not its existence from that Spirit, but the Spirit from it. It is to be concluded that this sole Word corresponds to him alone, from whom it has existence by generation, and after whose complete likeness it exists.

One Father, then, and not more than one Father; one Son, and not more than one Son; one Spirit pro- ceeding from them, and not more than one such Spirit, exist in the supreme Being. And, although there are three, so that the Father is never the Son or the Spirit proceeding from them, nor the Son at any time the Father or the Spirit, nor the Spirit of Father and Son ever the Father or the Son; and each separately is so perfect that he is self-sufficient, needing neither of the others; yet what they are is in such a way one that just as it cannot be attributed to them taken sep- arately as plural, so neither can it be attributed to them as plural, when the three are taken at once. And though each bne expresses himself and all express one another, yet there are not among them more words than one, but one; and this Word corresponds not to each separately, nor to all together, but to one alone.

CHAPTER LXIV.

Though this truth is inexplicable, it demands belief.

It seems to me that the mystery of so sublime a subject transcends all the vision of the human intel- 128 ANSELM.

lect. And for that reason I think it best to refrain from the attempt to explain how this thing is. For it is my opinion that one who is investigating an incom- prehensible object ought to be satisfied if his reason- ing shall have brought him far enough to recognise that this object most certainly exists; nor ought as- sured belief to be the less readily given to these truths which are declared to be such by cogent proofs, and without the contradiction of any other reason, if, be- cause of the incomprehensibility of their own natural sublimity, they do not admit of explanation.

But what is so incomprehensible, so ineffable, as that which is above all things? Hence, if these truths, which have thus far been debated in connection with the supreme Being, have been declared on cogent grounds, even though they cannot be so examined by the human intellect as to be capable of explanation in words, their assured certainty is not therefore shaken. For, if a consideration, such as that above, rationally comprehends that it is incomprehensible in what way supreme Wisdom knows its creatures, of which we necessarily know so many; who shall explain how it knows and expresses itself, of which nothing or scarcely anything can be known by man? Hence, if it is not by virtue of the self-expression of this Wis- dom that the Father begets and the Son is begotten, who shall tell his generation?

CHAPTER LXV.

How real truth may be reached in the discussion of an ineffable subject.

But again, if such is the character of its ineffabil- ity, — nay, since it is such, — how shall whatever con- MONOLOG1UM. 1 29 elusion our discussion has reached regarding it in terms of Father, Son, and emanating Spirit be valid? For, if it has been explained on true grounds, how is it ineffable? Or, if it is ineffable, how can it be such as our discussion has shown? Or, could it be ex- plained to a certain extent, and therefore nothing would disprove the truth of our argument; but since it could not be comprehended at all, for that reason it would be ineffable?