But how shall we meet the truth that has already been established in this very discussion, namely, that the supreme Being is so above and beyond every other nature that, whenever any statement is made concerning it in words which are also applicable to other natures, the sense of these words in this case is by no means that in which they are applied to other natures.
For what sense have I conceived of, in all these words that I have thought of, except the common and familiar sense? If, then, the familiar sense of words is alien to that Being, whatever I have inferred to be attributable to it is not its property. How, then, has any truth concerning the supreme Being been discov- ered, if what has been discovered is so alien to that Being? What is to be inferred?
Or, has there in some sort been some truth dis- covered regarding this incomprehensible object, and in some sort has nothing been proved regarding it? For often we speak of things which we do not express with precision as they are; but by another expression we indicate what we are unwilling or unable to ex- press with precision, as when we speak in riddles. And often we see a thing, not precisely as it is in it- self, but through a likeness or image, as when we I30 ANSELM.
I30 ANSELM.
look upon a face in a mirror. And in this way, we often express and yet do not express, see and yet do not see, one and the same object; we express and see it through another; we do not express it, and do not see it by virtue of its own proper nature.
On these grounds, then, it appears that there is nothing to disprove the truth of our discussion thus far, concerning the supreme Nature, and yet this Na- ture itself remains not the less ineffable, if we believe that it has never been expressed according to the pe- culiar nature of its own being, but somehow described through another.
For whatever terms seem applicable to that Na- ture do not reveal it to me in its proper character, but rather intimate it through some likeness. For, when I think of the meanings of these terms, I more naturally conceive in my mind of what I see in created objects, than of what I conceive to transcend all hu- man understanding. For it is something much less* nay, something far different, that their meaning sug — gests to my mind, than that the conception of which my mind itself attempts to achieve through this shad- owy signification.
For, neither is the term wisdom sufficient to reveal to me that Being, through which all things were cre- ated from nothing and are preserved from nothing- ness; nor is the term essence capable of expressing to me that Being which, through its unique elevation, is far above all things, and through its peculiar natural character greatly transcends all things.
In this way, then, is that Nature ineffable, because it is incapable of description in words or by any other means; and, at the same time, an inference regarding it, which can be reached by the instruction of reaso?
MONOLOGIUM. 131 in some other way, as it were in a riddle, is not ^-^erefore necessarily false.
CHAPTER LXVI.
-^ trough the rational mind is the nearest approach to the supreme Being.
Since it is clear, then, that nothing can be ascer- tained concerning this Nature in terms of its own peculiar character, but only in terms of something ^lse, it is certain that a nearer approach toward knowl- edge of it is made through that which approaches it iiaore nearly through likeness. For the more like to it anything among created beings is proved to be, the in ore excellent must that created being be by nature. tie nee, this being, through its greater likeness, assists tlie investigating mind in the approach to supreme Truth; and through its more excellent created es- sence, teaches the more correctly what opinion the mind itself ought to form regarding the Creator. So, "Undoubtedly, a greater knowledge of the creative Be- ing is attained, the more nearly the creature through "which the investigation is made approaches that Be- 5 ng. For that every being, in so far as it exists, is Xike the supreme Being, reasons already considered c3o not permit us to doubt.
It is evident, then, that as the rational mind alone, ^mong all created beings, is capable of rising to the i nvestigation of this Being, so it is not the less this ^ame rational mind alone, through which the mind it- ^elf can most successfully achieve the discovery of this ^ame Being. For it has already been acknowledged that this approaches it most nearly, through likeness ^=>f natural essence. What is more obvious, then, than "^hat the more earnestly the rational mind devotes it- 132 ANSELM.
self to learning its own nature, the more effectively does it rise to the knowledge of that Being; and the more carelessly it contemplates itself, the farther does it descend from the contemplation of that Being?
CHAPTER LXVII. The mind itself is the mirror and image of that Being.
Therefore, the mind may most fitly be said to b& its own mirror wherein it contemplates, so to speak, the image of what it cannot see face to face. For, if the mind itself alone among all created beings is ca- pable of remembering and conceiving of and loving it- self, I do not see why it should be denied that it is the true image of that being which, through its mem- ory and intelligence and love, is united in an ineffable Trinity. Or, at any rate, it proves itself to be the more truly the image of that Being by its power of re- membering, conceiving of, and loving, that Being. For, the greater and the more like that Being it is, the more truly it is recognised to be its image.
But, it is utterly inconceivable that any rational creature can have been naturally endowed with any power so excellent and so like the supreme Wisdom as this power of remembering, and conceiving of, and loving, the best and greatest of all beings. Hence, no faculty has been bestowed on any creature that is so truly the image of the Creator.
CHAPTER LXVIII.
The rational creature was created in order that it might love this Being.
It seems to follow, then, that the rational creature ought to devote itself to nothing so earnestly as to the MONOLOGIUM. 1 33 -expression, through voluntary performance, of this image which is impressed on it through a natural potency. For, not only does it owe its very existence to its creator; but the fact that it is known to have no power so important as that of remembering, and conceiving of, and loving, the supreme good, proves that it ought to wish nothing else so especially.
For who can deny that whatever within the scope of one's power is better, ought to prevail with the will? For, to the rational nature rationality is the same with the ability to distinguish the just from the not-just, the true from the not-true, the good from the not-good, the greater good from the lesser; but this power is altogether useless to it, and superfluous, un- less what it distinguishes it loves or condemns, in ac- cordance with the judgment of true discernment.
From this, then, it seems clear enough that every rational being exists for this purpose, that according as, on the grounds of discernment, it judges a thing to be more or less good, or not good, so it may love that thing in greater or less degree, or reject it.
It is, therefore, most obvious that the rational crea- ture was created for this purpose, that it might love the supreme Being above all other goods, as this Be- ing is itself the supreme good; nay, that it might love nothing except it, unless because of it; since that Being is good through itself, and nothing else is good except through it.
But the rational being cannot love this Being, un- less it has devoted itself to remembering and conceiv- ing of it. It is clear, then, that the rational creature ought to devote its whole ability and will to remem- bering, and conceiving of, and loving, the supreme 134 ANSEL1I.
good, for which end it recognises that it has its very existence.
CHAPTER LXIX.
The soul that ever loves this Essence lives at some time in true blessedness.
But there is no doubt that the human soul is a rational creature. Hence, it must have been created for this end, that it might love the supreme Being. It must, therefore, have been created either for this end, that it might love that Being eternally; or for this, that at some time it might either voluntarily, or by violence, lose this love.
But it is impious to suppose that the supreme Wisdom created it for this end, that at some time, either it should despise so great a good, or, though wishing to keep it, should lose it by some violence. We infer, then, that it was created for this end, that it might love the supreme Being eternally. But this it cannot do unless it lives forever. It was so created, then, that it lives forever, if it forever wills to do that for which it was created.
Hence, it is most incompatible with the nature of the supremely good, supremely wise, and omnipotent Creator, that what he has made to exist that it might love him, he should make not to exist, so long as it truly loves him; and that what he voluntarily gave to a non-loving being that it might ever love, he should take away, or permit to be taken away, from the lov- ing being, so that necessarily it should not love; es- pecially since it should by no means be doubted that he himself loves every nature that loves him. Hence, it is manifest that the human soul is. never deprived MONOLOGIUM. 1 35 of its life, if it forever devotes itself to loving the su- preme life.
How, then, shall it live? For is long life so im- portant a matter, if it is not secure from the invasion of troubles? For whoever, while he lives, is either through fear or through actual suffering subject to troubles, or is deceived by a false security, does he not live in misery? But, if any one lives in freedom from these troubles, he lives in blessedness. But it is most absurd to suppose that any nature that forever loves him, who is supremely good and omnipotent, forever lives in misery. So, it is plain, that the human soul is of such a character that, if it diligently observes that end for which it exists, it at some time lives in blessedness, truly secure from death itself and from every other trouble.
CHAPTER LXX.
This Being gives itself in return to the creature that loves it, that that creature may be eternally blessed.
Therefore it cannot be made to appear true that he who is most just and most powerful makes no re- turn to the being that loves him perseveringly, to which although it neither existed nor loved him, he gave existence that it might be able to be a loving be- ing. For, if he makes no return to the loving soul, the most just does not distinguish between the soul that loves, and the soul that despises what ought to be supremely loved, nor does he love the soul that loves him; or else it does not avail to be loved by him; all of which suppositions are inconsistent with his nature; hence he does make a return to every soul that perseveres in loving him.
I36 ANSELM.
But what is this return? For, if he gave to what was nothing, a rational being, that it might be a loving soul, what shall he give to the loving soul, if it does not cease to love? If what waits upon love is so great, how great is the recompense given to love? And if the sustainer of love is such as we declare, of what character is the profit? For, if the rational creature, which is useless to itself without this love, is with it preeminent among all creatures, assuredly nothing can be the reward of love except what is preeminent among all natures.
For this same good, which demands such love toward itself, also requires that it be desired by the loving soul. For, who can love justice, truth, bless- edness, incorruptibility, in such a way as not to wish to enjoy them? What return, then, shall the supreme Goodness make to the being that loves and desires it, except itself? For, whatever else it grants, it does not give in return, since all such bestowals neither compensate the love, nor console the loving being, nor satisfy the soul that desires this supreme Being.
Or, if it wishes to be loved and desired, so as to make some other return than its love, it wishes to be loved and desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of another; and does not wish to be loved itself, but wishes another to be loved; which it is impious to suppose.
So, it is most true that every rational soul, if, as it should, it earnestly devotes itself through love to longing for supreme blessedness, shall at some time receive that blessedness to enjoy, that what it now sees as through a glass and in a riddle, it may then see face to face. But it is most foolish to doubt whether it enjoys that blessedness eternally; since, MONOLOGIUM. 1 37 MONOLOGIUM. 1 37 in the enjoyment of that blessedness, it will be im- possible to turn the soul aside by any fear, or to de- ceive it by false security; nor, having once experi- enced the need of that blessedness, will it be able not to. love it; nor will that blessedness desert the soul that loves it; nor shall there be anything powerful enough to separate them against their will. Hence, the soul that has once begun to enjoy supreme Bless- edness will be eternally blessed.
CHAPTER LXXI. The soul that despises this being will be eternally miserable.
From this it may be inferred, as a certain conse- quence, that the soul which despises the love of the supreme good will incur eternal misery. It might be said that it would be justly punished for such con- tempt if it lost existence or life, since it does not em- ploy itself to the end for which it was created. But reason in no wise admits such a belief, namely, that after such great guilt it is condemned to be what it was before all its guilt.
For, before it existed, it could neither be guilty nor feel a penalty. If, then, the soul despising that end for which it was created, dies so as to feel noth- ing, or so as to be nothing at all, its condition will be the same when in the greatest guilt and when without all guilt; and the supremely wise Justice will not dis- tinguish between what is capable of no good and wills no evil, and what is capable of the greatest good and wills the greatest evil.
But it is plain enough that this is a contradiction. Therefore, nothing can be more logical, and nothing ought to be believed more confidently than that the I38 ANSELM.
soul of man is so constituted that, if it scorns loving the supreme Being, it suffers eternal misery; that just as the loving soul shall rejoice in an eternal reward, so the soul despising that Being shall suffer eternal punishment; and as the former shall feel an immu- table sufficiency, so the latter shall feel an inconsol- able need.
CHAPTER LXXII.
Every human soul is immortal. And it is either forever miserable, or at some time truly blessed.
But if the soul is mortal, of course the loving soul is not eternally blessed, nor the soul that scorns this Being eternally miserable. Whether, therefore, it loves or scorns that for the love of which it was cre- ated, it must be immortal. But if there are some ra- tional souls which are to be judged as neither loving nor scorning, such as the souls of infants seem to be, what opinion shall be held regarding these? Are they mortal or immortal? But undoubtedly all human souls are of the same nature. Hence, since it is es- tablished that some are immortal, every human soul must be immortal. But since every living being is either never, or at some time, truly secure from all trouble; necessarily, also, every human soul is either ever miserable, or at some time truly blessed.
CHAPTER LXXIII.
CHAPTER LXXIII.
No soul is unjustly deprived of the supreme good, and every effort must be directed toward that good.
But, which souls are unhesitatingly to be judged as so loving that for the love of which they were cre- ated, that they deserve to enjoy it at some time, and MONOLOGIUM. 1 39 which as so scorning it, that they deserve ever to stand in need of it; or how and on what ground those which it seems impossible to call either loving or scorning are assigned to either eternal blessedness or misery, — of all this I think it certainly most diffi- cult or even impossible for any mortal to reach an understanding through discussion. But that no being is unjustly deprived by the supremely great and su- premely good Creator of that good for which it was created, we ought most assuredly to believe. And toward this good every man ought to strive, by loving and desiring it with all his heart, and all his soul, and all his mind.
CHAPTER LXXIV.
The supreme Being is to be hoped for.
But the human soul will by no means be able to train itself in this purpose, if it despairs of being able to reach what it aims at. Hence, devotion to effort is not more profitable to it than hope of attainment is necessary.
CHAPTER LXXV.
We must believe in this Being, that is, by believing we must reach out for it.
But what does not believe cannot love or hope. It is, therefore, profitable to this human soul to be- lieve the supreme Being and those things without which that Being cannot be loved, that, by believing, the soul may reach out for it. And this truth can be more briefly and fitly indicated, I think, if instead of saying, "strive for" the supreme Being, we say, "be- lieve in" the supreme Being.
I40 ANSELM.
For, if one says that he believes in it, he appar- ently shows clearly enough both that, through the faith which he professes, he strives for the supreme Being, and that he believes those things which are proper to this aim. For it seems that either he who does not believe what is proper to striving for that Being, or he who does not strive for that Being, through what he believes, does not believe in it. And, perhaps, it is indifferent whether we say, "believe in it," or " direct belief to it," just as by believing to strive for it and toward it are the same, except that whoever shall have come to it by striving for (Jendendo in) it, will not remain without, but within it. And this is indicated more distinctly and familiarly if we say, "striving for" (in) it, than if we say, "toward" (ad) it.
On this ground, therefore, I think it may more fitly be said that we should believe in it, than that we should direct belief to it.
CHAPTER LXXVI.
We should believe in Father and Son and in their Spirit equally, and in each separately, and in the three at once.
We should believe, then, equally in the Father and in the Son and in their Spirit, and in each sepa- rately, and in the three at once, since the Father sep- arately, and the Son separately, and their Spirit sep- arately is the supreme Being, and at once Father and Son with their Spirit are one and the same supreme Being, in which alone every man ought to believe; because it is the sole end which in every thought and act he ought to strive for. Hence, it is manifest that as none is able to strive for that Being, except he be- MONOLOGIUM. 141 lieve in it; so to believe it avails none, except he strive for it.
CHAPTER LXXVII. What is living, and what dead faith.
Hence, with however great confidence so impor- tant a truth is believed, the faith will be useless and, as it were, dead, unless it is strong and living through love. For, that the faith which is accompanied by sufficient love is by no means idle, if an opportunity of operation offers, but rather exercises itself in an abundance of works, as it could not do without love, may be proved from this fact alone, that, since it loves the supreme Justice, it can scorn nothing that is just, it can approve nothing that is unjust. Therefore, see- ing that the fact of its operation shows that life, with- out which it could not operate, is inherent in it; it is not absurd to say that operative faith is alive, because it has the life of love without which it could not ope- rate; and that idle faith is not living, because it lacks that life of love, with which it would not be idle.
Hence, if not only he who has lost his sight is called blind, but also he who ought to have sight and has it not, why cannot, in like manner, faith without love be called dead] not because it has lost its life, that is, love; but because it has not the life which it ought always to have? As that faith, then, which operates through love is recognised as living, so that which is idle, through contempt, is proved to be dead. It may, therefore, be said with sufficient fitness that living faith believes in that in which we ought to be- lieve; while dead faith merely believes that which ought to be believed.
I42 ANSELM.
CHAPTER LXXVIII. The supreme Being may in some sort be called Three.
And so it is evidently expedient for every man to believe in a certain ineffable trinal unity, and in one Trinity; one and a unity because of its one essence, but trinal and a trinity because of its three — what? For, although I can speak of a Trinity because of Father and Son and the Spirit of both, who are three; yet I cannot, in one word, show why they are three; as if I should call this Being a Trinity because of its three persons, just as I would call it a unity because of its one substance.
For three persons are not to be supposed, because all persons which are more than one so subsist sepa- rately from one another, that there must be as many substances as there are persons, a fact that is recog- nised in the case of more men than one, when there are as many persons as there are individual substances. Hence, in the supreme Being, just as there are not more substances than one, so there are not more per- sons than one.
So, if one wishes to express to any why they are three, he will say that they are Father and Son and the Spirit of both, unless perchance, compelled by the lack of a precisely appropriate term, he shall choose some one of those terms which cannot be applied in a plural sense to the supreme Being, in order to in- dicate what cannot be expressed in any fitting lan- guage; as if he should say, for instance, that this wonderful Trinity is one essence or nature, and three persons or substances.
•YW;fVfPBPge ittetf *£<*£, v*bv ateae is i^ni aotf color -df all Iisappears, then — Bay, it is uabefikatirjgly declared t-iaat what is -called <jrpd is not rarthiug; ar*d that to trkik supreme iiasejaoe tbe r*aa>e <*>/ is properly ^iven.
^"-w -every -one who says <tbat:a<iod exists, whether ^^^aie sub&tauoe which be believes «to be above ev^ry **^tu«e that is not <iod, a©d that be is to be wor- ^^ipped -0* saeti because -erf.his preeminent majesty, '^^'^d -to be appeased for man's owe sake because -rf ^^toe imminent necessity.
jfciut what should be so worshipped ic ^accordance ***tl, its majesty, and what should be so appeased i» *^t*atf -off auy object, i*s the supremely f^ood and su- ^^fet ^U? for, as it is ^stattlid>ed that throi^b the 144 ANSELM.
supreme Good and its supremely wise omnipotence all things were created and live, it is most inconsist- ent to suppose that the Spirit himself does not rule the beings created by him, or that beings he created are governed by another less powerful or less good, or by no reason at all, but by the confused flow of events alone. For it is he alone through whom it is well with every creature, and without whom it is well with none, and from whom, and through whom, and in whom, are all things.
Therefore, since he himself alone is not only the beneficent Creator, but the most powerful lord, and most wise ruler of all; it is clear that it is he alone whom every other nature, according to its whole abil- ity, ought to worship in love, and to love in worship; from whom all happiness is to be hoped for; with whom refuge from adversity is to be sought; to whom supplication for all things is to be offered. Truly, therefore, he is not only God, but the only God, in- effably Three and One.
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
IN BEHALF OF THE FOOL.
AM ANSWER TO THE ARGUMENT OF ANSELM IN THE PROSLOGIUM. BY GAUNILON, A MONK OF MARMOUTIER.
i. If one doubts or denies the existence of a being of such a nature that nothing greater than it can be conceived, he receives this answer: The existence of this being is proved, in the first, t place, by the fact that he himself, in his doubt or de-*'* ni al regarding this being, already has it in his unde r- st anding; for in hearing it spoken of he und erstands what is spoken of. It is proved, therefore, by the fact that what he understands must exist not only in his understanding, but in reality also.
And the proof of this is as follows. — I t is a gre ater th ing to exist both in the understanding and in rea lity t han to b e in the un derstanding alon e. And if this being is in tfte understanding alone, whatever has even in the past existed in reality will be greater than this being. And so that which was greater than all beings will be less than some being, and will not be greater than all: which is a manifest contradiction.
And hence, that which is greater than all, already proved to be in the understanding, must exist not only in the understanding, but also in reality: for otherwise it will not be greater than all other beings.
I46 ANSELM.
2. The fool might make this reply: This being is said to be in my understanding already, only because I understand what is said. Now c ould itjoo t with equal justice be s fljfl ***** I have in \\ my unders tahaing an 'Tnanner of unreal obje cts, hav- ing^absolutelv no existence in themselves, because I u nderst and these things if one speaks of them, what- ever the y ma yT e?
Unless indeed it is shown that this being is of such a character that it cannot be held in concept like all unreal objects, or objects whose existence is uncertain: and hence I am not able to conceive of it when I hear of it, or to hold it in concept; but I must understand it and have it in my understanding; because, it seems, I cannot conceive of it in any other way than by under- standing it, that is, by comprehending in my knowl- edge its existence in reality.
But if this is the case, in the first place there will be no distinction between what has precedence in time — namely, the having of an object in the under- standing — and what is subsequent in time — namely, the understanding that an object exists; as in the ex- ample of the picture, which exists first in the mind oi the painter, and afterwards in his work.
Moreover, the following assertion can hardly be accepted: that this being, when it is spoken of and heard of, cannot be conceived not to exist in the way in which even God can be conceived not to exist. For if this is impossible, what was the object of this argu- ment against one who doubts or denies the existence of such a being?
Finally, that this being so exists that it cannot be perceived by an understanding convinced of its own indubitable existence, unless this being is afterwards APPENDIX. I47 conceived of — this should be proved to me by an in- disputable argument, but not by that which you have advanced: namely, that what I understand, when I hear it, already is in my understanding. For thus in my understanding, as I still think, could be all sorts of things whose existence is uncertain, or which do not exist at all, if some one whose words I should un- derstand mentioned them. And so much the more if I should be deceived, as often happens, and believe in them: though I do not yet believe in the being whose existence you would prove.
3. Hence, your example of the painter who already has in his understanding what he is to paint cannot agree with this argument. For the picture, before it is made, is contained in the artificer's art itself; and any such thing, existing in the art of an artificer, is nothing but a part of his understanding itself. A joiner, St. Augustine says, when he is about to make a box in fact, first has it in his art. The box which is made in fact is not life; but the box which exists in his art is life. For the artificer's soul lives, in which all these things are, before they are produced. Why, then, are these things life in the living soul of the arti- ficer, unless because they are nothing else than the knowledge or understanding of the soul itself?
With the exception, however, of those facts which are known to pertain to the mental nature, whatever, on being heard and thought out by the understand- ing, is perceived to be real, undoubtedly that real ob- ject is one thing, and the understanding itself, by which the object is grasped, is another. Hence, even ii it were true that there is a being than which a greater is inconceivable: yet to this being, when I48 ANSILM.
heard of and understood, the not yet created picture in the mind of the painter is not analogous.
4. Let us notice also the point touched on above, with regard to this being which is greater than all which can be conceived, and which, it is said, can be none other than God himself. I, so far as actual knowledge of the object, either from its specific or general character, is concerned, am as little able to conceive of this being when I hear of it, or to have it in my understanding, as I am to conceive of or under- stand God himself: whom, indeed, for this very rea- son I can conceive not to exist. For I do not know that reality itself which God is, nor can I form a con- jecture of that reality from some other like reality. For you yourself assert that that reality is such that there can be nothing else like it.
For, suppose that I should hear something said of a man absolutely unknown to me, of whose very ex- istence I was unaware. Through that special or gen- eral knowledge by which I know what man is, or what men are, I could conceive of him also, according to the reality itself, which man is. And yet it would be possible, if the person who told me of him deceived me, that the man himself, of whom I conceived, did not exist; since that reality according to which I con- ceived of him, though a no less indisputable fact, was not that man, but any man.
Hence, I am not able, in the way in which I should have this unreal being in concept or in understand- ing, to have that being of which you speak in concept or in understanding, when I hear the word God or the words, a being greater than all other beings. For I can conceive of the man according to a fact that is real and familiar to me: but of God, or a being greater APPENDIX. 149 than all others, I could not conceive at all, except merely according to the word. And an object can liardly or never be conceived according to the word alone.
For when it is so conceived, it is not so much the word itself (which is, indeed, a real thing — that is, the sound of the letters and syllables) as the signifi- cation of the word, when heard, that is conceived. But it is not conceived as by one who knows what is generally signified by the word; by whom, that is, it is conceived according to a reality and in true con- ception alone. It is conceived as by a man who does not know the object, and conceives of it only in ac- cordance with the movement of his mind produced by hearing the word, the mind attempting to image for itself the signification of the word that is heard. And * it would be surprising if in the reality of fact it could ever attain to this.
Thus, it appears, and in no other way, this being is also in my understanding, when I hear and under- stand a person who says that there is a being greater than all conceivable beings. So much for the asser- I j tion that this supreme nature already is in my under- • ' standing.
5. But that this being must exist, not only in the understanding but also in reality, is thus proved to me: If it did not so exist, whatever exists in reality would be greater than it. And so the being which has been already proved to exist in my understand- ing, will not be greater than all other beings.
I still answer: if it should be said that a being which cannot be even conceived in terms of any fact, I is in the understanding, I do not deny that this being / is, accordingly, in my understanding. But since I50 ANSELM.
through this fact it can in no wise attain to real exist- ence also, I do not yet concede to it that existence at all, until some certain proof of it shall be given.
For he who says that this being exists, because otherwise the being which is greater than all will not be greater than all, does not attend strictly enough to what he is saying. For I do not yet say, no, I even deny or doubt that this being is greater than any real object. Nor do I concede to it any other existence than this (if it should be called existence) which it has when the mind, according to a word merely heard, tries to form the image of an object absolutely un- known to it.
How, then, is the veritable existence of that being proved to me from the assumption, by hypothesis, that it is greater than all other beings? For I should still deny this, or doubt your demonstration of it, to this extent, that I should not admit that this being is in my understanding and concept even in the way in which many objects whose real existence i§ uncertain and doubtful, are in my understanding and concept. For it should be proved first that this being itself really exists somewhere; and then, from the fact that it is greater than all, we shall not hesitate to infer that it also subsists in itself.
6. For example: it is said that somewhere in the ocean is an island, which, because of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of discovering what does not exist, is called the lost island. And they say that this island has an inestimable wealth of all manner of riches and delicacies in greater abundance than is told of the Islands of the Blest; and that having no owner or inhabitant, it is more excellent than all other coun- APPENDIX. I5I tries, which are inhabited by mankind, in the abun- dance with which it is stored.
Now if some one should tell me that there is such an island, I should easily understand his words, in which there is no difficulty. But suppose that he went on to say, as if by a logical inference: "You can no longer doubt that this island which is more excellent than all lands exists somewhere, since you have no doubt that it is in your understanding. And since it is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone, but to exist both in the understanding and in reality, for this reason it must exist. For if it does not exist, any land which really exists will be more excellent than it; and so the island already understood by you to be more excellent will not be more excellent. " If a man should try to prove to me by such rea- soning that this island truly exists, and that its exist- ence should no longer be doubted, either I should be- lieve that he was jesting, or I know not which I ought to regard as the greater fool: myself, supposing that I should allow this proof; or him, if he should sup- pose that he had established with any certainty the existence of this island. For he ought to show first that the hypothetical excellence of this island exists as a real and indubitable fact, and in no wise as any unreal object, or one whose existence is uncertain, in my understanding.