Tue sort of things which men fear, and the persons whom, and under what affections as regards them- selves, will thus become plain. Now, let fear be de- fined to be “ A sort of pain or agitation, arising out of an idea that an evil, capable either of destroying or giving pain, is impending on us.” People do not fear every evil!; for example, a man does not fear lest he shall become unjust or stupid; but people fear all those evils whose effect is either a considerable degree of pain, or destruction, and these, provided they be not far removed, but give one the idea of being close at hand, so as to be on the eve of hap- pening”; for they do not fear that which is very far 10 Quem oderunt, perisse expetunt. Ennius ap. Cic. de Off.
1 It is essential to that evil which is the object of fear, that it seem qualified to destroy or inflict pain. It must be in fact such an evil as anger would inflict, rather than which hatred would.
? This is the description of evil against which the brave man must arm himself, or, in the language of the Ethics, boa θάνατοι ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγνια ὄντα. Eth. Nich. iii. 6.
32. These heads the orator is to use, 1. Fear defined, 2. Objects which oc- casion it.
3.Danger.
justice.
5. Insult- ed virtue.
6. The fear of our enemies, off: for all know that they shall die; but since the event is not near, they pay no attention to it.
If then fear be this, it must follow that all those things are to be feared which appear to possess great power either of destroying, or of hurting, in points whose tendency is toward considerable pain. On which account even the symptoms of such things are alarming, for the evil appears to be at hand; since this in fact is danger, viz. “the approach of what excites fear.” Of this description, however, are both the hatred and the anger of those who have it in their power to do us any harm; for it is evident that they have both the will and the power, so that they are not far from doing it. Also injustice, possessed of power; for [it is evident that it does not want inclin- ation to do harm] since it is from settled inclination that the unjust man is unjust. Also insulted virtue, invested with power; for it is evident that, invaria- bly, when it is insulted, it determines on a requital, and now it has the power of exacting one. The fear also of those who have the power of doing us any harm, is itself an object to be dreaded; for any one, in such circumstances, will of course be pre- pared against us.
But as men in general are depraved, and may be prevailed on by gain, and are timid amid dangers; it is, generally speaking, a fearful thing to be at the disposal of another. So that accomplices in any deed of guilt are to be feared, lest either they should . denounce you, or abandon you to trial. Also those who have the power to act unjustly, are always ob- jects of fear to such as may be attacked by injustice; for, in nine cases out of ten, a man when he has the power, perpetrates the injustice. Also those who * Compare c.19,§19. See Dr. Johnson’s motives for sup- pressing some of Savage’ s remarks on the great: ‘‘ What was the result of Mr. S.’s inquiry, though he was not accustomed to conceal his discoveries, it may not be entirely safe to relate, because the persons whose characters he criticised are power.
j AND POWER AND RESENTMENT ARE SELDOM STRANGERS,” etc. Life of Savage, p. 336 CHAP. V.] RHETORIC. 123 have beet wronged‘, or who conceive themselves to liave been wronged; for they are ever on the watch for an opportunity [of retaliating]. Also those who have wronged others®, if possessed of power, are to be feared, from their apprehension of being retaliated on; for cases of this kind were laid down to be such as to excite alarm. ‘Those, too, who are rivals for the same objects, and which it is not possible should accrue to both, for people are ever at variance with those towards whom they stand on this footing. Those who are objects of fear to our superiors, are also objects of fear to ourselves; for much more will they be able to injure us, than our superiors: and for the same reason [we needs must fear those] whom our superiors fear®. Men dread those also who have already annihilated persons superior to themselves; and those who have attacked their inferiors; for, either they are already deserving fear, or they will become so by being aggrandized in power. And among those who have been wronged, or are enemies, or opponents, it is not the passionate, and those who speak their minds freely, who are to be dreaded; but the mild, the dissembling, and the insidious; for they give us to doubt, whether they be not close upon us, so that they are never clearly known to be too far off to reach us.
* “Tt is too common for those who have unjustly suffered pain, to inflict it likewise in their turn with the same injustice, and to imagine that they have a right to treat others as they have themselves been treated.”’ Ibid. p. 339.
5 If the maxim of Tacitus be true—“ Proprium humani in- genil est odisse quem leseris;”’ then surely Aristotle’s position, that they are to be feared, will follow as a corollary from it;— Quem metuunt oderunt, Quem oderunt, perisse expetunt. Ennius apud Cic. de Offic.
§ Victorius, wishing to show that this is not “a distinction without a difference,” remarks, that by φοβεροὺς, the term used in the former case, we are to understand persons evidently possessed of that which all the world knows to be dreadful: whereas, in the latter case, Aristotle alludes to persons, whose power not being quite so manifest, we fear only because we see those people fear it, whose means of resistance are superior to our own.
The wronged 9. Rivals, The mild and dissembling, etc.: more to be fear- ed than the hasty 12. Great- est objects of terror.
Fear and sehr close- 13. How those are affected that feel fear.
124 ARISTOTLE’S ἘΒΟΟΚ II, But all those circumstances which excite fear, have a still greater tendency to do so, in respect of which should a man have committed a mistake, it is not pos- sible for him to recover himself, but which either are impracticable altogether, or which cannot be correct- ed by himself, but by his enemies only: as have those also which we have no means, or no easy means, of averting. So that, to speak generally, all those things are to be feared, which, happening or being likely to happen in the case of others, excite compassion. ‘The circumstances then of fear, and which men are alarm- ed at, those at least of greatest importance, are, as I may say, nearly those which I have enumerated: and now let me state under what dispositions, as regards themselves, men are susceptible of fear.
Now, if fear be attended by an apprehension οἱ suffering some destructive evil, it is plain that none of those who consider that they shall not suffer any thing, is subject to fear; and that no one is subject to it, in regard to those things which he does not con- sider that he shall suffer; nor in regard to those persons at whose hands he does not apprehend any thing; nor at a time when he is without apprehen- sions. It must follow, therefore, that those are sub- ject to fear, who apprehend they shall suffer some- thing, and this in regard to the persons at whose hands, and the things which, and at the times when, they so apprehend. But neither are those who are, and who think themselves to be, in the midst of great good fortune, at all apprehensive of suffering any thing, (on which account they are contumelious, con- temptuous, and rash; but it is wealth, strength, number of friends, power, which renders men of this temper, ) nor those who think that already they have suffered the sum of all that is horrible’, and whose feelings have been chilled with respect to what awaits them, just as those who have been already beaten on the rack; but [in order to the existence of fear] there must needs arise some hope of safety, about ’ Fuisset; Quem metui moritura? ZEn. iv. 603, ; CHAP. v.] RHETORIC. 125 which men feel the painful anxiety®; and this is a proof of it, that fear makes men deliberate; and yet no one deliberates about that which is utterly hope- less. So that, when it shall better serve our cause 15. that the audience be affected by fear, we must set them off as persons liable to suffer, inasmuch as others of greater power have suffered, and also to show that their equals are or have been exposed to sufferings; and this, at the hands of persons from whom they would not have apprehended it, and such things, and at times when they would not have apprehended it.
But since on the subject of fear, it is plain what it 16. Confi is; and on the subject of things exciting fear, and — dee also with what dispositions men experience it; from. this it will be plain both what confidence is, and on what points men are confident, and with what dis- positions; for both confidence itself is the opposite of fear, and what inspires it is the opposite of what ex- cites fear; so that it is the hope of things conducive to safety, accompanied by an idea that they are near; and of things to be feared, that they either do not exist, or are at a distance.
But these are circumstances inspiring confidence; 17. Cir- to have danger afar off, and that in which we may {10 confide, near: also means of recovering from, or of that creaverting loss, whether these be numerous, or valua- me confis ence, 8 Thus Seneca;— Desines timere, si sperare desieris.”’ “1 have often thought, that after a man has taken the resolu- tion to kill himself, it is not courage in him to do any thing, however desperate, because he has nothing to fear. When a man, either from fear, or pride, or conscience, or whatever motive, has resolved to kill himself; when once the resolution is taken, he has nothing to fear. He may then go and take the king of Prussia by the nose at the head of his army. He cannot fear the rack who is resolved to kill himself. When Eustace Budgell was walking down to the Thames, determined to drown himself, he might if he pleased, without any appre- hension of danger, have turned aside and first set fire to St. James’s. palace.” —Boswell’s Johnson, A. D. 1773; Att. 64, Satan, in his address to the sun, says,— So farewell hope, and with hope farewell fear, Farewell remorse; all good to me is lost. Par. Lost, lib. iv. 108.
15 Per- sons who feel confi- dence. The suc- cessful.
20. The rich, etc.
ble, or both: again, should we never have been in- jured, nor have ourselves injured others; also, if we have no rival at all; or should those we have, be de- void of power; or, supposing they have power, should they be our friends; or should they have benefited us, or have been themselves benefited by us; or should those, to whom the same things are an object as to ourselves, be more numerous than those to whom they are not, or more powerful, or both at once.
But, as regards themselves, people feel confidence when thus affected: should they conceive themselves to have been often successful, and this without hav- ing suffered; or should they often have fallen into danger, and have escaped: for there are two ways in which men become dead to apprehension, either from never having experienced, or from being pos- sessed of resources against calamity; just as, in the case of danger by sea, both those who never expe- rienced a storm feel confidence as to the result, and those who from their experience possess resources against it. Men feel it also, when the case does not alarm their equals, nor their inferiors, nor those to whom they conceive themselves superior; but they conceive thus of those whom, either absolutely in their own persons, or virtually in the persons of their su- periors or of their equals, they have overcome. And again, if they conceive there belong to themselves, in greater number and degree, those things in which, when they have the advantage, men are objects of fear; and these are, store of wealth, and strength in respect to retainers, and friends, and territory, and warlike preparation, either all together, or the most 9 [t is on this topic that A=neas rests his consolation to his distressed followers.
O socii, (neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum,) O passi graviora; dabit Deus his quoque finem. Vos et Scylleam rabiem penitusque sonantes Adcestis scopulos: vos et Cyclopia saxa Experti. En. i. 198.
So Lord Byron in the Giaour: Though far and near the bullets hiss, I ’ve scaped a bloodier hour than this, cHar. vI.] RHETORIC. 127 tmportant of them. Also, if they have not wronged any one, or not many, or not any of such a character as men are apprehensive of. And, in a word, if their account stands well with heaven, as well in other re- spects, as in what regards omens and oracles!®: be- cause anger is a thing which inspires confidence; and the being free from the commission of injustice, while you are wronged yourself, is productive of anger; and the deity is supposed to aid such as have been wronged. [Once more, people feel confidence | when, being the first aggressors, they think they can suffer nothing, or shall not, or shall succeed at last. And of the subject of what inspires confidence and fear, we have spoken.
CHAP. VI.
Touching what points men are alive to, or insensible to, Delicacy of Feeling; towards whom; and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions.
TuE points about which men feel delicate, or are in- sensible to such feelings, and towards whom, and with what dispositions, will be manifest from what follows. Now, let sense of shame be defined to be “a kind of pain and agitation about evils present, past, or to come, which appear to tend to loss of cha- racter.” And impudence to be, “a sort of neglect and callousness about these points.”
Now, if the sensibility defined be actually sensi- bility to shame, it must follow that a man is affected by it, on the occurrence of evils of a kind which ap- pear to be disgraceful, either to himself, or those for 10 Aristotle is here giving us the reasons why the two last- mentioned descriptions of persons are confident: those whc never injured any, because it is natural to them to feel anger, which is in itself a source of confidence; and those who are well with heaven, from their reliance on the protection of the gods. The last case is beautifully exemplified in the con- fidence felt by Nicias in Sicily.
22. Such as think them- selves se- cure.
μι .
2. Defini tion of shame; of impu- dence.
3. The occasions when shame is felt.
Coward- Ice.
Intem- 4 perance.
Mean- ness.
8. Adulation.
5.
‘128 ARISTOTLE’S BOOK ts whom he has a regard: and such are all results of depravity whatsoever; for example, the casting away one’s shield, or the turning to flight, for this pro- ceeds from cowardice; and the withholding a deposit! from a person, for it is the result of injustice. And ‘ that cohabitation with those with whom we ought not, or where, or when we ought not, [is a source of. shame;] for it is the result of intemperance: as is — also the deriving gain from paltry, mean, or imprac- ticable sources, as from the poor, for instance, or from the dead; whence also the proverb, “ ¢o pillage even from the dead:” for it is the result of a sordid . hankering after lucre, and of meanness. It is also a source of shame for a person, who has the means, not to contribute his aid in money matters, or to do so in a minor degree; and for one to be assisted by . those in less easy circumstances than himself; and for one to borrow himself, when his friend appears to be asking a loan; and to ask a further loan, when he would recall a former; and the recalling a former loan when he asks another; and the praising a ihing to such a degree as to seem to ask for it; and the persisting no less, though often foiled; for these are all indications of meanness. And the praising a person in his presence is a token of adulation; and the praising a man’s good points, while you slur over his failings; or, when one is grieved, the exhibiting grief in an inordinate degree, and whatever other conduct is of a similar kind, [is a source of shame, ] . because it manifests adulation. [It is also shameful ] not to sustain toils which those who are advanced in years, or who live delicately, or who are of higher rank, or, in a word, which they sustain whose strength is inferior to your own; because all these are indications of effeminacy: and so it is to be be- - nefited by another, and that frequently; or, to re- 1 Spartano cuidam respondit Pythia yates; Haud impunitum quondam fore, quod dubitaret Depositum retinere, etc. Juy. xiii. 139.
See the account of the deposit left bya Milesian with Glau. eus the son of Epicydes. Herodot. vi. 86.
omar. v1.} RHETORIC 129 proach a person with his obligations to you; fur they are all indications of a mean and abject spirit.
Again, to talk about one’s self, and to be one’s own 11 Vaai- trumpeter; and to assert that to be one’s own which ἴδ΄ belongs to another; for these are indications of arrogance. In the same way, too, in the several other instances of moral depravity, both their results, their indications, and the like attendant circumstances, are all subjects of shame; for they are disgraceful, and make one ashamed. And to the afore-mentioned we 12 may add,‘the non-participation in those creditable qualities which either every body, or all our equals, or the greatest part of them, partake of. By equals I mean, fellow countrymen, citizens, those of the same age, relations; in a word, those with whom we are on an equality; for [when a thing is so general | the non-participation in it begins to be disgraceful; for instance, the not having been educated”, at least in a certain degree, and so in the case of other deficiencies; but the disgrace of all these things be- comes much greater, should they appear to be want-_ ing by our own fault; for thus, they are more pro- perly the result of depravity should one be himself the cause of what has attached to him, or does now, or is likely so to attach. Again, men are sensible to feelings of shame, when they are suffering, have suf- fered, or are about to suffer any thing of such a na- ture, as tends to loss of respect, and disgrace: and these are all services consisting in the lending one’s self either personally, or in any shameful action where there is an idea of suffering insult: and what- ever administers to intemperance, whether it be vo- luntary, or not. and submission to violence, if invobe 8 be 8 3 It was by a somewhat similar consideration that Dr. Johnson refuted the argument of those who opposed the edn- cation of the poor on the ground of its raising their ideas above their sphere of life. “ΠῚ suid he, “ἃ few only are educated, it is a distinction, and those few may be proud; if it be general, it ceases to be a distinction, and, of course, to be a ground of pride. And the contrary will be the result; for instead οἱ its being ground of pride that a man has been educated, it will be matter of shame if he has not.” Boswel!’s Life K sons in whose presence men feel shame. Whom they esteem.
mire.
17. Their equals.
18. Those with whom they must live 19. The innocent 18. ARISTOTLE’S [soox πὶ luntary; for such submission, without defending one’s self, proceeds from an unmanly character, and from cowardice. These then, and the like to these, are the things about which men are sensible of shame. But as the sense of shame is an idea entertained of loss of character; and of this loss, in itself alone, with- out reference to its consequences; and as no one re’ ards the opinion, except for the sake of those who hold it; it must follow that a man is thus sensible in regard to those for whom he has an esteem. But he will have an esteem for those who admire him, and whom he does himself admire, and by whom he wishes to be admired, and in regard to whom he feels emu- lation, and whose opinion he does not hold cheap. Now, people wish to be admired by, and do them- selves admire, all those who possess any of those goods which are valued; or from whom they happen to be very much in want of getting something of which they have the disposal;. for instance, those who are inlove. But people have their emulation excited, in. reference to their equals; and they hold in consi- deration the prudent*, as being men who adhere to truth; of this description are men of education, and such as are advanced in years. Also actions done in the eyes of the world and in public [excite our shame], and hence the proverb, that ‘Shame dwells in the eyes.” On this account, people are more sensible of shame before those with whom they are always likely to be present, and those who fix their attention on them, for both these are instances of being before the eyes of persons:—again, they are sensible of it be- fore those who are not open to charges on the same points; for their sentiments, it is evident, are the op- posite of their own: before those also who do not make allowances for such as appear to be faulty;. for errors which a man commits Azmself, these he is said 3 Οἱ φρόνιμοι, more properly, men of the world. Such a character Cicero seems to have had in view, according to Vic- torius, when he says, “ gud est versatus in rebus, vel usu, quem gtas denique affert, vel auditione et cogitatione, que studio et diligentia precurrit etatem.’”’ Cic. de Orat. ii. 30.
cHaP. VI.} RHETORIC, 131 not to take amiss in his neighbours; so that he evi- dently will take amiss such as he does not commit himself: and before those who are fond of divulging what they know to the world; for whether a man does not think one’s conduct faulty, or does not divulge it, makes no difference. But persons likely to di- vulge [what they know to one’s discredit] are such as have been injured, from their being anxiously on the watch to retaliate; and those who are slanderers 20. Tae tlers.
generally; for if they speak ill even of those who are Ὁ not culpable, much more will they of those who are: as are also those who are on the look-out for the errors of their neighbours, for instance, jesters, and the poets of the old comedy; for these are in some sense slanderers, and fond of divulging. Again, [men are sensible of shame] before those with whom they never met with a repulse; for they are disposed to- wards them as admirers. On which account men ‘have a sense of shame, even towards those who ask any thing for the first time, as having never yet for- feited their good opinion in any points. And of this description are both those who have lately sought to be our friends. for they have observed our excellent qualities; and hence, the reply of Euripides to the Syracusans is a good one‘; and, of our old acquaint- ances, those who know no ill of us. And men are sensible of shame not only about the things them- selves which have been mentioned as delicate points, but even about the indications of them; for instance, not only about licentious conduct, but also about all indications of it; not only in doing what is disgrace- ful, but even in mentioning it®. And in the same way they are sensible of shame, not only before those who have been mentioned, but before those also who 4 It appears that Euripides had been sent to Sicily as am- bassador, but finding the Syracusans inclined to reject his oak ape for a peace, he told them, “ that they surely ought to ave some respect for a people who held them in such high consideration, particularly as this was their first request.” 5 Quod factu foedum est, idem est et dictu turpe. Οὐ yap αὐδάν ἔσθ᾽ ἃ μηδὲ δρᾷν καλόν, Sophoe. Gad, Tyr. 1499.
Servants.
will be likely to disclose their conduct to them, as for instance, their servants or their friends. In brief, ‘ however, people are not at all sensible of shame be- 24. How affected men feel shame, When the world is looking on, 25. When discredit may at- tac fore those whose opinions, in regard to their justness, they hold cheap; for no one feels shame before chil- dren and brutes: nor do men feel it about the same points when before acquaintances, as before strangers; but when before acquaintances they feel it on points really shameful®; but before strangers on matters merely sanctioned by eustom.
As regards themselves, men would be likely to be sensible of shame under these dispositions; first, if there should really exist any so affected towards them- selves, as I described those to be, in regard to whom they feel shame. And these were either those whom they hold in admiration, or by whom themselves are held in admiration, or by whom they are desirous of being admired, or of whom they are petitioning some- thing which they will not be likely to get, if not men of character. And if these be either actual spectators (just as, on the question of the allotment of Samos to colonists, Cydias introduced in his harangue to the ecclesia; for he put it to the Athenians to imagine that the Greeks were standing round as actual specta- tors, and not as mere future hearers, of the decree which they might pass); or should persons of this description be near, or be likely soon to be aware of their conduct: and on this account persons in misfor- tune, do not wish even to be seen by those who once deemed them happy; for they who thus deem of us are admirers. And when they have attached to them what throws discredit on the conduct and the actions, either of themselves, or of their ancestors, or any others with whom in any way they are closely con- nected; and, in one word, all in whose behalf they are sensible of shame; afd these are the above-men- tioned, and those who stand in any relation to them, 4 He told us above (chap. iv. § 23), that thase people were usually regarded as friends “‘ before whom we feel no delicacy on matters of mere opinion, though far from disregarding their opinions.”’
CHaP vi.] RHETORIC, 133 whose tutors or advisers they have been?, And if there be others, their equals, with whom they are at rivalry; for, from a feeling of shame, on account of persons of this description, men both do and leave undone very many things. Again, when people are likely to be seen, and openly to be engaged before those who are privy [to their disgrace], they become in a higher degree susceptible of shame. And hence the poet Antiphon, just as he was going to be beaten on the rack by Dionysius, observing those who were about to be executed with him muffiling themselves up as they went through the gate, said, “Why do you muffle yourselves up;—is it lest any of these pre- sent should see you to-morrow?”
Thus much then on the subject of the sense of shame; but of insensibility to it, we shall evidently know enough from the contraries.
CHAP. VII.
Those towards whom people feel Gratitude; on what occa- sions; and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions.
THE persons towards whom men feel gratitude, and the occasions on which, and with what dispositions on their own part, will be plain to us, after we have defined gratuitous benevolence. Now, let gratuitous 7 The Stoics had observed this feeling of carrying our views onward to posthumous glory; and found the love of glory the most difficult of all passions to eradicate:---διὸ καὶ ἔσχατος λέγεται τῶν παθῶν χιτὼν ἡ φιλοδοξία, διότι τῶν ἄλλων TOA- λάκις δι᾽ αὐτὴν ἀποδυομένων αὐτὴ προσίσχεται τῆ ψυχῇ. Sim- plicius in Comm. ad Epicteti, cap. 48. Tacitus, in speaking of the great love of fame manifested by Helvidius Priscus, jus- tifies him, by observing that Etiam sapientibus cupido glorie novissima eruitur. Hist. iv. 6. A mode of expression which strongly brings to our recollection the passage in Milton’s Lycidas, | Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise, That last infirmity of noble mind. Lycid. 70 26. With thei equals.
27. When openly disgraced: 5. How the orator paust in- 134 ARISTOTLE’S [BOOK If.
benevolence! be “ that conformably to which, he who has the power is said to confer a benefit on one who needs it, not in return for any thing, nor in order that any thing may accrue to him who so confers it, but that some benefit may arise to the object.” But it becomes great should it be conferred on one who is in extreme want”, or if the boon be great and difficult of attainment, or at a crisis of a certain description, or if the giver has bestowed it alone, or first, or in a greater degree than any other. Wants are however our desires of these; such particularly as are attend- ed by pain on failing of their objects; and of this description are our lusts, as for instance, love. Again, such as arise in the suffering of the body, and in dan- ger; for both the man who is exposed to danger, and who suffers pain, is anxious for something. On which, account, those who stand by us in poverty and ban- ishment, should they confer even trifling benefits, will yet have gratified us by reason of the greatness of our need, and the circumstances of the time; take the instance of him who gave but a mat [to a beggar ] in the Lyceum. It is necessary, then, that our obli- gation have reference, if possible, by all means to some case of this sort, but if not, to some one of equal or greater need. So that, as it is evident both when, and in what cases, an act of free benevolence takes place, and how the parties are affected, it is plain that out of these principles we must get up our speech, showing that, as regards the one party, they were or are exposed to pain, or want of this description, and as regards the other, that in such their want they as- sisted them by administering some boon of this de- scription.
And it is also evident, by recurring to what topics we may do away the obligation, and make our audi- 1 This chapter presents considerable difficulty from the double meaning of which the word χάρις is capable. See Schrader’s Note, Animadv, 3 Hence the value of the aid sent by the Athenians to the “Lacedemonians, when the Helots had possessed themselves of ithome CHAP. VII. J RHETORIC. 135 ence insensible of grateful feelings’; for either we may urge that they are or were assisting them for their own sakes, and this was supposed not to be free benevolence; or are doing so just because it fell out by chance, or because they were compelled to do so; or that they paid back a debt, but did not bestow a gift, and this as well if the party was conscious of his having been so indebted, as if he was not; be- cause there is in both cases the idea of a guid pro quo; so that neither on this view of the case will any gratitude be felt. We should also examine the point under all the predicaments; for free benevo- lence stands in this, either that that particular thing was given, or in such quantity, or of such a quality, or as to the time when, or the place where, it was given. And we may adduce it as a sign to suit this purpose, if the parties in question have refused a less favour; and if they have conferred on an enemy either the same favour, or an équal one, or a greater; for then it will be evident that they did it not for our sakes. Or, if he wittingly has given something paltry‘; for no one acknowledges that he stands in need of what is paltry.