And now have my sentiments respecting benevo- lence, and the want of it, been explained.
3 The ease with which impressions of gratitude might be effaced, appears to have been fully conceived by that French statesman, who said, when he granted a favour, “J’ ai fait diz mécontents, et un ingrat.”
* Horace sneers at this kind of liberality.
Quo more pyris vesci Calaber jubet hospes, Tu me fecisti locupletem.—Vescere sodes.— Jam satis est.—At tu quantum vis tolle-—Benigne.— Non invisa feres pueris munuscula parvis— __ Tam teneor dono, quam si dimittar onustus.— Ut libet: “hac vorcis hodve comedenda relinguis.’””.
vest the audience with it He eelings, or other- wise.
& Per 136 ARISTOTLE’S [BCOK πὶ CHAP. VIII. Of Pity.
Let us explain the circumstances which excite pity; and the persons whom men pity; and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions. Now let pity be defined to be!, “a sort of pain occasioned by an evil capable of hurting or destroying”, appearing to be- fall one who does not deserve it, which one may himself expect to endure’, or that some one connect- ed with him will; and this when it appears near for it evidently is necessary that a person likely te feel pity should be actually such as to deem that, either in his own person, or of some one connected with him, he may suffer some evil, and that an evil of such a description as has been stated in the defini- tion, or one similar to it, or nearly equivalent to it*. On which account neither do those who are abso- 1 Grief for the calamity of another is rity; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore it is called also compassion, and, in the phrase of the present time, ὦ fellow-feeling: and therefore, for calamity arriving from great wickedness the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity those men hate pity, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same. Hobbes’s Le- viathan. See Rochefoucault’s Maxims, No. 342, where the above is quoted in the note.
3 The evil in the case of pity is of the same character as was stated to be the object of fear. In fact, whatever when befalling another excites pity, in one’s own case excites fear Vid. chap. v. § 12.
3 It is on this principle that, in the Poetics, describing the character best adapted to the purposes of tragedy, and in whose sufferings we sha.l be most likely to take an interest, he ex. elndes an absolutely vicious character;—atpaywrératov yap τοῦτό ἐστι πάντων οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὧν δεῖ" οὔτε yap φιλάνθρω- πον, οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν, οὔτε φοβερόν ἐστὶ. And a little after he gives the reason of this:---ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον" φόβος δὲ “περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, § 25.
* Perhaps the whole germ of Aristotle’s doctrine on this subject may be traced, however ‘riefly expressed, in the cele. brated sentence of Terence, “‘ Humosum; humani nihil ἃ me alienum puto.”
CHAP. VIII. ] RHETORIC. 137 lutely lost, feel pity; for these think they shall no longer be exposed to suffering, for their sufferings are past; nor those who esteem themselves excessively happy, but these wax insolent; for evidently, if they esteem every good to be realized to them, they also esteem their lot to be incapable of suffering any evil; since this also enters into the number of goods. But of this description, viz. such as think they may yet suffer evil, are both who already have suffered and escaped®; and those advanced in years, as well by reason of their prudence, as of their experience: and the weak; and those who are rather timid; and men of education, for these calculate life’s contingen- cies aright; and those to whom belong parents ®, or children, or wives, for these attach to one’s self, and are liable to suffer the above-mentioned evils. Those do not feel pity who are under the excitements of courage, for instance, under anger or confidence; for these feelings little calculate the future: nor do those feel pity who are under insolent dispositions’; for these persons also calculate little of suffering any thing: but those who are of the mean temperament between these are susceptible of pity: and those again are not susceptible of it who are vehemently affected by fear; for such as are horror-struck do not feel pity®, by reason of its being akin to an evil which comes home to themselves. Also people are suscep- tible of pity, should they esteem some persons to be good; for he who esteems no one to be such”, will § So Dido, “ Haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco.” 4 Exemplified in Priam’s appeal to Achilles: Μνῆσαι πατρὸς σεῖο, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ᾽ ᾿Αχιλλεῦ, Τηλίκου, ὥσπερ ἔγων, x.7.X. l. xxiv. 486, 7 Sophocles, CEd. Tyr. 873:---ο-ὔβρις φυτεύει τύραννον. With the same view of human nature Aristotle, when he says that persons affected by pleasure are disposed to placability, quali- fied his expression by the exclusion of wanton insolence;— οἱ ἐν ἡδονῇ μὴ ὑβριστικῇ, καὶ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικεῖ" cap. iii. § 12.
® Lear, Act v. sc. iii.: This judgment of the heavens, which makes 1s tremble, Touches us not with pity.
* Thus the old, from their experience cf the depravity of sons who feel pity, 4.
5.
6. and do not feel pity.
sons to be pitied.
think every one deserving of evil. And in a word, every one, when he is so affected as to call to his recollection the fact, that evils of such a character have befallen either him or his, or to apprehend that they may befall either him or his. And now it has been stated with what dispositions men feel pity. The circumstances which excite their pity will be evident from the definition: tor whatever things, of the number of those which cause pain and anguish, have a tendency to destroy, ar3 all such as to cause pity: again, every thing whose tendency is utter abolition; also all those evils which involve the quality of greatness, and of which chance is the . cause!®, But the evils whose characteristic is great anguish and destruction, are 1s follows: death, as- saults, personal injuries, and age, and sickness, and want of food. And the evils of which chance is the cause, are, absolute want, or fewness of friends, (on which account even the being torn from friends and familiars is a circumstance to be pitied, ) ugliness, in- ‘firmity, deformity, and the circumstance that some evil befalls one from a source whence it were becom- ing for some good to have arisen; and the frequent occurrence of a similar thing: and the accession of some good, when one has already passed his suffer- ings; as for example, the gifts of the king were sent down to Diopithes after he was dead!'; and the fact either that no good has accrued, or of there being no enjoyment of it when it has arrived. These, then, and the like, are the circumstances on account of which men feel pity.
But people are sensible of pity toward their ac- quaintances, if they be not of extremely close con- nexion, but about such they feel just as they do about themselves when on the eve of suffering: and on this -- man, are less susceptible of pity than the young, whose inexperience judges well of human nature. See chapters xii. and xiii. "Ὁ For chance in a great measure excludes the idea of the person’s deserving the evil he suffers. 't Tn the last act of The Gamester there is a fine illustraticn of this; where Beverley hears of his succession to the inheri it- - ance just as he has drunk poison.
CHAP. VIII. | RHETORIC. 139 account Amasis!?, as they say, did not shed a tear over his son when he was being led to execution, but he did over his friend who was asking an alms; for this was a circumstance to call for pity; the other, to excite horror. For horror is distinct from pity, Herrcr is and has a tendency to expel pity from the breast, pacing and is frequently available to produce a contrary ef- 13. fect!3, Still men feel pity while the evil is yet ap- proaching. And they feel it towards their equals, whether in age, in temper, in habits, in rank, or in family; for in all these relations, the evil is seen with greater clearness as possible to befall also one’s self. For we must here also assume generally, that what- ever people fear in their own case, that they pity as happening in the case of others. Butas the disasters which excite pity always appear to be close at hand, while, as to those removed at the distance of ten thousand years, men neither in the expectation of them, if future, nor in the remembrance of them, if past, are sensible of pity at all, or at least not in an equal degree; this being the case, it must follow that those characters which are got up withthe aid of gesture, and voice, and dress, and of acting, generally have the greater effect in producing pity!*, For thus, by setting the evil before our eyes, as either —s 4.
—s 4.
12 Perhaps Aristotle quoted from memory; and it is not im- probable that he may have been mistaken as to the person to whom he attributes this conduct, since Herodotus relates the story, not of Amasis, but of his son Psammenitus; who re- maiks, in perfect accordance with the principles of the philo- sopher, τὰ μὲν οἰκήϊα---μέζω κακὰ ἢ ὥστε ἀνακλαίειν, Herod. iii. 14. See the conduct of Gelimer, the Vandal king of Africa, who burst into laughter at his interview with Belisarius after the loss of his kingdom and liberty. Gibbon, Dec. and Fall, chap. 41, note 3l.
13 On this principle is founded one of his criteria of excess ef criminality, viz. if the recital of its effects produce fear ine stead of pity;—6 οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον, ἢ ἐλεοῦσι, μεῖζον, lib. i. ο. xiv. § 5.
4’ Roti μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ THs ὄψεως γίνεσ- θαι, Poet. § 27. See a-ery pleasant paper of Addison’s on this subject, Spectator, No. 42, ‘“‘ We know the effect of the skull and black hangings in The Fair Penitent, the scaffold in Venice Preserved, the tomb in Romeo and Juliet,” etc, Twining.
1. Indignation opposed to pity.
Definition of it.
2.
being on the eve of taking place, or as having har pened, men make it appear to be close at hand Likewise things which have just taken place, or quickly about to do so, have on this very account a . greater tendency to excite pity. Also the indications and actions of persons; for instance, the garments '® of those who have suffered, and other things of that sort. And the expressions of those under suffering, for instance, of those already in act of dying. And especially is it a circumstance to move pity, that while in these crises the persons have borne themselves virtuously'®, For all these circumstances produce pity in a higher degree from its appearing near; also, the fact of the person’s being wnworthy, and his dis- aster appearing in view before our eyes.
CHAP. IX. Of Indignation.
To pity is opposed, most directly, that feeling which men call indignation; for, to the feeling pain at un- deserved misfortune, is opposed in a certain way the feeling pain at undeserved good fortune, and it ori- ginates in the same disposition; and these feelings are both those of a virtuous disposition. For we ought to sympathize with, and to pity those who are undeservedly unfortunate; and to feel indignant at those who are undeservedly fortunate; for whatever. happens contrary to desert is unjust; and on this account we make indignation an attribute. even of 15 Witness the effect of Antony’s display of the robe of Cesar stained with his blood. Julius Cesar.
* Illustrated in the effect produced by Polyxena 8 resigna- tion and anxiety to preserve, even in death, the decorum of female delicacy:--- ἡ δὲ καὶ ϑνήσκουσ᾽, ὅμως πολλὴν πρόνοιαν εἶχεν εὐσχήμως πεσεῖν, κρύπτουσ᾽, ἃ κρύπτειν ὄμματ᾽ ἀρσένων χρεών.
Eurip Hecuba, 563.
the gods'. It should seem, too, that envy stands opposed to pity in the same way, as appearing to be akin to, and in fact the same thing as, indignation; and yet it really is distinct. For envy is also a pain causing agitation, ἐξ also is felt at good fortune, not, however, at the good fortune of the undeserving [only], but of equals and fellows?. The feeling, however, in all cases equally [of envy and of indig- nation |, must exist [in the breasts of those affected by it], not because any difference will be likely to accrue to themselves, but on account of their neigh- bour, solely as regards himself. For no longer will the one feeling be envy, and the other indignation, but fear, should the pain and agitation exist on this account, viz. because some evil will probably result to themselves from the good fortune of the other. But it is plain that opposite feelings will be conse- quent on these passions: for he who feels pain at those who are undeservedly unfortunate, will feel pleasure, or at least be unaffected by pain, at those who are unfortunate under different circumstances?; for instance, no good man would feel pain about par- ricides and murderers when they meet with punish- ment; since we ought to feel joy at such occurrences; and so in the case of those who are deservedly for- tunate; for both are instances of justice, and cause the good man to rejoice, since it must be that he has 8 hope that what has been realized to his equal, will be realized also to himself, and these are all feelings 1 Thus Herodotus attributes the turn in the fortunes of Creesus to his having incurred the divine indignation;—Mera Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον, ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον" ws εἰκάσαι, ὅτι ἐνόμισε ἑωὺῦπτὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὀλβιώτα- τον. Herodotus, i. 84.
3 The envious and indignant have this in common, viz. the good fortune of their neighbour, as the object of their respect- ive passions; and the absence of any apprehension as to the degree in which their own circumstances may be affected by such good fortune; for the moment they begin to calculate the probability of any detriment arising to themselves therefrora, the feeling, ceasing to be any longer envy or indignation, will have become fear.
® That is. deservedly.
8. Eu oppose to pity. Definition of it.
4, Oppo site feel- ings are consepay on emotions, 5. Both are useful to repress pity.
6. Per- sons who excite in- digna- tion.
8. Not such as have mo- ral advan- tages, but 142 ARISTOTLE’S [Boox IL of the same disposition; and their opposites, of the opposite dispositions. Since the same man who ex- ults in misfortune‘ is also envious; for any who feels pain at the accession and acquisition of any good, that person necessarily must rejoice when that good is in act of being withdrawn and lost. On which account these feelings are all of them obstacles to pity; but, among themselves, they differ for the fore- going reasons, so that all are alike available with a view to render a thing not an object of pity.
On the subject of indignation, then, let us first state who the persons are with whom men feel in- dignant, the occasions on which, and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions; then, after these, of other points. But the subject will be plain from what has already been said; for if indignation be a feeling pain on a man’s appearing to be undeservedly fortunate, it will be evident in the first place that it is not possible to feel indignation in the case of every good. For there is no one who, if another be just, or brave, or shall make acquisitions of virtue, will feel indignation at that other; for neither is pity felt at the contraries of these qualities®: but it is about 4 ᾿Επιχαιρεκακία, or, in the language of the ‘‘ Ethica Mag- na,” χαιρεκακία, is one of the extremes between which νέμεσις is said to exist: the other extreme is φθονερία, an aptitude to feelings of envy. Speaking of the “‘ great power and force” of the Greek language, a late translator of the Agamemnon of éschylus remarks, that “‘ One word would sometimes require for its translation a whole sentence of modern language; as, for instance, ᾿Επιχαιρεκακία, a disposition to feel pleasure at the misfortunes of others; which makes a sentence, and con- stitutes a maxim in Rochefoucault, “ Il y a toujours dans le malheur d’autrui quelque chose qui ne nous deplait pas;”’ and adds in a note, that Lord Bacon (Essays) has beautifully touched on this disposition: ‘“‘ There is a natural malignity; for there be that in their nature do not affect the good others.”? Preface to Symmons’s translation of the Agamemnon.
5 Pity is not felt at the absence of these qualities from any one, because they cannot be absent without being deservedly so; and it is essential to pity that its object be undeservedly exposed to that inconvenience which he suffers; on the othe- hand, indignation cannot be felt at their presence, because it 1s the distinguishing feature of moral advantages that they cannot be possessed, without being deserved.
CHAP. IXx.] RHETORIC. 143 wealth and power and the like possessions [that people feel indignant], and in a word. about all those things of which the good are deserving, and such as are naturally possessed of advantages; as, for ex- ample, of high birth, of beauty, and advantages of that description. But-as what is ancient seems, in a certain sense, akin to what is natural, it must follow, that men are indignant, in a greater degree, at those who possess the very same good, if they be recently possessed of it, and are by its means in good circum- stances, [than with those who have long possessed it.] For those who have recently become rich give greater pain than those who have long been rich, and by right of birth. And, in the same way, persons in office, and men of power, and possessed of numer- ous friends, and of good children, and any good of this description; and likewise if, through the instru- mentality of these, there should accrue to them any further good: here, too, those of recent wealth, who by means of their wealth get into office, give greater pain than those who have been wealthy of old. And in a similar manner in the case of the others. But the reason of this is, that while the one sort appear to possess what is ther own, the others do not; for that which appears ever to have held this rank, seems to involve an idea of truth; insomuch that the others seem to possess what does not belong to them. And as, of the goods, each does not become any one who may accidentally present himself, but there is a certain proportion and idea of adaptation; for ex- ample, splendour in respect of armour, is not adapted to a man whose virtue is justice, but to him who possesses courage; and splendid marriage feasts are not adapted to those of recent wealth, but to those of high birth: therefore if any one, though he may be a good man, meet with a possession which is not adapted to him, we should feel indignant; as also with an inferior who disputes with his superior; and particularly if he does so on the very points in which he is inferior. Whence also this was remarked by Homer: “ He missed engaging with Ajax the son of those of fortune, Such as are newly fortunate.
10. They seem to possess what they have no right to.
11. Such as have any good incongru ously, S-ach as ecmpare two objects 144 ARISTOTLE’S [BOOK II.
Telamon; for Jupiter was indignant because he was fain to engage a hero his superior®.” But, if it be not on the same grounds, we feel indignant if an in- ferior challenge a superior, even on any grounds; which ad- for instance, if a musician were to dispute with a mit not of - compari- son.
12. Men likely to feel indig- nation, just man, for justice is superior to music. The per- sons then with whom, and the reasons why men feel indignant will be evident from this; for they are these or others of the same description.
As regards themselves, men have a tendency to in- dignation, if they deserve and have acquired the highest goods; for the circumstance of those not their equals being thought worthy of equal advan- tages, is not just. Next, they feel it, if they chance to be good and excellent persons; for they both 14. The judge aright, and hate what is unjust. Again, if ambi- tious.
what oc casions men feel indignant, they be ambitious and desirous of certain objects, and especially should they be ambitious about those things which others who are undeserving obtain. And those, in a word, who think themselves worthy those things, of which they do not esteem others worthy, are apt to feel indignant at those others, and about those very objects. On which account slaves, sorry fellows, and men devoid of ambition, are not liable to feelings of indignation, since there is nothing of which they think themselves worthy. And from this it is evident on what occasions of misfortunes, or Hl luck, or failure of success, persons ought to rejoice, or at least to be unaffected by pain; for, from what has been stated, the contraries will be evident. Se that should the speech have wrought up the judges into this disposition, and should it have shown that _ those who claim to be pitied, and that the circumstances under which they claim it, are undeserving pity, and really deserving not to gain it, it will be impossible for the judges to feel pity.
9 The remark is made of Cebriones, Il. ii. vy. 542; where, however, the second line quoted by Aristotle dues not occur.
cHar. X.] RHETOKIC. 145 CHAP, X. Of Envy.
Ir is plain also on what occasions, with whom, and with what dispositions men feel envy, if in truth envy be “a sort of pain at apparent good fortune, 1, Envy, Its defin’ touching the above-mentioned goods!, in the case of >.
equals, not in order that any thing may happen to one’s self, and simply on account of their [being thus fortunate ]:” for those who have, or seem to have equals, will be the people to be envious. I mean by equals, those who are like in circumstances of birth, connexions, age, habits, character, and property. They, too, will be envious who fall but little short of possessing all?: hence those who are carrying on mighty projects, and those who are prosperous, are envious; for they think that every one is carrying off what belongs to them. Again, those who are re- markably esteemed on any account, and particularly bo 5 Men like» ly to feel envy are those within a little of the sum- mit.
on account of their wisdom or happiness. And 3 those who are ambitious are more given to envy than those who are devoid of ambition. And those who make a show of wisdom, for they are ambitious on the score of wisdom. And, in a word, those who in any respect are ambitious of glory are given to envy in that respect. And the narrow-minded; for, to them, every thing appears of consequence.
The goods respecting which men feel envy have been told you; for all those things whatsoever, about which men are eager for praise, and ambitious, whe- 1 See: 7 and 8 of the last chapter, where he excludes mo- ral excellence from the number of the goods which excite in- The am- bitious.
The wise.
The nar- rowminded. 4, Objecta - which ex- cite envy.
dignation; and in justification of their exclusion in that place.
it may be observed, that the simple fact of their being pos- sessed is proof of their being deserved. And their exclusion from the subjects of envy may be justified by the consideration that the envious will, in general, esteem moral excellence scarcely worth troubling themselves about, 3. See the parable of the ewe lamb, addressed by Nathan to David.
L 5. Men likely to be envied.
Equals.
Rivals, ther they be productions or acquisitions, and re- spe sting which they are desirous of renown, and all cases of good luck; about all these nearly is envy felt; and particularly about such of them as the in- dividuals are themselves desirous of, or think they ought themselves to possess, or those things in the possession of which they are themselves superior, or deficient in a trifling degree.
Again, it is evident with whom men are envious; for this has been already stated in connexion [ with what has gone before]; since men envy those who come near them in time, and place, and age, and character; whence the saying, “ kindred too is conscious of envy*.” Men also envy those with whom they are at rivalry; for they are rivals of those above- mentioned; but of those who existed ten thousand years back, or who may live ten thousand years hence, or who are already dead, of these no one is the rival; nor again of those who live at the Pillars of Hercules*; nor of those of whom, in the opinions either of themselves or of others, they are greatly the inferiors; nor again of those to whom they conceive themselves to be in a great degree superior; with the like indifference do they regard those [at all en- . gaged | in pursuits of this description. And as men are affected by ambition in regard to rivals, and competitors, and all, in a word, who are eager after the same objects, it must follow that they envy these: in an especial manner; whence the saying, “ potter envies potter.” And those who either succeed with difficulty, or do not succeed at all, envy those who succeed quickly. Again, they envy those whose ac- quisitions and success are a reproach to themselves, and these are those who are near them, or their equals; for it becomes evident that they do them- selves fail of success through their own fault, so that 3 This apophthegm should seem to justify the caution of Cleobulus,—KAsdBovdos ὁ Λίνδιος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος τίνα δεῖ μάλιστα φυλάττεσθαι; εἶπεν, τῶν μὲν φίλων τὸν φθόνον, τῶν ὲ ἐχθρῶν τὴν ἐπιβουλήν. Stobeeus.
4 ἸΙρὸς τοὺς ες ποδῶν, φθόνος οὐδεὶς φύεται. Philo. Hooker, cHAP. Xi] RHETORIC, 147 this, galling them, produces envy. And those who 9, either possess or have acquired that which it would become themselves to possess, or which themselves had at one time acquired; at least the old, on this account, envy the young. And those who have been 10.
at considerable expense on an object, envy those who have expended little on the same object. But it is 11. evident both with whom, and on what occasions, and with what dispositions people of this sort feel pleasure; for they will be delighted, having in the contrary circumstances that very temper, the which being without, they are pained. So that if the The ora- iudges themselves shall have been wrought up into pete: Ὁ" this disposition, while those who lay claim to our eure wil pity or to the acquisition of some good, are such as remove have been described, it is evident that they will not P¥*Y- obtain pity at the hands of those on whom they depend for it.
CHAP. XI. Of Emulation.
Hence likewise it will be evident both with what + Emu- dispositions, and in regard to what objects, and of to. whom, persons are emulous. Because if emulation Its defini be “a sort of pain at the apparent’ presence of goods tion. which are held in honour, and which admit of one’s gaining them himself, in the case of those naturally our equals; felt, not because they are present to another, but because they are not likewise present to one’s self,” (on which very account emulation is a vir- It isa vis tuous feeling, and belongs to virtuous people, whereas Paced τὰ envy is a depraved feeling, and belongs to persons who are depraved: for the one, by motion of his emu- 1 The merely apparent presence of this description of goods is sufficient to excite emulation. The character of the goods which this passion has as its object is entirely different from that which excites envy and indignation.
Persons likely to feel emu- lation, The young and high- spirited.
2. Those whom others esteem, 3. Whose ancestry or rela- tions are worthy.
4, Thin which = objects of emula- tion. Virtues, Goods.
Wealth, ete, 5, Per- g0ns who are ob- jects of emula- tion.
6. All whom men wish to resem- ble, lation, sets himself to acquire the good; while the other, by motion of his envy, sets himself to cause the dispossession of his neighbour). It must be, then, that persons who deem themselves worthy of goods which they do not possess, are apt to feel emulation; since no one arrogates to himself that which appears impossible: and hence the young and the high-spirit- ed are thus affected; and also those to whom belong goods of such a description as to be worth the atten- tion of men in repute; these are wealth, number of friends, office, and whatever other goods are of this kind; for men feel emulous of such goods; as though, because they properly belong to such as are men of virtuous dispositions, it were matter of absolute right that themselves should be virtuous. Again, those are emulous whom others esteem worthy of such goods: and those again whose ancestors, or relations, or in- timate friends, or whose tribe or city is held in es- teem about any point, such persons‘are apt to feel emulation on that-point; for they think they belong properly to them, and that themselves are worthy of them.
But if those goods are matter of emulation which are held in esteem, it must of course follow that the virtues are of this description; and whatever things have a tendency to aid and benefit others; since people honour virtuous people, and those who benefit them: likewise that all goods whatsoever, the enjoy- ment of which accrues to one’s neighbours, are of this sort; for instance, wealth, and beauty, rather than health.
And it will also be evident who the persons are who are objects of emulation; since they who possess these, and the like goods, become objects of emulation; these goods are such as have been mentioned, for ex- ample, courage, wisdom, sovereignty; for those who are sovereigns have a power of benefiting many. Generals, orators, all, in fact, who have abilities this way [are objects of emulation]. And those whom many wish to resemble, or who have many acquaint- ances, or many friends. Or those whom many admire, CHAP. ΧΙ. RHETORIC. 149 or whom they do themselves admire. And those on 7. or ad- whom are pronounced the praises and encomia of ™¥® τ poets and panegyrists”. Persons, however, of a con- Contempt trary description, men despise; for contempt is the pide on ag contrary of emulation; and the despising of the being emula- - emulous. And it must be that persons so affected as tion. to emulate certain persons, or to be themselves ob- jects of emulation, are apt to feel contempt for those things and persons who possess evils the contraries of those goods which are the objects of emulation. On which account men frequently despise the fortun- ate, when their good fortune is unconnected with those goods which are held in esteem.
Of the means, then, by which the passions are ex- cited in the breast, and are allayed, one of the sources* out of which means of persuasion arise, of these we now have treated.
CHAP. XII. Of the Passions and Habits of the Young".
LET us next go over in detail the dispositions? of 1. Charac- men; considering of what kind of a turn they are, in a ae reference to their passions, habits, ages, and fortunes, 2 This description of orators were justly said to be λογογρά- got, (λόγους γραφεὶν 2) indeed it appears from the third book, that epideictic orations im general were intended. rather for pe- rusal than recitation. Speaking of the style of epideictic orators, he remarks, τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις, lib. 111. cap.
3 Viz. πίστις παθητικὴ, the third branch of πίστις ἐντέχνη. See book i. chap. ii. § 3, 4, 5.
This discussion of the dispositions of persons, under a few of the most striking circumstances of life, was promised in the first book (chap. x. ᾧ 11).
2 “The word ἤθη, taken in its utmost extent, includes every thing that is habitual and characteristic; but itis often used in a limited sense, for the habitual temper or disposition.”” Twin- ing. Probably ‘* humour,” in the sense in which it has been defined by Ben Jonson, comes nearer to ἦθος than any word in our language -— 2. Vary in. their i. Pas- sions.
iit. Habits.
i. Ages. iv. For- tunes.
3. Cha- racter of the young. Ardent Tncon- stant.
4, Irritable.
7. San- guine.
I call anger, lust, and the like, by the name pas- sions; a subject of which we have treated above. By the name habits, I designate virtues and vices: and of these we have treated above, both as to the points on which men form deliberate choice, and that towhich they give birth in action. And the ages are youth, prime, and old age. By fortune I mean, high birth, and wealth, and abilities, and their opposites; and, in one word, good and bad fortune.