Now the young are in their dispositions prone to desire, and of a character to effect what they desire.. And they are in the highest degree apt to pursue the pleasures of love above all desires about which the body is concerned, and in these they are incontinent. But they are prone to change, and fastidious in the objects of their desires. And they desire with earn- estness, but speedily cease to desire; for their wishes are keen, without being durable; just like the hunger and thirst of the sick. And they are passionate and irritable, and of a temperament to follow the impulse. And they cannot overcome their anger; for by reason of their ambition they do not endure a slight, but become indignant, and fancy themselves injured: and they are ambitious indeed of honour, but more so of . Victory; for youth is desirous of superiority, and victory is a sort of superiority. And of both these are they desirous in a higher degree than of gain; but least of all are they desirous of gain%, by reason of their having never yet experienced want; just ac- cording to the proverbial saying of Pittacus to Am- phiaraus*. And they do not view things in a bad When some one peculiar quality Doth so possess a man, that it doth draw All his affects, his spirits, and his powers, In their confluctions, all to run one way, This may be truly said to be a humour.
Every Man out of his Humour: where see Whalley’s note.
8 Power pleases the violent and proud: wealth delights the placid and timorous. Youth therefore flies at power, and age grovels after riches. Johnson’s Journey to the Hebrides, 4 Iv is not known what éhis saying of Pittacus was.
CHAP. x11.] RHETORIC. 151 light, but in a good, by reason of their never having yet been witnesses of much depravity. And they are credulous, from their never having yet been!
much imposed on. And they are sanguine in their expectations; for like those who are affected by wine, so the young are warmed by their nature; and at the same time from their having never yet met with many repulses. Their life, too, for the most part, is one of hope; for hope is of that which is yet to be, while memory is of that which is passed: but to the young that which is yet to be, is long; but that which has passed, is short; for in the early days of life they think they remember nothing, while they hope for every thing; and they are easily imposed on, for the reason which has been stated; because they soon cherish expectation. And they are brave ‘rather to an excess; for they are irritable and san- guine, qualities, the one whereof cancels fear, and the other inspires courage; for while no one who is affected by anger ever is afraid, the being in hope of some good is a thing to give courage. And they are bashful; for they do not as yet conceive the honour- able to be any thing distinct, but they have been educated only under the established usage of the state. And they are high-minded; for they have not as yet been humbled by the course of life, but are unexperienced in peremptory circumstances: again, high-mindedness is the deeming one’s self worthy of much; and this belongs to persons of sanguine ex- pectations. And they prefer succeeding in an hon- ourable sense than in points of expediency; for they live more in conformity to moral feeling than to mere calculations®; and calculation is of the expedient, moral excellence, however, of that which is honour- able. Again, they are fond of friends and companions rather than of their other compeers in age, by reason of their delighting in social intercourse, and of their not yet deciding on any thing in reference to what is 5 Λογισμὸς is that one of the seven causes of human action which /east affects the ycung. They usually act from Iunos or ἐπιθυμίᾳ.
Their life is one of hope.
12. With a sense of honour.
13. Social, 14. Their errors are on the side of . &xcess.
15. Their insults are mis- chievous not ma- licious. Prone to pity.
16. Are gracefully facetious.
1, Charae- ter of the old.
expedient; so that they do not decide on their friends [upon that principle]. And all their errors are on the side of excess and too great earnestness, in con- travention of Chilo’s rule; for the young carry every thing to an excess; for their friendships are in ex- cess, their hatreds are in excess, and they do every thing else with the same degree of earnestness; they think also that they know every thing, and firmly asseverate that they do; for this is the cause of their pushing every thing to an excess. And, in their trespasses, they trespass on the side of wantonness, and not of malice. They are likewise prone to pity, from their conceiving every one to be good, and more worthy than in fact he is®; for they measure others by the standard of their own guiltlessness; so that they conceive them to be suffering what they do not deserve. And they are fond of mirth, on which account they are also of a facetious turn’; for face- tiousness is chastened forwardness of manner. Such, then, is the disposition of the young.
CHAP. XIII. Of the Passions and Habits of those advanced in Life.
Burt those who are advanced in life, and who have passed their prime, are of dispositions in most: points 6 Vide note 3, chap. xiii. p. 154.
7 Ἑὐτράπελοι. I know no word in our language of similar moral signification in which the metaphorical allusion to Τρέπω, the turn, or easy adaptation of manner, is preserved, unless in- deed Minshew be correct in his etymology of Buxome, which, according to him, is derived from the German word booghsaem, i. FLEXILIS, and refers to the article pliant for further explan- ation. If this etymology be true, then Milton’s expression, buxom, blythe, and debonnaire, though applied rather to female than manly grace, will convey a netion of what is here in- tended by Aristotle. But see Minshew, p. 106, edit. 1627. In the Ethics, Ὁ. 4, he compares εὐτραπελία to gracefulness of person; which, in conformity with the notions of most ancient writers, he seems to think only discoverable in motion, not in rest. Compare also “ “’rito, or a Dialogue on Beauty.”
OMAP. χιπ ἢ RHETORIC. 153 the very opposite of these. Since by reason of their having lived many years, and having been deceived in a greater number of instances, and having mis- taken, by reason, too, that the majority of human affairs are but worthless, they neither positively as- severate any thing, and they err in every thing more on the side of defect than they ought. And they always “suppose,” but never “know” certainly; and, questioning every thing, they always subjoin a “ perhaps,” or ἃ “ possibly.” And they talk of every 1 thing in this undecisive tone, asserting nothing de- cisively. And they are apt to view things in an unfavourable light; for a disposition thus to view * things, is the judging of every thing on the worse ‘side. Moreover they are apt to be suspicious from distrust, and they are distrustful from their expe- ‘rience. And on this account they neither love nor hate with great earnestness; but, conformably to the remark of Bias, they both love as though about to hate, and hate as though about to love. And they “are pusillanimous, from their having been humbled by the course of life; for they raise their desires to nothing great or vast, but to things only which con- duce to support of life. And they are illiberal; for property is one of the necessaries; and they are at ‘the same time aware, from their experience, of the difficulty of its acquisition, and of the ease with which it is lost. And they are timid and apprehen- sive of every thing; for their disposition is the reverse of that of the young; for they have been chilled by years, but the young are warm in their temperament; so that their age has paved the way to timidity; for fear is a certain kind of chill. And they are attached to life, and particularly at its last closing day, from the circumstance that desire is of some object which is absent, and that men more espe- cially desire that of which they stand in need. And _ they have self-love more than is fitting; for this too is a kind of littleness of spirit. And they live in a greater degree than they ought by the standard of expediency, and not of what is honourable, by reason The old are doubt Cautious 5. Cow- ardly, 6. Illibe- ral, 7. Timid 8. Tena- cious of 9. Selfish 13. Weak in anger, but keen.
Live from calcula- tion.
14, Err on theside of malice. 15. Are apt to pity, from weakness.
Queru- lous.
of their self-love: for what is expedient is good rela- tively, to one’s self; but what is honourable is good absolutely. And they are insensible to shame, rather than liable to be affected by it; for on account of their not holding equally in esteem the honourable and the expedient, they despise appearances. Again, they are not easily inspired with hope, on account of their experience; for the majority of things are but paltry; wherefore the generality turn out inferior to the expectation; and once more on account of their timidity [they are apt to despond]. And they live more in memory than in hope; for the remnant of life is brief, but what has passed is considerable; and hope indeed is of what is to come; whereas memory is of things gone by: the very reason this, of their garrulity; for they never cease talking of that which has taken place, since they are delighted in awaken- ing the recollections of things. And their anger is keen, but faint. And their desires have, some, aban- doned them, the others are faint; so that neither are they liable to the influence of desire, nor apt to act in conformity to it, but with a view to gain; on which account men of this age appear to be naturally temperate, for both their desires have relaxed, and they are enslaved to gain. And they live more by calculation! than by moral feeling; for calculation is of expediency, but moral feeling is of virtue. And, in their trespasses, they trespass on the side of malice, not of wanton insolence. The old have more- over atendency to pity, but not on the same principle with the young; for the latter are thus disposed from their love of human nature, the former from their imbecility; since they consider the erdurance of every calamity at hand to them, and this was laid down as a principle of pity”. Whence they are que- 1 Their principles of action are the very contraries of those which principally influence the young; ἔθος and λογισμός be- ing the usual springs of action in the man of advanced life.
3 The two leading principles of pity were stated to be, a con- riction that the sufferer is undeserving what he suffers, and that you consider yourself liable to be placed in similar circumstances, It was on the former of these arinciples that the young were stated CHAP. xIv.| RHETORIC. 155 rulous, and neither facetious, nor fond of mirth; for querulousness is the very reverse of fondness for mirth.
Such, then, are the dispositions of the young, and of those in advanced life*. So that, as all welcome an address worded to their own disposition, and a speaker who resembles themselves, it is clear by em- ploying his oration in what way the orator will ap- pear of this description, as regards himself and what he says.
CHAP. XIV. Of the Dispositions of Persons in their mature Age.
TuoseE who are in their prime will, it is evident, be in a mean in point of disposition between these, sub- tracting the excesses of each: being neither rash in too great a degree, (for rashness is of this description, i. 6. 7% excess,) nor too much given to fear, but keep- ing themselves right in respect to both. Neither placing confidence in all, nor distrusting all, but judg- ing rather in conformity to the truth. Neither living with a view solely to what is honourable, nor with a view only to expediency, but with a respect to both. And conformed neither to penurious parsimony, nor to extravagance, but to what is fitting. -With the same equality do they carry themselves also in respect to anger and to desire. And they are of a tempering coolness joined with spirit, and are spirited not withto be apt to pity; because they take a favourable view of hu- man nature. The old are equally liable to be affected by that passion, but it is on the latter principle; for though they view human nature in an unfavourable light, yet have they so strong a sense of their own liability to suffering, that they are led to commiserate others. Compare chap. viii. § 7; and chap. xii. ὁ 15.
3. In the Rambler, No. 196, the change of sentiments usual as men advance from youth to age is beautifully traced; and the whole paper affords a striking illustration of the subject treated in this and the preceding chapter.
16. How the orator must use these cha racters, 1. Charace ter of the matured, They are moderate.
3.
Are spi- rited with coolness.
4, Prime of life for the body and mind.
1. Charac- ter of men of high birth.
2. Ambi- tious.
Contemp- tuous, 8. Dis- tinction between the noble and gene- rous. The ge- nerations of mar out temperate coolness: for in the young and in elderly persons these qualities are separated; since the young are spirited, and of an intemperate rash- ness, while elderly persons are of a chastened spirit, and timid. And thus, in a word, whatever advan- tages youth and age have divided between them, the middle age possesses both; and in whatever respects they are either in excess or defect, in all these it holds a mean and what is fitting. | But the body is in its prime from the age of thirty to five and thirty; and the mind about the age of forty-nine. Let thus much, then, have been said re- specting youth, and old and mature age, and the dis- positions which they severally are of.
CHAP. XV. The characteristic Dispositions of Persons of high birth.
Bort let us treat of the goods of fortune next in order, so many of them at least as influence the dispositions of men in any particular way.
Now it is the disposition of high birth, that its pos- sessor is more ambitious than others; for all, when any possession is realized to them, are wont to ac- cumulate upon it. But high birth is nobility of an- cestry; and it is apt to indulge in contempt even of those who are as good as its own ancestors; because distinctions, in proportion as they are more remote, rather than recent, are held in greater esteem, and afford a ready plea for arrogance.
But, noble, is an appellation referring to excellence of birth; whereas, generous refers to one’s not de- generating from the nature [of his ancestry |; which, generally speaking, is not the case with the noble, but the majority of them are ordinary persons. For there is a kind of richness of produce in the genera- tions of man, just as there is in that which arises from CHAP. XVI.] nHETORIC. 157 the land; and at times, should the stock be good, there arise in a family at intervals extraordinary per- sons; and afterwards it again relaxes. And a fami- ly of brilliant talent run wild into dispositions bor- dering on madness!; as in the instances of the descendants of Alcibiades, and Dionysius the elder: and one of sedate wisdom, into stupidity and dul- ness; as in the instances of the descendants of Ci- mon, and Pericles, and Socrates.
CHAP. XVI. The Dispositions consequent on Wealth.
Any one, without any great penetration, may distin- guish the dispositions consequent on wealth; for [its possessors] are insolent and overbearing, from being tainted in a certain way by the getting of their wealth. For they are affected as though they possessed every good; since wealth is a sort of standard of the worth of other things; whence every thing seems to be purchaseable by it. And they are affectedly delicate and purse-proud; they are thus delicate on account of their luxurious lives, and the display they make of their prosperity. They are purse-proud, and violate the rules of good breeding 3, 1 Mavixwtepa. In connexion with this word it should be borne in mind, that the Greeks were accustomed to consider every kind of enthusiastic impetuosity as a species of madness. See Twining on the Poetics, note 140.
2 Σόλοικοι, the inhabitants of Soli in Cilicia, whose corrup- tions of the Greek language became proverbial. The word was used also to designate those who were guilty of impro- priety in conduct, as well as in expression. Massinger, in enu- merating some instances of ill breeding, uses the expression.
He ne’er observed you To twirl a dish about, you did not like of, All being pleasing to you; or to take A say of venison or stale fowl by your nose, Which is a solecism at another’s table, etc. Unnatural Combat, act iii, sc. a.
See too Ben Jonson’s Fox, vol. iii. p. 275.
compared to the soii 1. Charae- ter of the wealthy.
Insolent.
3. Arro- gant of place and power, 4. Differ- ence be- tween the newly rich and those who have been from the circumstance that every one is wont to dwel. upon that which is beloved and admired by him, and because they think that others are emulous of that, of which they are themselves. But at the same time they are thus affected reasonably enough; for many are they who need the aid of men of pro- perty. Whence, too, that remark of Simonides addressed to the wife of Hiero respecting the wealthy and the wise; for when she asked him, “ whether it were better to have been born wealthy or wise,” he replied, “ wealthy; for,” he said, “he used to see the wise hanging on at the doors of the wealthy.” And [it is a characteristic of the rich] that they esteem themselves worthy of being in office; for they consider themselves possessed of that on ac- count of which they are entitled to be in office. And, in a word, the disposition of the rich is that of a fool amid prosperity.
However, the dispositions of those who are but lately rich, and of those who have been so from of old, are different; inasmuch as those who have re- cently become rich? have all these faults in a greater and a worse degree; for the having recently become so from of rich is as it were an inexpertness in wealth. And old, they are guilty of offences, not of a malicious nature, but such as are either offences of contumely or in- temperance; for instance, in the case of assault or adultery.
3 It is on this principle that Clytemnestra congratulates Cas- sandra on being the slave of an ancient family, rather than one recently advanced in the world:— ἀρχαιοπλούτων δεσποτῶν πολλὴ χάρις" οἵ δ᾽, οὔποτ᾽ ἐλπίσαντες, ἤμησαν καλῶς, ὦμοι τε δούλοις πάντα, καὶ παρὰ στάθμην.
fEsch. Agam. 1010.: Vide illustrations in Symmons’s Translation, p. 97. See Johnson’s Life of Savage, p. 338, vol. vii. edit. 1823, of his works; Examples, etc. See Ausch. Prom. Vinct. 35.
ἅπας δὲ τραχύς, ὅστις ἂν νέον κρατῇ.
CHAP. XVII. | RHETORIC. 159 CHAP. XVII. Of the Dispositions of Men in Power, and of the Fortunate.
AND in the same way on the subject of power, the most striking almost of its dispositions are evident; for of these power has some in common with wealth, and others which are better. For men in power are more ambitious and more manly in their dispositions than the wealthy; from their aiming at all duties whatsoever, which from their power they have the means of discharging. And they are less given to trifling, because, from a necessity of looking carefully to their power, they are constrained to a diligent at- tention. And they comport themselves with a dig- nity which is conciliatory rather than repulsive; for their claims for dignity render them more conspicuous; on which account, they bear themselves moderately: but conciliatory dignity is a softened and graceful sedateness. And, if they do transgress the bounds of right, it is not in small points, but in those which are of importance, that they are guilty.
But good fortune, according to its constituents, is of the disposition of the states which have been de- scribed; since those which appear to be the greatest instances of good fortune resolve themselves ulti- mately into these states: and, besides these, to the excellence of one’s progeny, and to personal advan- tages. But men are usually more overbearing and inconsiderate in consequence of prosperity. But one disposition, and that most excellent, is a concomitant of good fortune, viz. that the fortunate are lovers of the gods, and are disposed toward the deity with a sort of confidence, in consequence of the goods which have accrued to them from fortune.
The subject, then, of the dispositions as they con- form to age and to fortune has been discussed; for from the opposites of my remarks the opposite sub- jects will be evident; the subject, for example, of the disposition of a poor, or unfortunate person, or of one out of power.
1, Charao ter of men in power resembles the rich; 5. Charao ter of the fortunate.
6. Over- bearing, Yet re- ligious, 1. That there are certain κοινὰ εἴδη.
CHAP. XVIII.
That there are some Topics common to all the species of Oratory.
But since the use of persuasive orations has a refer- ence to the forming a decision (since on questions which we are acquainted with, and have decided on, there is no further need of an oration); and as this is their use, whether addressing his speech to a single iudividual, the speaker endeavours to exhort or dis- suade (which they do who admonish or persuade; since that individual is in no less degree a judge; because the person [be he who he may |, whomsoever we want to persuade is, once for all, a judge); and also if one be speaking against an adversary, or on any supposed question, it has equally [a reference to decision]; (for one needs must employ a speech, and sweep away objections against which, as against an adversary, he directs his address); this is just as much the case in demonstrative oratory (since the speech commends itself to the listener just as though toa judge). But he alone is strictly a judge, who decides on the questions at issue in civil! controversies: since both forensic questions, and those on which men de- liberate, are agitated as to how they stand. But of dispositions, as they are affected by the constitutions of states, we have spoken above. So that the means will now have been distinctly unfolded, both how, and by the use of what things, we may render our addresses ethical.
4. But as there was, in each species of orations, a certain distinct end proposed; and as respecting all of . them some ideas and propositions have been ascertained, out of which the deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial orators deduce their means of persuading; and as, in addition to these, the means by which it is possible for us to render our speeches ethical, have been developed; it merely remains, that we go over * Under the word πολιτικὸς, he seems, according to Victe- rius, to embrace judicial as well as deliberative questions, CHAP. XVIII.] - RHETORIC. 16) in detail the topics which are common to the three species of oratory”: for it is necessary that every orator should connect with his speech the topics ὁ possibility or impossibility; and for some it will be necessary to attempt to show that certain things will take place, and for others that they have taken place. }) And again, the topic of greatness is common to all oratory; for every orator, whether he exhort or dis- suade, praise or blame, accuse or defend, avails him- self of amplification and diminution.
Let us also, after these points have been explained, attempt to treat of enthymems in general (if we are in possession of any thing on the subject) and of ex- amples; in order that by subjoining what remains we may make good our original proposal.
But of these common topics, amplification is most congenial to demonstrative oratory, as has been re- marked; possibility, as relating to the past, to ju- dicial?; since on what has been its decision is made; but possibility, as relating to the future, is most con- genial to deliberative.
CHAP. XIX, Of Things Possible and Impossible.
First, then, let us speak of things possible and those which are impossible.
If then it be possible that one contrary should ex- ist, or be called into existence, the other contrary will also appear to be possible; for instance, if it be possible for a man to be convalescent, it also is possible for him to be sick; for the effective power of contraries, inasmuch as they are contraries, is the ? We may, if we please, consider this as the ἀπόδοσις of the sentence; and all the previous c_auses as so many distinct pa- rentheses; as the author of the Analysis has done, p. 101.
* This discussion of possibility was promised in the course of what he said on judicial oratory, book i. chap. xii. § 2.
M 3. They 816 four iu number. i. The pos- sible or impossi- 4. ii. Whe- ther the fact has or has not taken place. lii. Whe- ther it will orwillnot, 5. iv. The eat and ems, ye First of the possi- ble ae impossi- ble.
The possi- ble is of which the contrary ispossible, The end, 6. The subse- quent.
7. Things which we love.
8. Sub- jects of art orscience.
10. Where the parts are possi- ble, so is ‘the whole, 162 ARISTOTLE’S [Boox τί.
same. If, of two similar things, the one be possible, the other which is similar will be possible also. If the more difficult be possible, so will also that which iseasier. And if it be possible for a thing to be pro- duced in a state of excellence or beauty, it also is possible for it to be produced under general circum- stances; for it is more difficult for a building to be - made beautiful, than simply a building. And in whatever case the commencement is possible, the fulfilment also is possible': for of things which are impossible, none either take place or begin to do so; for instance, it neither zs the case, that the diameter of a square is commensurable with the side, neither will it ever begin to be so. Also, wherever the ful- filment is possible, so is the commencement; since every thing proceeds from a beginning. And if the subsequent in being or production be possible, so also is the antecedent: if, for example, it be possible that a man should be produced, so also is it that a child should, since it is antecedent in its production: again, if it be possible for a child, so is it also for a man to be produced; on the principle that the former is a commencement. ‘Things likewise are possible, of which there is a natural love or desire; for no one loves what is impossible, neither desires it, for the most part at least. Also, any thing which is the subject of an art or science, is possible both to exist 9. and to be produced. Likewise any thing whatsoever, the principle of whose production resides in those whom we can compel or persuade; such are those whose superiors, or lords, or friends we are. And wherever the parts are possible, so also is the whole. Wherever again the whole is possible, so also are the parts. generally speaking: for if the latchet, the forepart, and the upperleather of the shoe admit of being brought into being, so also do the shoes themselves: and if the shoes, then also the latchet, 1 Thus it is argued, that if all may receive the ἀρχὴ of re- generation, baptism; all may receive its τέλος, salvation. Baptism is expressly called by St. Basil, ἀρχὴ μοὶ ζωῆς τὸ βάπτισμα. De Spir. Sanct. 6. 10, CHAP. XIX. | RHETORIO, 103 the forepart, and upperleather?; also, if the genus be 11. If the of the number of things possible, so also will be the $00 the species; and if the species, so also the genus: for species; example, if a vessel can be produced, so can a and vice trireme; and if a trireme, so can a vessel. And if, }5"°* of things which have a natural relation to each other, the one be possible, so is also the other; as if the double be possible, so also is the half; and if the half, so also is the double. And if a thing admits of 18. Fs being brought into being without art or preparation, hoy rig ἃ fortiori it will admit of it by the help of art and with art. attention. On which principle too it has been remarked by Agatho, “ Yes, truly, in some things you must fare just as fortune goes; other things there are which attach to us by necessity and art.” Also, if 14. Ifin- any thing be possible to persons who are worse, or tae our inferiors, or less prudent, much more will it also can supe- be possible to their opposites; just as Isocrates said, ‘rs. that “it would be strange if Euthynus learnt it, and he were not able to find it out.”
With regard, however, to things impossible, it is 15.Things plain that they result from the contraries of the ‘lc anal above-mentioned principles. opposite, Questions as to the actual occurrence of any thing, 16. Se- are to be viewed under the following considerations. ape For, in the first place, if that which had a less natural taken - tendency to occur, has occurred; then may that have place, occurred which had a greater tendency. And if that 17. When which is wont to take place subsequently, has taken (8 subse- ‘ quent has place, that also has taken place which usually does happen- primarily: if, for instance, a man has forgotten, then ed. also must he at some time have learnt that [of which he is now forgetful]. Also, if a man was able and 18. If the willing, he achieved the deed; for all men when, being sailing. willing, they have power, proceed to act; for there is nothing in their way. If, moreover, a man was willing and had no external impediment. If, again, the act 19. And 3 The admirers of Sterne will do well, on reading this pas- sage, to borrow a hint from him, and consult the learned Al- bertus Rubenius upon it, or at least some one of the many great authorities mentioned chap. 19, vol. vi. of Tristram Shandy.
m2 under the influence ef anger or desire.
164 ARISTOTLE’S ἴβοοκ II.
was possible, and he was under the influence of an- ger’. And if it was possible, and he [the person in question] was influenced by lust; for, generally speak- ing, men, if they have the power, execute that of which they are desirous; the bad from weakness of principle; and the virtuous because they desire ob- 20. Ifhe jects compatible with virtue. Also, if a man was on was on the eve of do- ing it, etc.
22.Thin which τὰ have not happened are to be inferred from the opposite. Thirdly, what will passions.
24. If the antece- dents have hap- pened.
the point of bringing the thing into action and of doing it; since the probability is, that he who was on the eve of acting, did moreover really act. Also, if all those things have taken place which naturally oc- cur, either as preparatory to, or on account of the oc- currence in question; as for instance, if it has light- ened, it has also thundered; and if he attempted it, he has also achieved it. And if all those things which naturally occur subsequently, and that on ac- count of which the deed is done, have taken place, then has also the prior to them and that which is the cause taken place: if, for instance, it has thundered, it has also lightened; and if he acted, he also attempt- ed. Of all this number there are some thus subse- quent of necessity; others however merely generally.
With regard, however, to the non-occurrence of things, the considerations applicable will be plain from the contraries of those above stated.
Also with regard to what will happen, matters will become evident from the same considerations; for that which is within the power and the wishes of any one will take place. Also things which are subjects _ of lust, anger, and reasonings, accompanied by power 4.