as well as its professors, partly from inexperience, partly arrogance, and in part from other human causes; because, as I stated at the outset, it is a sort of subordinate division of logic, and portraiture of it; neither of them being a science of any one definite 3 Πολιτικὴ, For an explanation of this term—an enumer- ation of the various arts which he comprehends under it—and for an account of the estimation in which he holds it, see Ethics, lib. i. c. 2.
4 Ὑποδύεται. So blind are men to this affectation of rheto- ric and its professors, that he who, having had no occasion for the display of his persuasive powers, other than the ordinary course of affairs presents, would be accused of great arrogance were he to talk of having exercised rhetoric. Now Aristotle, so far from holding a person guilty of presumption for such an use of the term, would rather retort on the accuser the charge of ignorance of its true import. For with a view to invest their art, and of consequence themselves, with an air of dignity, the professors of rhetoric, said he, would have the world think (some of them, poor creatures, δι᾿ ἀπαιδευσίαν) that it was ap- plicable exclusively to such cases as are of high concernment to society. This in part is true; rhetoric is παραφυὲς τῆς Ilodrreias: but, as Majoragius observes, “ Virgulta magnam quidem cum arboribus quibus adnascuntur habent similitudi- nem, et rerum naturam redolent. Sed tamen multo sunt infe- riora, neque tam uberes fructus ferunt.”? So far prevalent is this notion to this very day, that we only apply this τὸ ἃ by way of ridicule to persuasion on ordinary topics.
8. Subdi- vision of πίστεις, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λό i. Ent τ mem, ii Example.
ample.
Defini- tion of Syllo- zism.
10. Vari- ous styles of speak- ing.
subject, as to what may be its nature; but both being certain faculties for furnishing ourselves with argu-~ ments. Now on the subject of the powers of the two, and their mutual dears nearly enough has been said.
With regard to means of persuading by proving, or appearing to prove your point, just as in logic one is induction, another syllogism, another apparent syl- : logism, so also is the case here in rhetoric; for its example is an induction, its enthymem a syllogism; and enthymem I call rhetorical syllogism; example, rhetorical induction. Now all orators effect their de- monstrative proofs by allegation either of enthymems or examples, and, besides these, in no other way whatever. So that if it be incumbent on you to prove with regard to any thing or person in form of syllo- gism or induction, it cannot but be (as is evident from Analytics) that each of these will be essentially the same as each of the former (enthymem and induction). And what the difference is between example and en- thymem is plain from the Topics, where, on the sub- ject of syllogism and induction, it has been stated before, that the proving that such or such is the fact in many and similar cases, is called in the other art, induction; in this, example. But when, certain points having been granted, there results, by virtue of these, something else over and above these, by virtue of their existence, either as generals or parti- culars; this process is, in that art, called syllogism; in this, enthymem®. Rhetoric, it is plain, enjoys each advantage; for [with respect to it] the case, in this treatise, is the same as in the Methodica has been stated of logic; the speeches of orators® abounding, some in examples, others in enthymems; and orators - themselves being in the same way, some fond of ex- ample, others of enthymem. Reasoning, however 5 Or, each style of rhetoric has its peculiar advantage.
4 Ῥητορεία, the words of an orator, modelled according te rhetoric, whose object it is to persuade; 3 versus, λόγος, the words of a logician, modelled according to logic, whose object it is to convince.
CHAP. II." RHETORIC. 13 conducted through the medium of example, are not less calculated to persuade; but those of which en- thymem is the characteristic are rather applauded’. But I will hereafter explain what is the cause of this, and how we are to use each species of proof: let us, at present, distinguish more clearly respecting these proofs themselves. Now forasmuch as that which carries persuasion with it, does so in reference to some one; and either is, immediately on being enun- ciated, actually of a nature to persuade, and enforce belief; or [has its effect] from its appearing to prove through the medium of such [as compose the former class]; and as no art considers particular cases; me- dicine for example, what is wholesome for the indi- viduals, Socrates. or Callias, but what is so for any person of such a constitution; for this question comes within the province of art, but particulars are infinite, and cannot be known: so neither will rhetoric con- sider probability in reference to particular individuals; what, for instance, is probable to Socrates or Callias, but that which is so to persons such as they are; just in the same way as logic, for that art does not draw conclusions indiscriminately from any subjects; for some things there are which appear probable even to a madman; [yet you never would dream of arguing about them;] but it supplies itself from subjects which require reasoning, as does rhetoric from sub- jects which are usual matters of deliberation. Its business then is respecting points about which we de- liberate, and have no art specially conversant, and before auditors of such abilities as are not able to take a connected view of reasonings, conducted through 7 Θορυβοῦνται. Twining, in his notes on the Poetic, quot- ing a subsequent passage of this Treatise, in which this word again occurs, (ii. 23,) translates it, “‘ are applauded,” and ob- serves, that “the commentators strangely mistake the sense cf this word here, and in lib. i.c. 2. They render it absurdly,— vehementius percellunt—perturbant maxime. Whether an at- dience be pleased or displeased, to any great degree, noise is equally the consequence; and the word ϑορυβεῖν is used, sometimes for ‘he uproar of approbation, and sometimes for that of dislike toric con- siders the πιθανὸν for ἃ class, not an in- dividual, and draws its sup- plies from subjects of delibera- tion.
12. Audi: ence held to be ἁπλοί.
13. Hence conclud- ing ἐκ σνλλελο- γισμένων πρότε- ov, being engthy, and ἐξ ἀσυλλο- γίστων μὲν δευμέ- νὼν O& συλλο- γισμοῦ, being un- admitted —are to be avoided, many stages, nor to deduce an argument from remote principles. Now we deliberate on subjects which appear to admit of having themselves in either of two ways: for on questions which cannot, under any cir- cumstances, past, present, or future, be otherwise; on these, I say, no one deliberates, at least not while he apprehends them to be such®; for by such a deli- beration nothing is gained. And you may draw your conclusions and inferences, sometimes from premises which you have arrived at by former syllogisms; and sometimes from propositions, not syllogistically de- duced, but requiring such a process by reason of their not being probable at first sight; but of these pro- cesses, it is impossible thatthe former should not be hard to follow up, by reason of its prolixity (for your hearer® is supposed to be aman of merely ordinary ndiiesutokdiue and the latter defective in persuasive efficacy, by reason of its not being deduced out of principles either acknowledged,.or probable; so that it is necessary that both the enthymem and example should be conversant about points which, generally speaking, admit of being otherwise, (the example an- swering to induction, and the enthymem to syllo- * A man under a mistaken idea of the nature of the subject may possibly deliberate on a question, the nature of which is fixed and necessary. Still, however, as long as he remains under this impression, the subject relatively to him is of a con- tingent nature, " 9 Cicero giyes a similar. caution:—“ Hee nostra oratio multitudinis est auribus accommodanda, ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda que non aurificis statera, sed quadam populari trutina examinantur.”” De Orat. lib. ii. We may further proye that this precept has its foundation in na- ture, by quoting the words of a celebrated modern writer, who, at least in penetration and knowledge of mankind, had few superiors; ‘f The receipt to make a speaker, and an applauded one too, is short and easy. Take common sense guantum suf- ficit; add a little application to the rules and orders of the House; throw obvious thoughts in a new light, and make up the whole with a large quantity of purity, correctness, and elegance of style. Take it for granted that by far the greatest part of mankind neither analyse nor search to the bottom; they are incapable of penetrating deeper than the surface.” Lord Chesterfield’s Letters.
o CHAP 11.] RHETORIC. 17 gism,) and be deduced out of few, and frequently out of fewer intermediate propositions than the syllogism, in its original form, consisted of. For if any of these be known, it is not necessary to mention it; for the hearer of himself makes this addition. For example, in order to convey the information that Dorieus was conqueror in a contest where a chaplet is the prize; it suffices to say, that he conquered in the Olympic games: but as to the circumstance that, having con- quered at Olympia, he got a chaplet, there is no ne- cessity for adding it, because every one knows it. But as the necessary premises out of which the syllogisms of rhetoric are formed are very few, (for the majority of questions about which decisions and consideration are exercised admit of being otherwise; because men deliberate and consider on the subjects of human conduct, and all conduct is of this con- tingent nature, nor is a single branch, I may say, of these subjects necessary,) and it cannot but be that _ you should deduce contingent conclusions from premises whose nature is such; and necessary ones, from necessary; (this is evident to us from the Analytics:) I say, since this is the case, it is plain that the premises out of which enthymems are de- duced, will be some of them necessary, but the greatest part contingent: for enthymems are ad- duced from probabilities 10 (εἰκότα) and signs (σημεῖα). And thus it follows of necessity, that, of these, each 10 In despair of finding adequate English expressions for the words εἰκὸς and σημεῖον, 1 have acquiesced in the usual, but erroneous translation. At the risk of incurring the charge of prolixity, the following are given as the most popular ways of explaining this difficult subject. Dr. Whately considers this “a division of arguments according to the relation of the sub- ject-matter of the premises to that of the conclusion.’”? The εἰκὸς (or διότι of Aristotle) he takes to be an a priori argu- ment, which may be employed to account for the fact supposed granted. The σημεῖον (or ὅτι of Aristotle) and example, arguments which could not be so employed: vid. Rhetoric, p. 116. Others, again, maintain that the σημεῖον is an argument to prove past matters, the εἰκὸς to prove future. The majority of commentators, however, consider the εἰκὸς and σημεῖον ag propositions in different matter: thus,— Cc thymems, are de- duced ei- ther from εἰκότα οἵ σημεῖα.
15. Defi- nition of εἰκὸς, respectively is identified with each of the former For probability is what usually happens, not absoεἰκὸς, in contingent matter, σημεῖον in necessary matter. in the ratio of an univer- sal toa particular. — a Ἴ As a particular As an universal to an universal. to a particular.
ἀναγ καῖον ΟΥ̓ TEk- ἡ ἀναγκαῖον dvi id (Concl é Ὧ ] : μήριον. (Conclu- | νυμον. (Inconclu- Poe aa sive, and only sive, the middle incetvinaie assailable in the |term not being : premises. ) distributed.)
Another explanation, founded on three passages, the first in the Analytics; the second by Cicero (de Inv. i. 30); the third in Quintilian, (v. c. ix. 10,) adopted by Majoragius, is as fol- lows: The σημεῖον is some sensible fact, either attested by sense (Illicit process . or reducible thereto, not a general truth; hence it will be the minor premiss in the enthymem, not the major, the σημειόμενον, or thing signified by it, being the conclusion, and as the latter is known solely through and by the former, there is always a real or supposed connexion between them.
Ist. The thing signified may be contained in the sign which implies not only that, but something more. ‘The latter then, as regards the former, will stand in the ratio of a whole to its part; as individual or particular nature to common or generic: - what is definite always containing or implying more than what is indefinite (on which principle we are told in logic that the species is more of a whole than a genus). Hence it is defined, ὡς τῶν καθεκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, and is called ἄναγκαϊον or τεκμήριον. Hence Quintilian, observing the conclusiveness of this argument, denies it the name of argument at all: ‘* Non sunt argumenta, quia ubi illa sunt, questio non est;” an error resembling that made by certain modern philosophers, who deny the utility of logic because the premises of a syllo- gism virtually imply the conclusion.
2nd. The thing signified may not be contained or implied in the sign. The latter being more vague and indefinite than the. former; bearing to the thing signified the ratio of a part to the whole, as common or generic nature to individual or particular, ws τῶν καθόλου Ti πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. This enthymem ap- pears in the same mood as the first, scilicet, Barbara, but in the second figure, hence an illicit process of the minor term. Note, that as the σημεῖον is always the minor and the thing signified the conclusion, the relation here spoken of as καθόλου, and κατὰ μέρος, must be understood not of the logical relation in the syllogism between the major premiss and the conclusion, but of the relation between two things, one specific, the other general. Now in the εἰκὸς enthymem, on the contrary, the CHAP. 11.} RHETORIC. 19 lutely so, however, as some define it, but, at any rate, that which, in contingent matter, has itself so to- wards that with respect to which it is probable, as an universal to a particular'!. But of the signs, one relation of εἰκὸς and the conclusion (ἐκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ εἰκὸς) is the strict logical relation of universal to particular, or of a generic law to its application in an individual instance. The εἰκὸς therefore is the major premiss, not the minor.
We see that the universal major in the σημεῖον enthymem cannot be the σημεῖον itself, because it is detached from any particular relation, and involves no particular deduction: nor yet is this major, though universal, an εἰκὸς, being ἁπλῶς and totally true, which is inconsistent with the very meaning of the word “ probable.”
Again, though the minor premiss of the εἰκὸς enthymem contains a simple matter of fact, it is not a σημεῖον, for to con- stitute a sign it must point to something else equally necessary with itself; a condition not fulfilled by the εἰκὸς enthymem conclusion. Still there is so much affinity between the minor premiss of the εἰκὸς enthymem, and the ἀνώνυμον σημεῖον, that by converting the major premiss, with the addition of the word “ probably” to the copula, we shall change the σημεῖον into an εἰκὸς of low degree: e. g.
All who have a fever breathe Those who breathe hard prohard. bably have a fever. This man breathes hard. This man breathes hard. This man has a fever. This man probably has a fever.
And this affinity perhaps led Quintilian to confound Aristotle’s ἀνώνυμοῦ σημεῖον with his εἰκὸς, (lib. v. c. ix. § 8.) It is this kind of ‘‘ sign’? and the argument deducible from it, which constitutes what, in criminal cases, is called circumstantial evidence.
Aristotle mentions another sort of σημεῖον (ὃ 18) which comes out a syllogism in the third figure, with an universal conclusion, and hence its error is.an illicit process of the mi- _norterm. The principle on which this syllogism proceeds is an imperfect, precarious induction, and endeavours to deduce a general truth from a particular instance. The ratio, there. fore, of the sign to the thing signified, is as one to all. This, it will be observed, is a new signification of the terms καθόλον and καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, but one which they will obviously admit, and borne out by the example he adduces.
The above explanation has been given rather at length, be- cailse it is not generally so well known as the others, nor so easy to follow.
1! The usual definition of εἰκὸς is considered by Aristotle as too vague; he limits it, therefore, to contingent matter, and would have it stand in such a relation to the conclusion to be drawn, as an universal to a particular. For instance, the 6. Three different sorts of σημεῖα.
μήριον.
Mela αἀνώ- νψυμα, has the same ratio as a particular to an universal; the other, as an universal to a particular: and of these, the one which is necessarily conclusive, I call τεκμήριον; but the other, which is not necessary, has no name assigned to it in reference to its difference [as a species ]. Now by necessary propositions, I mean those out of which a syllogism is adduced; and hence this kind of signs is called τεκμήριον, for when they think it impossible to do away what has been stated, people then esteem that they adduce a τεκμή- pov; the point having been evinced and coneluded; for, according to the old language, τέκμαρ is the same as “a boundary.” Again, there is one sign whose ratio is as that of a particular to an universal: thus, were one to assert, for instance, that “ The wise are just; because Socrates was wise and just;” this then is a sign, but it may be done away, even supposing the premiss stated to be true; for it vio- lates the rules of syllogism, as to the other!*, when, for instance, a person alleges as a sign that a man is sick, his being in a fever; or says a woman has had a child, because she has milk; this is a necessary sign; which very one of the signs alone amounts to a τεκμήριον; since it alone, if the premiss be true, cannot be done away. ‘The other sign is in the ratio of an uniyersal to a particular; as if, for instance, Corinthians at Athens state as an εἰκὸς, that the Corcyreans were addicted to piracy, their shunning alliances with other states, because those who would become pirates study secrecy; but this broad fact is, when compared with the single case of the Corcyreans, as an universal to a particular, or as a whole to a part, pirates being one class only of the many who study secrecy as a veil tocrime. It is moreover a case in contingent matter; for those who study secrecy, may or may not be ad- dicted to piracy.
12 Τεκμήριον, the other species of σημεῖον: 6. g. “ Ut mihi Platonis illud, seu quis dixit alius, perelegans esse videatur; quem cum ex alto ignotas ad terras tempestas et in desertum littus detulisset, timentibus ceteris propter ignorationem lo- corum, animadvertisse dicunt in aren& geometricas formas quasdam esse descriptas; quas ut vidisset, exclamavisse ut bono essent animo; videre enim se hominum vestigia; que videlicet ille non ex agri consitura, quam cernebat, sed ex dote trine indiciis interpretabatur.” Cic. de Rep. c. xvii. “ν. 52.
one were to say it was a sign that ἃ man has ἃ fever, because he breathes thickly. But this, even granting the premiss be true, may be done away: for it is very possible that one who has not a fever should breathe thickly. Now what is probability, what sign, and what τεκμήριον, and in what they differ, has been explained: but in the Analytics [these several gradations of proof] as well as the reasons why some are not correctly inferred, and others are, have been distinctly stated with greater clearness'!*, As to ex- ample, it has been stated that it is an induction, and induction on what kind of subjects; and its ratio is neither that of a part to a whole, nor of a whole to a part, nor of a whole to a whole: but example is in the ratio of a part to a part |‘, of a similar case to a similar, when, both coming under the same genus, the one case happens to be better known than the other. For instance, you assert that Dionysius, in asking a guard, has views of setting up a tyranny, because Pisistratus before him, when designing this, began to ask for a body guard, and when he got it, established himself as tyrant; so too did Theogenes, at Megara. And all other persons who have acted in this way, and with whom your audience are ac- quainted, become examples against Dionysius, with respect to whom they do not yet know whether he be asking a guard with this intention: and all these '3 In the Analyties, he says, “ the εἰκὸς is πρότασις ἔνδοξος, bnt the σημεῖον professes to be πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ, whether necessary or probable. Now an enthymem (he continues) is an imperfect syllogism, consisting of εἰκότα and σημεῖα, and the latter are assumed in three ways, according to the number of the figures of syllogism (for Aristotle made only three), the first, second, and third of logic. In all these the σημεῖον 15. the μέσον (i. 6, the argumentum, or minor proposition), but the first alone is ἄλυτον." Analytic. Prior. lib. ii. c. xxix. Edit.
44 Not as a part to a whole, for that would be σημεῖον; nor as a whole to a part, for that would be τεκμήριον: nor as a whole to a whole, for that would be ἐπαγωγὴ (which, when perfect, reasons from a whole taken individually to the same taken collectively). Example therefore is in the ratio of a part to a part.
ample, or rhetorical induc- tion.
ὡς μέοος πρὸς μέ- ρος.
20. Two different sorts of enthy- mem.
Ist. τό- OL.
2nd, εἴδη.
cases come under the same general premiss!”, that he who is laying schemes to set up a tyranny, asks a guard. Now then the points have been stated out of which the proofs which have an air of demonstration are adduced.
The difference of enthymems is considerable, and has remarkably escaped nearly every writer: it is, too, a difference the very same as exists between syl- logisms in logic: for some enthymems there are of applicability equal to that of rhetoric itself, in the same way that in logic some syllogisms are; others, according to the extent of other arts and faculties, existing, some already, and others not yet comprised by rules. And hence those who employ them both escape the observation of their hearers, and if they handle them more than is right, pass out of their pro- per characters as mere orators. This however will become clearer, if stated more in detail. I call those forms of reasoning!® properly logical or rhetorical, in reference to which, I use the expression places; such are those which apply with equal advantage to ques- tions of justice, and natural philosophy, and of the philosophy of social life, and to numerous other sub- jects which differ in species. The place for instance, of greater and Jess; for there will not be a whit more advantage in deducing a syllogism or an enthymem from this place, on a question of justice or of natural philosophy, than on any other subject whatsoever; and yet there are questions specifically distinct. But I call peculiar, all those reasonings which arise out of propositions conversant with each species and genus of subjects; for instance, there are propositions on subjects of natural philosophy’ out of which neither 15 By the τὸ αὐτὸ γένος is understood a common circum- stance and property of nature; by the τὸ οὐτὸ καθόλου, the general proposition in reference to all such cases.
16 Διαλεκτικοὺς Kal ῥητορικοὺς, i. 6. So exactly correspond- ing, in point of extent, to these arts, as to be applivable as often, and with as little limitation, as they are themselves.
17 This appears evident enough; yet the whole system of judicial astrology and the planetary influences was notbing more than an attempt of the kind.
CHAF. II.] RHETORIC. a enthymem nor syllogism could be constructed respect- ing morals; and on this subject, again, there are others out of which will arise no reasoning respecting natural philosophy; this is also the case equally on every subject. Now the first-mentioned reasonings (the τόποι) will render a man informed on no class of subjects, for they are about no distinct subject-matter: as to the other (téa), the orator, in proportion as he makes the better '® selection of propositions peculiar, will imperceptibly produce a science different from mere rhetoric or logic; for, if he light on first prin- ciples, thenceforth, it will no longer be rhetoric or logic which he is employing, but that science whose principles he embraces.
The greatest number of enthymems are constructed put of these peculiar propositions, which are particu- lar and limited; and from the universal ones, the less. Just then as I did in the Topics, so here must I make a distinction of the peculiar”® propositions and places of enthymems, whence we are to deduce them. Now I mean by εἶδη, those propositions which are peculiar to the several kinds of rhetoric; by τόποι, those which are common alike to all. Let us then treat of the special propositions before the others. Let us, however, first ascertain the kinds of rhetoric itself; in order that having distinguished them as to 18 Βελτίω,. ie. better, qua the art in question is concerned; —though as regarded by the logician or rhetorician, they will be in fact worse, inasmuch as they tend to merge these faculties, whose characteristic is universal applicability, in that particu- lar art from whence the προτάσεις happen to be deduced.
19 We may here mention that διαλεκτικὴ is not quite what we understand by logic, but seems rather to have been the faculty of conversation, which the ancients cultivated as a sci- ence, and of which logic was a species. ‘“‘ Zeno, the Eleatic, divided his dialectics into three parts: on consequences, épw- τήσις and ἐριστικὴ.᾽᾽ Whately’s Logic. Diog. Laert. in Pla- * He here designates, by the name εἴδη, those propositions of limited applicability which he had before called ἔδεα; those, in fact, which he considers as contradistinguished from the τόποι or general arguments, which he tells us are applicable το ἃ Ὅτι ας of subjects as little limited as the subjects of rheto- rie itse εἶδ.) first discussed, 1, Anora- tion pre- supposes three things: Ist. a speaker: 2nd. a subject: 8rd. a hearer. 2. Hear- ers of three sorts.
8. Hence three kinds of rhetoric; Delibera- tive, Ju- dicial, Epideic- tic. Business.
4. Time their number, we may separately ascertain the ele- ments of persuasion and propositions peculiar to each?!, CHAP. III.
He shows that there are three kinds of Rhetoric; what ts the end of each; and on what subject we must provide ourselves with propositions, ΤῊΒ species of rhetoric are three in number, for of so many descriptions are the hearers of orations; be- cause an oration is constituted of three things, of the speaker, and of the subject about which he speaks, and of the person to whom; and to him it is that the end of the speech has its reference; I mean to the hearer. The hearer must of necessity be either an unconcerned hearer, or a judge; anda judge either of things past or to come; one then acts as judge respecting what is yet to happen, as the mem- ber of a popular assembly; the other respecting what has already taken place, as the president of a court of justice; the other respecting the abilities of the orator, as the unconcerned hearer!. ‘Thus, then, there will necessarily result three kinds of orations, the deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative?. The business of deliberation is partly exhortation, partly dissuasion; for invariably those who in their indivi- dual capacities simply advise, and those who publicly harangue, effect one of these objects. The business of judicial rhetoric is partly accusation, partly de- fence; for the litigants must of course do one or the other of these things. Of demonstrative the busi- ness is partly praise, partly blame. Moreover the 21 Cf. lib. ii. c. 22, ὁ 13: στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυ- μήματος τὸ αὐτό: and lib. ii. c. 26, δ1: τὸ yap αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον. 3 1 Both hearers are interested; but the ϑεωρὸς is ἃ specula- tive, the κριτὴς a practical, auditor.
3 Vide Quarterly Review, July, 1822, No. liv. vol. 27,p 391.
CHAP. I1I.] RHETORIC.: 25 - time proper to each of these respectively is, to the deliberative orator, the futwre; for in exhorting or dissuading, he advises respecting things future®. The time proper to a judicial pleader is the past; for it is ever on the subject of actions already done, that the one party accuses, and the other defends. To the demonstrative orator the present time is the most appropriate, for it is in reference to qualities actually possessed that all either praise or blame. Orators, however, do very frequently avail themselves of other times; as well by awakening a recollection of what has already happened, as by anticipating what is likely to happen. The end of each of these branches is different, and, as belonging to three sub- jects, is itself triple.
The object of the deliberative orator is the expe- dient and inexpedient; for he who recommends, ad- vises you to adopt the better measure; but he who dissuades, diverts you from the worse; the other considerations either of justice and injustice, of honour or disgrace, he adjoins by the way, in addi- tion to these two. The object of the judicial pleader is justice and injustice; but he also embraces by the way those other considerations. The object of those who praise and blame is honour and disgrace; and these also refer other considerations to these two.
But we may take as a sign that what I have stated is the particular object of each, the fact that there are times when they will not feel inclined even to raise a question about the other: the litigant, for example, will not always deny that the fact has taken place, or that it has hurt the other party; but he 3 ἐξ Passion may be as much excited by the orator’s reason- ings on a future event, as on one past; and indeed the future, ceteris paribus, produces the greater effect on us, as that to which we are approaching, and what every moment gives us the added interest in, which it takes from the past. But then the past has the counterbalancing privilege of being susceptible of infinitely better testimony and evidence, from memory, pre- sent effects, etc.; memory, indeed, the great eye of the mind, unlike that of the body, sees all we have left behind, and no- thing before it.” Campbell, Phil. of Rhet 5. and end peculiar to each, 6. Proof of this from faet never, under any circumstances, would admit that he has been guilty of injustice toward him; for then would there be no need of a judicial decision. In the same way the deliberative orator very often aban- dons the other considerations; but as to the point that he is advising what is disadvantageous, or dis- suading from what is useful, this will he never admit; but it frequently happens that (on a question of in- vasion) they do not trouble themselves to make out that the subjugating a neighbouring people is not in- consistent with justice. Just so those who praise and blame do not consider whether the person’s con- duct has been advantageous or disadvantageous; nay, they, in many instances, set it down on the score of praise, that, overlooking his own interests, he wrought some deed of honour: thus they praise Achilles, be- cause he came to aid the cause of his comrade Pa troclus, with full knowledge that himself was fated to die; it being in his power, [by withholding that aid,| to live. To him, however, a death such as this was the more honourable prize: but to live would have been advantageous.
7. The From what has been said, it is plain that the orator erator in must first be in possession of propositions on the subeach class. mite αι iat ject of each of these divisions, separately; for the have xot- τεκμήρια, the probabilities and signs, are degrees of