Does Rhetoric furnish any instrument of persuasion, διὰ rot ἡ δεικνύναι, besides these ἢ From what matter necessary, contingent, or impossible, are enthymems drawn?
Am I to understand that the enthymem is drawn from the εἰκός and σημεῖον ὃ Can an orator syllogize from premises previously inferred?
Is there any objection to this process?
What is the objection to premises not previously inferred?
If a particular proposition is inferred from an universal, is it an εἰκός OF σημεῖον?
Of the σημεῖον how many kinds are there?
You say that one is anonymous, because it has no logical dif- ference to fix the species; mention the logical difference, which, when added to the other σημεῖον fixes the species τεκμήριον?
Are both these species equally forcible?
What is a παράδειγμα ὃ Which is of most service in induction, the τεκμήριον or παράδειγμα?
Is the τεκμήριον used in induction?
CHAP. III.
How many species of orations are there?
From what premises does Aristotle infer the three species of oration?
Is the judge of things past a judicial orator or public speaker?
Does the Θεωρὸς judge merely of the power of an oration, or exercise the functions of a judicial orator?
Which species of oration is inferred from the ἐκκλησιαστής?
Which is inferred from the δικαστής and Oewpdc?
Is it the business of the judicial orator to dissuade and praise?
What are the ra τέλη of the three species of oration?
Must a deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative orator bo ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 349 im possession of προτάσεις on the subjects of each of these species?
If an orator wished to prove the injustice of Alcibiades’s banishment in a judicial court, would the premises of his syl- logism be εἴδη of the judicial species, if drawn from the τὰ τέλη honour and turpitude ἢ, Must a syllogism in the judicial species always be composed of εἴδη, or will it ever admit of τόποι ὃ When the orator is arguing on the possibility of a fact, are his προτάσεις the εἴδη or τόποι ὕ CHAP. IV.
How many chapters are devoted to the εἴδος συμβουλευτικὸν?
Does Aristotle make any distinction between the subjects of deliberation, and the things from which we deliberate, viz. στοιχεῖα and εἴδη ἢ Throughout the following treatise does not Aristotle pre- mise στοιχεῖα (vide chap. vi. 1) from which the εἴδη and τό- ποι, &c. are deduced?
In the εἴδος συμβουλευτικὸν are not some the στοιχεῖα and εἴδη of happiness and its divisions? (chap. v.)
Are not others the στοιχεῖα and εἴδη of the τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ and συμφέροντος simply affirmed concerning a subject of delibera- tion? (chap. vi.)
Are the στοιχεῖα and εἴδη ever comparatively affirmed con- cerning a measure, whether it be better and more useful? (chap. vii.)
With what view does Aristotle treat of different. forms of government and their ra τέλη in this treatise?
Could the orator be possessed of προτάσεις on a deliberative subject without a knowledge of different forms of government and the institutions of the same?
Are the things concerning which orators deliberate in necessary, impossible, or contingent matter?
To what kind of thjngs is deliberation principally confined?
Am I then to understand, that men deliberate on such things as it is possible for them to accomplish, and which de- pend not on chance for existence?
How many subjects of deliberation does Aristotle enumerate?
In debates on finance. war and peace, internal defence, ex- 350 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS ports and imports, what should the orator be accurately ac- quainted with?
Is the knowledge of legislation of importance to a deliber- ative orator?
In what does Aristotle place the safety of a state?
CHAP. V.
What is the great object of human pursuit?
How many definitions of happiness does Aristotle give?
Which definition was adopted by the Stoics?
Which by the Epicurean and Peripatetic schools?
Can you enumerate any of the ra μέρη of happiness?
Distinguish the ra μέρη into the ra τ᾽ ἐν αὔτω, or internal goods, and into ra ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά, or external goods?
Can you confirm the enumeration of the internal goods by the second definition of happiness, and that of the external goods in a measure, by the third definition?
Define numerous and worthy progeny, nobility, and good old age.
Does honour arise ever from the reputation of conferring benefits?
Why does Aristotle omit to treat of the virtues under the deliberative species of orations?
CHAP. VI.
What is the object proposed to the deliberative-orator?
Does he deliberate on the means conducive to the end, or the end itself?
How many definitions of good does Aristotle enumerate as στοιχεῖα?
How many εἴδη are there in this chapter deduced from the στοιχεῖα ὃ Are the στοιχεῖα of good ever definitions of good?
Give definitions of good assumed bythe reasons of choice, appetite, intellect, and disposition to contentment.
Can you infer from the above premises that the acquisition of good, and the exemption from evil, are goods?
Prove them to be goods by some of the definitions of good.
Goods τὰ ὁμολογούμενα can be proved by the above defini UN ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 351 tions, but in disputed cases, (ἐν ἀμφισβητησίμοις,) what is the easiest method of proving a thing to be a good?
Can you prove legislation to be a good because anarchy is an evil?
Can you prove happiness to be a good by the reason of choice?
Can you prove pleasure and social intercourse to be goods by the reason of appetite?
Can you prove the moral virtues to be goods by the reason of intellect?
Are the consequences to the exemption from evil and ac- quisition of good, immediate or remote?
Does Aristotle imply the utility of the virtues when he says that they are effective of good?
How does he prove such specific virtues as temperance, fortitude, &c., to be goods?
Do you consider, on reviewing this chapter, that persuasion can be effected by other προτάσεις than simple προτάσεις as- sumed from the end of the εἴδος συμβουλευτικὸν?
CHAP. VII.
How many definitions of good did you enumerate in the preceding chapter!?
Repeat these four definitions.
Mention the στοιχεῖα premised by Aristotle in this chapter, from which he deduces the εἴδη περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ συμφέροντος.
Do I understand you to say that the definition of “ excess, and the thing exceeded,” is premised as the στοιχεῖον?
Define the ro τέλος.
Is a plurality of goods greater than one, or a fewer goods, by the reason of numerical excess?
Would this εἴδος be fallacious, if the one, or the fewer, were not co-enumerated with the plurality? Vide Annotations, If an orator were to say, that beauty, strength, and riches, were a greater good than virtue, would his assumption, ac- cording to Aristotle, be correct ἢ 1 The first four may be considered as definitions of the τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, the others descriptions of the τοῦ συμφέροντον 852 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS Why would it not?
Have the excesses of genera and species any analogy?
Could an orator prove ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγιστοῦ ὑπερέχη, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, that if justice is a greater good than bravery, Aristides excelled Themistocles?
How many εἴδη does Aristotle enumerate in this chapter?
Can an orator prove one thing to be a greater good than another by the reason of its being the τὸ τέλος?
Is happiness, therefore, a greater good than virtue?
Could he prove from the definition of the τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ and συμφέροντος, that virtue is a greater good than happiness, διὰ τὸ μείζονος ἀγάθου ποιητικὴν εἶναι?
How would he prove one principle (ἀρχὴ) to be greater than another??
CHAP. VIII.
With what view has Aristotle treated in the former chap- ters of Εὐδαιμονία and the ἀγαθὸν and συμφέρον ὃ Why was it essential that he should treat of the εὐδαιμονία first? (vide chap. v. 2.)
Is it by προτάσεις on the ἀγαθὸν and συμφέρον that the ἐκκλησιαστὴς persuades his audience?
Can you give a reason why the ἀγαθὸν and συμφέρον have a peculiar relation to εὐδαιμονία as the σκόπος of human pur- suit? (chap. viii. 2.)
Why does Aristotle assign so much importance to a know- ledge of the ra τέλη τῶν πολιτειῶν? (chap. viii. 5.)
Why does he consider a knowledge of the ἤθη of each πολιτεῖα essential? (chap. viii. 6.)
Explain how the speaker will become invested with moral character, by a perfect knowledge of the ἤθη without any pre- vious opinion having been entertained of him. (chap. viii. 6.)
Enumerate the τὰ τέλη πολιτειῶν.
Are the τὰ τέλη the subjects of deliberation, or measures which have a reference to the τὰ τέλη?
3. The reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief of the Art of Rhetoric, for a distinct enumeration of the τόποι throughout this treatise.
ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC, 353 CHAP. 1X.
Give the definitions of the τὸ καλὸν and τὸ αἰσχρὸν, honour and turpitude.
Are these definitions premised as the στοιχεῖα from which the εἴδη of demonstrative oratory are deduced?
If the τὸ καλὸν be that which you have defined, does it fol- low that virtue and its species are honourable?
Give the definitions of virtue.
If virtue is a δύναμις εὐεργετικὴν Which of the species of virtue do you consider the greatest?
Would you consider δικαιοσύνη a greater virtue than πρᾳότης ὃ Can you prove this assumption by the τόπος, ra μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ποιητικὰ, μείζω ὕ (vide chap. vii. 7.)
Give the definitions of the species of virtue, as these are στοιχεῖα from which εἴδη in demonstrative oratory are deduced.
Have demonstrative and deliberative oratory any points in common? (vide chap. ix. 35.)
Have the demonstrative and judicial any points in common? (chap. ix. 38.)
What is the difference between ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον?
On what principle must we show a man to have acted to be worthy of praise? (vide chap. viii. 32.).
Is coincidence of circumstances admissible as an indication of the προαίρεσις?
Which are the best indications of a man’s habits?
To which of the species of oration are amplification and extenuation peculiarly adapted? | Is the παράδειγμα adapted to one species more than another?
Why do you consider it more adapted to the deliberative?
To which species is the enthymem most adapted?
CHAP, X, In considering the nature of the sources from which the εἴδη of judicial orations are deduced, what are the three ques- tions which Aristotle proposes to consider?
Define the τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
Do you conceive, generally speaking, that whatever men do εἰδύτες they do ἑκόντες?
2a 304 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS Does the προαίρεσις characterize all actions which men de ἑκόντες ὃ Does the προαέρεσις characterize all actions which men do εἰξότες ὃ Mention the causes of actions which men do προαιροῦμενοι and παρὰ τὸν νόμον.
Must the accuser consider the τένων, καὶ πόσων ἕνεκα, or the inducement, to exist in his adversary?
What are the efficient causes of those actions which men do not dc αὑτοὺς ὃ Of this class of actions which men do not δι᾿ αὑτοὺς, but ἐξ ἀνάγκης, what are the specific causes which Aristotle mentions?
What are the efficient causes of those actions which men do δι᾿ αὑτοὺς ὃ Into how many species does Aristotle divide the Soekuc?
Mention the logical differences, which, when added to the genus ὄρεξις, give the species βούλησις, ὀργὴ and ἐπιθυμέα ὃ Enumerate the seven causes of actions.
Can the ἡλικίαι and ἕξεις be called the true causes of human actions?
Have they their consequences which when added to the true causes give additional weight to the argument?
Why does Aristotle omit to treat of the ἡλικίαι and ἕξεις under the judicial species?
Does Aristotle infer, from the definitions of the seven causes of human actions, the ends of the agents? (chap. x. 12, 13, 14, et seq.)
From which of the seven causes of actions does he infer the ends of those actions which men do δι᾿ αὑτοὺς ὃ When Aristotle says, that all such things as men do δι᾿ av- rove are real or apparent goods, why does he make the dis- Am I then to understand that all things which men do willingly, and consequently all things which they do unjustly, are really or apparently good, and really or apparently plea- sant, and that these are the ὧν ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσι ὃ CHAP. XI.
With what view has Aristotle introduced the συμφέρον in the judicial species of oration, when he had previously con- ON AR'STOTLE’S RHETORIC. 355 sidered it as the τὸ τέλος of the deliberative? (chap. x.
Do I understand you to say, that he introduces it because it is the end of human action?
You have before stated that the εὐδαιμονία was the σκόπος of human pursuit, and now state that the συμφέρον and ἀγαθὸν are the τὸ τέλος of actions; explain the meaning of the words σκόπος and τέλος.
- Give the definition of ἡδονὴ and λύπη.
How would you infer the definition of the ἡδύ and λυπηρόν!
Are these definitions the στοιχεῖα from which Aristotle de- duces the εἴδη in this chapter!?
CHAP. XII.
What division does Aristotle make and premise of the πῶς ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι ὃ What are the three subdivisions of the ὅταν οἴωνται ἑαυτοῖς δυνατὸν?
Why does Aristotle refer the discussion of the δυνατὸν πραχθῆναι to the second book of Rhetoric ὃ Explain why the second part of the division, viz. ἑαυτοῖς δυνατὸν, should belong more especially to the judicial species, when the δυνατὸν πραχθῆναι is considered as a τόπος.
Enumerate the threefold subdivision of the ὅταν οἴωνται ἑαυτοῖς δυνατὸν.
To what things do those persons trust who rely on the punishment being less than the gain, if detected? (third _ member of the subdivision. ) Enumerate the things to which those persons trust who hope to escape punishment if detected: (second member of the subdivision.)
CHAP. XIII.
Why should right and wrong be defined in reference to two kinds of law?
Why is the twofold distinction of persons (πρὸς otc) in refer- ence to whom right and wrong is defined, necessary ἢ (3.)
The reader is referred to Hobbes’ Brief of the Art of Rhetorick, for an enumeration of the τόποι throughout this treatise.
356 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS How many species of law does Aristotle enumerate?
What is the subdivision of the νόμος ἴδιος ὕ (2.)
What do you understand by the νόμος κοινὸς?
Give the definition of ro ἀδικεῖσθαι.
From whence does Aristotle infer this definition? (chap.
Wast is the threefold division which Aristotle makes of ἐγκλήματα, or accusation?
Why does Aristotle decline treating of the ἐγκλήματα διὰ πάθος in this chapter ἢ In what kind of cases do men, generally and specifically speaking, manifest the προαέρεσις in action? (chap. x. 4.)
Is it necessary for an accuser to lay great stress on the προαίρεσις?
Under what circumstances, or with what dispositions, de men act by deliberative choice? (chap. xii. 1.)
Do you consider that the depravity and injustice of an act is manifested by the προαίρεσις of the agent?
Are they a σημεῖον or τεκμήριον of deliberate choice ἢ Is the προαέρεσις a σημεῖον or τεκμήριον of depravity and injustice?
How many distinctions of right and wrong (d«aia καὶ ἀγαθὰ) are there?
Why is this twofold distinction made?
Into how many species does Aristotle divide the subaltern genus ἄγραφα?
Can you give a reason why the species “remarkably virtu- ous and vicious,” (τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν, &c.,) is not included in the written law?
When Solon was asked why he had not enacted a special law against parricide, what was his answer?
Does not this answer give the reason why ἄδικα of this spe- cies are not included in the written law ἑκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν?
Mention some virtues, which as falling under the species καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν, &c., are not noticed in written laws?
Is it because they are so universally acknowledged and re- quired, that they are not noticed in written laws?
What is the second species of τὰ δικαία and ἄδικα ἢ What is the cause of this defect in the written law of states?
Give the definition of equity.
ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 357 CHAP. XIV.
What is the standard by which the degrees in criminality may be ascertained?
With what view does Aristotle infer εἴδη, ὁσὰ ἄν ἦ ἀπὸ μείζονος ἀδικίας ἢ (vide chap. ix. 39, with respect to the αὔξησις, and Book ii. 26.)
What kind of injuries are comparatively the more severely felt?
You stated in reply to questions in the first book, (chap. x.) that κακέα generally, and ἀκρασία specifically, were the causes of acts of injustice characterized by the προαίρεσις, how then would you ascertain the comparative enormity of ἀδικήματα ὃ (vide Annotationes Schrader.)
Are ἀδικήματα of this description estimated by the hurt done, or the προαίρεσις of the agent? (xii. 5.)
If the hurt done be irremediable, is the act of injustice capable of being amplified?
Will the definition of ἀδικήματα depend on the πρόνοια of the agent? (vide Annotationes xiv. 5.)
-Am I then to understand that ἀδικήματα which are irreme- diable, incapable of being adequately punished, of being re- venged, which are done frequently, and ἐκ προνοίας, may be considered μείζονα ὃ CHAP. XV, How many distinctions of the πίστεις ἄτεχναι are there ὃ Into how many species is the distinction νόμοι subdivided ἢ?
Into how many subaltern genera is the distinction paprupec (chap. xv. 13) divided?
Into how many subaltern species is the subaltern genus παλαιοὶ μάρτυρες subdivided?
What kind of persons and things constitute the lowest spe- cies to the subaltern species, (περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων) of the μάρτυρες παλαιοὶ ἢ (vide chap. xv. 13, 14.)
What kind of things and persons constitute the lowest spe- cies to the subaltern species (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων) of the μάρτυρες παλαιοὶ ἢ (chap. xv. 14.)
Is the lowest species to the subaltern species, (περὶ μὲ; τῶν 358 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS.
γενομένων,) Viz. poets and illustrious men, most adapted to the judicial species of oration?
Is the iowest species to the subaltern species, (περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐσομένων,) Viz. soothsayers, oracles, and proverbs, equally serviceable in the deliberative as in the judicial species of oration?
Into how many subaltern species is the subaltern genus μάρτυρες πρόσφατοι divided? (chap. xv. 13.)
What kind of things and persons constitute the lowest spe~- cies to the subaltern species (οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου) of the μάρτυρες πρόσφατοι ἢ (chap. xv. 15, last line.)
What kind of persons constitute the lowest species to the subaltern species (οἱ δὲ ἐκτὸς κινδύνου) of the μάρτυρες πρόσφα- ro? (chap. xv. 15, first line.)
Which of the two lowest species (viz. the of γνώριμοι, and οἱ ἂν δόξωσι ψεύδεσθαι, or Viva voce evidence, ) is most entitled to credit?
Aristotle has hitherto treated of the different kinds of μάρτυρες, and he then proceeds to consider the manner in which their credit is to be amplified and extenuated by the orator; if the orator then has no witnesses to support his case, by what arguments must he diminish the credit of testimony? (chap. xv. 17.)
To what circumstances does testimony speak ἢ (18.)
Is the impeachment of the veracity of a witness by an en- thymem (ἐξ εἰκότων) a solid objection to his testimony?
Am I then to understand, that if the orator has no testi- mony to adduce, he must, Ist. Insist on the propriety of the judge deciding, γνώμ τῇ ἀρίστῃ. (vide Book I. chap. xv. 5, 12, 17. Book 1. chap. xxv. 10.)
2nd. That cixora are better than witnesses, as they are never open to corruption.
3rd. That εἴκοτα are never convicted of falsehood?
If the orator has witnesses to support his case, by what arguments stould he corroborate their testimony, and extenu- ate the εἴκοτα?
What two precepts does Aristotle give with respect to the extenuation and amplification of the συνθῆκαι and βάσανοι?
What is the fourfold division with respect to oaths ὃ GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE JUDICIAL SPECIES OF ORATION.
In treating of the judicial species of oration, what docs Aristotle propose that the orator should first consider in his accusation?
If the question be simply whether his adversary has com- mitted an injury, the orator must prove,—what? (chap. x. 2.)
If an act of injustice has been committed, but that act of injustice has not been defined by the written law, under which species of law must he prove his case? (chap. xiii. 14; xv. 4.)
Am I then to understand, that in inquiring whether his adversary has committed an act of injustice, the orator’s first business is to prove that he has acted for some end; secondly, that he was a likely person to commit it; and thirdly, that the object injured was a person likely to be injured?
Are these the three general points which he must prove against his adversary?
What is the specific point he must prove against his ad- versary?
Why is the general question, Whether the adversary has committed an act of injustice, (chap. x. xi. xii.) and the spe- cific question, Whether he has acted unjustly, (chap. xiii. distinguished? (vide chap. x. 7.)
To prove that his adversary has acted unjustly against the state, or a private individual, what must the orator urge against his adversary? (chap. xiii. 7.)
If the act is clearly done by a voluntary agent, on what principle must the orator prove his adversary to have acted? (chap. xiii. 7.)
360 GENERAL QUESTIONS.
If the act is clearly done by deliberative choice, what is the next question an orator must prove against his adversary? (chap. xiil. 9.)
To prove simply that his adversary has acted unjustly, how many specific questions arise for the orator’s consideration?
Are they not three?.
lst. Whether he has violated the written law? (chap. xili. 9.
2nd. If 3A has not violated the written law, whether he has acted with depravity so excessive as not to be de- fined by the written law? (chap. xiii. 12.)
3rd. Whether he has acted in violation of equity? (chap.
ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC.
BOOK II.—CHAP. I.
You stated in reply to questions in the first book, that Aris- totle had made three distinctions of πέστεις, viz. διὰ τοῦ ἤθους, διὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, διὰ τῶν λόγων: which of these three distinc- tions has he already treated of, and which is he now proceed- ing to discuss?
What is the end of Rhetoric, or the object which an orator in speaking has always in view? (vide Annotationes, chap. i. 2.)
How does the investment of one’s self with moral character effect persuasion in the auditor? (vide Schrader’s note, 1, 3.)
Must the qualifications by which the speaker invests him- self with moral character, be perceived from the speech as ' existing in him, (vide Book I. chap. ii. 4,) or known to have existed in him before?
From the three distinctions of πέστεις, what do you infer to be the three great accomplishments of a perfect orator?
Do I understand you to say, proof by enthymem, invest- ment of himself with moral character, and the excitement of the passions in his auditors?
What are the three causes of a speaker’s effecting persua- sion through moral character?
If a speaker appears to be a man capable of imparting be- nefits to the state, does he effect persuasion through moral character, by his virtue? (vide chap. ix. 4, definition of virtue.)
When Demosthenes in the oration for the crown makes use of the following words,— 362 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS "ANN ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκεῖνος 6 καιρὸς Kal ἣ ἡμέρα ἐ, εἰνη οὗ μόνον εὔνουν καὶ πλούσιον ἄνδρα ἐκάλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρηκολουθηκότα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ συλλελογισμένον ὀοθῶς τίνος ἕνεκα ταῦτ᾽ ἔπραττεν ὃ Φίλιππος καὶ τί βουλόμενος" ὁ γὰρ μὴ: ταῦτ᾽ εἰδὼς μηδ᾽ ἐξητακὼς πόῤῥωθεν ἐπιμελῶς, οὔτ᾽ εἰ εὔνους ἦν οὔτ᾽ εἰ πλού- σιος, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἤμελλεν ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν εἴσεσθαι οὐδ᾽ ὑμῖν ἕξειν συμβουλεύειν. ἐφάνην τοίνυν οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῇ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐ ἐγώ, καὶ παρελθὼν εἶπον. εἰς ὑμᾶς, ἅ μου δυοῖν ἕνεκ᾽ ἀκούσατε προσέ- χοντες τὸν γοῦν, ἑνὸς μέν, ἵν᾽ εἰδῆτε ὅ ore μόνος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ πολιτευομένων ἐγὼ τὴν τῆς εὐνοίας τάξιν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς οὐκ ἔλιπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγων καὶ γράφων ἐξηταζόμην τὰ δέονθ᾽ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς φοβεροῖς, ἑ ἑτέρου δέ, ὅτι μικρὸν ἀναλώσαντες χρόνον πολλῳ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς πάσης πολιτείας ἔσεσθ᾽ ἐμπειρό- τεροι;---- to which distinction of πέστεις does he recur, and through which of the causes φρόνησις, ἀρετὴ, or εὔνοια, does he endeas vour to effect persuasion?
CHAP. II.
What are the three questions which Aristotle proposes for consideration in treating of the passions? (Book II. chap. i. 9.)
With what view was this threefold division necessary?
Is it possible to obtain τόποι calculated for the excitement of the passions without a knowledge of these three questions proposed by Aristotle? (Book II. chap. i. 9.)
Give the definition of anger.
Is this definition proposed as a στοιχεῖον from which the γόποι are afterwards inferred ἢ Does not Aristotle explain this definition by two proposi- tions, viz.
Ist. Anger is against some individual on account of con- tempt to one’s self or friends.
- 2nd. Pain is not so much the consequent of anger as a certain pleasure?
Explain the reference which these two explanatory propo- sitions have to the definition of anger.
To what cause do you attribute the sensation of pain in anger?
To what causes (which are two) do you attribute the sensa- tion of pleasure in anger?
ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 363 Can you give any other reasons why pleasure should be a consequent? (Book I. chap. x. 17, 18; chap. xi. 10, 12, 13.)
Could you infer a reason from the definition of Syme in the first book?
Is the ἡ ὀργὴ a generic or specific term!?
Under what generic term do you class the ἡ ὀργὴ What is the object of anger?
What is the cause of anger?
How many species of the ὀλιγωρία are there?
Does not Aristotle prove that the καταφρόνησις is a species of ὀλιγωρία from the definition of ὀλιγωρία?
Do you consider the ἐπήρεασμος to be a distinct species of ὀλιγωρία?
Explain how Aristotle from its own definition proves the ἐπηρεασμὸς to be a distinct species of ὀλιγωρία.
Is slight attended with a certain pleasure?
You have before stated in reply to questions in the former book, that all actions done by men ἑκόντες are ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινό- μενα ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα: can you show that if the ὀλιγωρία be ἃ Sematicy act, it must be consequently ἡδύ ἢ φαινόμενον dv?
Why should it not be ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν ἢ (Book To what cause do you attribute the pleasure which the o ὑβρίζων feels?
How then are men affected when they feel anger?
With what kind of persons do they feel angry?
What are the causes of this passion?
‘What is it incumbent on the orator to prove, to excite an- ger against his adversary?
What kind of person must he prove his adversary to be, tc merit anger?
When Aéschines uses the following arguments in his ora- tion against Ctesiphon, does he endeavour to excite anger against Demosthenes? and by which of the causes ὀλιγωρία, or its species, does he endeavour to excite it against his ad- versary?
Δεύτερον δὲ καὶ πολὺ τούτου μεῖζον ἀδίκημα ἠδίκησεν, ὅτι τὸ βουλευτήριον τὸ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἄρδην ἔλαθεν ὑφελόμενος καὶ μετήνεγκεν εἰς Θήβας εἰς τὴν Καδμείαν, τὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν πράξεων τοῖς Βοιωτάρχαις συνθέμενος" καὶ τηλι- = 364° ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS καύτην abroc αὐτῷ δυναστείαν κατεσκεύασεν, ὥστ᾽ ἤδη παριὼν ἐπι τὸ βῆμα πρεσβεύσειν μὲν ἔφη ὅποι ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ, κἂν μὴ ὑμεῖς ἐκπέμπητε, εἰ δέ τις αὐτῷ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀντείποι, καταδουλού- μενος τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ συνεθίζων μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἀντιλέγειν διαδι- κασίαν ἔφη γράψειν τῶ βήματι πρὸς τὸ στρατηγεῖον᾽ πλείω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὰ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ἔφη ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος πεπονθέναι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατηγείου. μισθοφορῶν δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ξενικῷ. κεναῖς χώραις, καὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ χρήματα κλέπτων, καὶ τοὺς μυρίους ξένους ἐκμισθώσας ᾿Αμφισσεῦσι πολλὰ διαμαρτυρομένον καὶ σχετλιάζοντος ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐμοῦ, προσέμιξε φέρων avap- πασθέντων τῶν ξένων τὸν κίνδυνον ἀπαρασκεύῷ τῇ πόλει. τί γὰρ ἂν οἴεσθε Φίλιππον ἐν τοῖς τότε καιροῖς εὔξασθαι; οὐ χωρὶς μὲν πρὸς τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν χωρὶς δ᾽ ἐν ᾿Αμφίσσῃ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους διαγωνίσασθαι, ἀθύμους δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνας λαβεῖν τηλικαύ- της πληγῆς γεγενημένης; καὶ τηλικούτων κακῶν αἴτιος γεγενη- μένος Δημοσθένης οὐκ ἀγαπᾷ εἰ μὴ δίκην δέδωκεν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὴ καὶ χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ στεφανωθήσεται ἀγανακτεῖ" οὐδ᾽ ἱκανόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον ὑμῶν κηρύττεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὴ τῶν ἙἭ λλήνων ἐναντίον ἀναῤῥηθήσεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη ἀγανακτεῖ. οὕτως, ὦ ἔοικε, πονηρὰ φύσις μεγάλης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβομένη δημοσίας ἀπεργάζεται συμφοράς.
CHAP. III.
As the ἡ zpaivore is the contrary to the ἡ ὀργὴ, and the τόποι are therefore inferred ratione contrariorum, it will be necessary to propose many questions on this chapter.
What is the definition of the ἡ πράῦνσις?
You stated in reply to a former question, that pain and pleasure were consequent to the τὰ πάθη and σημεῖα of the ἡ βούλησις, (chap. iv.) but are they both consequent to the ἡ πράῦνσις, and which is the σημεῖον of the βούλησις in this passion?
CHAP. IV.
What is the definition of the τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ Can you infer from this definition that a friend is perceived from the indications of the ἡ βούλησις ὃ What are the σημεῖα of the ἡ βοῦλησις? (8.)
How many species of the ἡ φίλιο are there? (28.)
What are the causes which give occasion to the pidu ~ ON ARISTOTLE’S: RHETORIC, 365 What is the difference between the ἡ ὀργὴ and the ἡ ἔχθρα?
How many differences does Aristotle enumerate?
How many, and what are the causes of the ἡ ἔχθρα which Aristotle enumerates? (30.)
You have stated that the ἡ ὀργὴ is felt on a count of the ἡ ὀλιγωρία and its species; but if a man is habitually addicted to the ἡ ὀλιγωρία and its species, are our sentiments those of the ἡ ὀργὴ or ἡ ἔχθρα ὃ Do anger and hatred ever differ with respect to the objects against whom they are felt? (xxxi. line 3, 4.)
Can you class both these passions under the genus ὀρέξεις ἄλογοι?
Does the sensation of the ἡ λύπη accompany the ἔχθρα ὃ (xxxi. line 10.)
Which of the two passions, the ἡ ὀργὴ and the ἡ ἔχθρα, does Aristotle consider as incurable?
You stated in a former chapter that the ἡ τιμωρία was the object of the ἡ ὀργὴ, what is the object of the ἡ ἔχθρα ἢ (xxxi. line 6.
Whee kind of person will an orator describe his adversary to be, when he endeavours to excite feelings of hatred against him in his auditors?
CHAP. V.
Give the definition of the ὁ φόβος.
Does it follow from this definition that all the ra κακὰ are the objects of the ὁ φόβος?
What kind of evils then excite the ὁ φόβος?
Is it absolutely necessary for the sensation of the ὁ φόβος that the evil should be close at hand?
Can you mention any circumstances, or characters in life, which excite the ὁ φόβος in others? (vii. et seq.)
What is the reason that men are not afraid of such evils as death?
Am I to understand that some hope of safety is essential in the sensation of the ὁ φόβος ἢ (xiv.)
Is deliberation also essential in the sensation of the ὁ φόβος?
If the τὰ κακὰ be of such a description as to annihilate all hope of safety, and prevent all deliberation in the sufferer, what is the τὸ πάθος which under such circumstances is felt?
366 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS In what chief respects do the sensations of the ὁ φόβος and τὸ δεινὸν differ?
Do I understand you to say, “In the feeling of hope and anxiety, and excitement of deliberation, which accompany the one, but are annihilated in the other?”
Do they differ also in any other remarkable respect? (chap. v. 12, line 4; chap. viii. 13, line 4.)
Do I understand you to say, “ In the sensation of the ὁ ἔλεος if the τὰ κακὰ were to happen to others and not to ourselves?”
Is the difference discoverable in the case of Amasis?
Give the definition of the τὸ ϑαῤῥεῖν.
What is the twofold division which Aristotle makes of the men who feel the τὸ ϑάρσος ἢ (xviii.)
What illustration does Aristotle give in support of this dis- tinction?
To which of the three species of oration do you consider appeals to the ὁ φόβος most peculiar ὃ Give me a reason why you consider them most peculiar to the εἴδος συμβουλευτικὸν. (Confer Book I. chap. iii. 4, with the definition of the ὁ ¢6Goc.)
In which of the three species do you consider appeals to the ἡ ὀργὴ, ὁ φθόνος, and ὁ ἔλεος, most likely to occur ἢ Does Aristotle approve of such appeals to the ὁ δικαστῇ; ἢ (Book i. chap. i. 5.)
CHAP. VI.
Give the definition of the αἰσχύνη.
Do only acts of depravity, or do the σημεῖα of such specific vices as illiberality, flattery, &c., ever excite the ἡ αἰσχύνη ἢ.
Give me a σημεῖον of the ἡ κολακεία ὃ CHAP. VII.
Give the definition of the ἡ χάρις.
Has this word two distinct significations? (vide Schrader Annotationes. ) Which of these two significations is expressive of the ré πάθος ὃ; With what view does Aristotle explain the ἡ χάρις as im- plying gratuitous benevolence?
ON ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC. 367 Is it for the purpose of showing how it may be amplified?
What division of the ai ὀρέξεις does Aristotle make in this chapter? (iii.)
To which division do you consider such ἐπιθυμίαι as hun- ger and thirst belong?
Is it necessary that the party benefited must be ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δεήσει to constitute the ἡ χάρις? 3: Is it necessary that the party benefiting should assist the other ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ χρεία CHAP. VIII.
Give the definition of the ὁ ἔλεος.
What kind of persons are most sensible of the ὁ ἔλεος ὃ What reason does Aristotle give that the of παντελῶς απο- AwAdrec do not feel the ὁ ἔλεος ὃ Why do not the οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι feel the ὁ ἔλεος?
What reason does Aristotle give that the oi ὄντες ἐν ὀργῇ ἢ Sapper do not feel the ὁ ἔλεος ἢ (vi.)
Can you give another reason drawn from the definition of the ἡ ὀργὴ and ὁ ἔλεος?
Can you class the ἡ ὀργὴ and ὁ ἔλεος under the genus ὄρεξεις ἄλογοι ὃ What kind of persons do men pity?
Give me a reason why you except the σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὦσιν οἰκειότητι.
In what respects do the τὸ δεινὸν and ὁ ἔλεος differ? (xii.)
Can you give a reason why certain characters, when repre- sented on the stage, excite pity?
= CHAP. IX.
What passion is directly opposed to the ὁ ἔλεος ὃ Can you class the ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ ἔλεος under the same genus of the ra πάθη ἢ What is the logical difference which when added to the generic term, gives the specific terms ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ ἔλεος ὃ (i. line 4.)
Does not Aristotle define the ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ φθόνος by a comparison of each with the ὁ ἔλεος?
368 ANALYTICAL QUESTIONS Do you consider the ἡ νέμεσις and ὁ ἔλεος to proceed from the same virtuous dispositions? (ἀπό τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους.)
If they do not proceed from the same virtuous dispositions, could they be classed under the same genus of the ra πάθη ὃ Is the ὁ φθόνος opposed in a measure only, or does it differ entirely from the 6 ἔλεος?
In what respects do they agree, and in what differ?