that of which the contrary is expedient to an enemy: for example, if your being cowards be above all things expedient to your enemies, it is plain, that to the citizens your courage will be above all things beneficial. And, in a word, whatever be the things which the enemy desires and in which they rejoice, the contrary of those things appear beneficial; and hence was it well said;— _§ See Otho’s speech to the soldiers on Vitellius’s usurpation after the murder of Galba:—Si Vitellio et satellitibus ejus eligendi facultas detur, quem nobis. anim:'m, quas mentes imprecentur; quid aliud quam seditionem e! discordiam opta- bunt? Tacit. Hist. i. 84.
42 ARISTOTLE’S [Boox αὶ And yet this case does not always hold, though it does generally; for there is no reason why the self- same things should not, at times, be expedient to two hostile parties; from which comes the saying that evils bring men together®, when the same thing hap- pens to ‘be injurious to both. That too is a good, which is not in excess’?; but whatever exceeds what . it ought, is an evil. And that on account of which much toil or expense has been bestowed, for already will it have appeared to be a good; and we already conceive of every such thing as of an end, and as ar end of many efforts; but the end is a good; and on this principle rests the force of that appeal, “It were in accordance forsooth with Priam’s heartiest and of this, ‘* Base indeed is it to remain so long;” II. β, 1. 298. and that of the proverb of *‘ Breaking the pitcher at the very door.” Vide Erasmi Adagia IT. i. 75.
. That too of which many are desirous, and which appears to be disputed for; because that of which all are desirous, was laid down to be a good; the gener- ality, however, have the appearance of being all, . And that which is recommended; because no ene recommends that which is not good’, And that which your enemies and the bad recommend; for all, as it were, already acknowledge it when even they do who are ill affected; for solely on account of its being plainly such will these acknowledge 105: and in ex- § So Shakspeare quotes the proverb, * Misery makes a man acquainted with strange bedfellows.” 7 A good which requires no qualification; e. g. moral truths, 8. To desire evil as evil, and feel pleasure in it as such, is verfectly unnatural. Hence St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, ch. i. ver. 32, sums up the iniquity of-the Gentile world in this one word; that not only did they in person com- mit the enormities, but ‘‘ had pleasure in them that do them.” 9 Virgil therefore could not have praised Aineas more than when he makes Diomede say,— Stetimus tela aspera contra, Contulimusque manus: experto credite, quantus In clypeum assurgat, quo turbine torqueat hastam. Ain omar. γι} RHETOR10 43 actly the same way they are held to be but paltry characters [and with these even their friends find fault, and all good men] with whom their enemy finds no fault: on which very principle the Corin- thians conceived themselves to have been scandalized by Simonides introducing in his verses, “ Troy finds no fault with the Corinthians!°.”
‘And that is a good which any who are practically wise, 25. whether among men or women, have preferred; in- stanced in Minerva’s choice of Ulysses; Theseus’ of Helen; and the Goddesses’ of Paris!!; and Homer’s of Achilles. In a word, all objects of determined 26, choice are good. And men determinately choose to do both the things which have been mentioned, and those which are evil to foes and good to friends; and those which are possible—these are varied in two ways; such as may be done, and such as may easily 27. be done!*, Easy things are such as are done either without pain, or in a short time; for difficulty is de- fined in reference either to the pain, or length of time. And men choose what is done as they wish; and they wish what either is in no respect an evil, or in a less degree than it is good. This will occur in the case of unjust action, where the punishment either escapes notice or is trifling: and suck actions as are 28. peculiar; as no one has done; or which are extra- ordinary, for thus is their value greater: and those things which have an adaptation to ourselves; of which kind are things belonging to us in respect of family, and power. ‘Things too which men consider are wanting to the completion of something else; for 1 Glaucus the Lycian, who was of Corinthian descent, as- sisted the Trojans, consequently Simonides meant to praise them; but from the known bias of this writer to “‘ censure in disguise,’ (of which another instance may be found, lib. 111. ch. 2,) the Corinthians might very fairly suspect his purpose.
π Vid. ii, c. 23, § 12, sub fin. περὶ ᾿Αλεξάνδρου, “ ὃν αἱ θεαὶ mpoikpivav.”
2 Vid. c. xii. δ 1, εἴτε ἂν Δ θεῖν πράξαντες, ἣ, μὴ λαθόντες» μὴ ὁὀοῦναι δίκην, κι τ. A.
1. The greater zood must fa discussed, 2. Defin:- tion of the excess and the exceeded.
be they ever so trifling 15, they in no less degree de« termine on putting them in execution: and things easily brought about; for they are possible, inas- much as they are easy: but things easily brought about, are such as every one, or many, or our equals, or our inferiors, have succeeded in. Whatever gra tifies one’s friends, or will be disliked by one’s foes. Every thing, too, which they whom we admire de- liberately set about. Things toward which men are well fitted by nature, and about which they have ex- perience; for they suppose they shall more easily succeed in them. Things too which no bad man does; for they are the rather commendable. What people happen to be desirous of; for not only does it appear pleasant, but it is viewed in the more favour- . able light'*. And men more particularly choose on deliberation the things in reference to which they severally are of a certain disposition; the ambitious, for instance, if the object be victory; the avaricious, if it be money; and other characters in the same way. On questions then of good and of expediency, we must deduce our means of persuading from hence, CHAP. VII.
On the subject of the greater Good, and the more expedient Measures, Burt as the advocates of opposite measures, while they in many instances allow both to be expedient, dispute nevertheless on the question which is the more so; we shall have next to speak of greater good, and what is in a higher degree expedient. Let ex- cess, then, be defined to be, as much and yet more; the thing exceeded, however, to be that comprised 18. So Horace...-O! si angulus ille Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum { '* If seen through che deceitful medium of desire.
within the excess. Again, greater and more! are terms relative always to some particular /ess thing:? but great or small, much or little, have reference to the size of things generally. And that which is great exceeds; but that which is deficient is small; and of the terms much and little in the like manner.
Now as we call that good, which, independently, for its own sake, and not on account of any thing else, is an object of choice; that, too, which every thing desires; and which, if invested with intelligence and practical wisdom, every thing would choose; as also what is preservative or productive of, or on which such things are consequent; and as that, with a view to which we act, is the end; and as an end is that for whose sake every thing 6156 is done: but that is good to a man’s self which has these affections in re- ference to himself: this being the case, it must be that plurality is a greater good than one or a few, provided that one or those few be enumerated in con- junction with it?; for it then exceeds them, and the within comprised one or few is exceeded. And if the greatest individual of one species exceed the great- est individual of another, then also will the first spe- cies itself exceed the second.4 And, vice versa, wherever one species exceeds another, the greatest 1 Greater, in reference to quantity continuous, or magnitude 3 more, in reference to quantity discrete, or multitude.
3 The meaning of this passage appears to be this,—that while all terms designating quantity are relative, the gram- matical degrees of comparison imply relation to certain objects then more immediately before us. Those who are puzzled by this doctrine of excess and defect, had better take Victorius’s hint, and illustrate each remark by an example from numbers.
8 This qualification is absolutely necessary to the truth of the position; for it may happen, if the plurality be not of things of the same species as the less number, that the less number is of higher value than the greater. F%ve guineas are “a greater good”’ than two, i. 6. the greater number than the ‘less, of things of the same species; yet it does not therefore follow that five farthings are better than two guineas, for there the less number is not, as in the first case it was, virtually enu- merated in the greater. Compare Ethics, lib. i. c. vii. ᾧ 8.
4 Or, as Lord Bacon expresses it, ‘‘ That kind is altogether best, whose excellence or pre-eminence is best,” Φ 3. Differ. ent στοῖ- χεῖα of the great er good.
ε individual of the exceeding, exceeds the greatest in- dividuals of the exceeded species: for example, if the greatest man be greater than the greatest woman, then will also men, in general, be greater than women; and if men generally be greater than women, then will also the greatest man be greater than the great- est woman; for the excesses of species, and of the greatest individuals under them, have a common ra- 5. tio.» When one thing is a consequence of another, but that other thing is not a consequence of it; (now, things are consequent, recollect, either simultaneously or subsequently, or virtually;) then is that of which the other is a consequence the greater good; because the enjoyment of the consequent is inherent in the enjoyment of the other. Things are consequent si- multaneously, as life on health; but it is not conse- quent on life: and subsequently, as knowledge on learning; virtually, as larceny on sacrilege; for the man who has committed sacrilege would be ready also 6. to steal. ‘Things which exceed the same thing in a greater degree [than itself], are greater®; for of ne- 7. cessity they exceed even the greater. Things produc- tive of a greater good are greater, for this would be by virtue of their being productive of something greater. ‘That, too, the productive cause of which is greater, is likewise greater; for if that which is healthy, be preferable to, and a greater good than, that which is pleasant; then also will health be su- 8. perior to pleasure. As also that which, independently of any thing, is preferable, is superior to that which is not preferable independently: thus strength is above things conducing to health; for the latter are not sought on their own account, while the former is, 9. the which was assumed as a criterion of good. And should one object be an end, the other not an end; 5 As is the excess of the male above the female sex, so is the excess of the greatest man above the greatest woman; and conversely, as is the excess of the greatest man above the great- est woman, so is the excess of the male above the female sex.
5 E. g. Eight exceeds two by six, which is also greater than the original number two.
an =e = OHAP. ν11.} RHETORIC. 47 for the one is for the sake of something else, the other, for its own sake; thus is exercise inferior to a good habit of body’. That too 15 ἃ greater good which in a less degree stands in need of any one or more things as accessions, for it is in a higher degree independent: now that is said less to need accessions, which needs such as either are fewer or more easily obtained. And whenever one thing does not exist, nor can pos- sibly be brought into existence independently of ano- ther, but that other can without it; then that which needs not the accession, is more independent, and thus shows itself to be a greater good. Again, if one be a principle and the other not; and for the same rea- son, if one be a cause, the other not; since without a cause or principle, existence or production is impos- sible*. And of goods both proceeding from princi- ples, that is the greater good which arises from the higher principle; as also that is the greater good which originates in the higher of two causes. And, vice versa, that of two principles which is the principle of the greater good, is greater; and that of two causes which is the cause of the greater, is itself greater. It is evident then from what has been said, that it is possible for a thing to appear the greater both ways; for supposing this to be a principle, and the other not, it will appear the greater; as also will it, sup- posing it not to be a principle’? while the other is; 7 Man’s will hath two several kinds of operation, the one natural or necessary, whereby it desireth simply whatsoever is good in itself, and shunneth as generally all things which hurt; the other deliberate, when we therefore embrace things as good, because the eye of understanding judgeth them good to that end which we simply desire. Thus in itself we desire health, physic only for health’s sake; and in this sort special reason oftentimes causeth the will by choice to prefer one thing before another, etc. Hooker, v. jis. p- 186.
® ἀρχὴ is the beginning of a thing, αἴτιον the cause; the latter consequently is prior to the former. In a plant, the seed is the ἀρχὴ, the vegetative power the αἴτιον.
® By the rule which states the principle to be superior to that which is not so.
That is, supposing 1t to be an end; for, by a former rule, 13. The same object may be made to appear ᾿ the great- er pee in different ways.
It.
because the end, and not the principle, was above stated to be the greater Just like the saying of Le- odamus in impeaching Callistratus, “ that the man who devised the deed was worse than he who exe- euted it; for had he not devised it, the other could not have executed it:” and conversely, against Cha-, brias, he argued that “the agent was worse than the \ deviser; for had there not been an agent, it would not have been realized in action, because people de-: vised plots on this very account, that others may execute them.” The more rare good is greater than the abundant!!; thus gold is better than steel, not- withstanding that it is less useful; for the acquisition, by reason of its being more difficult, is greater. And in another view, the abundant is better than the rare, for the enjoyment of it exceeds that of the other; for the idea of often exceeds that of seldom; whence it is said, “‘ Water!? is the best of things:” and, in a word, the more difficult is superior to the easier ac- quisition, for it is more rare. In another point of view, the easier is above the more difficult; for it has itself as we wish. That also is the greater good, the contrary of which is the greater evil; as is also that of which the deprivation is the greater loss. Virtue, too, is greater than what is not positive virtue, and vice than what is not positive vice; for the former severally are ends, the latter are not ends. Causes, the productions of which are more becoming or more disgraceful, are themselves of greater importance.
ends are superiur to means: thus, by one rule the superiority is assigned to ends, and by another to principles. So that, whichever side you take, you will have something to allege.
1! On this principie Aristotle argues in his Poetics for the superiority of the fable above the other five constituents of the drama, inferring its superior worth from its superior difficulty and rarity. ‘‘ Que rara, cara.”
12 Perrault, the French critic, misled possibly by this very passage, impotently ridiculed Pindar for the triteness of this idea: being ignorant that the poet alluded to the philosophy of Thales, who borrowed and taught the Fheenician doctrine, that water was the principle of all things. Vide Whartoa on Pope, vol. i. p. 132.
CRar. νἹΣ. RHETORIC. 49 Also of whatever things the excellencies and defici- encies are of greater importance, of them are also the productions of greater importance: since results stand to each other in the same ratio, as their several causes and principles; and, vice versa, causes and principles, in the ratio of their several results. Things, the excess of which is preferable or more becoming, as accuracy of sight is preferable to that of smelling, for sight is preferable to smelling; and the being greatly attached to friends is more becoming than to be greatly attached to money!*, so that attachment to friends is more becoming than fondness for money. And conversely, too, the excesses of better feelings are themselves better; and of the more becoming, them- selves, more becoming: as, too, are those things of which the desires are better or more becoming; for the greater desire is of the greater object: and, for the same reason, the desires which fasten on the more excellent and becoming objects, are themselves more excellent and becoming. Again, where the sciences are more grave or becoming, there the subject-matter also is more grave and becoming; for, as is the science, so is its truth; for each science takes cognisance of its peculiar truths: and analogous to this precedence of subjects is that also of the sciences, which recognise graver and more becoming subjects, above the rest; for the same reasons. And that which men of practi- eal wisdom, or every person, or the generality, or the majority, or the best of men have, or would have pronounced to be a greater good; that of course must be such, either absolutely, or so far at least as they decided conformably to their prudence. This, too, is a test available in common to the other ques- tions about good; for their substance, quantity, and quality, have themselves so as science and prudence may direct; on this subject however we have treated. For that has been defined to be good which every 43 πὸ φιλέταιρον εἶναι καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον; i.e. the being affected by these several feelings to such a degree, that they become a leading feature of the character; in which case, there is an ὑπερόχη, as it were, of the feelings, E being, if fraught with prudence'*, would choose; wherefore it is evident, that what prudence pronounces . good in a high degree is a greater good, Also that which belongs to the better men, either absolutely, or in respect of their being better; as courage is better than strength. Also what the better man would make the object of his choice, either absolutely or in respect of its being better; as, the suffering rather than the doing an injury, for this would he choose who is more just. And that which conduces more to pleasure rather that what conduces less; because every being pursues pleasure, and is desirous of en- joying it for its own sake; now it is in reference to this, that the good and the end have been defined: that is said to conduce more to pleasure, which is conducive to it with less alloy of pain, and for a . greater length of time. That which is more becoming rather than what is less so; for the becoming ei- ther is that which tends to please, or is desirable on . its own account. Whatever things people prefer being the causes of to themselves or to their friends, those are greater goods; but whatever they would least wish, are greater evils. Things whose duration is long, rather than those whose duration is short; and those which are more secure, rather than those which are less so: for there is an advantage in their enjoyment; of the former, in respect to time; of the latter, from their being at will: for the enjoyment, of what is secure is more in their power whenever they wish. And as are the terms arising from con- jugates and similar inflections, so are the qualities they denote; for example, if courageously be an idea. more noble and desirable than ¢emperately, courage will also be something more noble than temperance, and the idea of a man’s being courageous than of his . being temperate. What every one chooses is better than what some do not, as also is the choice of a ma~ jority better than that of a minority; for as that was supposed a good which all desire, so that is propor- ‘4 Whence it follows that prudence is competent to decide on the nature of good.
euar. vit] RHETORIC. 51 tionately greater which is more desired. That, too, which litigants or foes, judges, or arbitrators selected by judges, prefer, is better; for in one case the deci- sion is equivalent to that of all mankind; and in the other, men of authority and information actually do pronounce. And sometimes good is greater in which all participate; for not to participate in it is a dis- grace: while at others, that is which none, or which few share with you; for it is more rare. Things more commended, because more becoming; and in the same way things are better to which belongs the greater honour, because honour is as a kind of esti- mate of worth. ‘Those things again are more hein- ous on which are imposed the greater punishments. Again, what is greater than things confessedly or ap- parently great, is itself superior in greatness. And the same objects, when separated into their several constituents, have an air of superior greatness, for the excess of a plurality of objects is conspicuous. Whence the poet says that Meleager’s wife persuaded him to rise up to the war by entering into detail:— “* She paints the horrors of a conquer’d town, The heroes slain, the palaces o’erthrown, The matrons ravish’d, the whole race enslaved *.”
Iliad ix. 705.
Again, the condensing and accumulating of circum- stances in the way Epicharmus used to do, is produc- tive of effect, and that on the same principle as their separation; viz. because the condensing of them évinces great excess, and for the further reason, that it appears a principle and a cause of great results. But as that is greater which is more rare and difficult, circumstances both of opportunity, and age, and place, and time, and strength, produce great effect.
16. Another striking instance of the effect produced by a de- tail of circumstances may be found in the Septem contra Thebas of Aischylus, 302, ed. Bl.— οἰκτρὸν γὰρ πόλιν ὧδ᾽ ὠγυγίαν aide προϊάψιαι, κι τ. λ, and in Burke’s speech on the Nabob of Arcot’s Debts, Work. vol. ii. p. 480: see also Sheridan’s celebrated speech against Warren Hastings. E2 For an exploit beyond one’s strength, and age, and equals, if achieved, or if under such circumstances, at such a place or time, will gain importance whether it be good, or honourable, or just, or the opposite. Whence originated the inscription of the Olympie victor, “Formerly, indeed, with a rough basket '® on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.” [Simonides.] And on this proceeds that encomium of Iphicrates [who was the son of a shoe- maker] on himself, when he said, “From what begin- . nings have these things been realized!” ‘That, too, which is innate is superior to what is adscititious, from its greater difficulty; wherefore the poet says, “Of myself am I taught.” And the greatest part of what is great; as Pericles said in his funeral ora- tion 8, “ That the youth were swept from the city, just as the spring, were it to be withdrawn from the year.” That, too, is more precious which is available in the greater need; as in old age, or sickness, for instance. And of two means, that more immediately conducing to the end. That whose qualities have direct reference to one’s self, than those which are general, What is possible, rather than what is im- possible; for the one attaches to one’s self, the other not. And things which are comprised in the end 19 of Jife; for things conducing to the end partake in a . greater degree of the nature of ends. Things having reference to truth rather than to opinion:—as a de- finition of matter of opinion we may take what one, likely to escape observation, would not choose to do: and on this principle the receiving good would appear more desirable than the doing it; since one would 16 ἄσιλλα is properly the yoke which was laid across the shoulder, from which the basket hung. 17 Hom. Odyss. xxii. 347.
18 Whether we suppose the ἐπιτάφιον to have been lost, or feel inclined to charge Aristotle with a lapsus memorie, so it is that the words are not attributed to Pericles in any work which has come down to us. ‘he same illustration was used by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, to the deputies from the states of Greece, who implored his assistance. Herodotus, vii. 162, 19 Τέλος, the end or object of life: εὐδαιμονία scilicet.
CHAP. vil.| RHETORIC. 53 choose the first even should it be unobserved; with respect however to the doing good, that it seems no one about to be unnoticed would choose”. Those things, too, are better, of which men prefer the real possession to the appearance; for they have a nearer reference to truth: on which principle some argu that justice is a trifling good, because it is better for it to appear, than merely to exist?!: in respect to health, however, this is not the case. That which: is conducive to the greater number of uses; as what conduces to life, to happy life, to pleasure, and to noble conduct; wherefore health and wealth appear the highest goods, for these include every thing. That which is accompanied by less pain, and on which pleasure is attendant; for the good is more than merely single, since it is realised both in the positive pleasure, and in the absence of pain. And of two goods, that which, added to the same good, renders the sum greater. That, too, whose presence does not escape us, rather than that which does??; for such approach reality; whence the being really rich will seem a greater good than the appearance of being so. That, too, which is held dear, is a greater good:—whether, as in some eases, it be single; or, as in others, accompanied by more: on which account the punishment is not equal, in the case of putting out the eye of a person who has but one*, and of % A strikingly ostentatious principle of benevolence this: _ but it is one which an exact observance of human nature, even now that it has met the rebuke of Divine wisdom, will perhaps too fully justify Aristotle in laying down.
71 According to the argument of the sophist Thrasymachus. Plato. Rep. lib. i.
32 J have thus ventured to understand ἡμᾶς with λανθάνει; for it appears the simplest way of getting over the difficulty which is caused by the illustration, which would appear better adapted to one of the former εἴδη than to this.
23 Zaleucus established among the Locrians the.aw of re- taliation, “an eye for an eye.”” But on one occasion a man with a single eye being threatened with blindness by his enemy, procured a clause to be added, denouncing the loss of both eyes to him who deprived another of his only one. Demosth.
ont. Timoer. p. 744.
1. Rea- sons why the de- liberative orator must know go- yern- ments.
one who has two eyes; for there is, in the one case, a deprivation of the dearest object.
The sources then from which, in exhortation and dissuasion, we must deduce our means of persuading, have nearly been enumerated.
CHAP. VIII.
On Forms of Government;—what and how many they are; —and on the end of each, THE means of greatest and most paramount import- ance with a view to being able to persuade and give advice in a becoming style, is the having made one’s self master of all the forms of government; and the having clearly distinguished their Several practices, and legal principles, and interests: for all men are persuaded by what is advantageous; but that which ‘is preservative of the constitution, is absolute ex- . pediency'. And further, the dictum of the authori- ‘tative power of the state, is itself authoritative.
But the authorities are distinguished according to the forms of government under which they exist; for 24 Dr. Parr, quoting the following passage from the Politics; do yao ἐστὶν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι ποὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητὸν, remarks:—“ I suspect that ἀγαπητὸν here means more than carum, it may be ren- dered unicum, atque adeo carum. Aristotle, in lib. i. c. 7, Rhetor. says of the eye, destroyed in him who had only one, ἀγαπητὸν ἀφήρηται: see Hen. Stephens’s Thesaurus: but I> should observe, that in the margin of Aristotle, καὲ μόνον are added, perhaps, as explanatory. Upon the word ἀγαπητὸν in SS. for povoyévn, see Suidas and Hesychius in vy. and the notes.”? Spital. Sermon, notes, p. 39.
1 T6 σώζον πολιτείαν appears with Aristotle to have been equivalent to abstract expediency; and he therefore cannot be charged with a violation of his own rule against entering into particulars on any subject as peculiar to rhetoric, because every question of expediency will ultimately be viewed in reference to the constitution under which the parties live; at any rate the question is treated merely in a popular way— διηκρίβωται yap ἐν τοῖς πολετικοῖς.
cua. vitt 7 - RHETORIC. 55 as many forms of government as there are, so many are the authorities.
Now there are four forms of government; demo- cracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy. So that the authoritative and judicial functions will be merely one constituent of these, or the whole. Democracy is a form of government?, in which men apportion out the magistracies to themselves by lot. But an oligarchy, in which those only who, from the valua- tion of property, are entitled. Aristocracy, in which those bear magistracy who can conform to the con- stitutional plan of education. By such education I mean that established by the law: for those who ad- here to the principles of the law, are the men who, in an aristocracy, hold magistracies; and it must be that these should appear the best, whence this form of government took its name. Monarchy is that form in which, conformably to its name, one man is su- preme; and, of monarchies, those which are held by conformity to some limitations are kingdoms, but the unlimited are tyrannies?, Neither should the ends of the respective forms of government escape us; for men choose whatever con- duces to the end. The end then of a democracy, is liberty; of an oligarchy, it is wealth; of an aristocra- cy, the institutions relating to education and the prin- ciples of the law; the end of a tyranny, is the protec- tion of the tyrant’s person‘. It is evident then, if