the things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves the causes, some they do through ᾿ custom, and others through natural desire; and this partly through this desire influenced by reason, and in part through it devoid of reason. Now the act of 8. wishing is desire accompanied by reason, fixing on some good as its object; because no one wishes for any thing other than what he conceives to be a good.
The desires devoid of reason, are anger and appetite.
So that all things whatever which men do, they ne- These are cessarily do from seven causes; by chance, compul- csr sion, nature, custom, will, anger, or appetite. But j Chance to carry on distinctions in reference to age, or habits, ii. Com- or whatever else enacts itself in conduct, were su- a perfluous. For, granting that it happens to young ture. men to be passionate, it is not by motion of their ἣν Cus- youth that they act thus, but by motion of anger and + "Ww; appetite: neither is it by motion either of wealth or vi. Anger _ poverty, simply, but (in the case of the poor) it is on 1 Appe account of their neediness that it happens that they 9.~ cherish an appetite for wealth; and (in the case of the rich) on aceount of their having the means, that they risk an appetite for unnecessary pleasure; and these persons will act neither by motion of their wealth nor of their poverty, but by motion of appe- tite. And in exactly the same way, the just and un- just, and all such as are said to act econformably to habits, will in reality act, under all cireumstances, by motion of these principles; for they on the impulse either of reason or of passion; but some from good manners and passions, others from the contrary. Still, however, it happens that on habits of this par- 10 ticular charactes: principles of action the same in ll.
i, Chance.
ii. Na- ture.
iii, Com- pulsion.
character are consequent; and on those of that kind, principles also of that kind. For on the temperate man perhaps forthwith, by motion of his temper- ance, are attendant good opinions and appetites re- specting pleasures; but on the intemperate, the con- trary on these same subjects. For which reason we must wave distinctions of such a kind; but we must consider, on what conditions’, what principles of conduct are wont to follow: for it is not ordained, (in the nature of things,) that, if a man be white or black, or tall or short, principles of this or that kind should be attendant on him; but if he be young or old, just or unjust, here some difference begins; and so, in a word, in the case of all contingent circum- stances whatever, which produce a difference in the tempers of men, for instance, a man’s seeming to himself to be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate; in all these cases there will be some, essential differ- ence. Of this, however, we will speak hereafter; let us now treat first of the remaining points. Things proceed from chance which are of such kind that their cause is not definite *, and are produced in the ab- sence of any final motive, and that neither invariably, nor usually, nor in any prescribed order. My mean- ing on these subjects will be plain from the definition of chance. All those things exist naturally whose cause is internal and ordinate; for they turn out, either invariably or generally, in the same way; since there is no need of an accurate inquiry on results contrary to nature, whether they be produced conformably to a certain nature, or any other cause. It would appear, tco, that chance is the cause of such results. All 4 He here first informs us that he shall not make his excln- sion sv rigid as he had above stated, but will admit youth and age, etc. to-a particular consideration, as holding an important influence over character, though that influence ought philo- sophically to be referred to one of the seven above-mentioned principles; while every thing else which people choose to fix upon as a principle of conduct will, on examination, prove to be merely secondary, and to avt mediately through one or other of the seven.
things originate in compuision, which are produced through the instrumentality of the agents themselves, contrary to their inclination and reason. In habét 15 originates every thing which men do because they have often done it before. From will proceed what- ever of the forementioned goods appear to be useful, either as an end or as conducing to the end, when it is by reason of such their usefulness that they are real- ized in action: for even the intemperate do some things which are useful; but not on account of their useful- ness, but on account of pleasure. Through the medium of anger and excited feeling arise acts of vengeance. Now, between revenge and punishment there is a dif- ference; for punishment is for the sake of the sufferer, but revenge for that of the person inflicting it, in or- der that he may be satiated®. On what subjects this excitement of feeling exists, will therefore be plain in my treatise of the passions. But all such things as ap- ‘pear pleasant are produced in action on the impulse of appetite. But that which is familiar and has be- come habitual, is of the number of things pleasant; for many things there are, even among such as are not pleasant xaturally, which, when men have been habituated to, they do with pleasure. So that, to speak in one word comprehending the whole, every thing whatsoever which men do of their own proper motion, either is good, or apparently good; pleasant, or apparently pleasant. But as they act voluntarily in whatever they do of their own motion, and invo- luntarily in whatever they do not of their own motion; all things whatsoever in respect to which they act voluntarily, will be either good or apparently good; pleasant or apparently pleasant. For I also set down the getting quit either of evils or apparent evils, and the getting a less evil in exchange for a greater, in the class of goods; because they are in a certain way desirable things. And, among things pleasant, I likewise set down the getting quit of things bringing pain, or appearing to do so; or the getting things ® Revenge is a kind of wild justice. Bacon’s Essays.
iv. Habit νυν. Will, vi, Anger, vii. Appe- tite.
These motives are briefly compre- ἡ hended in one word, pleasure, 9, What abjects are plea- sant, therefore, must be discussed.
t. Imme- diate mo- tives of injustice consider- ed. Defi- nition of pleasure. 2. Pain is ξξτασις.
3 A re- version to nature is pleasant.
Yess so, in exchange for such as are so in greater de-. ree, ὶ We have therefore to ascertain the number of things pleasant’ and of what kinds they are. Now on the subject of what is useful, something has been already said in my treating of deliberative rhetoric; but on the subject of what is pleasant let us treat, beginning at this point. As to the definitions, you must deem them to be adequate [to my purpose } if they be found, on each subject, exempt from obscurity, though not accurately precise.
CHAP. XI. What things are pleasant.
Let it be laid down by us, that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul, and a settlement of it, at once rapid and perceptible, into its own proper nature; and that pain is the contrary. If then pleasure be a thing of this nature, it is plain that whatever is pro- ductive of the disposition I have described, is plea- sant; while every thing of a nature to destroy it, or produce a disposition the opposite to it, is painful. Generally speaking, therefore, it is necessary, both that the being in progress toward a state conform- able to nature, should be pleasant; and that, in the highest degree, when those feelings, whose original is conformable to it, shall have recovered that their nature; and habits, because that which is habitual becomes by that time natural, as it were; for, in a certain way, custom 15. ike nature, because the idea of frequency is proximate to that of always; now na- ture belongs to the idea of ahvays, custom to that of 7 In all judicial questions a knowledge of the constituents of pleasure will be of essential service; for they all suppose some wrong done, and there is no man doth a wrong for the wrong’ sake, but thereby to purchase himself pr ~ or pleasure, oF Aonour, or the like. Bacon‘s Essays.
CHAP. XI.} RHETORIC 73 often. What is not compulsory, also, is pleasant; for compulsion is contrary to nature. Wherefore acts of necessity are painful; and it has been truly remark- ed, “ Every act of necessity is in its nature painful.” It must be also that a state of sedulous attention, anxiety, the having the mind on the stretch, are painful, for they all are acts of necessity, and con- strained, unless they have become habitual; but it is custom which, under such circumstances, renders them pleasant. The contraries of these must also be pleasant; wherefore, relaxation of mind, leisure, listlessness, amusements, and intervals of rest, rank in the class of things pleasant; for none of these has any thing to do with necessity. Every thing of which there is an innate appetite, is pleasant; for appetite is a desire of what is pleasant. Now, of ap- petites, some are irrational, others attended by reason. I call all those irrational, which men desire, not from any conception which they form: of this kind are all which are said to exist naturally, as those of the body; thirst or hunger, for instance, in the case of sustenance; and the appetite of sustenance in every kind. And the appetites connected with objects of taste, and of lust, and, in fact, objects of touch gener- ally; the appetite of fragrant odours, too, as connect- ed with smelling, and hearing, and sight. Appetites attended by reason, are all those whatsoever which men exercise from a persuasion: for many things there are which they desire to behold, and possess, on hearsay and persuasion. Now, as the being pleased stands in the perception of a certain affec- tion, and as imagination is a kind of faint perception, there will attend on him who exercises either me- mory or hope, a kind of imagination of that which is the object of his memory or hope; but if so, it is plain that they who exercise memory or hope, cer- tainly feel pleasure, since they have also a perception. So that every thing pleasant consists either in the perception of present objects, or in the remembrance of those which have already been, or in the hope of such as are yet to be; for mer exercise perception 4, All freedom from com straint, 5. Appe tites are pleasant.
Trration al.
Rational, 6. Hope and memory are pleasant, ~I on present, memory on past, and hope on future ob- 8. jects. Now the objects of memory are pleasant, not Criterion of love.
row.
only such as at the moment while present were pleasant, but some even which were not pleasant, should their consequence subsequently be honour- able and good; and hence this saying, “ But it is indeed pleasant for a man, when preserved, to re-. member his toils;” and this, “ For after his suffer- ings, a man who has suffered much, and much achieved, is gladdened at the recollection.” But the reason of this is, that to be exempt from evil is . pleasant!. And all objects are pleasant in hope, which appear by their presence either to delight or benefit in a great degree; or to benefit, without giving pain. In a word, whatever objects by their presence delight us, do so, generally speaking, as we hope for, or remember them. On which account, too, the feeling of anger is pleasant; just as Homer has remarked of anger in his poem, “That which with sweetness far greater than distilling honey as it drops;” for there is no one who feels anger where the object seems impracticable to his revenge; nor with those far their superiors in power do men feel anger at all, or if they do, it is in a less degree, There is also a kind of pleasure consequent on most appetites; for either in the recollection that they have enjoyed them, or in the hope that they shall enjoy them, men are affected and delighted by a certain pleasure: thus men possessed by fevers feel delight, amid their thirst, as well at the remembrance how they used to drink, as at the hope of drinking yet again. Lovers, too, feel delight in conversing, writing, and composing something, ever about the object beloved; because, in all those energies, they have a perception, as it were, of the object they love. And this is in all cases a criterion of the commence- ment of love, when persons feel pleasure not only in . the presence of the object, but are enamoured also of it when absent, on memory; wherefore, even when 1 Suave mari magno, turbantibus equora ventis, Alterius procul e terra spectare dolorem, etc. Lucretius, «ἡ a Se pain arises at absence, nay in the midst of mourning, and the very dirge of death, there yet arises within us a certain pleasure. For the pain is felt because the object is not present; but the pleasure consists in remembering and seeing, as it were, both the person, and what he used to do, and the kind of character of which he was. Whence has it been said, and with probability enough, “Thus spake he, and excited within them all a desire of lamentation.” Also the avenging one’s self is pleasant; for the getting of that is pleasant, the failing to get which is painful: now the angry do feel pain in an excessive degree if they be not avenged; but in the hope of revenge they take pleasure. Again, to overcome is pleasant, not to the ambitious only, but even to all; for there arises an imagination of superiority, for which all, either in a faint or more violent degree, have an appetite. But since to overcome is pleasant, it must follow of course, that amusements where there is field for rivalry, as those of music and disputations, are plea- sant; for it frequently occurs, in the course of these, that we overcome; also chess, ball, dice, and draughts. Again, it is the same with respect to amusements where a lively interest is taken®; for, of these, some become pleasant as accustomed to them; others are pleasant at first; for instance, hunting and every kind of sporting; for where there is rivalry, there is also victory; on which principle the disputations of the bar and of the schools are pleasant to those who have become accustomed to them, and have abilities. Also honour and good character are most pleasant, by reason that an idea arises, that one is such as is the good man; and this in a greater de- gree should those people pronounce one such, who 2 See book ii. chap. 2, ὁ 1.
8 If this rendering for the word ἐσπουδασμένη be not tha. which the Greek might first suggest, yet it is that which seems best to suit the context; for sporting and hunting do not very well accord with our ideas of grave and serious amusements, though exercised as they were by the Greeks, as mere pre- paratives for the labours of military duty, they might justly deserve serious attention.
venge.
tory.
our and characteg Friends.
18. Being admired.
Flattery.
bitual ac- tion.
riety.
he think speaks truth: such are those immediately about one, rather than those who are more removed; familiar friends, and acquaintances, and one’s fellow citizens, rather than those who are at a distance; the present, rather than a future generation; a man of practical wisdom, rather than a mere ignoramus; many, than a few; for it is more likely that these I have mentioned will adhere to the truth, than that the opposite characters will: since one has no anxiety about the honour or the opinions of such as one greatly despises, children and animals for instance, not at least for the sake of such opinion itself; but if one is anxious about it, then it is on «ccount of something else. Α friend, too, ranks among things pleasant; for the affection of love is pleasant; since there is no lover of wine, who does not delight in wine: also the having affection felt toward one is pleasant; for there is in this case also an idea of one’s being an excellent person, which all who have any sensibility to it are desirous of; now the having affection felt for you is the being beloved yourself, on your own account. Also the being held in admir- ation is pleasant, on the very account of being hon- oured by it. Flattery and the flatterer are pleasant; since the flatterer is a seeming admirer and a seeming friend*. To continue the same course of action is also pleasant; for what is habitual was laid down to be pleasant. To vary is also pleasant; for change is an approach to what is natural: for sameness pro- duces an excess of a stated habit; whence it has been said, “In every thing change is pleasant?.” For on this principle, whatever occurs at intervals of time is pleasant, whether persons or things; for * It may be interesting to compare the grounds on which Dr. Johnson considered flattery pleasant with these of Arise totle. The Doctor’s words are, ‘‘ Flattery pleases very gener ally. In the first place, the flatterer may think what he says to be true; but, in the second place, whether he thinks so or not, he certainly thinks those whom he flatters of consequence enough to be flattered.”” Boswell’s Life, A D. 1775, δι. 66, § Eurip. Orest. 234.
CHAF χι. RHETORIC, 77 it is a variation of present objects; and at the same time that which occurs merely at intervals possesses the merit of rarity. Also learning and admiration, generally speaking, are pleasant; for under admira- tion exists a desire [to learn], so that what is admired is desired; and in the act of learning there is a set- tlement into a state conformable to nature. To benefit and to be benefited are also of the number of plea- sant things; for to be benefited, is to get what peo- ple desire; but to benefit, is to possess and abound; things, the both of which men desire. And because a tendency to beneficence is pleasant ®, it is also plea- sant to a man to set his neighbour on his legs again, and to put a finish to that which was deficient in some particular. But as the acquisition of know- ledge is pleasant, and the feeling admiration, and such things; that, too, must necessarily be pleasant which has been expressed in imitation, as in painting, sculpture, and poetry: also, every thing is pleasant which has been correctly imitated, although the ori- ginal object, of which it is the imitation, may not in itself be pleasant; for one does not feel pleasure on that account; but there is an inference that “this means that:” and thus it happens that we learn something. Also sudden reyolutions’, and the being saved from danger narrowly; for all these are cases exciting admiration. Again, since that is pleasant which is conformable to nature, and things which are akin are respectively conformable to nature, every thing like and akin, speaking generally, is pleasant; 6 This principle of pleasure has been thus deyeloped by Hooker: “As to love them of whom we receive good things is a duty, because they satisfy our desires in that which else we should want; so to love them on whom we bestow is nature, because in them we behold the effects of our own virtue.””—Ecc. Pol. v. § 63, p. 285. See also what is said towards the end of this chapter, of the love borne towards whatever is, in any sense, an ἔργον of own—as children, works of genius, etc.
7°Eoti δὲ περιπέτεια ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολὴ, κι τ. λ. Poet. 21. Twining explains it to be, “when,” ina drama, “ the things that are doing have an effect the very reverse of which is expected from them,” ij. 77.
21. Learn ing: ad- miration 22. To do good: to receive good.
a Imita- tion.
Painting Seulp- ture. Poetry.
verses. Narrow escapes. 25. Simi- larity and conformi- ty to na- ture and ourselvea.
a¢-P ower, Wisdom. Censure.
28. Dwell- ing on one’s own excellen- cies, 2s man to man, horse to horse, and youth to youth. Whence also these proverbs originate: “ Fellows in age, delight;”—“‘ Whatever is similar;”—“ Beasts recognise their species;”——“‘ Birds of a feather fiock . together;” and every other saying of this sort. But as every thing like and akin is delightful to it, and as every one stands to himself in this relation in a most special manner, all must be, more or less, lovers of themselves; for all these qualities do in a par ticular manner exist in reference to self. But as all are lovers of themselves, that necessarily which is their own must be pleasant to all; as, for instance, their sayings and productions. On which account men are in general fond of flatterers and lovers, and are ambitious and fond of children; for children are their own production®. It is also pleasant to put a finish to what is deficient; for it became by that time one’s own production. And as rule is the most pleasant of all things, the appearing to be wise is also pleasant; for knowledge is a principle of power; and wisdom is a knowledge of many subjects, and those commanding admiration. Moreover, as men in general are ambitious, the power of rebuking one’s neighbour must needs be pleasant. Also the pausing on that province in which he appears to be best, when compared with his own powers in other re- spects; just as Euripides remarks, “And this he plies, allotting the greatest part of each day to it, 8 One passion is often productive of another: examples are without number; the sole difficulty is a proper choice. I be- gin with self-love, and the power it hath to generate love to children. Every man, beside making part of a greater system, like a comet, a planet, or satellite only, hath a less system of his own, in the centre of which he represents the sun, darting his fire and heat all around; especially upon his nearest con- nexions; the connexion between a man and his children, Jundamentally that of cause and effect, becomes, by the addi- tion of other circumstances, the completest that can be among individuais; and therefore self-love, the most vigorous of all passions, is readily expanded upon children. Lord Kames’s Elements of Criticism, chap. ii. part 1, § 5.
9 The cumpletion of what has been left unfinished was bee fore stated to be pleasant on another principle.. See ᾧ 22.
owaP. xit.] NHETORIC. 79 in which, himself being compared with himben, he appears most excellent. * In a similar way, since amusement ranks among pleasant things, and as every relaxation and laughter is of the number, things ridiculous must therefore of course be pleasant, as well persons as expressions and productions. But on the subject of the ridiculous, a detailed discussion has been entered into in the Poetics!°. Let thus much have been said on the sub- ject of things pleasant; from the contraries of these things, what is painful will be evident. These, then, are the objects for the sake of which men act unjustly.
CHAP. XII.
With what Dispositions men eommit Injustice, in what instances, and towards whom.
LET us now state with what dispositions men commit injustice, and towards whom they do so. As regards themselves then, it is when they think the thing is one possible to be done, and possible to themselves; and either that, in doing it, they shall escape detec- tion, or, if they do not escape it, that they shall not suffer punishment, or that they shall indeed suffer a punishment, but that the damage thereby incur- red will be less than the gain, either to themselves or those for whom they have a regard. Now the subject of things which appear possible, and those: which appear tmpossible, will be explained in the se- quel; for these are points applicable in common to all kinds of rhetoric!. Now as to their own advan- tages, those men think they are in the highest degree likely to commit injustice with impunity, who are of. talented.
ability in speaking, and men of the world, and such as have experienced many a forensic contest. If, In one of the books which has unfortunately been lost. His definition of it is, αἰσχρὸν ἄνευ λυπηροῦ. ' They are, in fact, τόποι, ii. 19.
Laughter 1. Πῶς ἔχοντες, or the agents of injustice, then act unjustly, when it seems pos< sible that they shall escape de- tection.
2.
The The pow- erful.
aC ARISTOTLE’S [Boon 1 too, they happen to have many friends. If they be 3 rich?. And more particularly do they think they ‘ can get off, if they be themselves* possessed of the: 4.If likely to escape detection.
δ. Such as the oppo- sites to the charge, etc, forestated qualities; and if they be not themselves so qualified, yet if they have friends, or supporters, or associates‘ of such talents, then also they think to. get off; for these are the endowments, by aid of | which men are able both to act, to escape detection, ἡ and avoid punishment®. Again, if they be friends, 1 either of the injured party, or of the judge; because © friends are off their guard against injustice, and are moreover appeased before prosecuting their revenge. But the judges gratify their friends, and either alto- gether let them off, or amerce them in a trifle.
People likely to escape detection, are those the very opposite in character to the charge; as, a man of per- sonal imbecility, on a charge of assault; or one poor and deformed, on a charge of adultery. Again, cir- cumstances exceedingly palpable, and in the eyes of all the world; for these are unobserved, by reason . that no one would think of them at all. Acts, too, of such enormity and such a character that no one would presume; for in regard to these also men are off their guard: for it is against crimes which are ? He remarks, in his Politics, the general tendency to insub- ordination and disobedience to laws observable in the rich and prosperous;—oi μὲν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς εὐτυχημάτων ὄντες, ἰσχύος, καὶ πλούτου, καὶ φίλων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρχεσθαι οὔτε βούλονται οὔτε ἐπίστανται. Polit. iv. ὁ. 11. Upon the same principle Tacitus remarks, ‘‘ Opes principibus infensas.”’ Ann. lib. xi. c. 1 3 In the Ethics, where, in speaking of Βούλευσις, he limits its sphere first and generally to things possible, he remarks— Δυνατὰ δὲ, ἃ δι᾽ ἡμῶν γένοιτο av. Ta δὲ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι᾽ ἡμῶν πῶς ἐστίν ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. Eth. Nich. iii. 3, 1 The Thessalonian Menon, in Xenophon, courted the friendship of men in power with this view: φίλος τ᾽ ἐβούλετο εἶναι τοῖς μέγιστον δυναμένοις, ἵνα ἀδικῶν μὴ διδοί» δίκην. Anab. lib. ii. c. 6. vid. infra.
5. The yast assistance to be derived from friends and sup- porters by those who are under accusation, may be illustrated by the following strong expressions of Augustus, who said, *Cunctari se, ne, st superesset, eriperet legibus reum; sin dee esset, destituere, ac predamnare amicum videretur.”’ Sueton.
CHAP. XII.] RHETORIC, 81 ordinary, as it is against bodily infirmity of an usual kind, that men set themselves on their guard; but as ‘to cases in which no one yet has been afflicted, no one is cautious. Also those people are open to at- tack, to whom no one is an enemy, or to whom many are; for in the one case the aggressors think to escape detection from their not being on their guard; and in the other, they escape from its not seeming likely that they would make an attempt on people ever on their guard, and from their having ever at hand the plea, that they never could have been so mad as to attempt it. Those again are likely to act unjustly, who have at hand means of concealing or changing property, places to hide, or any easy means of dispos- ing of it. All those persons, too, who, if they do not escape, having nevertheless means of setting aside the sentence, or of tedious delay, or of corrupting the judges; and who, if the fine be imposed, can yet set aside its payment, or put it off a length of time, or who, from their neediness, have nothing to lose. All, too, who have the gain clearly in view, or great, or close at hand; while the loss is trifling, indistinct, and at a distance. Also any one to whom the punishment is not adequate tothe advantage; of which kind atyranny seems to be. All, again,-in whose case the commission of injustice is an act of gain, while the punishment is mere opprobrium. So, on the contrary, are they whose unjust acts lead to a kind of credit, (as if it