bond;” as though he were, on this account, affected 5, by anger. Now people think it becoming that they 7.
should be looked up to by their inferiors, whether in birth, power, or moral excellence, or generally speaking, in whatever respect one may happen to be 5 It is an essential feature of vexatiousness, and in fact of every species of slight, that there is a total absence of any self- ish motive on the part of him who offers it; the appearance of any such motive having actuated him, would be a salvo to the pride of him who is made the subject of such treatment; but to be exposed to an opinion that one is utterly beneath con- sideration (δόξα περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον), is a reflec- tion to which no person, actuated by the common feelings of our nature, ever can submit.
9. With what feel- ings, and how situ- ated, men are angry.
much superior: thus the rich man thinks to be looked up to by the poor, in regard to money; also the man who has a faculty of speaking, by him who is desti- tute of it, in the case of speaking; and he who thinks himself worthy to bear office, by him who deserves to be subject to rule. Whence it has been said, ‘“‘ Beware! for dreadful is the wrath of kings;”’ and in another place, **Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last:” for they feel indignant by reason of their superiority.
- Moreover [men think it becoming that they should be looked up to] by those at whose hands they think they ought to receive good; and these are such as they have benefited, or continue to benefit, whether in their own persons, or as instruments of any one, and whom any of their relatives have benefited, or wish, or did wish to benefit.
1. From hence it is by this time manifest both un- der what affections as regards themselves, and with what objects, and for what reasons, men feel anger. For as regards themselves, it is when they happen to be aggrieved, since he who is aggrieved is anxious for something. Now aman [ will feel thus aggrieved ], as well on any person’s clashing with him in regard to any object, directly; when he is thirsty, for exam- ple, in regard to drinking: as also should they not directly clash, yet will he appear to do the same thing; and if a person thwarts, or does not co-operate with one, and if a person annoys one in any respect, when thus circumstanced, one feels anger against all these. _ On which account people who are ill, in poverty, love, thirst, in a word, who are under desire, and fail of success, these all are fretful and irritable, and parti- cuiarly with those who slight their present condition: the sick man, for example, is annoyed by those who > slight him in regard to his disease: the poor man too, with those who do so in regard to his poverty; and the warrior, in regard to war; the lover, in regard to love; and in other cases similarly, for each one has the way paved to the feeling anger in each vase, by CHAP, RHETORIC. too CHAP, RHETORIC. too the passion which exists in his mind. Again, a man is nettled should he happen to be expecting the very opposite of what results; for that pains one more deeply which falls out very unexpectedly; just in the same ratio as that which is very unexpected de- lights, should it be what one wishes for. On which account seasons, times, dispositions, and ages, which class of them are readily excited to anger, and when, and how, wil) be plain from this which I have said; also it will be plain that they are then excited with greater readiness, when more immediately influenced by these circumstances. As then regards the persons themselves, under these dispositions it is that they are readily excited to anger.
2. But people feel anger towards those who laugk at them excessively, and gibe, and scoff at them, for these treat them with contumely; with such also as hurt them in all particulars, of such a nature as are tokens of contumely: these of course must be such as neither are in requital for any thing, or beneficial to those who are the agents ὃ; for this is enough to make it appear to be an act solely of contumely: towards those also who underrate and despise what themselves take a warm interest in; thus all those who are fond of philosophy, are angry if any one undervalues phi- losophy; so, too, they who embrace the notion of an universal idea’, are nettled if a person despises the doctrine; and as regards other things in a similar manner. But all this will be felt much more keenly, if these persons suspect that the qualities so under- rated do not really belong to them, or not completely, or not firmly, or that they do not appear to belong to them; since, if they conceive themselves to be very strong in the points on which they happen to be ral- lied, they do not regard it*, and anger is felt to- § Here also Aristotle maintains the absolute exclusion of any thing like self-interest as characteristic of this species of ὀλι- γωρία. See note on the last chapter.
7 Alluding to Plato’s doctrine of ideas, which Aristotle him- self so warmly controverted. See Eth. Nich. i. 6.
§ See chap. iv. § 14, where he says, we are fond of those who praise us on points where we esteem ourselves weak.
15 17 Towards friends, in a greater degree than towards such as are not friends; because people conceive it to be more fitting to receive good at their hands than not: also towards those who have "θη in the habit of honouring or bestowing consideration on them, if, on the contrary, they do not keep on the same terms with them; because people conceive themselves de- spised by them, for otherwise they would do as be- fore. ‘Towards those also who do not requite a kind ness, or who do not return an equivalent, towards those also who thwart them, if they be inferiors; for these all appear to despise them, the latter as though they were their inferiors, the former as though [the kindness had been received] from inferiors. Men feel it also in a greater degree towards persons of no account, should they slight them; for anger is sup- posed to arise from a slight, and to exist towards persons whose conduct misbecame them; now it be- comes inferiors to make no manifestation of slight. Towards friends, anger is felt if they do not or speak not well; and still more so if they do the contrary; also if they should not perceive us to be in want, just as the Plexippus® of Antipho was angry with Meleager; for not to perceive this is a token of slight, since in regard to those for whom we feel . deference, this does not escape our notice: towards those also it is felt who exult in their misfortunes; and, in a word, towards such as are in good spirits amid their misfortunes; for this marks either a foe, or one who manifests slight: towards those also who do not care if they give us pain; wherefore, men feel anger towards those who announce evil tidings. Against those also is anger felt who either readily listen to, or scrutinize our failings; for they resemble persons who slight us, or who are our enemies; since a friend sympathizes with one, and all men, as their peculiar failings are scrutinized, feel pain. More- 9 Plexippus was a brother of Althea, Meleager’s mother, and a character in a play of Antipho’s, now lost. 10 And the first bringer of unwelcome news Hath but a losing office. Shakspeare.
“Map. 116] RHETORIC. nl over men feel anger towards those who slight them wards in the presence of five descriptions of persans, viz. in eis the presence of those whom they emulate, whom they pratt be admire, by whom they are desirous of being ad- fore per :...sons of mired, in whose presence they are alive to delicacy % 46. of feeling, and before those who have a delicacy of scriptions, feeling towards them; if before these any one should i. Whom slight them, they feel anger more sensibly: with ‘ey em™™ those also do men feel angry who slight them in such ii. Whom respects, as it is disgraceful for them not to stand up they ad- in defence of; in regard to parents, for instance, or ii. By children, wives, or persons in subjection: with those, whom _ too, who make no return of favours; for the slight pa ite then is contrary to what is becoming: and with those mired. who play off sarcasms upon them when seriously en- iv. Before gaged; for sarcasm has an air of contempt: also with es aie those who benefit others, if they do not also benefit sensible of them; since this also carries an air of contempt, the paar aa not thinking them worthy what all are worthy of. + °-3ore Also the letting a man escape our memory is a thing those who very apt to provoke anger; for example, the nearly ae forgetting even his name, since forgetfulness seems of feeling to be an indication of slight; because forgetfulness towards arises from disregard, and disregard is a kind of 53°™ slight. Now, it has been told you against whom men 24. feel anger, and under what dispositions, and why!!. = It evidently will be needful for an orator to work up 97, his audience by his speech, into such a frame of mind as that under which men are prone to anger, and his adversary, too, as being obnoxious to that on account of which men feel anger, and as being such an one 88 people feel anger against. 41 Vide this chapter, ᾧ 3, CHAP. III.
The Persons susceptible of Placability, also those towards whom, and the occasions on which τέ is felt.
1. As the feeling anger is the opposite of being ap- peased, and anger itself of placability, we must as- — certain with what dispositions men are placable, towards whom they are thus affected, and by what 2 Placa- means they are appeased. Let placability, then, be es de- defined to be “‘asubsiding and appeasementof anger!.” 3 To. Now, if men feel anger towards those who slight wards _ them, and if slight be voluntary, it is plain that they ee are placable in regard to those who do no such thing, placable, OF who either do so, or appear to do so, involuntarily:.
4, towards those also who wish the contrary of what they do; and those who behave in the same way toward themselves also, for no one seems likely him- 5. There- self to be guilty of slight towards himself. Men pentant. are thus disposed also towards such as acknowledge and repent of their guilt; for taking their feeling of pain for what they have done as a punishment, they are appeased:—there is proof of this in the case of chastising servants; for we chastise more vio- lently those who contradict us, and deny their guilt; but towards such as acknowledze themselves to be justly punished, we cease from our wrath”; the rea- son of which is, that the denial of what is evident is a sort of impudence, and impudence is slight and contempt: therefore we are not aliye to sense of shame, in regard to those whom we despise very 6. The much. Men are thus disposed also towards those humble. who humble themselyes before them, and do not 1 This passion, different from all the others, supposes the previous existence of another in the mind, the emotions of which it may be said to allay more properly, than to be itself an emotion. Rochefoucault, Maxim 328.
2 « A soft answer turneth away wrath.”
3 See the instance of Ahab’s humiliation of himself, (1 Kinga xxi. 27,) and that of the Ninevites, (Jonah iij. 5, etc.,) w which we may add David.
contradict their imputations; for they appear to ac- knowledge themselves inferior; but inferiors fear us, and no one who fears is guilty of slight. But the fact that anger ceases towards such as humble themselves, even dogs evince by their not biting those who sit as suppliants. Placability is also felt towards such as are earnestly attentive, where they are themselves attentive; for they think themselves regarded with attention, and not despised: towards such as [subsequently to their manifesting slight] have gratified us in more important points, and with those who implore us, and deprecate our anger; for these are more humble: towards those also, who are not given to contumely, nor to jeering one; and who do not manifest slight towards any one, or to- wards those alone who are not good men, and not towards such as we ourselves are. In a word, we should consider the subject of placability, from the opposite of the doctrine of anger. Once more, it is felt towards those whom men fear, or have a delicacy toward; for so long as they are thus affected, they are not influenced by anger; since it is impossible to feel anger and fear at the same time. Again, people either do not feel anger at all, or feel it in a less degree, towards those who have themselves act- 7. Those who are attentive to us.
8.
ed under the influences of anger; for these appear’ to have acted, not from any motive of slight; for no one who is angry with you slights you; since slight is unattended by pain, anger, however, is so attend- ed. ‘Thus are they also disposed towards such as re- gard them with respect.
It is evident, also, that men are placable, when in a _ frame of mind contrary to the feeling of anger; thus in amusements, in mirth, in festivity, amid rejoicings, or a course of success and of gratification, or, in a word, when in a state of freedom from pain, and amid chastened pleasure and virtuous hope. Those, too, who have suffered some time to elapse, and are not fresh from the influence of anger; for time makes anger cease*. Also vengeance previously taken on Cleon was aware of this when he exclaimed against ἃ In what situations men are apt to be placable, and how affected.
13. When venge- ence has deen taken.
16. When the object is insensi- bie.
114 ARISTOTLE [zoox 1.
one object allays the anger felt against another, even if he be more violent. For which reason, Philocrates, when some one asked him “ how it was, as the popu- lace were enraged with him, that he did not make his defence,” very justly said, “I will not do it yet.”— “But when will you?”—‘“I will do it, when I see some one else criminated.” For people, after they have exhausted their anger on some other object, become placable; which happened in the case of Er gophilus; for the populace, though more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, yet acquitted him, because, on the day before, they had condemned Cal- listhenes to death. “Men are thus disposed if they have convicted the object, and if he have suffered a greater ill than they, with all their anger, would have themselves inflicted; for they think they have got- ten, as it were, their revenge. Again, if they are aware that they are themselves unjust, and suffer de- servingly>; because anger is not felt at what is just; for in that case men no longer conceive themselves sufferers contrary to what is becoming; but anger was defined to be such a feeling. On which account we should preface punishment with a sort of lecture; for thus even slaves feel less indignant at being pun ished. Moreover they are thus disposed, if they conceive that the sufferer will not perceive that he is punished by them, and in return for what they have have suffered; for anger is felt against individuals: second hearing of the Mitylenweans:---- Θαυμάζω μὲν τῶν χρόνου διατριβὴν ἐμποιησάντων, 6 ἐστὶ πρὸς τῶν ἠδικηκότων μᾶλλον. ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχετο".- Thucyd. iii. 38.
Χρόνος γὰρ εὐμαρὴς Feds. Soph. Elec. 179.
5 Well illustrated in Richard the First’s pardon of Bertrand de Gourdon, on his death-bed:—“‘ Wretch,” said the king, ** what have I ever done to you to oblige you to seek my life?”’ ** What have you done to me?” coolly replied the prisoner: “you killed, with your own hands, my father and my ‘two brothers; and you iniended to have hanged myself,” etc. Richard, struck with the reasonableness of this reply, and humbled by the near approach of death, ordered Gourdon to = set at liberty, and a sum of money to be given to him.
ume.
CHAP. 111.} RHETORIC. 115 and this is plain from the definition. Hence is it said in the poem with great propriety, “ Go, say twas Ulysses, subverter of cities,” etc.; as though the hero had not been revenged, unless Polyphemus perceived both by whom®, and in return for what’, he suffered. So that men are not angry with any who are no longer sensible; neither any longer with those who are dead 8, as being persons who have endured the extremity of suffering; nor with those who will not be susceptible of pain, nor feel the punishment inflicted, a point of which those affected by anger are desirous. On which account the poet, wishing to restrain Achilles from his anger against Hector now that he is dead, aptly says, “‘In his madness he is vexing a senseless clod.” It is evident that arguments must be deduced from the topics here furnished, by those who would appease their audience; by working up the hearers themselves into feelings such as I have described; and those with whom they are enraged, either as ob- jects of fear, or as deserving reverence, or as persons who have benefited them, or as having been involun- tary agents, or as now exceedingly pained at what they have done.
® Thus Gloucester, m Henry VI., Down, down to hell, and say—I sent thee thither, etc. 7 Again, in the Aneid, the hero tells Turnus, Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas Immolat. δ Πᾶσα δυσμένεια τῷ βίῳ τούτῳ συναποτίθεται. Synes.
Quoted in Hooker, v. § 7, vol. ii. p. 26. Compare Byron’s tragedy of the Two Foscari, act v. last scene: Barsariao (to Loredano).—What art thou writing, With such an earnest brow, upon thy tablets? LoREDANO (pointing to the Doge’s body).—That he has patd me.* 9.1; ha ta.” An historical fact; see History of Venice, PF.
Darus, p. ΜΝ vol. ii, ον "3 17. How we are to ap- pease the audience, wards whom we feel it.
CHAP. IV.
The Characters towards whom men entertain friendly feel- ings, or hatred; and the reasons why.
. LET us y tardies the characters towards whom men bear friendly feelings, and hatred, and the reasons why they do so; setting out with a definition of friendliness and the act of cherishing this feeling.
i- Let the bearing friendly feeling, then, be defined to be “the wishing a person what we think good, for his sake and not for our own, and, as far as is in our power, the exerting ourselves to procure it.” Anda friend is he who entertains and meets a return of this feeling.! And those people consider themselves friends who consider themselves to stand thus affected towards each other.
These considerations being laid down, of necessity it must be, that one who participates in another’s joy at good fortune, and in his sorrow at what aggrieves_ him, not from any other motive, but simply for his sake, is his friend. For every one, when that hap- pens which he wishes, rejoices; but when the con- trary happens, all are grieved. So that the pain and pleasure men feel are an indication of their wishes.
. Those, too, are friends, to whom the same things are become by this time good, and the same evil; those, too, who are friends and foes to the same persons, for these must necessarily desire similar objects. So that he who wishes for another what he does for himself, appears to be a friend to that other.- Men love also those who have benefited either themselves, or those for whom they have a regard; whether in important particulars, or with readiness”, and for their own sakes, or those whom they deem willing to . benefit them. Again, people love the friends of their friends, and such as cherish friendly feelings towards 1 Thus the feeling discussed in the Ethics is called εὔνοια ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι μὴ λανθάνουσα. Eth. Nich. viii. 2. * Bis dat, qui cito dat.
cap. iv.} HETORIC. 117 those for whom they do themselves; likewise those who are loved by such as are beloved by themselves 5 those also who are enemies to the same people, and 7.
who hate those whom they hate themselves, and those who are hated by those who also are hated by themselves; for to all these the same objects seem good as to themselves; so that they wish for things which are good to them, both which were laid down to be characteristic of a friend. Moreover men love 8. those who benefit them in regard to money matters, and the security of life; on which account people The brave honour the liberal and brave. ‘They love also the ὡς ἢ like: just, of which character they esteem those who do 9. The not live at the cost of others, such are all who just. are supported by their bodily labour, and of these are husbandmen, and among the rest handicraftsmen Husband- in particular. They love also the temperate, for ™e”- they are not unjust; and those who are disengaged ~ from business, for the same reason. We love also 11. those of whom we wish to become the friends, should they appear to desire it also. Of this sort are those who are good in respect to moral excellence, and men of approved character, either among all men, or among the best men, or those who are held in admiration by ourselves, or who themselves admire us.
Again, we love those who are pleasant companions 12. Com. for passing time, or spending a day with; of this panions, description are the good-tempered, and such as are “™ not fond of chiding those who err, and are not quarrelsome or contentious*. For all people of this sort are fond of dispute; but such as are fond of dispute give us the idea of desiring the opposite of 3 The character given by Clarendon of Sir Edward Herbert (afterwards Earl of Montgomery), one of the favourites of James I., seems to answer to Aristotle’s description of a per- son likely to conciliate friendship:—“ He pretended to no other qualifications than to understand horses and dogs very well; which his master loved him the better for, (being at his first coming to England very jealous of those who had the re- putation of great parts,) and to be believed honest and gener- ous, which made him many friends, and left him no enemy.” Clarendon’s History, vol. i. p. 59.
15. Those neat in ilress.
17. The forgiving.
what we do. Also those who have a happy turn in passing and taking a joke; for both seem bent on the same things as their neighbours, being able both to endure being rallied and neatly rallying others *. Men love also those who praise their good qualities, and particularly such as they apprehend not to belong to them: also those who are neat in their appearance, their dress, and their whole manner of living. Also those who do not reproach them with errors, nor their own benefits; for both these descriptions of people have an air of reproving them. People admire also those who forget old grievances; and who do not treasure up grounds of quarrel, but are easily re- conciled; because of whatever disposition they show themselves towards others, people naturally think they will prove to be of towards themselves also: as also those who do not talk scandal, nor inform themselves of the ills either of their neighbours or themselves, but of their good points only; for this is the con- duct of a good man. We are friendly disposed also towards those who are not at cross purposes with us when angry, or seriously engaged; for all such people are fond of dispute: towards those also who comport themselves seriously towards us; thus, for instance, those who admire us, or consider us worthy . men, and take a pleasure in our society, and who are thus affected in regard particularly to points about which ourselves are desirous to be admired, or to ap- pear excellent or agreeable: as also towards our equals, and those who have the same objects in view, supposing they do not clash with us°, and that their livelinood arise not from the same profession, for thus * See Eth. Nich. iv. 8. 5 So long as we are imitated at a respectful distance: Non ita certandi cupidus, quam propter amorem Quod te imitari aveo: Lucretius, iii. 5.
our pride is flattered; but when this imitation has been sv suc- cessfully continued as to resemble competition, our envy is quickly awakened. To this point Rochefoucault well ob- serves,—‘‘ Those who endeavour to imitate us we like much better than those who endeavour to egua/ us. Imitation is a sign of esteem, but competition of envy.’? Maxims, No. 113, cuaP. Iv.] RHETORIC. 119 arises an instance of the proverb, “ Potter hates pot- ter ®.” We stand thus affected towards those also who are desirous of the same objects with ourselves, and which it is possible for us to participate in as well as them; otherwise the same collision takes place in this case: towards those also, in regard to whom men have themselves in such a way as, while they do not hold them cheap, not to feel shame on mere matters of opinion. With this feeling do peo- ple regard those also in respect to whom they feel shame about matters really shameful: and those be- fore whom they are studious to stand approved, and by whom they wish to be emulated, yet without be- ing envied, all these men either love as friends, or wish to become their friends; also those with whom they would co-operate toward some good, were it not that greater ills are likely thereby to befall them- selves: and such as regard with friendly feeling, the absent equally with the present; on which account all love those who manifest this disposition in regard to the dead. Also men entirely love those who are particularly zealous for their friends and never aban- don them; for eminently beyond all the good, people love those who are good as friends. They also love those who do not dissemble towards them; of this class are such as mention their own failings; for it has been said already, that before friends we feel no shame about mere matters of opinion; if, then, he who is so ashamed has not the feelings of a friend, the man who is without such shame bears a resem- blance to one who has friendly feelings. Also we love those who do not inspire us with fear, and be- fore whom we feel confidence; for no one loves a person whom he fears’. But the species of friend- ship are companionship, intimacy, relationship, and the like. And the efficient causes of friendship are gratuitous benefits, the rendering a service unsoli- cited, and the not disclosing it after it has been ren- 6 Two of a trade can ne’er agree. 7 There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear. L John iv. 18.
22. Those who imi- tate us.
26. Such as love the dead 27. The sincere.
28. Three sorts of friend- ship.
29. Causes of friend- ship: and of hatred.
81. Six points of compari- son be- tween an- er and tred.
dered; for thus done the favour appears to be solely for the sake of your friend himself, and from no other motive.
The subject of hatred, however, and of bearing it, may, it is plain, be considered by taking the contra- ries. But the efficient causes of hatred are anger, vexatiousness, calumny.
1. Now anger arises out of something which has reference to ourselves; hatred, however, even inde- pendently of any thing having reference to ourselves, since if we conceive a person to be of a certain de- scription, we bear hatred towards him. 2. And our anger invariably has reference to individual objects, as to Callias* or Socrates; but hatred may be borne even to whole classes; for every one hates the cha- racter of a thief and an informer. 3. Again, the one feeling is to be remedied by time; the other is in- curable. 4. Also the first is a desire of inflicting pain on its object, the last of doing him deadly harm; for the angry man wishes to be felt®, to him who bears hatred this matters not; and all. things which give pain may be felt; but what does harm in the highest degree, is least capable of being felt, for instance, in- justice and folly, for the presence of vice does not at all pain [him to whom it is present]. 5. And anger is attended by pain, hatred is not; for he who is affect- ed by anger is pained, but he who is affected by 8. Callias is attacked by Luvian in his dialogue, entitled Τιμὼν ἢ Μισάνθρωπος, where Mercury, taxing Plutus with not going to those who deserve riches, says, ᾿Αριστείδην καταλιπὼν Ἱππονίκῳ καὶ Καλλὶᾳ προσήεις. p. 232, Scrip. Grec.; and several times in Aristophanes.
® So chap. iii. § 16. It was remarked that a man who is © affected by anger does not consider that he has his revenge, unless the object perceive both at whose hands, and in return for what, he suffers. From this, as from many other of its distinctive characteristics, anGER will be confessed to be a more generous passion than HATRED. To this purpose Lord Bacon well remarks, that ‘‘ Some, when they take revenge, are desirous the party should know whence it cometh: this is the more generous; for the delight seemeth to be not so much in doing the hurt, as in making the party repent; but base and crafty cowards are like the arrow that flieth im the dark.” Essays: Of Revenge.
omar. v.| RHETORIC. 221 hatred is not. 6. The former, too, had many ills befallen the object of his anger, might be inclined to pity him; the latter would not, in any case; for the former wishes the object of his anger to suffer in his turn, the latter desires the extinction of the object of his hate!®. Out of these heads, then, it is plain that the orator may both prove those to be friends and enemies who really are such, and render such those who are not, and may do away the assertions of people on the subject, and may draw over those who hesitate whether an act was done from motives of anger or hatred, to whatsoever side he may fix on.
CHAP. V.
The nature of Fear, and the objects which excite it, and the dispositions under which men are afraid.