BOOK XII.] ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLE's METAPHYSICS. ISZXiil In chcpter iii. we have an assertion made in the outset, of the existence of demonstrations and definitions respecSng the in the case of sensible ma^tudes, and this would seem separability of to militate against the separability of mathematical maJusS***^*" entities. Certainly this position cannot be established entities. by those who regard these mathematical entities from the point of view from which they are nsnally beheld. And thit reasoning is again confirmed by a reference to harmonics and optics, for they do not take cognisance of different objects from those that fall witnin the province of our visual or vocal organs. It must, then, be admitted, that if any separation takes place, it is one that is purely niental, as is proved by a reference to the sciences of the geometrician and the arithmetician.
In the conclusion of this chapter Aristotle exposes g,^^ Arfstip- the error of supposing that the mathematical sciences pic error in are in no way conversant with what is good and with what reg«jd of is fair. But an immediate refutation of this false view "** ®™* *^'' in regard of mathematics may be found in this one fact, that it is with the most important species of the fair — ^the to /coXov— namely, of order and svmmetry, or proportion and definition, that aU these sciences, in the most eminent aegree, frame their demonstrations. So that, from what is contained in both of these chapters, Aristotle is of opinion that we have no reason for contending for the inherence of mathematical entities in sensibles; and if, moreover, they do not involve a separable subsistence, it is plain that thev do not exist at all, or if they do, it must be after some such mode, and, therefore, perhaps the plain truth is, they do not exist at all.
Alter the demolition of these mathematical entities, Aristotle next proceeds to attack the Ideal hypothesis of and v.*iSe ui Plato, which already has been brought before our notice attack on the in book I., yet not with the same completeness or fiaiish j.^jjj,*^®®'^ °' as here, though, indeed, most of the arguments found in book Xn. can be pointed out likewise in book I. We are not, how- ever, to consider tiiem as unworthv of attention because remarks of a similar import have already found their place in other parts of the Metaphysics; for, as Mr. Maurice observes, "Aristotle's repetitions of himself, or the reports of his difPerent pupils, generally clear awar many difficulties." It is to be also remembered, as Aristotle himseu states, that in his criticism upon the Ideal theory, he in no wise connects the nature of ideas and of numbers together, as was done by certain speculators who wished to blend the systems of Plato and Pythagoras together.
In the first place, then, as to the original of the Ideal theory, Aristotle considers it to have been a £• ^?*l°"i!!S.i mere reaction against the Heraclitics, for the purpose Heraciitism.
of securing the permanence of what those sceptics thought to sweep away in their theory of flux. Ail sensible objects IxZziT ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLE*S METAFBTSK^ [BOOK XIL are in a state of continual flux, says the follower of Heraclitus; then says the Flatonist, if we are to have such a thing as scientific or even prudential knowledge of anything at all, there must exist certain dif- ferent natures, endued with qualities of permai.ence, independent of those that fall under the notice of our senses; fc r it is quite plain that there cannot subsist a science of things that are ever m a condition resembling the waters of a river, flowing onwards. So far for the relation of the system of Heraclitus to t£it of Plato. A'm.»««4i„.»«> There was, however, another philosopher who midit of the Socratic DC said to have exercised a more palpable and inimediate on tije ^deaiis- influence upon the rise and growth of Idealism, and ticp oBop y. ^jj^^ philosopher was Socrates. The inquiries which Socrates pursued in regard of the moral virtues gave an impulse to Idealism, because, in consequence of those inquiries, he was led into investigations about universal definition; aud this was the fure- runner of a more complete examination into the ver^ nature of things —the TO ri eori — which he already had partially pierced into in his ethical speculations. Strictly speaking, indeed, Aristotle considers that Socrates was not the first pmlosopher who busied himself in this department of knowledge, for that already Democritus had done so, though, to be sure, to a small extent; and the Pythagoreans, who connected the formal or substantive principle of things with num- bers; yet Socrates it was, undoubtealy, wno, by bringing forward plainly before men the t6 ri ivri., was the actuating cause in the production of Idealism.
10. This Now, the Platonists tlius borrowed their system from ' influence was Socrates; and in order to conceal their obligations in the KSonists ^^* ^*^' *^®^ imparted a separate subsistence to of some of the the univcrsals of the Socratics, which Socrates himself ■J««"fditte8of had omitted to do, and they additionally invested them their system, ^j^^ ^|^ appellation of ideas; and yet really this was a source of absurdity in their svstem, for they thereby were forced to acknowledge the existence of ideas in the case of all universals.
And this mode of procedure was just as if a man were of thu?'*' ° ^ complain of the intricacies of numeration in the case of a small sum, but when that sum was increased to one many degrees higher, should boast of his ability to calculate the entire consequent upon this disappearance of anterior difficulties! These ideas or universals of the Platonists, in point of fact, were more numerous than singulars — such as fall under the notice of the senses; and in endeavouring to give an account of certain pheno- mena^ and at the same time inveighing against the obstacles they were obliged to encounter, they have regularly abandoned the real subjects of inquiry, and passed on from these into regions of specu« lation where the perplexities they came in contact with were far more complicated, but by themselves considered as tblqxq easy ol •olutioiL BOOK XII.] ANALYSIS OF ARI8T0TLE*S IJSTAFHTSIOS. IZXXV Thus the Ideal hypothesis would seem to prove too much,' for the ideas transcend the actual phenomena in theory provei multitude; so that, wliat are we to say ot the surplus P too much. Must there not in such a case be ideas where there can be dii^covered nothing as corresponding with them in the nature of things, in the sphere of actuality P But there is not a ^ ^ -i • fiingle mode advanced by the Idealists as one according ^int*. * *" to which the ideas subsist that can after all be shown hj them to be such in reality, and thus this hypothesis may be said signally to fail in its efforts to prop up its system. And more than this; the very arguments which the Flatonists would advauce in defence of their theory will be found on inspection, in point of fact, to he quite destructive of its pretensions to truth.
The utmost length to which we can go is to admit jj how far we the existence of iaeas or forms in the case of those may admit the things that may be classified severally under systems of ^stem of the science as their objects; this confessedly is a method of * °"" * dealinff with the question that harmonises with the rational principles dedacu)le from the sciences. But, in short, the prin- h. The idealist ciples the Idealists go upon cjuite overturn what they overturns hu themselves woidd desire the existence of, even in prefer- ®^"* t*»eory. enoe to that of the forms; and what they say in regard of the forms as participants of things, is only an assertion of the same absurdities unaer the disguise of a Cerent phraseology.
But why, as he proceeds to show in chapter v., should 15. xotai in- this Ideal hypothesis command our assent, when it is lufflciencv of palpably insufficient to account for the actual pheno- {Jcste fS the*** mena it professes to furnish a solution of. Has it not ends for which been advanced by Plato, as what points to adequate it^ advanced; causes for the production of things Natural and Supra- ^ ^' ^' natural P but what, in this way, do forms contribute either to the generation or corruption of things cognisant to our senses, or to the etemal elements that may be msengaged therefrom P In the Ideal theory, we cannot put our finger upon a single efficient or alterative principle, nor can its advocates show what service it is that thej propose conferring upon the interests of science in general by this nypothesis about forms. They certainly cannot estabush their asser- tion of these ideas constituting the substance of things; for if such were true, they woidd be inherent in things; neither is it true to say that they in any way are related to Sie existence — the ease — of things; f Dr if so, they would be discovered resident in their parti- cipants. Thus the Ideal hypothesis would seem to inyolve causality; but it is a mere shadow of it, and the reasons advanced for the su[)- port of such are capable of an easy refutation — treasons advocated originally by Anaxagoras, and subsequently to his time by EadoxuB.
0) Ritter gives us an analysis of Aristotle's refutation of the XdeiJ theory, if T«l« III. of lus History of PhilosopLy, Monisot's translation.
kxxvi ANALYSIS OP aEISTOTLB's METAPHYSICS. [bOOK XIL 16. Further But, after all, the Idealists pat forth a]^:iiraents to inconsistendes prove their theory, which are entirely insufficient foi ayttemoi^ ^ that puTpose; nor, indeed, can any of the nsnal methods Plato. advanced for the establishment of their hypothesis be demonstrated as competent for such an end. And, moreover, any one who chose to apply himself to the subject would be able to collect toffether many mipossibilities in reference to an opinion such as that acmered to by the Flatonists, and quite sufficient to overrule its claims upon the acquiescence of the philosophic world. For instance, to speak of ideas as the models or paradigms of things is quite absurd and silly. And ajgain, how are the ideas substances of tiling, if they at the same tmie are allowed by the Flatonists to subsist separately therefrom, as is admitted by Flato himself, in the 17. Aristotle's I*™^^^-.^^^ ^^6 grand objection against the Ideal grand objection hypothesis, and one which the advocates of it can never id*aS\h*^* reply to, is that it entirely ignores the efficient grineory. ^jp^g^ fQj. ^|jj^^ ^g qoite fail to discern anything m it like causality; and what renders the perception of this fundamental fallacy in their system the more difficult is, that the Flatonists them- selves have brought forward their doctrine as the wisest solution that has yet been offered of the theory of causation. This last para- graph may be regarded as containmg the sum and substance of Aristotle's entire attack on the Idealism of Flato, and he now passes on to the philosophy of Fythagoras, having completed his survey of that of Flato in chapter v.
The speculations which follow in chapter vi. are not occu^^ed'with ^^^® ®^ interesting and instructive as those which have discussions gone before; for the obscurity is sufficiently dense, respecting mdced, with which Aristotle discusses the question, as num era. ^ whether we are to consider numbers as separable substances, and the primary causes of things. For example, we are favoured with inquiries sucn as these, — as to there being a difference in species bitween what is primary and consecutive in number, as to the effect of this upon monads, m making them incommensurable or incomparable one with another, as to the different modes of numeration, and the error of confounding ideal and mathematical number together, as well as denying the monadic nature of number in general, which last dogma was peculiar to the Fythagoreans, and formed a difficulty peculiar to their philosophy.
Id. chapter vii. we have a discussion of the question, on the subject ^ *^ whether monads are capable of comparison, or of monads in commensuratiou, one with another; and it would be other**"'** ^"^^ needless to set down the discussion, which may be examined by a reference to the chapter itself in the Metaphysics; for it is not what admits of being put in any other form more simple, or intelligible, than that which it wears in thai place.
BOOK XII. J ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE S METAPHYSICS. IxXXt!^ In chapter viii. we liave another curious examination 20 cj,a», vui into the difference between a number and a monad; a isieve^ difference that must subsist either according to quantity afirainst the or according to quality. Aristotle, also, inquires as to ^ a«onc»' whether number be mute or infinite, and remarks upon the diffl* culties of fixing any limit thereto. He also enumerates certain intri- cate deductions consequent upon the system of the Pythagoreans; ftud he then boldly challenges them to prove, if they can, their Theory of Unity as the substance of thin^.
In chapter ix. we have the same sort of mvestigations still earned on; for instance, as to whether number is 21. chap. ix. compounded of unity and plurality. And this question fSIther* is connected with that of the finity or infinity of number, speculations examined into in chapter viii. Having brought these numbers^ discussions to a close, Aristotle sums up his remarks on these schools of philosophy at the close of chapter ix.; and thev are well worthy of study in the original. He adauces the discordancy prevalent amongst the earliest advocates of these theories as the plainest indication of their fallacy, and of the confusion which really lurked at the bottom of their systems. There was a constant current of vacillation ebbing and flowing throughout their entire philosophy; what one school embraced the other discarded; and thus, in reality, was truth sacrificed to the interests of party. Those philosophers, for instance, of this Supranatural school, schools ofThe who admitted the existence of mathematical number, Supranaturai- merely did so from a horror of the Ideal theory; and \^^^ accounted thus unconsciously discarded the element of truth found therein. On the other hand, those who were desirous of maintaining the tenets of the Idealists as well as of the Pythagoreans, perceiving no mode whereby they could account for the subsistence of mathe- matical independent of formal number, have identified both together as regards their formal principles; but, indeed, in point of fact, they have entirely abolished mathematical number from their theories, which, however peculiar to themselves, are of a wholly unmathe- matical tendency. After all, Plato is the only philo- sopher who argues either correctly or consistently on consistent? °°* these subjects; and the inconsistencies and falsehood discoverable throughout the entire philosophy of the Pythagoreans may be considered generally as a positive proof against its truth The foundation of this school is improperly laid, — their assumptions in the first instance are false; and, as Epicharmus lays down correctly enough, "We can never fairly make good any assertions wber» our arguments are drawn from principles not fairly esta- blished." This brings the Aristotelian review of the Pythagorio philosophy to its conclusion.
The end of this book is taken up with a sort of 24. conciuiion •ummary of what has gone before, in reference to the ofbookxii.
IxxXViii ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLE*S METAPHYSICS. [bOOK XIII contains a Platonists and Fytha^reans. Aristotle remarks, as a •ummary re- sort of apologj for his examination of these systems, PiatoniVSnd *^** ^^^I properly belonged to metaphysics, and, there- Pythagoric fore, he nas thus at some lenMh been induced to dwell systems. upon them, to the exclusion of a consideration of mere objects of sense; for these fall outside the province of the meta- physician, and within that of the physicist or natund philosopher. The great line, too, of demarcation to be drawn across the Supra- natum philosophy, is one which subdivides it into two leaoing sections; one of which contends for the ideas as constituting what is supra-sensual, and the other for the numbers as sucL AnstotJe, accordingly, offers some few remarks in this and the next chapter, as regarous the Idealistic hvpothesis, and as regards the advocates of number; that is, not formal number, which he nas already examined, but purely mathematical number, "niis discussion is reserved for the last book of the Metaphysics.
BOOK XIII.
BOOK XIII.
We come now to book XIII. (al. XIV.), which bringa book XIII. *^c Metaphysics to its close; and though some of the speculations therein are devoid of interest, yet the chapters on the existence of good in the world are well worthy of our careful study; for they dimise much light around the rest of the speculations of the Stagyrite, especially the character of his theolo- 2. Chap. i. on gical System, properly so called. Chapter i, of this contrariety book is taken up with an examination of the relation cipie^"* P'*°" subsisting between ccHitrariety and causation; and the student is referred to the text itself for information on this topic, which is treated of with such obscurity as to make Taylor believe that Aristotle was not expressing here his own genuine senti- ments. Such as they are, however, they may be better understood by a reference to the commentaries of Syrianus, to be found in Brandis, and a translation of which is given in Taylor.
„,.. Chapter iL opens with the discussion of a very impor tegaidmg ' taut question, as to whether we can predicate composi- things eternal, tion of things that are eternal, or whether the consider- polite^nature?. ^^^^^ ^^ thiugs eternal as composite natures would not, in point of reality, ignore their existence altogether. Ana, further, for the decision of tms question he appeals to a prin- ciple abready established as to the essential nature of the Eternal 4. Our know- Substance consisting in energy. This leads him to an ledge of "non- examination into our knowledge of the "non-ens," sug- *"*•" gested by a quotation from the writings of Parmenides; •nd (rem this he passes on to inquire how entity can constitute { lOOK XIII.] ANALYSIS OF 4BI9T0TLE*R XETAFRrSIOS. Izxxis plurality, or how relatives are pkraL In fact, in general, it may be stated that this inqniry in regard of plurality extends itself to the other categories. Ana the cMpter concludes with the inyestigation of the grounds, if any, for the subsistence of niunbers, whether ideal or mathematical.
In chapter iiL we have a sort of sketch of the 5. chap. iii. several systems prevalent amongst the advocates for regardbig numbers as the substance of things. Some, for in- '**"°^'«"* stance, identify ideas with numbers; soma again, identify numbers with things; and, again, some identify matnematical natures with number; and we also are presented with a brief review of these systems, which takes up the entire of this chapter. In e. chap. w. aa doapter iv., which contains a portion of what obviously regards the to belongs to chapter iii., we have a most remarkable sub- *'y°*°'* ject of inquiry touched upon; namely, how we are to account for the existence of what plainly meets us on every side, viz. the Good — the TO dyaOov. Various systems have been put forth on this vital question; but they may be reduced to two, namely, those on the one hand who maintain the antecedence of the rb dyaOhv as an efficient principle; and on the other, those who would make it out to he nothing else than a mere result in the way of natural and necessary development. This, undoubtedly, is the s&tement to be found in the fourth chapter of this book; and the student will be reminded of the identity of this controversy with that which has been perpetuated from the age of Aristotle downwards to our own. Aris- totle adduces the authority of the Magi, and of the iippSts hi$ Sages, the Sophoi,' of antiquity to support the theory of theory about the antecedence of the good, and of its being a para- byViefereiKe mount principle of Creation. And in support of the to antiquity, same, he appeals to the systems of the ancient poets, who likewise agreed with mQ Magi, as is evidenced in their assigning the sovereignty amongst their first principles, not to such negations as Chaos or Night, but to Jupiter, whom they recognised as a source of positive dominion. We have also in this chapter an examination mto the relation between the rh ayaB6v and the r6 tv. And that the former does not, nor cannot, constitute the latter is illustrated by an appeal to the Ideal Theory.
In chapter v. we have a discussion as to the conse- g ^ ^ ^^ quences of a non-classification of the Good — the gpecting the t» t6 oya^oi^— amongst first principles, and it chiefly turns i^a06vMA on the fallacy of supposing the less perfect to be antece- "' ^""^ ^^^* dent to what is more perfect. Also, Aristotle inquires as to the mode after which numbers consist from first principles, whether by mixture, or composition, or as a thing springs from seed. This leads to a denial of the substantive character of numbers, and an asser- ( 1 ) This vas the designation for scientific men previous to the age of Pythagoras, r%» was the first to be styled a '* philosopher." Vide Diog. Laertius, Intioduenon.
9 Xe ANILTSIB OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHT8ICS. [BOOK XUL tion of the Tagoeness prevalent as to the mode of their causality.
9. Chap. yi. ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ chapter, which is the last, contiaues a experimental discussion of the Same topic, and tests the validity of faHacy'o?the ***® theories about numbers as causes, by examining Pythagoric somc of the instances that have been brought forward system of |jy the supporters of this system, aud exposing the ab« num ra. surdity of the same. Chapters v. and vL are well worthy of attention; as they touch upon certain departments of speculation of the most vital importance, and the iulerest in which continues unabated to the present day.
10. Aim of the Having thus brought this Analysis to its termination, foregoing the hope Is expressed that it may prove of assistance to Analysis. students desirous of becoming acquainted with the metaphysical system of Aristotle. The plan pursued has been to endeavour to show the thread of connexion that runs tiirougli the Metaphysics, to explain the doctrines from time to time laid down there, and in general to discover as far as possible the drift and tendency of the entire Treatise. And all this seems more attainable by Bekker's arrangement of the several books, which has been followed, than that which has been proposed by Dr Gillies, probably in imitation of Petiti,^ and censured by Taylor,* with every possible show of reason.
11. Transcend- From the Analysis it maj be seen that the aim of the entaiismofthe Stagyritc is eminently transcendental, and the whole Metaphysics, ^^j.^ jg based on the supposition of the existence of a something that is capable of and actually involves a separable subsistence, independent of and superior to those objects that fall under the notice of our senses. And it is through the prin- ciple of causation that we are enabled to ascend upwards to this supra-sensual substance; and, therefore, we may observe the con- stant struggle of Aristotle, jn his metaphvsical system, to dissipate the obscurity that hung around the principle of efficiency in the philo- sophic world. This is quite apparent in his review of the Greek ))hilosophy, in his elucidation oi the relation between matter and form and between energy and capacity, and in his mode of refuting 12. Does this *^'® IdesX Hypothesis of Plato. Still, however, his asser- amount to tion of the necessity of the existence of a certain supra* an a^ertion sensual substancc may fall very far short of a demon- existence t stration of God's existence; and the examination of this point, of how far Aristotle had advanced in the develop- ment of his theological system, may form not an unsuitable conclusion to the foregoing interpretation of his Ontology. IS. incon- '^ow, it has appeared from several portions of thii •latency of Analysis,' that whenever he has ventured to do so, the Aristotle in his mention of questions strictly theological is made by (1) The proposed arrangement is given by Blakesley.
(2) In his Introduction to his translation of the Metaphysics.
(3) For instance, book I. chap. L* book V. chap. ii.. and elsewhere.
BOOK XI!I.] ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S HETAPHl&ICS. xd Aristotle with the utmost coldness, and that nowhere imperfect in the whole Treatise does he manifest ttiat interest treatment of for such suhjects which we should expect to find Theology, in a writer who really thought— as the Stagyrite did — that the pro- Tinces of Theology and Metaphysics intersected each other, nay, occupied common ground. And tnis apathy for religious speculation is, perhaps, the more inconsistent in Aristotle, because he not merely in the very outset of the Treatise acknowledges that Theology is an interchangeable term with Metaphysics, but that it is the former that imparts such dignity tc the latter, and that sheds such lustre around it as a science; so that the same complaint lies against the Meta- physics as against the Ethics, namely, the absence of the religious element from both.
As to the absence of the religious element from the ethical system of Aristotle, the student is referred absence of the to a Preface to " Selections from the Greek Text of the religious Nicomachean Ethics," written by Dr. Fitzgerald, the AnXdeU^"' present Bishop of Cork, at a time when he tilled the Ethics, chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Nothing can be more eloquent than this short dissertation on the advantages to be derived from a study of Aristotle's ethical writings; and whilst the merits of his moral system are ably pointed out, at the same time are exposed its defects, as the work of a mind not impregnated with " the truth as it is in Jesus." The perusal of this treatise is recommended as a guide towards the formation of a correct judgment on the point in question, as well as " Essays on some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion," Essay I. sections 3, 4, 5, 6.^