The absence of the religious element, however cul- pable in the Ethics, is in tJie Metaphysics an omission J^mUie^**^"^* the more flagrant, because, though Aristotle might Metaphysics have answered such an objection in the case of nis 2°J*'j-.t- * Ethics by saying that the object there was merely the enumeration of those practical duties that rest on man's social and individual nature, to the exclusion of anything in itself supra-mun- dane, yet no such apology is open for him in the case of his Meta- physics. Here he had the most ample opportunity for developing liis theological system; he must have felt how he was called upon to do so from the relations which he confessed as subsisting between Metaphysics and Theology, to such an extent as that the latter in its importance quite overshadows the former. We look in vain, how- ever, for anything like an adequate treatment of this subject, and the meagre outlines, therefore, which he has furnished us in this depart* ment,are the only data that we have to go upon in the formation of our opinions as to what Aristotle's precise noiions on the Nature ol God were, viewed in relation to the character of His Divine govern- ment over men as titeir supreme and moral Ruler.
(1) By Hi« present Archbithop of Dublin.
KCii ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S IISTAFHTSICS. [bOOK XIII: 16. How far ^ ^ AiistoUe's notions about the Nature of God, Aristotle'! the foregoing Analysis showa us what may be learned theology goes, qjj ^^^^ y^^g^. jj^*. jjj^ Tlieology seems to stop here, and there is no further amplification of the fact of Gkni's existence into the various relations in which that fact stands to man himself, and into the various duties of love, and gratitude, and obedience, which necessarily are suggested to a religious or even thinking mind on the mention of it. And on aotount of Aristotle's sflcnca as regards the moral government of God, and his Divine Providence over the world, iH connexion vnih his First (Jause, has he been stigmatized with the brand of.Atheism.
In the controversies, however, concerning the Stagy- omUsion In the ^^^^'^ Theology, this very circumstance has been over- controversy looked; and admirers of the genius of Aristotle, from a foSe'saSeism. J^i^owledge of his works, have been unable to restrain their indignation at the accusations of Atheism, — from )ersons perhaps who have never studied his writfiigs,-*>that have been hurled trom all quarters upon the head of this remarkable man. The rancour shown on either side would obviously have been mode- rated had both parties perceived the lurking ambiguity of the word Atheism, and a strict definition of that term might perhaps be the means of creating a perfect coincidence of opinion on the subject.
Now, bearing this in mind, let us try and see how the case stands. As far as the Metaphysics are concerned, let us try to discover whether there may not be one sense in which Aristotle is, and another in wiiioh he is not, an atheist; and whether the latter accep- tation may not be the one espoused by the advocated, and the former by the enemies, of the Stagyrite's philosophy.
Now, from the foregoing Analysis, as already stated, totie'soceount ^^ V^^^ Aristotle's assertion of a supra-sensual sub- of Ood free stance; (he makes the existence of this substance H^.tOrSli^^f an argument for the necessity of there being such a atheUmr science as Metaphysics;) but bv his distin^shing Physics from Metaphysics, and^ oesignating the chief division of the latter as Theology, he obviously makes his description of this substance to constitute his Theology, that is, his account of God. The question, then, among theologians, is, or rather ought to be, as to whether we are to accept such an account from Aristotle of God's Nature, and at the same time to consider this account as suffi- cient to release the Stagyrite from the imputation of being an atheist.
A istoti • From the very start., indeed, in the Metaphysics, we First Cause? ' <^an discover the transcendental tendency of Aristotle's philosophy; we can observe how in his searching foi causes, in their utmost generalisation, he does so in subservience tc (t) The student should abore all eonsult the FabricU Delectus, chap. 8, iU.
aOQK XIII.] ANALYSIS 07 AKISTOTLE's HETAPUTSICS. XcUk the interests of Ontolo|nr; we can see how he embraces such causes as are competent to solve the phenomena of design, and regularity, and excellence. We perceive nim, too, ascending from these causes upwards to a First Cause, and this First Cause we find him arraying in many of the distinctive attributes ascribed by us to God.
Let us further, however, examine as to what de- „ ^ ^ Telopment this notion of God's existence receives at Sin^S^thfa Aristotle's hands, and whether he builds thereupon First Cause the reality of God's providence over us as our Creator ^*Divinr**°* and moral Governor; and we will discover that such a providence? search will be made in vain, and that there is no trace- able connexion between his notion of a First Cause, and our depen- dence upon that First Cause, as his creatures, and the subjects of his dominion. Now, all that can be found is merely a demonstra* tion— -partly a priori, and partly a posteriori^of the existence of a First Cause, together with a short delineation of the nature of that cause, and its mode of operation. The truth seems to be this, that Aristotle, even as a theologian, did not reallv /eel himself called upon to go any further than he had done; and, accordingly, in the non-formation of a system of moral and providential government upon the fact of God's existence, the Stagyrite displays no conscioiisuess of his being guilty of a sad omissiou. And the cause of 21. Thenaion all this arose from the peculiar constitution of his mind, of his not which, impatient of bemg curbed by received opinions, ****^* *®* would have appeared following in the beaten track of other inquirers,,. if he had attempted anything further beyond the mere statement of God's existence as the logical conclusion from premises already established. And this is exemplified in the fact, that Aristotle's treatment of Theology was characterised by a violent swing from the system of his master, rlato — a remark, indeed, that is applicable to hit entire philosophy. Aristotle viewed Theology physicsuly, in contra- distinction to Plato, who viewed Physics theologically; and there- fore it is, that so broad a line may be drawn between the Academy and the Peripatetics; between the warm aspirations of the one after an ideal perfection, compared with the icy ratiocinations of the others.
Thus we may, from this, understand how it has come 22. why Ans- to pass, that Aristotle should have been recognised as totie has been an atheist. Does not he, one of his defenders would say, ^^.^^ acknowledge the existence of a first intelligent Cause P *. " * Does not ne, moreover, array this First Cause in many of the Divine attributes P How, then, can he be regarded as an atheist f Simply, the assailant would reply, because he omits to enlar^ upon the idea of God, and elucidate B.\s, relation to us here ic the world, as the Lord of this earth, and the supreme Buler of the UniTerae.
Xciv ANALYSIS Olf ABISTOTLBTS METAPHYSICS. [bOOK Xltl.
The sum comes to this, then, us has been alreadj a?he^*dete*r- ohserved, that the wisest course far for the assailants minabie by a and defenders of Aristotle to pursue on the question of the word **^ Theology, would be to settle beforehand what they Athdst. mean by the word Atheist; and thereby both parties will discover that in a certain sense Aristotle is, and in a cer- tain sense that he is not, an atheist. If we mean by an atheist one who denies the existence of a perfect intelligence subsisting of itself, and eternal therefore in its essence, and the cause of a*! things else, Aristotle can hardly be called an atheist in this sense. If, on the other hand, we mean by an atheist one who ignores the reality of God's moral government, one who strips God of those attributes that vital and practical religion rest upon, one who robs the fact of God's existence of its vivifying element for us in producing holiness, — ^if, in short, we mean by an atheist one who, thou^ he may allow the bare existence of a First Cause, yet invests that First Cause with none of those Divine characteristics that adorn it as a proper object of wor- ship, and one to be propitiated by prayer, in sucA an acceptation of the term most indiibitably must Aristotle be acknowledged an atheist.
24. This N^^ ^^^ ^*y ^® considered a fair statement of the question question of the Stagyrite's theology; but whatever viewed here in yiews one may be inclined to adopt, the study of the Metaphysics. Metaphysics is mdispensable towards the tormation of a sound judgment on this question. And it is in reference to the Metaphysics chiefly that the controversy about his atheism has been handled in the foregoing, and hardly any account has been taken of other parts of his works which might be noticed as confirmations of what has been laid down above. All dogmatism has been avoided, the subject has been discussed without cringing under the prejudices of either party in the controversy, and no more is needful to be said beyond addressing a few words of caution to all disputants on such a question.
25. Certain All pcrsons, then, who engage in such a controversy, cautions set should be cautious of the injustice of affixing the stain corSuct of r*^ °^ Atheism to the memory of one living before the time controversy of that God '' became flesh and dwelt amongst us," because, this descrip- forsooth, we oannofc find him forming an eaually ade- quate idea of the Nature of God with ourselves, upon whom has rolled such a flood of light as to the Divine perfection, " by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and nath brought life and immortality to light thro\igh the Gospel." Again, we snoidd remember that a Pagan's belief m the immortality of the soid is beside the question of his atheism, because a lieathen might have maintained the truth of God's existence without a simultaneous assertion of the reality of a future state of BOOK XIH.] ANALYSIS OP ARIBTOTLE'S METAPHTSIC8. XCV rewards and punislimeiits. Further, the doctrine of the etemiiy ol the world,* with Aristotle at least, does not clash with a belief in the existence of God; nay, however paradoxical such an insertion may appear, this dogma mi^ht be urged as one of the arguments in favour of the Theism of Aristotle. Again, we shcdd not overlook the utter incompatibility of a system of atheism with a system of incorporealism; and therefore, in all disputes of this kind, we should be careful to settle beforehand how far the ancient writer whose atheism is under examination may be proved to acknowledge the reality of an incorporeal substance. And lastlv, we should endeavour perfectly to understand in what sense it is that the ancient author, whose tueological opinions we are trying to ascertain, employs the word " Qto^t* whether as a term to designate one dominative principle in the Universe, or as a mere generic name designed as an appellation for whatsoever is supra-sensual or transcendental in its nature.
It may likewise be of service to the student to read ^ ^,,. the Logics of Aiistotle along with his Metaphysics: aot should Te **^*'* but that they are two distinct sciences in themselves, studied with This assertion, however, is not acquiesced in by aU, for ^p^y^c^" it is controverted by Bacon and Batter; though; on the other hand, its trutn is affirmed by Kant, and Thompson, and Mansel, and, above aU, by Aristotle himself, who takes the earliest opportunity, in the Metaphysics, to apprise his readers how that the subject that he is there introducing to their notice, is one which has been as well neglected by other speculators as hitherto unexplored by himself. Many of the terms recurring in the Metaphysics are explained in the Contraries, the Topics, and tne IVeatise on Literpretation, e. g, ovaia, XJyoy, Kivrja-is, dnixpaa-is, KaTd(l>a(rig, and SO fortn. Again, the subject of Demonstration {BfUvva-is) is treated of in the fist book of the Posterior Analytics, as well as that of Media, and of First Principles (dpxai). And in book ii. of this same Treatise we have an examins^ tion into the nature and grounds of scientific knowledge. Instances of reference of this kind, however, have been pointed out, from time to time, in sufficient abundance, in the notes of the translation; and the student is here merely reminded of the importance of prosecuting this comparison for himself. The only available Translation of the Logical Treatises is that by Mr. Owen, in Bohn's Classical Library— a translation that deserves to be mentioned for its accuracy and tho deamess with which the work is put before an English reader by means of the margmal notes.
All that remams now is to point out, extrinsic to 27. collateral Aristotle's works, some collateral studies with the subjects 01 Metaphysics. There may, therefore, be mentioned, as MetJiJ**^^ useful for such a purpose. Archbishop Whately's * *^ ^*'*^"* Logic, book ii. chap, v.; book iv. chaps, i. and ii.; together with the (I) The student is referred to Dr. Clarke on "The Being and Attr.butea of God,* iu the proof of his third Proposition,; SI London coition. «/»«.
CCvi ANALT8I8 Of ARIBTOTLirS MElAPHYSICb. [bOOKXIIL Ajppendix of Ambiguous Terms, e.g. Capable, Possible^ Impossible, Necessary, Truth, Cause, and Experience: Sir William Hwnilton's Dissertations — 1. on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned— 4. on Logic — 6. on Idealism; and his Essay on the Study of Matiiematics: Dr. Hampden's (Bishop of Hereforct) Lectures on Scholastic Philo- sophy, Lectures i. and li.: Kanf s Critique * of Pure Reason, Tran- scendental Dialectic, book ii. chap, iii.; Transcendental Doctrine o! Method, chap, iii.: Cudworth's Intellectual System, book i.: Dr. Whewejl's Pnilosophy of the Inductive Sciences, book L; bookiiL chaps, ii. iii. iv.; book vi. chap, v.; book ix. chap, vi; Hansel's Prole- gomena, chaps. V. and ix.; Thompson's Laws of Thought, part iv.; and Tennemann's History of Philosophy, translated in Bohn s Philo- logical Library, a book that no student should be without. 18. Work! ^ ^ works more immediately conversant with Arismore imme- totle, I would suggcst the article Aristotle in Smith's « aILS"* I^ictionary of Greek Biography, Blakesley's Life of * Aristotle, Thomas Stanley m his History of rhilosophy, part vi.. Bitter's Philosophy, vol. iii. chaps, i. ii. (Morrison s Translation), and Buhle, in the dissertations prefixed to his edition of the " Organon."* As to commentators, I have been chiefly indebted to Thomas Aquinas and Augustinus Niphus, and most especially to a selection from the ancient commentators, made by Brandis m his " Scholia in Aristotelem." As to works antagonistic to sistk^tol^ Aristotle, the student, if such be within his reach, may consult "Patricii Discussiones Peripatetic®, vols. iii. and cv. Petri Gassendi Exercitationes Paradoxicae Adversus Aristoteleos;** and also a curious little book of Peter Bamus, '' Aristotelicn Ani- madversiones," in which he attacks the Metaphysics by name; also the " Enchiridion Metaphysicum " of Henricus More.'
In genera^ however, as a companion to the studj of rice's Analysis. ^^ Metaphysics must be mentioned Mr. Maunce's Analysis of them in the " Cyclopaedia Metropolitana," an analysis to which I must acknowledge myself deeply indebted; and I taie this opportuniir^ of recommending it — ^though but a very short treatise — ^to sdl siudents desirous of mastering the difiiculties and piercing into the spirit of the ontological system of Aristotle.
(1) Translated in "Bohn's Philosophical Library."
(2) This edition of Aristotle's works by Buhle was never completed, consequent on the loss of the requisite materials in the burpin«{ of Moscow. This may be lamented as one of the greatest losses classical learning sould have sustained; and in no portion of Aristotle's works would Buhle's labouro have been more acceptabls and useful than in the Metaphysics.
(3) Also the 15th book of Eusebius' £vang. Prsepar.
END OP THE ANALYSIS.
TBF METAPHYSICS^ OE AEISTOTLE.
BOOK L CHAPTER I.
All men by nature are actuated with the desire i. Man's n»> of knowledge,^ and an indication of this is the S^J^Sjj^i toTe of the senses; for even, irrespective of » proof thereof, their utility, are they loved for their own sakes;' and pre- ^ This term demens Alezandrinus (Strom. L) cozunders as equiTaleut with soprRnatiual; but others, as significant merely of the accidental position of the present treatise after the Physics It is said to have been nnt nsed by Andronicus of Bhodes, who, out of the materials employed IB Compiling the Physics, set down after them, and designated as " rSt fi§rd tA fmruidf'* whatever he found unsulted for Insertion there. Clemens, however, is supported in his view by an anonymous Greek commentator, whom Patridus has translated into Latin, and styles Philoponus; his words are as follow, — Meri r& tpvoriKii hriy4ypairrcu ^ irpar/fMrtia od Hard riftt t^iy rov wpdyfjutros &AA& Kord Hiv rd^iv rris avayyi&atets bta\dfifiavti ydp ircp2 <pv(rtK£v dpx^^' * This, probably, is what Cicero means when he says, in the De OfficiiB, I. 4, — " In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio." The assertion, however, that all men desire know- ledge, has been objected to, on the ground that in some this desire is wholly absent; but this absence merely amounts to a suppression of the natural desire from various causes; e.g, want of leisure for intel- lectual pursuits, constitutional laziness, voluptuous habits. This natural craving for knowledge leads to a concentration of individual abilities on particular studies, and thus to a subdivision of intellectual labour. Aristotle omits to notice here the connexion between this desire and our social capacities, whish ensures the mutual communication between mankind of their mental and scientific discoveries. Vide Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, part IL sect. iiL * Aristotle thus assigns two reasons for our love of the senses,-^ their utility, and their being sources of knowledge; or, as Thomaf Aquinas expresses it, ** in quantum sunt utiles ac cognoscitiv].'* S > rd eminently above the rest, the sense of sight For not only for practical purposes, but also when not intent on doing anything, we choose the power of vision in preference,^ so to say, to all the rest of the senses. And a cause of this is the following, — ^that this one of the senses particularly enables us to apprehend^ whatever knowledge it is the inlet of^ and that it makes many distinctive^ qualities manifest.
* Aristotle's reasoning amounts to this. Man loves knowledge, and loves the senses, therefore, for their own sakes; that is, so far forth as they are the inlets of knowledge, and, consequently, the sense of sight for the cause he assigns. The elevation of this sense above the others was in accordance with the notions of the old philosophers, and of the scholastics; and this superiority was grounded on the immediateness of the perceptions afforded by the organ of vision, compared with the others which came in through a medium. This notion is discarded by the modems. All the senses, as such, are equally the sources ot knowledge, as is most satisfactorily proved by Brown, and with much originality too, in his Philosophy of the Human Mind, voL IL chaps.
* Md\i(rra rifias iroifi yvospl(fip. This I take it to be the sense of these words. Taylor renders them thus, — " it, especially, of the rest makes us to know something;" but in this translation the force of rl is quite lost; whereas it is preserved in Bessarion's interpretation, who for the Greek rl has the Latin *' quicquam." Taylor evidently did not consult the Cardinal's version. There is another sense which the words could possibly bear, namely, — 'Hhat the sense of sight is particularly instru- mental in furnishing us with whatever knowledge we have;" and this would make Aristotle, as stated in the foregoing note, fall into the vulgar error of the old philosophers, — ^that all knowledge originally capaein through the organ of vision. This, indeed, seems to have been the sense put upon these words by the scholastics, as appears from the objections that were made against Aristotle's assertion by his commentators in the laddie Ages; namely, that, as Augustine Niphus puts the objection, our tactual organs and the remaining senses were, in an equal degree, sources of information.
If I were to suggest an emendation of the text as it stands in Bekker, following some MSS., I should leave out the particle rl alto- gether, and render the passage thus, — " it, the sense of sight, enables us to acquire the greatest amount of knowledge." And this would be sup- ported by the old Latin version, which Thomas Aquinas has preserved, and which renders the words, simply, '^maxime facit cognoscere." Aquinas, however, does not seem to tiiink that fidKiara refers to the quantity of the knowledge afforded, but its quality; he renders it by the word " perfectissime," and styles the sense of sight as ** spirituaHor," compared with the other senses. Vide foregoing note.
^ Much distinctive information flows in through the inlet of the sense of sight. On the value of this sense, compared with the others, vide Brown, in his remarks on the organ of vision, Philosophy of the Human Mind, voL IL OHil.*] SENSE, MEMORY, FORESIGHT. S By nature then, indeed, are animals formed en- 2. DUferent a» dowed with sense; but in some oi them memory^ gJ^J in'tSe^''' is not innate from sense, and in others it is. brute creation, And for this reason are these possessed of more ^enntmder^lt foresight, as well as a greater aptitude for disci- development, pline, than those which are wanting in this faculty of memory. Those furnished with foresight, indeed, are yet without the capability of receiving instruction, whatever amongst them are unable to understand the sounds they hear; as, for in- stance, bees, and other similar tribes of animals; but those are capable of receiving instruction as many as, in addition to memory, are provided with this sense also.
The rest, indeed, subsist then through impres- 3^ comparison sions' and the operations of memory, but share bet^n men experience in a slight degree; whereas the human "' race exists by means of art also and the powers of reasoning.
Now, experience accrues to men from memory; 4. The diflerenTNy for repeated acts of memory about the same Sanknoi-**^* thing done constitute the force of a single ex- ledge, and thcb penence: and experience seems to be a thing lopment. almost similar to science and art.
* Tliat memory is a distinct faculty in man, much less in brutes, ifl denied by Brown; but that what we term memory in the human Species is found in brutes, is shown by Locke in the instance of birds, after a few attempts, learning to warble particular airs of music.
* ^atfrofflous. Taylor translates this word " phantasy," which conveys little or no meaning at all, and is conceived in defiance of <pavraala being in the plural number. It is not, however, quite so easy to deter- inine the meaning of this word in the philosophic wor^s of the ancients. In the present case, Aristotle seems to mean those ideas that are conveyed into the minds of animals by means of their repre- sentative power. This word occurs frequently in the writings of Sextua Empiricus, — in the Pyrrhonian Institutes, and in his treatise, Contra Mathematicos: but in the Latin version we have it translated merely " phantasia." Quinctilian, in his interpretation of the word <papraffia^ uses the following language, — '* per quas imagines rerum absentum ita repraesentantur animo ut eas cemere oculis ac praesentes habere videamur.*' Quinctilian thus improves on Cicero's translation, who renders it by " visum ** in various places, and by " visionem " in the Lucullus. Plutarch's exposition of the word, in the De Placitis, is curious: he derives ^vracia from ^tas-, because, as light proves ita own existence, and that of the things it illustrates, so <f>avraarla brings itself to light, and is constructive of itself. Thomas Aquinas, in his Commentary, defiues <pavr curia thus: "quae est motus j^tus a sensu secunduot actum;" whxoh reminds ug of Hobb^s* definition of sensation itself.
ii2 f. The gentn- But sdenee and art result unto men by means IcteneeffoMT** ^^ experience; for experience, indeed, as Polus ezpeiieiiee. saith, and corrcctlj so/ has produced art, but inexperience, chance. But an art comes into being when, out of many conceptions of experience, one universal opinion is evolved with respect to similar cases. For, indeed, to entertain the opinion that this particular remedy has been of service to Callias, while labouring under this particular disease, as well as to Socrates, and so individually to many, this is an inference of experience; but that it has been con- ducive to the health of all, — such as have been defined according to one species, — ^while labouring under this disease, as, for instance, to the phlegmatic, or the choleric, or those sick of a burning fever, this belongs to the province of art 6. The compa. As regards, indeed, practical purposes,^ there- with exTO? fore, experience seems in no wise to differ from rience.in regard art; nay, cvcu WO scc the experienced com- of practice. passing their objects more effectually than those who possess a theory^ without the experience. But a cause of this is the following — ^that experience, indeed, is a knowledge of singulars, whereas art, of universals; but all things in the