doing, and all generations, are concerned about the singular: for he whose profession it is to practise medicine, does not restore man to health save by accident, but Callias, or Socrates, or any of the rest so designated, to whom it happens to be a man. If, therefore, any one without the experience is furnished with the principle, and is acquainted with the universal, but is ignorant of the singular that is involved therein, he will frequently fall into error in the case of his medical treatment; for that which is capable of cure is rather the singular.
But, nevertheless, we are of opinion that, at least, knowledge ^ This assertion is put into the mouth of Polus in the Qoorgias of Plato. Vide Bipont Ei. vol IV. p. 7.
^ np6s fi^v ovK r6 irp(krr€iv: in these words, as Alexander Aphrodisi- onsis remarks, Aristotle demonstrates that knowledge is a thing more boQourable than action, in order to show that wisdom, being involved iu knowledge, and not in practice, is likewise itself, on that account, more worthy of respect.
* The word A J70S, which I have here translated " theory," occurs fre- quently throughout the Metaphysics, and in various senses; aach aa iha *'priucipi« of a thing," ** a definitioQ," ''a seatence," &c.
OH. I J AJIT COMPARED WITH EXPERIENCE. 5 and understanding appertain to art rather than j, t^^ tuperi experience; and wen^ckon artists more wise than ontyofartoTci the experienced, inasmuch as wisdom is the con- reicardofkiioir- ccmitant of all philosophers rather in propoition *****•• to their knowle(%e.
But this i& BO because some, indeed, are aware 3^ Threefold of the cause, and some are not. For the expe- proof of thU; rienced, indeed, know that a thing is so, but they knowiedge^of dp not know wherefore it is so; but others — I **'*»®' mean the scientific — are acquainted with the wherefore and the cause. Therefore, also, we reckon the chief artificers in each case to be entitled to more dignity, and to the repu- tation of superior knowledge, and to be more wise than the handicraftsmen, because the former are acquainted with the causes of the things that are being constructed; whereas the latter produce things, as certain inanimate things do, indeed; yet these perform their functions unconsciously, — as the fire when it bums. Things indeed, therefore, that are inanimate, by a certain constitution of nature, p^orm each of these their functions, but the handicraftsmen through habit; inas- much aa it is not according as men are practical that they are more wise, but according as they possess the reason of a thing, and understand causes.
And, upon the whole, a proof of a person's ggcondiy in having knowledge is even the ability to teach;^ the abUity to and for this reason we consider art, rather than ^^^' experience, to be a science; for artists can, whereas the handi- craftsmen cannot, convey instruction.
And further, we regard none of the senses to ^.j^j^i ^^ be wisdom, although, at least, these are the cause fenie, in most decisive sources of knowledge about singu- ^n*toicience, lars: but they make no affirmation of the where- »ay» nothing oi fore m regard of anythmg, — as, for example, why fire is hot, but only the fact that it is hot.
Therefore, 2 indeed, is it natural for the person 9. speculative who first discovers any art whatsoever, beyond rather than ^ This is what Socrates means in the Alcibiades Primua, when he says, ffSii ripa c25cs (rotpdv trutvv aHiwdrovma Toii^ircu &AAov ao^v &rcp 9ibr6t; Bipont Ed. vol. V. p. 35.
* Aristotle here shows the paths through which men must travel into this ''wisdom,** or first philosoply; and for this purpose adducei 6 THE METAPHYSICS OF ABISTOTLS. [boOK I.
active art is the ordinary power of the senses, to be the ob« }ecuont!. which j^ct of human admiration, not only on account is answered. Qf something of the things that have been dis- covered being useful, but as one that is wise and superior to the rest of men. But when more arts are being discovered— both some, indeed, in relation to things that are necessary, and others for pastime— we invariably regard such more wise than those,^ on account of their sciences not being for bai'e utility. Whence all things of such a sort having been already procured, those sciences have been invented which were pur- sued neither for purposes of pleasure nor necessity, and first in those places where the inhabitants enjoyed leisure: where- fore, in the neighbourhood of Egypt tiie mathematical arts were first established; for there leisure was spared unto the sacerdotal caste. It has then, indeed, been declared in the £thics^ what is the difference between an art and a science, and the rest of the things of the same description. 10. That wis- ^^^) ^* present, the reason of our producing this dom is a science treatise is the fact, that all consider what is termed firmedrand*^* wisdom to be couvcrsaut about first causes and stated as the principles: so that — as has been said on a former object of the "^.^. i. j,, present trear occasiou — the experienced seem to be more wise ***®- than those possessing any sense whatsoever, and the artificer than the experienced, and the master-artist than the handicraftsman, and the speculative rather than those that are productive. That, indeed, wisdom, therefore, is a science conversant about certain causes and first principles is obvious.
the example of the Egyptian priests, who were enabled to construct the speculative sciences of geometry and mathematics by having enjoyed leiaure from the laborious employments of life. They were thus allowed an opportunity of contemplating the heavenly pheno- mena, and, from such observations of experience, of deducing the abstract sciences! The student will do well to consult Alexander's Commentary on the passage, and the more elaborate explanation of Asclepius, taken from Ammonius.
^ That is, that those who knew the reason of things were more wise than the artificers.
^ The objection which Aristotle imagines is tacitly implied in the foregoing remarks amounts to this, — ^that such are tantamount to destroying the distinction between art, science, and wisdom. Arisljotle, however, repels the imputation that he is using these words in the same sense by a reference to his Ethics, bookVl. chap. iii.,whero distinction! between them are carefully drawn.
511. II.] THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF METAPHYSICS.
CHAPTKP. II.1 Now, siDce we are engaged in investigating this i. wisdom science, the foUowing must form a subject for J^S^tSd** our consideration; namely, about what kind of univeraai causes, and what kind of first principles, is this *^"^'* science — I mean wisdom-— conversant. If, doubtless, one would receive the opinions which we entertain concerning the wise man, perhaps from this our proposed inquiry would be evident the more.
Now, in the first place, indeed, we go on the 2. Threefold supposition that the wise man, especially, is ac- J"^ 'JJ"^*^ l. quainted with all things scientifically, as far as nitionofwise this is possible, not, however, having a scientific ™*°* knowledge of them singly. In the next place, a person who is capable of knowing things that are difficult, and not easy for a man to understand, such a one we deem wise (for perception by the senses is common to all« wherefore it is a thing that is easy, and by no means wise). Further, one who is more accurate, and more competent to give in- struction in the causes of things, we regard more wise about every science. And of the sciences, also, that which secondly, from is deEorable for its own account, and for the sake the definition of knowledge, we consider to be wisdom in pre- ° ^" °°** ference to that which is eligible on account of its probable results, and that which is more qualified for preeminence we regard as wisdom, rather than that which is subordinate, — for that the wise man ought not to be dictated to, but should dictate unto others; and that this person ought not to be swayed in his opinions by another, but one less wise by this man. Respecting this wisdom and wise men^ do we entertain such and so many suppositions.
^ Aristotle haying shown, in the first chapter, that the science tinder investigation — which he here calls wisdom, though elsewhere by a different denomination — is conversant about causes, proceeds now to lay down what sort these causes are, their nature, and number.
'^ The remarks of Alexander Aphrodisiensis upon Aristotle's analysii of the wise man, and of the science denominated wisdom, are wortk » reference by the student Vide Braudis' Scholia, pp. 525 sqq.
8 THB METAPHYSICS OF ARICTOTLE. f^fiOOK Z, Thi di from ^^^ ^^ these characteristics the scientific know^ the appiica- ledge of all things most needs be found in him detiniSoif*" Tuost especially who possesses the universal the present scieucc;^ for this person, in a manner, knows all science. things that are subjects of it. But, also, the most difficult nearly for men to know are the things that are especially universal, for they are most remote from the senses. But the most accurate of the sciences are those respecting things that.are primary, in the most eminent sense of the word; for those from fewer principles are more accu* rate than those said to be from addition, as arithmetic than geometry.^ But, also, that science, without doubt, is more adapted towards giving instruction, at least, which speculates about causes; for those do afibrd instruction who assign the causes in regard of each individual thing. Now, imder- standing and scientific knowledge, for their own sakes, most especially reside in the science of that which is most par- ticularly fitted for being scientifically known. For he who selects scientific knowledge, for its own sake, will especially choose that which is preeminently science; but such is that which is the science of that which is particularly fitting as an object of scientific knowledge, and particularly fitting as objects of scientific knowledge are first principles and causes; for on account of these, and by means of these, are the other objects of knowledge capable of being made known: but not these by means of those things that are subordinate to them. Most fit for preeminence likewise amongst the sciences, and fit for preeminence ^ in preference to that which is subservient, is the science which communicates the knowledge of that on account of which each thing is to be done; but this con- 1 During the first age of Greek philosophy it was styled <ro<l>laf or *' wisdom," and its cultivators, <ro<l>oi, or '* wise men; " and the term philosopher was first applied to Pythagoras. This change, no doubt, he* tokened a corresponding change in men's mode of thought; for thereby an element hitherto imdiscovered was brought into notice, — ^namely, the relation of our emotions to scientific investigations.
^ There is the same reasoning adopted by Aristotle in the Posteriof Analytics, book L chap. ii.
^ There is a passage in Bacon's works which recognises thii subordination amongst the sciences; viz. " cum moralis philo'to* phia ancLllsa tantum vices erga theologiam suppleat." De Aul l VIL4 00. tl.] ONTOLOGY A SPEaULATTTB SCIENCE. 9 stitutes the good in each particular, but, in general, thti which is the best in every nature.
From all, therefore, that has been stated, ^ ^^^^.^ the sought-for appellation lights upon the same f^om the fore- science; for it is necessary that this be a science dom'is'a**^^ speculative of first principles and of causes, for tcienee of the good, also, viewed as a final cause, is one from *'*"*®** amongst our classified list of causes.
But that the science under investigation is not 4 ^^ ♦ «- i it science employed in producing,^ is evident from a science wis- the case of those who formed systems of philo- ^^tive^but" pe- Bophy in the earliest ages. For from wonder men, cuiative- proof both now and at the first, began to philoso- * *'*** ' phize, having felt astonishment originally at the things which were more obvious, indeed, amongst those that were doubtful; then, by degrees, in this way having advanced onwards, and, in process of time, having started difi&culties about more im- portant subjects, — as, for example, respecting the passive conditions of the moon, and those brought to pass about the sun and stars, and respecting the generation of the universe. But he that labours imder perplexity and wonder thinks that he is involved in ignorance.^ Therefore, also, the philosopher — that is, the lover of wisdom — ^is somehow a lover of fables,^ for the &ble is made up of the things that are marvellous. Wherefore, i^ for the avoidance of ignorance, men from time to time have been induced to form system^ of philosophy, it is manifest that they went in pursuit of ' Ariftotla shows that the science under investigation is speculative, not active, from the fact that the earliest philosophy sprang from wonder, — ^that wonder flows from ignorance, — ^that the removal of ignor- ance amounts to knowledge, — ^that this was accomplished by speculation' and not practice; and that therefore wisdom, the source of the highest knowledge, was speculative and not active. Compare Alexander Aphrodisiensis on the passage, and also Thomas Aquinas in his remarks on the Prooemium of Aristotle.
' The ancient Theogonists made Iris the daughter of Thaumas — thus harmonizing with Aristotle's expression here. — Aaclqnut, * Consult Asclepius, from Ammonius, on the passage. Pliny calls philosophy it>i\ofivBla. Philosophy necessarily, at the first, partook largely of the nature of the fabulous, on account of its being therewith deeply tinged through the influence of poetry. This is manifest from the works of Qreek antiquity in the instances of Linus, Musseus, and Orpheus. The subject is discussed by Cudworth; and, more at large, iv •everal of the notes of his commentator, Mosheim.
10 THE MBTAPHT8I0B OF ABISTOTLB. [boOK!• •oiontifio knowledge for the sake of understanding it, and not on account of any utility that it might possess. But the Proof trom ex- event itself also bears witness to the truth of this perience, statement; for on the supposition of almost all those things being in existence that are requisite towards both ease and the management of life^ prudence of such a sort as this began to be in requisition. Therefore is it evident that we seek scientific knowledge from no other actual ground of utility save what springs fi^m itsel£ 8. ThtR «cieno« But as wc Say a free man exists who is such roost uberai. f^^ his owu sake, and not for the sake of another, 1/ 60, also, this alone of the sciences is free^ for this alone subsists for its own sake.
6. Not human Wherefore, also, the acquisition of this science in it» origin, j^qj jjg justly r^arded as not human, for, in many instances, human nature is servile.^ Proof of thi« So that, according to Simonides, the Deity only from the poeti. g^ould eujoy this prerogative; yet that it is un- worthy for a man* not to investigate the knowledge that is in conformity with his own condition. But if, in reality, the puets make any such assertion, and if the Godhead is in its nature constituted so as to envy, in this respect it is especially natural that it should happen, and that all those that are over-subtle should be unfortunate:^ but neither does the Divine essence admit of being affected by envy, but — according to the proverb — ^the bards utter many falsehoods.
7. This science Nor ought wc to considcr any other science most honour- jj^^j^ entitled to houour than such as that under ' Men often are the slaves of their nature on account of their super- abundaut bodily necessities. — Asclepius, * The old copies left out ovk before ffjreiv, which robbed the sentence of its point, as Aug. Niphus shows. Aristotle's object, in bringing forward Simonides, is to show that this wisdom, on account of the very elevated speculations it contains, seems a thing of Divine growth, as being inconsist-ent, in regard of its origin, with the frail faculties and condition of man.
* Hvarvxeis. Their superior qualifications would excite the rancour of the Deity, on the supposition of the truth of the poetic idea of the Divine as a nature essentially envious. Herodotus was of the same opinion, that the character of the Divinity being envious, there resulted mis- fortime, sent by the invidious Deity upon those amongst the human race that shonr above their fellows. Plato says somewhere, in disproot •f this, 'PSoyos tan t^w Beiov x<^fHW- CR. II. J ONTOLOGY A DIVINE SCIENCE. 11 Investigation %t present. For that which is most divine is also most worthy of honour. But such will be so in only two ways; for that which the Deity would especially possess ia a divine one amongst the sciences; and if there is any sucii science, this woiild be the case with the science of things divine. But this science, such as we have described it, alone is possessed of both of these characteristics; for to all specu- lators doth the Deity appear as a cause, and a certain first i/ principle;^ and such a science as this, either God alone, or he principally, would possess. Therefore, indeed, may all sciences else be more requisite than this one; but none is more excellent.
It is, indeed, necessary, in a manner, to esta- 8. This scienct blish the order^ of this science, in its develop- o?der°comrar** ment, in a direction contrary to the speculations to the early that have been carried on from the beginning. P*»i^o*op*»y- For, indeed — as we have remarked — all men commence their inquiries from wonder whether a thing be so, — as in the case of the spontaneous movements of jugglers* figures to those who have not as yet speculated into their cause; or respecting the solstices, or the incommensurability of the diameter;^ for it seems to be a thing astonishing to all, if any quantity of those that are the smallest is not capable of being measured. But it is necessary to draw our inquiry to a close in a direction the contrary to this, and towards what is better, according to the proverb.* As also happens in the case of these, when they succeed in learning those points; for ^ This is a remarkable passage to occur in the writings of Aristotle, about whose deism or atheism so much has been said and written.
' That whereas the old philosophy originated from wonder, — that is, ignorance, — and attained unto a sort of knowledge, yet that when men reached this knowledge, knowledge, as such, became the great actuating g motive in speculation. This present science under investigation, how* ^ ever, would set out from an opposite point in this progress, because it started from the consideration of that which is the highest object o| speculative knowledge.
3 "Or the incommensurability of the diameter," — that is, as I take it^ of the diagonal of a square with its side: vide note, book II. chap, ii^ on this geometric principle.
* " According to the proverb." The proverb alluded to by Aristotle is probably the Greek one, "Stvr^pwp h-fiuvSvan"** originating, in all like* lihood, with the custom of repeating wacrifices in cases where, in the first instance, they were vnfavourable. Indeed, we have a sirrilar siiyiD|| fcmongst ourselves, — * Second thoughts artj beat.** 12 THR MKTAPHYAIOfl OF ARIBTOTLE. [bOOK t nothing wDuld a geometrician so wonder at, as if the diametet of a squara should be commensurable with its side. What, therefore, is the nature of the science uider investigation has been declared; as, also, what the aim should be which the present inquiry and the entire treatise should striTe and attain.
CHAPTER III.1 1. Fourfold ^^^ since it is manifest that one ought to enumeration of be in posscssiou of a scieucc of primary causes (for then we say that we know each individual thing when we think that we are acquainted with the first cause); and since causes are denominated under four different heads,^ the first of which we assert to be the substance and the essence of a thing (for the inquiry of the wherefore, in the first instance of a thing, is referred to the last reason,' but the first wherefore of a thing is a cause and first principle); and the second cause we affirm to be the matter and the subject; and the third is the source of the first principle of motion; and the fourth, the cause that is in opposition to this, — ^namely, both the final cause and the good; for such is an end of every genei'ation; 2. The labours Therefore, although there has been a suffi- ofhispredecei- oicut amouut of Speculation concerning these sdenceofBtir in OUT treatise on Physics, let us, however^ oiogy. bring forward those who before our time have approached to an examination of entities, and have formed systems of philosophy respecting truth. For it is obvious that they also affirm that there are in existence certain first prin- ' ^ ristotle now proceedB to examine into the labours of his prede* cessors in the depcurtment of Sdtiologj; and the course he pursues is first to enumerate the opinions thereupon of the early schools of philo- sophy, and of individual speculators; and next, to set down arguments for or against these theories, and show how far they are true, and how far fiilse.
' This fourfold enumeration of causes is taken from the Physics, books I. and II. We have the same division laid down in the Posterior Analytics, book II. chap.' xi.
s "The last reason." This refers to the method cf demonstration Adopted by the mathematicians in their problems. Vide the remarkf of Asdepius upon the passage in Brandis' Scholia, p. 531.
OH IILJ TH12 ancients PURE iklATEKf A LISTS. 15 oiples and causes; therefore will it, at ai y rate, bo of service to our present treatise should we take a review of these phi- losophers; for either we shall thereby discover a certain dif- ferent description of cause, or we shall, in prefeience, repose our confidence in those that have been already enumerated.
Now, the majority of those who first formed ^ xheir first systems of philosophy consider those that subsist principle a ma- in a form of matter to be alone ^ the principles of **"*^ **'**®* all things; for wherefirom all entities arise, and wherefrom they are generated, as firom an original, and whereto they are cor- rupted,— ultimately the substance, indeed, remaining perma- nent, but in its passive states undergoing a change, — this they assert to be an element, and this a first principle of all things.
And for this reason they are of opinion that nothing is either produced or destroyed,^ inas- d'oginar"Du' much as such a constitution of nature is always fJ^xSpJ.*^ in a state of conservation; as we say, that Socrates neither is absolutely brought into being when he may become handsome or musical, nor that he is destroyed when he may throw aside these habits on account of the fact of the subject, — namely, Socrates himself remaining perma- nent; 80 neither is it the case with anything else that it is either generated or corrupted anew. For it is necessary that there should be a certain Nature — either one or more than one — from which the other entities are produced, that re- maining in a state of conservation. The plurality, indeed, and the species of such a fiibt principle, all do not affirm to be the same.
But Thales,^ indeed, — the founder of this kind 5 Material of philosophy, — affirms the nature just mentioned <»"«e held by * Aristotle's object — the igh, indeed, it is not very clearly set forth in the Metaphysics, consequent upon the obscure arrangement which he follows — seems to be to show that his predecessors, with a few excep- tions, merely busied themselves with a material cause, to the exclusion of any other.
-* This dogma has been most fully illustrated Vy Cudworth in " The Intellectual System/' in several places of that gigantic treatise. Through his elaborate examination of this very dogma, he ultimately establishes — ar fancies he does — the monotheism of antiquity. In Harrison's edition of Cudworth there is an able dissertation on this ancient dogma from ^le pen of Mosheim, his learned and careful commentator.
' T hales — son of Examius imd Cleobule — was bom, according to 14 THE METiLIHTSIGS OF ARISTOT;.]!!. [bOOK k Th«ie»of Ml- to be water, (wherefore, also, he declared the !fr«««« «* earth to be superimposed upon water.) probably thu opinion, denying ms opinion from observing that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that even actual heat is therefrom generated, and that animal life is sustained by this (but that wherefrom a thing is produced, this is a first prin- ciple of all things); and doubtless for this reason, likewise, holding such a theory, both from the &ct of the seeds (f all things possessing a moist nature, and of water being a fii*st principle of their nature to things that are humid. r>. Thaies in- But there are some who suppose those who siSiyby^hETpre. l^vcd in the most ancient^ times, and far previous decessoTs. to the present generation, and who first formed schemes of theology, to have also entertained opinions after this manner concerning Nature; for these philosophers con- stituted both Oceanus and Tethys as the parents of gene^ ration, and water ^ as the object of adjuration amongst the gods,— called Styx by the poets themselves; for most entitled to respect is that which is most ancient, — now an object of adjuration is a thing most entitled to respect. Whether, therefore, there is this certain early and ancient opinion con- cerning Nature, in all likelihood would be an obscure point to decide. Thaies, indeed, is said to have declared his sentiments in this manner concerning the first cause; for no one Apollodorus, B.a 640. There is a difference of opinion as to his native country. Diogenes Laertius considers him a Phcenician; to which Clement assents, on the authority of Leander, Strom. I. Plutarch makes him a Milesian, which is the opinion generally received.
^ An enumeration of these opinions of the early philosophers is given by Cicero in the De Naturft, book I. — ^manifestly a translation from this portion of Aristotle's works. Cicero's treatment of this subject, however, is awkward and confused, and proves that he was but super- ficially informed in the deep researches of Aristotle thereupon. It is manifestly from this portion of the works of the Stagyrite that all sub- sequent authors appear to have derived their speculations on ajtiology. This is quite perceptible in the case of the early apologists for Chris- tianity; e.g, Eusebius in his Demonstration, and Clemens Alexaudrinus in the Stromata and Adhortatio ad Gentes.
2 What Aristotle means by these words he puis into the form of an enthymeme. — What is an object of adjuration ii heaven must needs be a thing the most ancient — but water is such; therefore water has been assigned by the philosophers as the first principle of things. Upon this, consult Aristotle, De Ccelo, II. 13; Cicero, De NaturA, 1. 10 • lOd Plutarch, De Placitis, I. 8.
same CH. III.| TO WIT, THALES, ANAXIMENES, ETC. IS would deign to place Hippo ^ along with these, on account ol the meanness of his intellect.
But Anaximenes and Diogenes ^ placed air ^ Material before water, and especially as a cause of simple cause held also bodies; whereas, Hippasus of Metapontum, and JXdmogenes?' Heraclitus^ of Ephesus, fire; but Empedocles in- and Empedotroduced four bodies, — that is, one m addition to those three already mentioned, — adding earth as a fourth; for that these ever continued permanent; and further, that they are not produced, save that, either in plurality or in paucity, they are compounded together, or dissolved into one and from one component element.
But Anaxagoras of Clazomense* — in age,^ in- g. The deed, being prior to this speculator, but in his works principle,