mfimte, either m a progress m a straight forward efficient, final, direction, or according to form, is evident. For ^ 'oraiai. neither, as of matter, is it possible that this particular entity proceed from this to infinity; for instance, flesh, indeed, from earth, and earth from air, and air from fire, and this without ever coming to a stand-stilL Nor can there an infinite pro-;; gression take place with the origin of the principle of motion; as, for instance, that man should have been moved by the air, and this by the sim, and the sun by discord; and of thib that there should be no end. Nor, in like manner, can this infinite progression take place with the final cause, — that walking, for instance, should be gone through for the sake of health, and this for the sake of enjoyment, and this enjoyment for the sake of something else; and, similarly, that one thing invariably should subsist on account of another. And, in like manner, is it the case with the formal cause. For of media, to which externally there is somethiug last and first, it is neces- sary that what is firat should be a cause of those things which are subsequent to it. For if we must declare what is the cause of three things, we will assert that it is the first of the three; for, doubtless, it is not the last, at least, for that is not, at any rate, at the exti'emity of anything as a cause: but, truly, neither is it the middle, for this is the cause of one thing only. But it makes no diitierence whether one or many media be ' This is au important chapter, and aeemn to have suggested to modem philoBophers their phraseology, as well as mode of aiguing, in ret^ard of the d priori demonstration of the existence of Qod* ■* S so THIS Ml^APHTSIOS OF ABISTOTLB. [BOOK 1 aaaumed, noc whether they aire tbii^ infinite or finite; but in this waj all the portions of things infinite, and of the. Infinite in general, are similarly media up to the extremity; so that if l^ere is nothing that is the first, there is, in short, no cause. 2. No progrea- ^^^ neither, truly, is it possible, as regards a tioji of causes progression downwsmls, to proceed 0-1 to infinity, dpwnwaids. j^ ^^^^^ ^j^^ which is in a progression upwards inyolTes. a. first principle; as, for example, that from fire, indeed, water should be produced, but from this earth, and so invariably that a certain different genus be produced. For, in a twofold manner,^ is one thing produced from another, — ^not as this particular thing is said to take place after that; for example, the Olympic games from the Isthmsean, — eithsi as a man is produced from a boy imdergoing a change, oi' air from water.
5 Twofold dif- ^^ indeed, then, we say that a man is pro- fereocebe- duced from a boy as a thing that has been tween these. ^^^^^ ^^^^^ which is in a proccss of formation, or that which has been finished from that which is being finished, or tends towards perfection, for always is there a certain medium; as production is a medium between existence and non-existence, so also is the thing that is being produced between entity and nonentity: and a person receiving in- struction is one becoming scientifically learned. And this is the meaning of what is affirmed,— that from a person learning is produced one that is scientifically learned; and just as watei is generated from air on aocoimt of the air having undergone corruption. Wherefore, in the former instance, the things adduced, indeed, do not revert into one another, nor is a child produced from a man; for that which is being pro- duced does not arise from the act of generation, but is sub- sequent to generation: for so, also, the day is generated from the dawn, because it is posterior to this; wherefore, neither is the dawn generated from the day: but the other instances revert into each other.
4. According to I^ bulh these cascs, however, it is impossible STtherewf^n** *^ pursu6 the progress on to infinity; for, in the finity of causes, ouc case, of those that are media there must ' In a twofold manner, vXlKott koi irpoy^arosiScM: that is, when one fystem of matter is produced from another, and when that is a traa* Mtiun from what ia immature to what is finiahed.
{jB. II.] nunmrist phuobession »f gadbas. 51 needs be m end, and, in the other case, the things adduced revert into one another, for the Sesf niction' 6i one is the geneiution~of the other. But at the same time, also, it is impossible, that what is first, seeing that it is eternal, should be subject to corruption; for since generation is not infinite in an ascending progression, that nature must needs not be eternal from which anything has been produced as from that which is primary, and has been subject to corrup- tion; but this is impossible.
Further, the final cause is an end; but a thing 5. ko infinite of this sort is that which does not subsist on?J"*""*51?^?
account of another, but other things on account fin&iorfonmd of that. Wherefore, if that which is last be a ^'''••• thing of this sort, there will not be a progression to infinity; but if there is no such thing — I mean tiiat which is last-» the final cause, will have no existence. But they who intro- duce thJH infinite prngrftRwinn fnrgftt fffrft^ ^hfiy dflHtrpy fhft na^nrtt nf thft gQ^vj Although uo ouc would imdcrtake entering on any course of action not intending to go on to a termination of his undertaking; nor would there be design in such things: for one who is possessed of mind always does a thing for some purpose or other, (for this is a termination for it,) for the end proposed is a termination. But, indeed, neither can the formal cause admit of being referred to another definition more copious iu reason. For the prior iefinition is invariably more the definition of a thing; but the subsequent is not so. But to thj^t.,.of, which tfaerais-no firat, neither has that which is next jr, wdftr any PTist^nffff, : Tg-m^hSl^the^Jesfr^^^^^ ThU theory ipake assertions in this way; for it is not even of infinite pro- pCBSBIe'to iinderstand anything before we come S^rturattie*^* to individual things; and scientific knowledge possibiutyof has no existencje in this case: for things infinite, "^^ *' in this manner, how is it possible to apprehend? for the in- finite here is not a thing similar to infinity in the case of a line, which, as regards its divisions, indeed, does not come to a stand-still, but is indivisible; nor is it possible for one to apprehend these divisions, except he imposes some limit to their divisibility. Wherefore, he will not reckon the divisions or sections who goes through the infinite in detail. Bu^ ako, as regards the matter, — so fiir as it is such, in what ic b2 '^KS XETAFHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE [bOO&I being moved,^ — ^it is necessary to understand it thus far; and for nothing that is infinite is there any possibility of ex- istence: but, if this is not the case, not infinite, at any rate, is that by which we may know the infinite. But, doubtless^ if theja)ecie8^j^.^c^^^ infinite Jn Tlfffiaber, neither^n sible: for then we think we know when we may make known the causes: but the infinite according to addition, it is not in finite duration possible to exhaust.
CHAPTER 111.2 : ^.\ But lectures on philosophic subiects fall out of habit on our according to our habits; for as we have been IpSSms!^* accustomed, so we deem it right a thing should be expressed; and whatever things are besides these do not appear similar: but, from the fact of our not being habituated thereto, they seem more imknown and strange, for the habitual is more known. And how great force the habitual possesses, the laws make manifest, in which fabulous^ and puerile things have greater force from usage than the reality of our knowledge concerning them. 2. Different de- But somc pcrsous, indeed, do not admit those f?®'"^*^*^''*"* making assertions, unless one speaks with mathekinds of matical precision; but others do not approve of science. -vrhat is said, unless they express themselves by means of an exemplar; and others think it right to adduce a poet as a witness. And some require all things to be ex- pressed with accuracy; whereas accuracy is troublesome to others, either on account of their not being able to carry on ^ " In what is being moved.*' Some read, Kiyovfittniy: meaning, that matter is not infinite in the sense of things that might be said to be infinite in energy.
^ The subject now treated of is also discussed in his Ethics. His reasoning here has been adopted by all subsequent philosophers: f.g. Bishop Butler; vide Preface to his Sermons, and part II. chap, ii of the Analogy.
' This is illustrated in the fiable of the earth being the mother of tlie human race, which was recognised in the Athenian and Spartan laws. We, accordingly, find Plato recommending the recognition of thia myth in the legislative system of a people, since thereby would b« ••cured among^ ihem patriotism and a love of country.
CH. III.J BEUREISS OF S0IEKTIF70 AGCURAOT. 59 a train of reasoning, or on account of their considering such as mere quibbling about verbal niceties, — for the precise iu- volves some such thing. Wherefore, as in the case of con- tracts, so also in that of philosophic discourses,^ precision seems to be a thing to some p^rsoiis that is illiberaL Wherefore, it is necessary that one should have been instructed what way we must admit each turaUst^Inot and all points of inquiry, as it would be absurd expected to em at the same time to seek for scientific knowledge tuai accuracy and the mode of attaining such knowledge: but ^^^^s^^^- it is not easy to acquire either of these. Now, mathenmtical accuracy of language ^ is not to be required in all things, but in tEose tKings that do not involve any connexion wijh tnat^T Wherefore, such is not the natural mode of dis- covering truth;* for perhaps the whole of Nature involves matter: therefore, first must we investigate what Nature is.* For in this way, also, will it be evident about what only natural science is conversant, and whether it is the province of one science, or of many, to speculate into causes and first principles.
* M Twv xAywv, I have translated these words " discourses," following the Latin ** orationibus." The term which Aristotle already has used^ in the beginning of the sentence, is dxpodirus, which I have rendered '' lectures." This term has given rise to the distinction of the Aristote- lian writings into acroatic and exoteric.
' As to the different sorts of accuracy requisite for the treatment of different departments of human knowledge, the student is referred to Ethics, I. iii, and to Post Analyt. I. 13, 24.
' That is, the mode of discovering truth adopted by the natural philosopher.
^ " What Nature is." These words have led commentators to form the surmise that this is a fragmentary portion of some physical treatise. It is worthy of remark, too, that this book is said not to have been written by Aristotle at all, but by one styled Pasicles, a native of Bhodes, who is said to have been a hearer of Aristotle, and a ■on of BoiUBus or Boethuii^ a brother of EudiBixiua.
BOOK II* CHAPTER I.
1. Dmibt-its ^^^ ^^ advancement of the science under in* niationto yestigation it is necessary for ns, first, to take a reyiew of those points respectmg which one ought to doubt in the first instance; but these are whatsoever suQects some speculators have entertained opinions of after a drfferent mode, and whatever beyond these may happen to have been overlooked. For it will contribute towards one*s object, who wishes to acquire a &cility in the gaining of knowledge, to doubt judiciously, for a subsequent acquitdtion^ in the way of knowledge is the solution of previous doubts; but when one is ignorant if the bond of a thing, it is not possible for such to loose it. But the perplexity of the intellect makes manifest this assertion respecting the matter in hand; for so far forth as the dianoetic fiiculty doubts, so &r does it undergo something similar to persons loaded with chains; for it is impossible, in both cases, to advance further. Wherefore, it is necessary, in the first instance, to speculate into all the difficulties involved in the present subject, both on account of thiese things, and also from the &ct, that they who carry on an investigation, without doubting first, are similar to persons ignorant where Hiey ought to wfdk; and, in addition to these things, neither can such know whether he has discovered the object of his speculation or not; for the end is not manifest to this specukitor: but to one who has previously doubted, in a judicious waj, it is manifest But^ ^ This book, if we allow what is commonly called Book I. the Lcbb to be as a separate one and as book IL, wonld, in this case, stand third in order, which it does in some of the MSS. In this book, howeyerj Aristotle proceeds, according to the hint dropped at the end of the first book, to lay before his readers, after the mode usually adopted by dis- putants in the sehools, the doubts suggested to a thinking mind, tm connected with the subject-matter of ontological or metaphysical science.
^ This idea, according to Asclepius, is taken by Ariiiotle from Plato^ who pithily illustrates it by the case of fire being the result of the rub> bing together of two sticks.
l] doubt in relation to trutb 5d further, there is a necessity that a person s^^ould be better qualified for forming a judgment who has heard all the reasons, as it were, of adversaries and opposing disputants.
Now, the first source of perplexity is concern- ing those things which we have expressed doubts of causes, u a of in our Preface; namely, whether to speculate iogy"to*bc*n>^ into causes^ be the province of one or many g««rded as one sden^sesl and whether it be the province of this °'°**°^^* soienoe to discover merely the primary principles of substance, or also to speculate concerning the first principles from which all dedve their demonstrations 9 as, for instance, whether it is possible to affirm and deny one and the same thing, at the same time, or not, and concerning the other things of such a kindl And, if it is the province of this science to be con- versant about substance, whether one may be about all, or whether there be many such in existence? and, if many, whe- ther all are akin to each other, or it may be proper to style some of them sciences of ^wisdom," and others of them, aomething else?
And this very thing is amongst the necessary, q^^^.^„^ ^ points of investigation, whether it should be to the different affilrmed that sensible substances exist only, ^^'.^^^tiS^^^^^^^ or whether others also subsist in addition to and their accu these 1 and whethOT there is a genus singly, or *!!!!U a a«mber of ge^W^^^niwotmr^ tETopinion of 'tbwu whe4atroduceDoth forms and mathematical entities afi things intermediate between these and sensibles? Con- )^ oeming these, therefore, — as we have said, — an examination must be made; and also concerning substances, whether the speculation extend only to them, or to the essential accidents of these substances? But, in addition to these points, we might inquire in regard of sameness^ and diversity, and similarity and dissimilarity, and identity and contrariety, and concerning priority and subsequence, and all the rest of such things, concerning as many as the Dialetticians endeavour to ' This subject is considered more at lai^ in book IIL ' Aristotle had already discussed these pomts, one would suppose, with sufficient copiousness in the Topics: whj, then, do these inquiries intrude into the regions of ontology? The commentators reply, Uiat in his Logic he traats of these merely specalatlTeY* ivi6^»s, but here, as a metaphyaiciao ought, really, dXifiumu 56 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLH. [bOOKR.
examine, instituting tbeir inquiries from matters merely of opinion, — we might, I say, investigate whose province it is to speculate into all of these. Further, may one investigate whatsoever things are essential accidents in these very things, both not only what each of them is, but also whether, in truth, one be contrary to one 9 And whether genera are first principles and regtSTofSnt elements, or those things into which, as being ^^a^hlt^ inherent, each thing is (Svided, and if the genera they are; how are SO, whether they are such things as are imd"L*to thS' predicated last or the first concerning individuals! iwjdeofsnb- ag^ for example, whether animal or man be a fiist principle, and be so rather than a singular ^ But most especially must we investigate and examine, with pains, as to whether besides matter there is any absolute cause or not, and whether this is separate or not, and whether it be one, or such causes may be many in number? And whether there is anything beside entirety,^ (but I mean by entirety when anything has been predicated of matter,) or nothing, or whether this is the case with some things, indeed, but not so with others, and what sort of entities such are? Moreover, whether first principles are limited in number or in species, both those that subsist in formal causes and those that are in the subject? and whether of things cor- ruptible and incorruptible the principles be the same or different? and whether all are incorruptible, or whether of corruptible things there are corruptible principles? More- over, also, the most difficult of all, and involving the greatest perplexity, is the inquiry, whether unity and entity, as the Pythagoreans and Plato used to affirm, be not anything else but the substance of entities; or this be not the case, but that there be some other subject, as Empedocles says harmony is, and a certain other philosopher, fire, and another, water or air? And whether first principles are universal or are as the singulars of things? and whether they subsist in capacity or in energy? Further, whether they subsist otherwise than according to motion? for also these speculations would fiimish much perplexity. But, in addition to these points, there remains the inquiry, whether numbers and dimensions, ^ This subject of the rb trwoXov is treated of in bock VI. mor« hiUy; for example, vide chapter iii and figures and points, be certain substances or not t and, if they are substances, whether they are capable of being separated from sensibles or be inherent in them? for, con- oeming all of these questions, not only is it difficult success- fully to attain unto the truth, but neither is a judicious doubting easy for the reasoning faculties.^ CHAPTER II.« In the first place, indeed, therefore, let us i.ThequeatCwi institute an inquiry concerning the first asser- di8cu88ed,-i8 tions which we have made; namely, whether to science of Speculate concerning all kinds of causes be the regardid*Mone province of one or many sciences? ^ For how science or Irould it be the province of a single science to °^*°^ take cognisance of existing first principles when they are not contrary to each other 1 But, further, in the case of many of the entities all do not exist in all * of them. For in what way is it possible for the principle of motion to be found in things incapable of motion; or that the nature of the good should, if everything which may be essentially good, and by reason of its own nature, is an end, and so a cause, inasmuch k& on account of that other things are both produced and exist? But the end and the final cause are an end of any action. And all things in the act of doing are attended with motion; therefore, in things incapable of motion it would not be possible that this should exist as the first principle, or that there be therein any essential good. Wherefore, also, in mathematics nothing is demonstrated through this cause; nor is there any demonstration for the reason that a thing IB better or worse: but neither does any mathematician make * Or T^ \6yu might be translated, " on rational grounds."
, ' Aristotle having enumerated the doubts which suggest themselves, now proceeds to enter upon an examination of each separately; which he does, in general, by laying down the reasons on both sides, as well for the affirmative as for the negative of each question.
* Mr. Maurice remarks, in his Introduction to Moral and Metac >hysical Science, on this passage, that " this question involves the ver;f subject of the whole treatise."
^ All are not agreed about the text. I have translated it as it standi in Bekker* irScrai, of course, refers to ipx*^* 58 THE mSTAPHTSIGB OF ARISTOTLE. [BO)Ka mention at all of any such thing whatsoever. Therefore, for this reason, certain of the Sophists, as, for example, AristippuSi regarded these sciences with disdain; for in the other arts^ even the mechanical ones themselves, as in those of carpentry ^nd shoe-making, he said that wherefore a thing is better or worse could be declared in every respect, but that the mathematical sciences ^ make no account concerning things good and evil. But, truly, if there are, at least, many sciences of causes, and different sciences of a different first principle, which of these must be said to be the one under investigation; or whom of those that are in possession of them shall we pronounce scientifically informed, particularly in the matter under inquiry — for in the same subject is it possible that all the modes of causes exist; as, for example, of a house, the 3rigin of the principle of motion is from art and the builder, and the final cause is the work, but the matter in earth and stones, and the form is the definition? / 2. ontoiflgy. as From the distinctions, therefore, laid down by *8<^nceofthe ug originally, as to which of the sciences we sbteiicd'^i' ^ ought to denominate wisdom, is involved a ^^^* reason for further styling each thus. For as fiir as a science is most qualified for the pre-eminence and for superiority over the rest, and so fai as it is just that, as servants, the rest of the sciences should not contradict, so lar «uch is a science of the end and of the good, for the rest of things are. on account of this; but as far as wisdom has been defined a science of first causes, and of that which is es- pecially capable of being scientifically known, so &r such would be a science of substance. For seeing that persons may acquire the same knowledge by many methods, we say that he rather understands a thing who makes known by its being what that thing is than by its not-being; and of these themselves one in preference to another, and particularly he who knows what a thing is, and not he who knows the quantity or the quality of a thing, or what it is by natuie ' The mathematical Bcienoes stood in higher estimation amongst the Platonists than the Peripatetics. As to the sneer of Aristippus, in which Aristotle almost appears silently to join, an answer might, in one way be given in the Talue which Plotinus attaches to mathematics fof familiarizing mankind with that part of their nature not included in thi notion of body; or^ to use his o?ni words, irp6s ffw*$uru6v rris dawfjuiroi Uv^Im*- Uv^Im*- n.] AVODSIKTl? PRtNOIPLBI. M fitted far in the way of action or of passion. Fortheri in the case of ether things, the understanding eaoh of those fiubjecta. concerning which there are demonstrations^ ^fiLl^JRk Jtji^ / to Jiave an existepee when we may understand what a tibing/ ^Ji^ 6 is^ for instance, what the squaring of a right-lined figure is:| 0 that it is the finding of a mean proportional.^ In like manner | ^^' r«(^^t is it in the case of the rest. But with regard to generations, and actions, and every kind of change, we are in a way of understanding each when we undei-staud the first principle of motion; and this is different and in opposition to the end. Wherefore, it would appear to belong to the department of a different science ' to investigate each of these causes.
But, truly, also, with regard to demonstrative s. The qneftioa/ first principles, whether they belong to one science 2jSt'mo«S?i or more is a question open to doubt. But 1 tic principles—.' term demonstrative even those common opinions and whether ' / from which all derive their demonstrations; for {Jjy faii^undwrt instance, that everything must needs be either ontoiogicai | an afiirroation or negation, and that it is im- "**""' possible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time, and whatsoever other such propositions there are. It is^I «ay, a question open tb doubt, whether there be one science of these ittid'^BuBiBiaaoe or k dilSpr!^.' ptig r «nd ifnot'bne,' whether it is necessary to denominate as such the science under investi- gation) Therefore it would not then appear reasonable, indeed, that it should be the province of one science; for why, in preference, should the perception concerning these peculiarly belong to geometry rather than to any o^er science what- soever? If, therefiMre, in like mann^, truly it belongs to any whatsoever, but it does not admit <^ befonging to all the sciences, as neither is it the peculiarity of the rest, so neither is it the province of that science which makes known the substances to investigate concerning these. But, at the same time, also, in what way will it be die science of these? For what each of these happens to be we also now know; the rest ' For instance, if you wanted to mace a rectangle into a square, you should find a mean between two of its conterminous sides; and the square of that would be the required one, on the principle that ths rectangle under the extremes is equal to the square of the mean.
' Alexar ler, instead of the usual x-eading, would insert oCk befon 4fy 'kr f THi? MBTAPHTBI09 OP ABIBTOTLE. [BOOK of the arts, therefore, employ fhem as things known. B if there be a demonstrative science concerning them, it w: be necessary that there be a certain subject-genus, and th; some of these, Indeed, should be passive properties and othe axioms: for concerning all things it is impossible that the should be a demonstration; for demonstration must needs 1 composed of certain principles, and be conversant respectir some thing, and the demonstration of some things. Wher fore, it happens that there is one pai*ticular genus of a thm£^ that are' being demonstrated, for all the demonstrau^ soigflotw employ aidpms. But, truly, if there be a science < substance different from the one concerning these, which < them is by nature fitted to be more sovereign and prior, f( especially and universally the principles of all things are tt vasioms 1 And if this is not the part of the philosophe whose else will it be to speculate into the truth ai^d fiilsehoo regarding these 9 4. The ques- And,upon the whole, whether of all substancei