of*8ubstwSSf ^3 there one science or more 1 if, indeed, then ducussed. fore, there is not one science of such, what soi of substance must we consider as the subject-matter of th: science of ontology? But that there should be one science ( all substances is not reasonable; for there would be ou demonstrative science concerning all things that are essentia accidents, if every demonstrative science, in respect of a certai subject, speculates into essential accidents from genen opinions. Respecting, then, the same genus it is th province of the same science to investigate the essentia nccidents from these same general opinions: for an exam; nation respecting the wherefore belongs to one science, an to one respecting those elements whereof a thing consisti whether both investigations belong to the same or a differeo science % Wherefore, the like will take place in regard ( accidents, whether these will investigate them or one of those But, further, might we examine whether the speculation i confined only to substances, or is also concerning the acci ^ Substanoes would be classed by the Peripatetic and Platoni schools as being those that are cognisant bjc the mindiand immoveabli and that fall under the notice of tbClsenses, and ha^e motion impreiiae upon them; that is, oii<riau, vinfrai icat cuclunroi, and oCa.v aiadrjTai ko^J CH. IL] DOUBTS IN REaARD OF SUBSTi jiTCEfl.
6i dents ^ in these 1 but I say, for example, if a solid oe a cortain substance, and lines, and surfaces, whether it be the province of the same science to take cognisance of theso things, and of the accidents of each genus about which th« mathematical sciences demonstrate, or if it be the province of a different one 1 For if, indeed, of the same, there would be a certain demonstrative science, and that the science of substance; but of the essence or formal cause there does not appear to be a demonstration: but, if of a different science, what will be 'the science that speculates about the accidents of substance 1 for this would be altogether difficult to render an account of. Furthery.nlgo, whethop muflti we say thai^thega-' a|]B sensible substances onlj^ or> also,, besides these^ others? im3'"Whether do the genera of these substances happen to subsist singly, or are they more numerous, as, for instance, they who speak both of forms and media between forms,^ and things sensible, concerning which, they say, are con- yersant the mathematical sciences?
As to the assertion, then, indeed, that we have 5. Denial of tbe made,^ namely, that forms are causes, and sub- Joms separable stances absolutely subsisting, it has been declared ^o? 8en»ii»ies. in the earliest of our disquisitions concerning these: but as these inquiries in many ways are clogged with difficulties, it would be no less absurd the assertion that there are, indeed, certain natures besides those which are in the heavens, and that these are the same w4th things sensible, except that the former are, indeed, eternal, and the latter, corruptible. For they speak of the existence of ideal man, and ideal horse, and ideal health, but say nothing else in regard of these; acting, in a way, similar to those who affirm the existence of the gods, no doubt, but in the shape cf men -^ for neither * As to a Bcience of the t6 (rvfi^t^riK65, vide book V. chap. ii.
* As regards the system of the Platonists in this point of forms, or rh ^71, Aristotle has already delivered his opinions in the first book, and resumes his consideration of this portion of their philosophy in book XII. chap iv.
* x4yofitv: in using the first person, Aristotle seems to identify him- self, though perhaps he would n3t be brought to acknowledge this, with the Platonic school. He was, it is needless to say, a pupil oi Plato's, though he soon burst away from his master.
; * This has been a tendency in man always; one great aim in the lati >f Moses is to counteract this tendency. The folly of anthropQ;. morphism is wittily exposed in Cicero's De Nat. Deor. lib. I. cc. 27 bqc^ (i THB MBTAFHTBIOS OF ABISTOTLB. [bOOKII did theie latter oonatitute aught save eternal men, nox do the f(»iner make species anything else but eternal seosibles.
6. The inquiry, ^^*» ^^"^^^J^j 1^ ^^ addition, also, to forms and .-Are there ' seusibles any will set down things intermediate SSdu^tw^u he will be involved in many doubts. For it is forms and sen- evident that, in like manner, there will be lines, rabi?f£Ma'^*^ and each of the other genera^ besides also them iSton.nL«I;; ^^^ are senslWe. Wherefore, since astrology is Bteted and ex- one of these, there will also be a certam heaven plained. besides the sensible heaven, and a certain other sun and moon; and so with the rest, in like manner, of the bodies that are situated in the heavens. Although, how need one place confidence in such statements as these? for neither is it reasonable that this ideal heaven should be in- capable of motion; but, also, that it should be capable of motion is altogether impossible. In like manner, also, is it the case concerning the objects whereof optical science treats, and that of harmonics in mathematics; for, also, it is impos- sible that these should have a subsistence different from sensibles throu^ the same causes: for if things sensible and senses have an intermediate subsistence, it is manifest, also, that there will be animals which will be media between them and things corruptible. But one would doubt, also, con- cerning what sort of entities it is necessary for these sciences to investigate. For if geodesy will differ from geometry in this only, that one is conversant about things which we perceive by the senses, but the other, about things that are not cognisant by sense, it is manifest that besides the medici*- nal science, and besides each of the rest, there will be a certain science intermediate between the healing art itself and this particular art of medicine. Although, indeed, how is this possible? for, also, would there be, in such a case, certain salubrious qualities in addition to those that are sensible, and to the salubrious itself: but, at the same time, neither IS this true that geodesy^ is conversant about sensible ' Geodesy, like the pure mathematical sciences, originated, in Egypt, from local circumstances. It was the growth of a necesaity annually experienced of having fresh surveys of land, and effaced land-marks restored* in consequence of the inundation of the river Nile. Thus it hsd to deal with rd a&r^irri.
CH..U,] XATHSICATIOAL MEDIA. 65 magpitudes and those that are corruptible; for it would fiUl into decay when they were in proceas of being destroyed. But, truly, neither will astronomy be conversant about sen- sible magnitude nor about yon heaven. ITor neither are the lines that &11 under the cognisance of the senses the same as the geometrician describes them; for nought of the things that are perceived by the senses is in this way strictly strtught or round, for the circle touches the rule not in a point,, but as Protagoras ^ was accustomed to say in his refu- tation of the geometricians. Neither are the motions and the evolutions of the heaven similar to those about which astrology has formed its systems; nor have the symbols ^ the same natiire with the stars.
But there are some persons who say that these 7. objections reputed media between forms and sensibles are S?i"*liiif p®" not, mdeed, separable from sensibles, at least, but being mathe- inherent in them: and to enumerate all the S^herenttosen- impck^ibilities attendant upon these statements ■i^i«>- would reqnire a more copious discourse y but even it will be sufficient to speculate thus much on this point. For neither is it reasonable that this should be so in the case of these merely; but it is evident that it would be possible, also, for forms to subsist in sensibles: for both of these are results of the same process of reasoning. But, further, must there needs * This alludes to a practice of Protagoras, who used to give an illus- tration of the principle stated in the text by actually applying the rule to the circle in the presence of the geometricians, and then laugh at them, in hhs derision of their science. This quite accords with the usual conduct of the sect to which Protaf^oras attached himself; namely, that of the Sophists, who appeared at the time of the transition of the early Greek philosophy into that which begun with Socrates, and reached maturity under Plato and Aristotle. The Sophists, however men of learning at the first, gradually degenerated into mere pretenders to knowledge, whose aim was merely to extort money; and the effect of their system would, if generally adopted, have been to destroy the distinction between truth and falsehood. Fortunately, however, a dawn of purer radiance was soon to break over Greece, and to dissipate these mists and clouds of darkness. As to the original import of the term * Sophist,' see Grote's History of Greece, vol. viii. pp. 474 sqq.
' When astronomy became entangled in the thorns of superstition, we know how the astronomic charts became crowded with cabalistic signs, for the lormation of horoscopes, and other vain subtleties of un- tutored reason; which signs soon displaced the sober qroibols of math* acatio.
a THE MBTAPHJSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK tt be two solids in the same place; and these mathematioal entities muse needs not be things incapable of motion, seeing that they, at least, subsist in sensibles that are being moved. and, in short, on what account will any one lay down their having a subsistence, indeed/ and a subsistence in sensibles? for the same absurdities with the things that have been pre- viously spoken will ensue; for there wul be a certain heaven in addition to the heaven we see, except that it will not be separate, but in the same place, which is still more absurd.
CHAPTER III.* CHAPTER III.* i.The question, ^^^» respecting these points much doubt —Are genera therefore prevails; namely, how it is necessary by discuwedTn*" forming one's opinion thereupon to attain unto afve'ancTthe" *^® truth: and, likewise, respecting first prin- neKstive, by a ciples, whether it is requisite to consider the th^ngs^Jationai, genera as elements and first principles, or, in natural, and * preference, those things from which, as inherent, *^' *''*■ each first thing consists? as, for example, the elements and first principles of voice appear to be those things from which all voices are composed primarily, but not the voice in common; and we say that those things are elements of figures the demonstrations of which are inherent in the demonstrations either of all or of the greater part of other things But, further, both some in affirming that there are many elements of bodies, and others that there is one ^, of which they are composed, and from which they consist, assert these to be the first principles; as, for example, Empedocles asserts that fire and water, and the elements sub- sisting along with these, are those from which, as being inherent, entities derive their existence: bnt he does not speak of these as the genera of entities. And, in addition to these statements, we may subjoin the remark, that if any one wishes to contemplate the nature of the rest of things — as, for * Aristotle still continues his discussion of the enumerated doubts; and in the order that he states them in the beginning of this book. ' * This dogma of one original element, or material principle, is steadilj opposed by Aristotle throughout the Metaphysics CB. IllJ ARB GENERA nBST PBINOIFLESf M example, a bed, of what parts it consists, and how those parts are put together — in that case he is acquainted with the nature of it. From these reasons, therefore, it would appear that first principles would not be the genera of entities. But so fiur forth as we obtain a knowledge of each thing by means of the definitions, and so far as first principles are the genera of definitions, it is necessary, also, that first principles be the genera of things capable of definition. And, likewise, if to acquire the science of the forms according to which entities are denominated is to acquire the science of entities themselves, in this case the genera of the forms are first principles. But those, also, who affirm that the elements of entities are unity or entity,^ or the great and the little, appear to employ these as genera. But neither, truly, in both cases is it possible, at least, to affirm, also, that they are first principles. For; indeed, of substance there is one reason or formal principle; difierent, however, will be the definition through the genera, and that which declares the entities whereof, as inherent; a thing consists. If, also, most especially, in addition to these things, the genera are first principles, whether is it necessary to regard the first of the genera to be principles, or the lowest that are predicated of individuals ) for this, also, is involved in doubt. For if, indeed, it is requisite that universals are first principles in a more eminent degree, it is evident that the topmost genera will be first principles; for these are pre- dicated of all things. Therefore, the first principles of entities will be as numerous as the first genera; so that unity and entity will be first principles and substances: for these especially are predicated of all entities. But it is not possible that there should be one genus of entities, or that unity or entity should be such; for it is necessary, indeed, that the differences of each genus both exist, and that each should be one: but it is impossible either for the species to be predi- cated about the proper difierences of the genus, or for the genus to subsist, independent of the species of itself. Where- fore, if unity or entity be a genus, neither will entity or unity constitute any difference. But, doubtless, unless there oe genera there will not be first principles, since genera are ^ This tenet Aristotle examines in book I., and towards the close of the next chapter. He glances at this system in several parto of the Hetai^hyncs, e.g. in book IX. chap. iL * t6 T?E METAPHT&1CS OF ARISTOTLB. [BOOI; IL first principles. Further, also, media that are comprehended along with the differences will be genera as &r as to indi- viduals; but now this appears to be the case with some, and not with others. And further, in addition to these things, we may add that the differences are rather first principles than the genera; but if these, also, are first prin- ciples, first principles become infinite, so to speak: and this is especially the case if one should constitute the first genus a first principle.
2. Reasons to But truly, if, also, the one rather be that which fo™t*8 *ecie8 ^ principal, and if one be a thing that is indivi- may be prinei- siblc, and everything that is indivisible is so, P^®*- eitheracoording to quantity oraccordingtospecies, and if that which is according to species have a prior sub- sistence, and the genera are more divisible into species, one would be predicated last, for man is not a genus of certain particular men. Further, of those things wherein the prior and subsequent are inherent, it is not possible that what is predicated of them would be anything different from these; for instance, if a duad be the first of numbers there will not be any number different from the species of numbers: and, in like manner, rather will there be figures in addition to the species of figures. But if this is not the case in regard of these, hardly, at least, will there be genera of other things in addition to the species, for of these there seem especially to be genera. But in individuals there is not one thing that is prior, and another that is subsequent Further, Tvhere one thing is better and another worse, that which is better always is prior; so that none of these could be a genus. From these statements, indeed, therefore, it ap- pears that those things that are predicated of individuals are first principles, rather than the genera. But, again, how, on the other hand, it is necessary to regard these as first priu« ciples, it would not be easy to express. For it is requisite that there should be a first principle and a cause exclusive of the things of which there is a first principle, and that it should be capable of subsisting in a condition of separation therefrom; but, as to the existence of some such thing besides the singular,^ why should one make a supposition to this ^ Aristotle almost seems to thmk it to have been the business of hiui life to oppose the ideal hypothesiB of Plato.
GB-ITJ AKTTniNG SEPAR.\BLE FBOU SINGULARS? 6T effect, except that it is predicated uniyersally, and of all things f But if, indeed, this is done on this account, in such a case univeirsals are to be set down as first principles in a more eminent degree, so that the first genera would be principles.
CHAPTER IV.»
But a doubt closely connected with the fore- j j, 4,,^^^ ^y, going is one which of all is both the most thUig separate difi&cult and the most requisite to examine into, ""*^" "* concerning which our treatise, at present, is immediately occupied. For if there is not anything besides singulars, and if singulars are infinite, how is it possible to be in possession of a science of things that are infinite? for, as far as there is something that is one and the same, and as &r as there is something that is universal, so far do we attain a knowledge of all things. But, doubtless, if this be necessary, and if there must needs be something in addition to singulars, it would be requisite that there be genera in addition to singulars, whether they are the lowest or the highest; but that this is impossible we have ourselves just now expressed a doubt.
. But, further,^ if most especially there is some- 2. la theie any- thing besides the entire when anything has been thing separable predicated concerning matter, whether, if there ^mpounled of be a certain form, must there needs be somethinsc n»a"" »"?
umversal m addition to some, and not m addition question dis- to other things, or is there nothing universal *'"■■«<*• besides singulars? If, then, there is nothing universal besides singulars, there would not be anything that is cognisable by the mind;' but all things would fall beneath the notice of the ' This is a very important chapter, not merely because it giveg Aristotle's opinions on a subject where he may be seen in direct oppo- riiion to his master, Plato, but also because we are fiivoured in it with A glimpse into Aristotle's transcendentalism.
' The mode pursued by Aristotle, in the discussion of this question, b to show the validity of the affirmatlye^ drawn from the absuxdities of the negative of it ' The reasoning contained in this and the following sentence throws A good deal of Ught upon the theological system of Aristotle; how inseparably connected it is with Psychology and Physics, at least, im the philosophy of the Stagyrite.
f2 68 TBI METAPHTBIUB OF ABI8T0TLE. [bOOK II.
senses, and there would not be a scientifio knowledge oi anything, unless one would assert the exercise of the sensea to be science. Further, would there be nothing eternal or immovable; for all things sensible are in a process of cor- ruption, and are in motion. But, truly, if there is, at least, nothing that is eternal, neither is it a thing possible that there should be generation; for there must needs be some- thing, namely, that which i& being produced, and wherefroni It is produced: and of these the last must be ingenerable if both the progress of successive productions is to stop at all) and if generation from non-entity should be a thing that is impossible. But, moreover, on the supposition of such things being in existence as generation and motion, there must needs be a limit likewise, for neither is any motion infinite; but of every motion is there an end: but that cannot be produced which it is impossible could have been produced; but that which has been produced must needs exist when first it has been produced.^ But, further, if matter be an existence from the &ct of its being ingenerable, still it is much more reasonable that substance should have a subsistence when that is generated so as to have a being; for if neither substance nor matter shall have an existence, neither will there be anything at all in existence:^ but, if this be impossible, there must needs be something in addition to the entire^ namely, the form and species; yet, if, on the other hand, any one will establish this dogma, a doubt presents itself, both in the case of what things one should make this assertion, and in the case of what one should not. For that this is not possible, in the case of all, is evident; for we would not posite existence of any particular house in addition to certain houses. • rp, ««« But, in addition to the foregoini; points, we fei to the unity may subjom the inquiry, whether will there be Bub8t^e7iuad ®^® substaucc of all things, for instance, of men? principles ex- Now, this is absurd, for all things are not one amine. ^^ which the substauco is one, but are many and difiEerent; this, however, also, is an unreasonable statement And, at the same time, also, how would matter become each 1 This point is disciiiBed and reasoned upon similarly in the sixth book of the Physios, diap. y. ^ Such a supposition then would end in « system of nihilisin.
CH. If.] IfOBTAL AND IMMORTAL KATUBES. 69 of these I and how is the entire both of these f But, further, respecting first principles we would also entertain this par- ticular doubt For if, indeed, they are one in species, nought will there be that is one in number; nor will actual unity or entity have any existence; and how would scien- tific knowledge be in existence, unless there was a certain one in all things ) But, truly, if they are one in number, each of the first principles also will be one; and not, as in the case of sensibles, one principle of one thing, and another of another; as, for ini^iuice, of this syllable when it is the same in species, the first principles, also, are the same in species, for these, likewise, are dififerent in number: and if this be not the case, but if the first principles of entities are one in number, there will not be in existence anything else besides the elements; for to speak of one in number, or of the singular, makes no dif- ference, for so we speak of the singular as one in number, and of the universal as that which is common to these. Just, therefore, does the case stand as if the elements of voice should be limited in number, all the letters necessarily must be in number as many as the elements, since neither two, nor more than two, of them would be the same.
§ 1. But a doubt ^ of no less difiiculty has been i. An the prin- overlooked, both by modern investigators and JJlJjfbJfg^^J'd by our predecessors, namely, as to whether the incorraptibies first principles of things corruptible and of things *^® '""** incorruptible be the same or difierent 9 For if^ indeed, they are the same, how is it the case that some things are incorruptible and others corruptible, and from what cause does this difference arise ) Those of the Hesiodic school, and all as many j Enoneous as are theologians, fixed their thoughts only upon vW of the the probable, as it appeared to themselves; but this ^int. they have treated us with disdain. For, seeing that they make the first principles gods, and to have been produced from gods, whatsoever did not taste of the nectar ind ambrosia they say are mortal; palpably speaking of these denominations as expressive of things that are known to ^ The question now discussed is most important, as bearing directly on the inquiry, — ^What was the theology of Aristotle^ or had he any such system at all?
70 THE MKTAPHTSIC8 OF ABISTOTLE. [BOOK lU themselves. Respecting, Lowever, the actual adducing of these causes, they have spoken beyond our comprehension. For i^ indeed, the immortals partake of these for the sake of pleasure, the nectar and ambrosia are, in no respect, the causes of their existence; and if these are the causes of their existence, how would they be eternal when thus requiring sustenance ) But, respecting those &bulous systems of philo- sophy, it is not wordi one*d while considering them with seriousness.
But from those who make assertions by de« thereof of*the moustratiou, it is necessary to ascertain in our Physicists inquiries, why, forsooth, if entities are from the consistent in Same sourcc, somc of them are in their nature ^pedoc^es. ctemall and why others of these entities are subject to decay? But, inasmuch as they neither mention a cause of this, and as it is not reasonable that the case should be so, it is manifest that the first principles of these would not be the same, nor would there be the same causes of them. For, also, one whom any person would suppose to speak particularly consistent with himself, namely, Empedodes,' has, likewise, experienced the same difficulty. For he, indeed, is for establishing discord — which is a first principle in his system — as a certain cause of corruption. Nevertheless, this would seem, however, also, to produce entities that are beyond the one -^ for from this are produced all the other works of creation, except the Deity. The following, at least, are the words of Empedocles: — ** From which are all things, as many as were, and are, and shall be after; And trees therefrom have blossomed, and men and women. And beasts and birds, and water-fed fishes, And even the long-lived gods."