And, moreover, some things are one according.,,, to number, but others accordmg to species, and according to a others according to genus, and others according ^^^^a^ divfaior to analogy. Those things are one in number of which the matter is one, but in species of which the defi- nition is one, but in genus of which there is the same figure of predication; but according to analogy are things one as many as are disposed as one thing in relation to another. The subsequent, however, invariably follows the things that are prior; as, for instance, whatsoever things are one in number are also one in species, but whatsoever things are one in species are not all one in number; but all things are ^ne in genus, whatsoever are likewise so in species; but whatsoever are one in genus are not all one in species, but are so in analogy; and whatsoever things are one analogically are not all so in genus.
It is manifest, however, also, that plurality g Different .will be spoken of in an opposite manner to senses of piu- the one, partly from the fact of its being not ' ^^' continuous, and partly from having its matter divisible according to species either as the first matter or the ultimate matter, but partly from possessing many of those reasons or definitions which declare the essence of a thing, or its very nature.
CHAPTER VII.
Entity^ is denominated partly as that which j Different subsists according to accident, and partly that senses of "eni which subsists essentially; an enity subsists ^'^ "*** **** 1 Entity, about which metaphysics is most concerned, is now defined by Aristotle. This term is examined into by an old Cambridge scholar, HenricuB More, in a treatise of his entitled, ''Enchiridion JMieta*^ physicum." Eeferenoe, too, may be made o- ^his subject ia YcA.!^ 12? THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. ["BOOK IV, aocording to accident as when we say that a just man is musical, and that the man is musical, and that the musician is a man; speaking in a similar manner as when we say that the musical man builds because it is an accident to the builder to be a musician, or for the musician to be a builder: for the affirming that this particular thing is that signifies that this thing is an accident in that. So, also, in the case of the instances that have been mentioned; when v/e say that the man is a musician, and that the musician is a man, or that one who is white is the musician, or that the latter is white, we say this because both of these are accidents in the same subject; but we say that because they are accidents in entity: but that the musician is a man we say because the being a musician is an accident to this person. So, also, is it said that what is white is a man because^ that is a man to which the being white is an accident. Things, indeed, therefore, said to subsist according to accident are expressed in this way, either because both are inherent in the same entity, or because they are inherent in that entity, or because they are the same with that in which the accidents are inherent, and of which the thing itself is predicated.
Entities, also, are said to subsist essentially f«," found in whatsoever signify the figures of predication; for tencategories; ^ often as they are predicated, so often do ^ ' they signify essence. Since, therefore, of the tnings that are predicated some signify what a thing is, or quiddity, and others quality, and others quantity, and others relation, and others action or passion, and some the place where, and others the time when, to each of these the being or essence signifies the same thing. For there is n© difierence in the expression, the man is in a healthy state, from this, namely, the man is healthy, or, the man is walking or is cutting, from the expression, man walks or cuts. And in like manner, also, is it in the case of the rest, and in Further, the words "to be" and " it is " signify that truth as op. ^ ^j^ |g tj^g^ l3^^ ^YiQ words " not to be,'' that of Cudwoirth's Intellectual System, p. 152, I^amson's Ed., where there are some rem&rks of Mosheim on the same point. More, in his analysia of the rd tv, diffeis widely from Aristotle. ^ I have followed Taylor, whose translation makes the text clear.
OH. Vin.] EKMTY DEFn:ED. 12?
U 18 not true, but false / in like manner is it the posed to fabe- ease both in respect to aflfirmation and negation; "^^' as, for example, he who says that Socrates is musical says sb because this is tnie; or he who says that Socrates is not white says so because it is true; he, however, who says that the diameter is not incommensurable says so because this is fiJse. Further, *' to be " and " being " signify that ^ ^^u ^ which is expressed partly as potentially,^ and in capacity and partly as actually, of those things that have been •*'*^*"*y- enumerated. For we say, also, that seeing is both seeing in potentiality expressly, and in actuality; and similarly we say that he is endued with scientific knowledge who both has ihe ability to employ scientific knowledge and does actually employ it, and that a thing is in a condition of rest both in which rest is at present inherent, and which involves the capability of remaining in a state of quiescence. But in like manner, also, is it in the case of substances; for we speak of the existence of Mercury^ in the stone, and the half of the line; and we call that corn which not yet has reached a state of maturity. When, however, a thing is potential, and when it is not as yet potential, must be defined elsewhere.
CHAPTER VIII.
As regards substance,* both simple bodies, as,. j. for instance, earth, and fire, and water, and such of oi<ria. or sub- like, are called substances; and, in general, JJShed?"'"*' bodies are styled so; and animals consisting of these, and those beings that are of the nature of demons,^ and * Vide books III. chap. viii. and VIII. chap. x.
* We have an examination into this subject in book Till.
' '* Mercury in the stone;" that is, a stone with an image of Mercuiy impressed upon it. Vide book VIII. chap, viii ^ obffia: this is another very important expression in the vocabulary of the ontologist. Taylor translates this word "essence;** but I have differed from him, and rendered it by the term "substance.** Locke tuses the phrase in this sense. Vide Essay on the Human Understand- ing, book II. chap. 23.
* The recognition of existences beyond the sphere of what is purely mundane, involved in the mention of the word ZaifMv, is seldom to bn found in Aristotle*8 works. This passage, therefore, is the mctt nmnrkable on that account. Vide Cudworth, vol. II. p. 79.
128 THE JIETAPHY6ICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOR IV.
the parts of these. Now, all these are denominated substancei because they are not predicated of a subject, whereas other things are predicated of these. But in another way is that styled substance whatever may be the cause of being, and may be inherent in such as are not predicated of a subject; for example, soul in an animal. Further, as many parts as are inherent in such things that both define and signify " the what ** a certain thing is, on the removal of which the whole is taken away, — as, for example, if superficies be taken away body also is destroyed, as some say; and superficies is destroyed by taking away a line; and, in general, number seems to certain to be a thing of this kind: for that if it is removed away nothing can subsist, and that it defines all things, — such parts we may consider substances. Further, the essence of which the formal cause is the definition, this, also, is styled the substance of each thing.
2. Reduction Now, substancc happens in two ways to be of these to two. gtyied substaucc, both as the ultimate subject which no longer is predicated of anything else, and as that which may be this certain particular thing, and may be separ- able; but such is the form and the species of each thing.
CHAPTER IX.1 1. Different BuT the Same are styled partly according fh^'Siarae^f *<> accidcut, ss the white and the musical are •'same peraeci- the samc becausc they are accidents in the same '^' subject, and man and musician are the same because either is an accident in the other; I mean, that naan is musical because the musical is an accident in man: and this is the same with either, and either of these the same with this; for also with the man that is musical both man and musical are styled the same, and that is regarded the same with those. Wherefore, also, all these are not predi- cated universally; for it is not true to say that every man is the same thing with what is musical: for universaJs are absolute existences, but accidents are not absolute existences, but are simply predicated of singulars. For it seems the 1 Aristotle now examines into our notions of identity and diversity; a subject the theme of much discussion amongst thA xnodcms.
On.Z.] IDENTITT AND DITERSmT. IS^^ Bame thlug to be Socrates and Socrates the musical, for the expression Socrates is not af&hned of all; wherefore, not every Socrates is predicated as every man is. And some things in this way are called the same. Some and of "same things, however, are called the same essentially p^ •«•'* in the same way as unity also; for those things likewise of which the matter is one either in species, or in number, or in genus, are called the same, and those of which the sub- stance is one are called the same. Wherefore, it is evident that sameness is a certain unity of the being of either many things, or when one employs anything as many, as when one affirms the same thing to be the same with itself, for he employs that thing as two.
But diverse are those things called of which 2. <vnien either the species are numerous, or the matter, or tilings are said the definition of the substance; and, in general, ^ ^*''"' is the diverse denominated in a manner opposite to the same. And those things are styled different whatsoever are diverse; being, however, in some respect the same, not merely in number, but either in species, or genus, or analogy. Further, things are considered different of which the ^^ff^„J^^ genus is diverse, and the things that are con- similar, and trary, and whatsoever involve diversity in the ^"^™""- substance. Similar are those things styled both which everywhere undergo the same affection and undergo more of the same affections than of the diverse, and of which the quality is one, and in as many of the contraries as a change is possible, that which possesses more of these, or the more important amongst these, is similar to that thing. Things that are dissimilar, however, are denominated in an opposite way to those that are similar.
CHAPTER X.
Things that are opposite^ are called contra- 1. opposition diction, and contraries, and relations, and priva- defined in the * As to the nature and different sorts of opposition, Aristotle explains himself more fully in his logical treatises, e.g. chap. viL in his work •* On Interpretation." For further information on the same subject, the student may consult Whately's Logic, book II. chap. y.; Morell'f liAndbook of Lo(^o, p. 29; Derey's Logic, p. 94, Bohn'i edition.
13^ THE MBTAFHT8IGS OF ABISTOTI^E [bCOK IV.
«tie of lontra* tion, and habit, and those things from which 4lption: ultimate things arise, and those into which they are resolved: as, for instance, the generations and corrup- tions of bodies, and whatsoever things it is not admissible at the same time should be present in that which is receptive of both, these are said to be opposite either themselves or those whereof they are compounded. For black and white at the same time are not inherent in the same subject. Wherefore, those colours of which they are compounded are and of con- opposite to these. Those things are called con- trariety, traries, both those which cannot be present in the same subject at the same time, of things that differ in genus; and those things are called contraries which involve the greatest amount of difference, of those that ai*e in the same genus, and things that widely differ in the same recipient, and which widely differ of those under the same capacity, an<} those of which there is the greatest difference, either simply, or according to genus, or according to species. And other things are styled contraries; some as having such things in possession, and others as being recipients of such, and some in being effective,^ or in being capable of undergoing passive conditions, or in being agents, or being passive, or being rejections, or affinities, or habits, or privations, of these and of things of this sort. Since imity and entity, however, are spoken of in many ways, there is a necessity of the other things also following as many as are expressed according to these. Wherefore, also, will there be a distribu- tion of the same, and the diverse, and the contrary; so that there must needs be something diverse in each category. 2. ^vhat di- ^^^ diverse in species are those things called versity in ape- as many OS being of the same genus are not ces means. subalternate, and as many as being in the same genus involve a difference, and as many as in the substance are related in the way of contrariety. And contraries are diverse in the species of one another, either all or those which are denominated primarily, and are those of whatever in the ^ The word translated " effective " is icoirtriKd.. The same word is tpplied to the " prima philosophia," as a qualifying epithet, by Arli- totle in the first book, where we find it rendered in the old Latin versions by "activa." It occurs in the sixth book of the Topics. ch»p. z., ViA is translfttxl '' effective " by Mr. Owen.
CE.ZL1. OPPOSITION DEFINED. a31 ultimate species of the genus the definitions are diverse; as, for instance, man and horse, which are individuals in the genus, but the definitions of them are diverse. And those are contraries as many as being in the same substance involve a difference. Those things, however, are in species the same which are expressed in an opposite way to these.
CHAPTER XI.i Prior and subsequent are things called., ^,- ^ Some, as m the case of a certam thmg exist- senses of ing as first, and as a first principle, in each K^epJ^,*'5ther genus; for prior is that which is nearer a certain a? » fi"t prin- first principle, defined either simply and by *'*^*®' nature, or relatively, or according to place, or by certain things: as, for instance, some things are prior in place from the fact of being nearer either by nature to a certain definite place as to the mean or the extreme, or by some ordinary relation in this way; and that which is more remote from this definite locality is subsequent. Other or in reference things prior and subsequent, however, are so in *® duration; accordance with time; for some things, indeed, are considered prior as they are more remote from the present moment: for instance, in the case of things that have taken place in time past; for the Trojan annals are prior to the Medean because they are further removed from the present time; and other things are prior in regard of being nearer the present time, as in the case of things to come: for the Nemean games ^ are prior to the Pythian because it is an event nearer the present, using the present as a first principle and a thing that is first. Some things, also, according to motion are prior and subsequent; for that which is more immc- or motion, and diate to the first moving power is prior: as, for capacity, and example, a boy is prior to a man; and this, also, ^ The subject of priority and subsequence, treated of in this chapter, 18 likewise examined into by Aristotle in chap. xii. of the Categories. There are soma distinctions drawn here which are well worthy of oui ftttention.
* For an account of the Grecian games, the student may consul Potter's Qreek Antiquities, book II. chaps. 21—25 inclusive.
k2 132 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. ]^BOOK I?
is a certain first principle simply considered. Some things, also, aro prior according to potentiality; for that which is Buper-^minent in potentiality is prior, and that which is more potential is prior: but that nature is of such kind as according to the free-will of which another must needs follow which is also posterior. Wherefore, in the event of that one not imparting motion, the consequence will be that no motion should ensue in the other; and, in the event of that one imparting motion, that motion should ensue in the other; but free-will con- stitutes a first principle. Also, things according to order are styled prior and subsequent; but these are such as according to some one relation defined are distant proportionally: as, for example, in a dance the person standing second^ is prior to one that stands third, and the paranete to the nete^ in a musical instrument; for in the former is the person who presides, and in the latter the medium is a first principle. 2 Priority These things, indeed, therefore, are styled prior and subiie- in this way; but in another way is a thing prior ed1n7eference ^^ knowledge as if it were even absolutely prior, to our know- Qf these things, however, that are otherwise, some either f^om are accordmg to reason, and some according to 8eiwe° **' ^^^ sense; for, certainly, according to reason things that are universal are prior; but according to sense the singulars are prior. And according to the reason, also, the accident is prior to the whole^ as the musical is before a man that is musical; for the entire reason will not be without the part, although it is not possible to be musical when there is not a certain one that is musically gifted.
^ I have followed Taylor in translating the word trapatrrdnfis thus. Alexander Aphrodisiensis reads the text differently; for he renders it In his commentary by trpwroardrnSf which is found in the Asclepian MSS. The word, in fact, means one who stands in a chorus on the right or left hand of another. Strictly speaking, vapourTdrris is a military term; it was applied to the leader or front rank of either of the wings of an army; and irpwroffrd-nis meant the right hand man in the front* rank of the main body.
^ irapapriTTi: x^P^"^ ^ ^he word understood. The paranete is a term borrowed from music, and signified the string next to the undermost; or, in other words, the one next to the last of five strings. The note, virrri, i, e. vidnfi x^pHt ^ the laat, but with us the highest in the musical scale. The most succinct account of the music of the Greeks is to b€ found in the ''Dictionary of Antiquities," edited by Dr. Smith; article^ kpfMvla, CH. Xn.J PRIORITY AM) BUBSEQUENOB. 133 Further, the passive ccnditions of things that are prior are called prior; as, for instance, straightness is prior to smooth- nefs: for the one is an essential affection of a line, and the other of a superficies.
Some things, therefore, are called prior and s. other subsequent in this way; but others are termed t?may°vtew^^ 80 according to nature and substance, as many npSrtpov and as it is admissible can be in subsistence without ^''^•'*"*'' others^ but others cannot subsist without them; which opinion Plato adopted. But since "the being'' ^ is in many ways denominated, in the first place the subject is prior through which the substance is prior; in the next place the things according to potentiality and actuality are otherwise; for according to potentiality^ are some things prior, and others according to actuality, subsequent; as, for instance, according to potentiality is the half prior to the whole^ and the part to the whole, and the matter to the sub- stance; but according to actuality^ is this a thing that is subtequent: for when dissolution has taken place things will subsist according to actuality. In a certain manner, it is true, all things that are styled prior and subsequent are expressed according to these; for some according to generation it id admissible may subsist without others, as the whole without the parts: but some according to corruption, as the part is prior to the whole. But it is in like manner with the rest.
CHAPTER XII.* CHAPTER XII.* Potentiality is called the first principle of i. Different motion or change in another thing, or so far ofthe tenn^po- forth as it is another thing; as the building art tentiauty or is a potentiality that does not reside in the thing ^*P^^*y- that is built: but the art of healing, when it constitutes a ' The technical rendering of the word used in the text, r6 ttyat, would be the " esse;" a term sufficiently familiar to the ontologist.
* This subject is discussed at large in book VIII.
• * Thii passage throws much light on what Aristotle meant by the ti;ord liT-ffAcxcta.
* Aristotle now comes to treat of SiSvafuSf which I have translated iriostly by the word " potentiality." Taylor renders it by " capacity;" a ierm intelligible enough, but hardly literal. I have, howeyer, ocoa- vonaiiy rende^ it bv caoacitY* 134 THB METAPHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOE T^ potentiality, would reside in the person who is being healed, but not so far forth as he is a person that is being healed Therefore, in general, the first principle of change or of motion is said to be potentiality in another thing, so far forth as it is another, and potentiality is styled such fi*om another thing, or so far forth as it is another; for according to this sense of potentiality is what is passive in any degree passive. Sometimes, then, if it may be possible also that anything whatsoever undergoes passion, wo say that thing involves the potentiality of being passive; but sometimes we say that this is not the case as regards every passion, but if it be passive in reference to what is better. Further, is potentiality the capacity of accomplishing this |)articular thing well, or doing BO according to free-will; for sometimes persons who merely have been walking or speaking, but yet who have not done so well, or not as they would choose, we would not say possessed the power or potentiality of speaking or walking: but also, in like manner, is it in the case of passion. Further, as many habits as according to which things are entirely devoid of passion, or unchangeable^ or not capable of being easily altered into a worse state, such are styled potentialities.
For things are broken, indeed, and rubbed together,^ and bent, and are, m general, subject to decay, not from the having capacity, but from the not having capacity or potentiality and from deficiency in some point: other things, however, are impassive by such as scarcely, and in a small degree, become affected on account of potentiality, and the pos- session of potentiality, and the being in a certain manner disposed.
rent Now, secing that potentiality is denominated modes of the in SO many ways, in the first place will also the FesJoSdtr" potential be styled as that which possesses a first with those of principle of motion or of change, (for even what capacity.^' ^ Stationary is something potential in another thing, or so &r forth as it is another,) and in the second place, if anything else of this should possess a capacity of this sort, and in the third place, if it involve such a capacity of iDringing about a change in anything whatsoever, whether into what is worse or into what is better. For, aJsi*, * ffovrplficrau Taylor translatea thig word '^bnuBed." I have rat dered it literally.
OH. XII.] POTENTIALITY DEFINED. 135 that which is in a state of decay seems to be a thing capable of falling into decay, otherwise it would not be corrupted if such were impossible; but already has it a certain disposition of parts, and a cause and first principle of such a passive oondition. Sometimes, however, from the &,ct of pos8(!8sion, ftnd sometimes from the fact of privation, does it seem to be a thing of this sort. And if privation in a manner constitute a habit, all things by the fact of the possession of something would be potentialities; but the entity would be also ex- pressed equivocally. Wherefore, is a thing potential in respect of having a certain habit and first principle, and in reispect of involving the privation of this, if it is admissible that it ahould involve privation. And in the fourth place is a diing potential from the non-possession of a potentiality — or a first principle of this in another, or so &r forth as it is another — which is subject to corruption. But, moreover, are all those things potential either in the mere accident of their being generated or not being generated, or in respect of their being generated in an excellent manner. For, also, in things that are inanimate is there such a capacity inherent; as, for instance, in musical instruments: for one lyre, they say, can send forth sound, but that another does not possess this capacity, if it be not &.ir sounding.
Impotentiality, however, is a privation of ^ impotenti- pbtentiality, and a certain removal^ of a first aiity as opposed principle of such a sort, as has been mentioned, *®P®^""*^**y* either entirely so, or from being by nature adapted to have Buch, or already to have such when it has been naturally fitted thereto also; for we would not say that in like manner was it impotential or impossible for a man and an eunuch to beget a child. But, moreover, according to both sorts :«f potentiality is there impotentiality opposed, both to that merely which is capable of motion, and to that capable of motion in an excellent manner. And things are styled impotential, some in accordance with this kind of im- potentiality, and others in another way; as, for instance, both the possible and the impossible. That, 4. whentHnga indeed, is a thing impossible tlie contrary of "esaidtobe ^ Siptrtt. This word is translated in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, hi reference to this passage, "abolition." It is a technical term ia pwfery, corresponding to the Latin expression ** ictus."
136 THE MBICAPHTSICS OF ABIBtOTL& [bOOK 17.
hnpouibie, at which is necessarily true; as the oommensurability in geometry, ^f ^}jg diameter is a thing that is impossible^ because such a position in mathematics is &lse; and the oontrary of this is not only true, but also must necessarily be so, namely, the incommensurability of the diameter. Its being commensurable, accordingly, is not merely false, but must be Mae, The contrary, however, to this is the possible, when it is not necessary that the contrary should be &lse; as, for example, the possibility of a man's sitting: for not necessarily is his being in a posture not of sitting a thing that is false. The possible in one way, therefore, as has been stated, signifies that which is not necessarily false, but in another it signifies the being true, and in another that which it is admissible may be true. Now, this is what in geometry is figuratively styled potentiality. These, indeed, therefore, are things possible — not so according to potentiality. 5. Reduction ^^* ^^ *^® things that are expressed according of these to one to potentiality are enumerated ^ with reference ifeims. ^^ ^^^ original potentiality or capacity; and this is a principle of change in another, so far foi*th as it is another. For the rest are styled potential, partly in some other of them possessing such potentiality, and partly in its non-possession thereof, and partly in its being thus dis- posed. In like manner, also, is it the case with things that are impotential. Wherefore, the precise definition of the first potentiality* would be a principle capable of bringing about a change in another thing, or so far forth as it is another.
CHAPTER XIII.* ,, Quantity is denominated that which is divi- ••quantity,"ex- gible into things that are inherent, of which plained. either or each thing is adapted by nature to be a ' For an explanation of this familiar principle to geometricians, th« reader is referred to a note in bopk III. chap. viii. p. 109.
' Aristotle insists on this point again in book VIII. chap. L ^ These words clearly recognise the creative energies of a first oause. Vide Sir Wm. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 585, and elsewhere.
* The subject of quantity is also treated of in the sixth chapter oi CH.Zni.] QUAKTITT EXPLAINED. 137