must necessarily be, that not simply or absolutely are the parts predioated. For if, also, soul is an animal, or that which IS animated, every animal ^ is each animal's own soul; and if the circle constitute the being of a circle, and the right angle^ the being of the right angle, and the substance, also, the sub* stance of the right angle, what particular thing, and belonging to what, as a substance, each of these is, we must state on a subsequent occasion; for instance, of those parts that are con- tained in the definition, and of a certain right angle; for both the angle of brass which subsists in conjunction with matter is a right angle, and that, also, contained within lines — I mean, singular lines. But a right angle that involves no connexion with matter is subsequent to those parts that are contained in the definition, and prior to those parts that are contained in the singular. But this is not to be affirmed of part absolutely. And if soul be something that is different, and does not con- stitute an animal, in this case must we both assert some parts to be prior, and other parts we must assert to be not prior, just as has been declared.
CHAPTER XI.« CHAPTER XI.« I. What sort But it is a matter of doubt, naturally, what ie fom^or^lhef ^^^ quality of the parts of form, and what sort ofvrhatiscom- the parts are not, but what kind the parts are, Song^fth which belong to a composite nature. Although, form, viewed in in casc this is uot evident, it is not possible to entirety, ^ggjjg gj^j^ thing. For of that which is imiversal and of form is there the definition; as to which, therefore, of the parts are related as matter, and which are not so, if these be not iraanifest, neither will be manifest the definition of the thing. As many things, indeed, therefore, as appear to be ingenerated in the form of different things, as a circle in brass, and stone, and wood, these, then, seem to be manifest, because neither the brass nor the stone is anything of the substance * This is Taylor*8 sense, which differs from that of the Latin VersiozL ' In this chapter, I take it, Aristotle wants to show the difficulty of framing logical in contradistinction to material definitions, from the &ot that we cannot always distinguish what is formal from what ii material in the thing to be defined.
XL] A QUESTIOK ABOtTT FOBIC 193 of the circle coiisequent upon its separation from them. But as many things as are not perceived to be separated there is no hindrance to their being similarly disposed with these, as if all circles were seen composed of brass; for, nevertheless, would the brass be in no wise a part of form, but it would be difficult in thought to abstract this: as, for instance, the form of man always appears in flesh and bones, and in such like parts — are these, then, also, parts of form, and of the definition, or are they not so, but matter merely? But, on account of its not being ingenerated in another also, we find it im- possible to separate it. And, since this seems to be admis- sible,— yet as to the time when, this is obscure, — certain philosophers now are involved in doubt, in the case both of a circle and in the case of a triangle, as if it were not fitting for lines, and that which is contained within lines, also to be defined by continuity; but that all should be predicated in a similar manner with the flesh or bones of a man, and the brass and stone of a statue, and they refer all things to numbers: and the definition of a line, they say, is that of the duad. Of those, likewise, who assert the existence of ideas, some make the actual line the duad, but others, the form of the line; for, in regard of some things, they say that form, and that of which the form is compounded, are the same: as, for instance, a duad and the form of the duad. But in the case of a line it is not so.
Therehappens, therefore, to be one form of many ^ ^^ ideal- things of which the species appears to be different, istic solution which consequence also ensued in their system jJnsuredT*"* unto the Pytiiagoreans; and it is possible, as a result from this position, to make one actual form of all things, and that other things be not forms at all, although on this supposition will all things be one. That, therefore, those things involve a certain doubt, (I mean, those questions that have been started respecting definitions, and from what cause it is that they are thus attended with difficulty,) this has been declared.
Wherefore, both to reduce all things in this s. summary way, and to abstract matter, would be super- JueTtionM*r«. fiuous; for in the case of some things, perhaps, gards the this is in this, or these things are so disposed. P"'»ofform. And the comparison that is made in th^ case of an animal, O 194 THE MBTAPHTSIGS OF ABISTOTLB. [bOOK JL which the junior Socrates ^ was accustomed to employ, is not a good one, for it forcibly withdraws one away firom the truths and makes us suppose as possible that man should subsist without parts, as a circle without brass. But this latter instance is not similar to the former, for animal, perhaps, is something that is cognisant by sense, and which cannot be defined without motion; wherefore, neither can it be defined without the parts somehow disposed. For not altogether is the hand a part of a man, but that which is able to accom- plish the proper function of a hand; wherefore, when it is animated it is a part, but when it is not animated it is not a part. Eespecting, however, mathematical entities, why are not definitions parts of the definitions of such ) for example, why are not semicii'cles parts of the definition of a circle? for these are not sensibles; or, shall we say that this makes no difierence, for they will be the matter of certain things, and of those that are not sensible, and of everything that is not the very nature or essence of a thing? These, then, will not be the parts of universal circle, but of singulars, as has been stated previously, for matter is partly sensible and partly intelligible. And it is evident, also, that the soul is the first substance, and that body is matter, but man or animal is the compound of both as universal. If the soul, however, be the form of such, Socrates and Coriscus are two-fold,* for some regard Socrates as soul, but others as an entirety: but if they be considered as this soul regarded simply, this body also will involve the relation of the uni- versal and of the singular.
4 other i Whether, however, beside the matter of such q'uiries as re- sort of substances, there is any other substance, funce!"**^ and whether it is necessary to search for any different substance of these — as, for instance, numbers, or some such thing — must afterwards be examined into.2 For, on account of this, let us also endeavour to frame some distinctions respecting sensible substances, since, in a * As to the younger Socrates, he was not any relation, at least it does not appear so, of Socrates, who, in reference to this, his namesake^ was termed the elder Socrates. He is supposed to have heen a pupil of Plato, and is represented by Plato in his writings, e.g. in the Tlo\tTtKi's, conversing with the elder Socrates. Some imagine that hfl Wap a brother of Theaetetus.
> FtflSe book XIL chap. vL OB. XI.] BEOAPrrtJLATION. 195 certain manner, the investigation regarding sensible substance is a work of the physical and second philosophy;^ for not only is it necessary for the natural philosopher to afford in- formation respecting matter, but also respecting tnat sub- stance which subsists according to the definition, even still more. In the case, however^ of definitions, in what manner are those parts which are assumed in the definition, and why definition is one reason, — for it is evident that the thing is one, and that the thing is in a cei*tain way one definite particular, which involves parts,— this must subsequently ^ be inquired into.
What, therefore, is the essence of a thing, and 5. Recapituia- how this subsists in itself, that is, absolutely, has quesSoisIn been declared respecting everything universally, regard of defi- and why the definition of the essence of some "*'*®"' things possesses the parts of that which is defined; but, in other things, why this is not the case, and why that in the definition, indeed, of substance the parts so constituted as matter are not inherent, this, likewise, has been declared. For they are not parts of that substance, but of the entire together; and of this there is at least, in a manner, a defini- tion, and there is not so. For as involving a connexion with matter there is not a definition (for it is a thing that is indefinite), but according to the first substance there is; as, for instance, the definition of man is the definition of his soul. For the substance constitutes form, that is, such as is indwelling, from which and from matter the entire sub- stance is denominated; as, for example, hollo wness or concavity: for firom this and nose a flat nose, and flatness, are composed, for therein twice will the nose be inherent. In the substance, however, in its entirety, as in a flat nose, or Callias, is matter also inherent. And that the essence or very nature of a thing, and a singular in the case of some things, are the same — as in tlve Ciise of primary substances; for instance, a curvature, and the essence of a curvature, if it is primary — that these, 1 say, are the same, this has been declared. Now, I mean by primary, or first, that which is not expressed in respect of one thing being inherent in * The "prima philosophia '* is, of course, hyper-physicaL Ab to the Assertion in the text, vide Physics, book II. chap. ii. ' Aristotle 3xamine8 into tiiis point in the oext chapter.
o2 i96 THB METAFHTSICS Op ARISTOTLS. [bOOKTI another, and in a subject as matter. But as many things as subsist as matter, or as things involving a connexion with matter, these are not the same, except that they are one according to accident, as Socrates and the musical for these are the same according to accident.
CHAPTER XII.
I. Another Let US uow, howevcr, first discuss the subject gords'defi"-"^ SO far forth as there has been no statement tion discussed, made conccming definition in the Analytics;^ for the doubt that has been expressed in those inquiries is of advantage to our present dissertations respecting substanca Now, this doubt which I allude to is as follows: "why, pray, a thing that is capable of definition, of which the reason, we say, is a definition, is one thing, as the definition of man is a two-footed animal 1 for let this stand as a definition of him." Now, why is this one thing, but not many, animal and two- footed? for also, in the case of man and white, they are many things when they are not inherent, either in the other; but when the one is inherent in the other, and when the subject — viz. man — undergoes any passive condition, they are one, fbr then a white man becomes and is one thing. Here, however, either does not partake of the other, for genus does not appear to participate in the diflferences; for in such a case would the same thing at the same time participate in contra- ries, for differences are contraries wherein the genus differs. And if the genus does participate in the differences, the same reasoning holds good, even though the differences be many in number; for instance, having the capability of walking, biped, without wings. For why are these things one, but not many 1 for they are not one because they are inherent,^ for so, indeed, will there be one of all. But it is requisite that, at any rate, as many things as are contained in definition should be one, for definition is a certain single principle or * In this chapter certain points pertaining to definition are discussed; Buch as had been omitted by Aristotle in the second book of the Pos- terior Analytics, where the same subject is examined into.
^ These words are supplied in Didot's, but are not found in ihd Loipsic edition.
CH. XII.] OUESTION ABOUT DEPINTFION. 197 reason, and belongs to substance.^ Wherefore, of one par- ticular thing this must needs be a definition, for also sub- stance signifies one certain particular thing, as we say.
And it is necessary, finl^ to examine respecting 2. in rebpect of those definitions which subsist according to divi- genus and dir- sions. For there is nothing else involved in defi- ®'®"*'®' nition unless the genus that is denominated first, and the difierences, but the other things are genera, both that which is first, and the diflFerences comprehended along with this; as, for instance, the first genus is animal, and that next in order to this is two-footed animal; and, again, two-footed animal without wings; and, in like manner, will it be the case if thi definition be expressed by means of many distinctive quali- ties. In general, however, there is no difference whether it subsists by many such, or by few, or by two of them: yet if a thing be defined by two distinctive qualities, the one will be difference, and the other genus, as, for instance, of two-footed animal, animal is the genus, and the other, two- footed is the difference. If, therefore, genus, simply con- sidered, is not anything different from the species, as it were, of that genus, or if, indeed, it is, yet it is as matter, — for voice is genus and matter, but the differences produce the forms and elements out of this, — it is evident, in such a case, that a definition is a sentence or discursus composed from dif- ferences. But, therefore, is it necessary, likewise, ^^^ ^ ^^ ^^^ tliat the difference of the difference should, at oftheditrer- least, be divided; as, for example, a difference be- difflJeSL* longing to animal, such as having the support of feet: again, it is requisite to know the difference of the animal that possesses the differential quality of being sup- ported on feet, as fer forth as it is such — I mean, such as has the support of feet. Wherefore, it is not proper to say that of an animal which has the support of feet, one sort we find with wings and another without them, if one is to express himself correctly; but on account of the impossibility of making a proper division of the distinctive qualities will one do this: but it is correct to say so if one kind has cloven, and aLother has feet that are not cloven; for these are the differ- ences of foot, for a cloven foot is a certain quali^ y of foot. Ani 1 Some MSS. reed aicria.
\db TlIE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK TL BO always does one desire to go on making divisions of dis- tinctive qualities, until we come to things that do not involve any difference. But then will there be as many species of foot as there are differences, and the number of animals with feet supporting them will be equal to the/ dififerences.
3. The unity of ^^^' ^^ *^®^ things are so, it is evident the definition that the ultimate difference will be the substance b?thl'numl2r of the thing,! and the definition of it, if it is not of specified dif- necessary to say oftentimes the same things in the case of definitions, for it would be super- fluous. But this, at least, happens sometimes; for when one calls an animal that has feet supporting it a biped, he has said no more than this, viz. that an animal having the support of feet has two feet. And if he make a division of this by an appropriate difference, he will say the same thing frequently, and in an equal number of times with the differences. If, indeed, therefore, a difference of a differ- ence may be produced, one which is the ultimate difference will constitute form and substance; if, however, the division be made according to accident, as if one should make a division, in the case of the classes of that which has the support of feet, of one into white, and another into black, so many differences or distinctive qualities will there be as there may be divisions of them. Wherefore, it is evident that definition is a sentence that is composed from the things that are differences, and from the last of these that is drawn up in accordance with a correct classification, at least. And this would be plain, if one should transpose the arrangement of the terms of definitions of this kind; as, for example, that of a man, saying, — instead of the ordinary definition, — animal biped having the support of feet; for superfluous would be the distinctive quality of having the support of feet, on the supposition of the thing defined being denominated, a biped. An arrangement of terms, however, does not exist in sub- stance; for how is it necessary to understand the one as subsequent, but the other as prior? Respecting, then, definitions that subsist according to divisions ^ of the dis- ^ The unity of definition Aristotle rests on the determination of It by the ultimate difforeuce. * Asclepius mentions that this chapter was mainly directed agaimt OH. XIII.] ABE UN1VEB8ALS SUttSTANOEBl 199 tinctive qualities of the things defined wliat sort they are, let thus muoh^ in the first instance, be affirmed.
CHAPTER XIII.1 But since our present investigation is concern- i. Connexion lug substance, let us once more take a review of JriS^he fo™' the matter. Now, substance is said to subsist going. as the subject and the essence or very nature of a thing, and that which is composed from these is termed substance, and that which is universal. Respecting, indeed, then, two of them have we declared our opinions already; for also we have done so in the case of the essence or very nature of a thing, and the subject, observing that in two ways it is a subject, either as being this certain particular thing, as an animal is the subject of its passive states, or it is as matter in a condition of actuality. But to some speculators doth the universal in an eminent degree appear to be a cause, and the universal appears to be a first principle also. Where- fore, likewise, as regards this point must we institute an inquiry.
For it seems to be a thing impossible that 2. Are univer- •substance should be anything whatsoever of sals substances! those things that are denominated imiversal, for primary substance, to be sure, in everything is that which does not belong to another thing; that which is universal, however, is common, for that is said to be universal which by nature is fitted to be inherent in many things: of what, then, will this be a substance 1 for either it will be a substance of all things or of nothing; but of all things it is not even possible that it should be a substance: and if it be the substance of one thing, other things also will be this; for those things of the Platonists by Aristotle, who considered that they had treated the subject here discusHed superficially and unmethodically.
* Aristotle comes to be engaged in the speculations pursued in this chapter, from the fact that me^physics being coucem&d about the rd tv, and the rd Kvpiojs hy being, as he has shown, equivalent with ottrUi, and outrla being subdivided into subject, form, the composite of both, And the universal; and three of these being already discussed, he now comee to consider some points connected with the fourth, the 1*^ 4JiBo\oy.
800 THB fltETAFHTSIOB OF ABI8T0TLB. [lOOK Yt which the substance is one, and the eauLuce or yery nature one, will themselves likewise be one^ Further, is that deno- minated substance which is not predicated of a subject; the universal, however, is invariably predicated of a certain sub- ject. But then shall we say that it is not possible, certainly, that it should subsist in such a way as the essence or very nature of a thing, but that it be inherent in this: for ex- ample, animal in man and horse. Therefore, is it evident that there will be a certain definition of it But there is no difference either if there is not a definition of all those things that are contained in the substance; for this, nevertheless, will be a substance of something, as man is the substance of man, wherein man is inherent. Wherefore, the same conse- quence will again ensue, for substance will be substance of man;^ as, for instance, animal is substance in that species in which it is inherent as a peculiar property.
t -^T^^ further, the thing would be both im- a'substance"^ possible and absurd, that this particular thing poses such"^ ^^^ substance, if they are composed from certain things, should not consist of substances, or of anything of the sort, but from quality. For that which is not substance and quality will be prior both to substance and this particular thing; an assertion that is impossible: for neither in definition, nor in time, nor in generation, is it possible, likewise, that the passive properties of a thing should be prior to the substance of it, for they will involve a subsistence separable from it. Moreover, in Socrates, who is a substance, will substance be inherent; wherefore, will Socrates be a substance in two substances. And in general the result following ensues — if man is substance, and as many things as are thus expressed — that none of those things con* tained in definition is substance of anything, and that it has not a subsistence separable from them, nor does it subsist in another: now, I mean, for example, that there is not any animal besides those certain particular ones, or anything else of those things that are contained in the definitions. Now, from these considerations, also, it is evident to persona examining into the subject, that nothing of those things that have an universal subsistence is substance, and that nothing ' The punctuacioQ adopted in the Leipaic edition is most confuaecj I have followed Didot'a text in preference.
OH. Zm.J THIS QUESTION DISCUSSED. 201 of those thiiigs that are predicated in common signifies thii certain particular thing, but a thing of such a quality.
And i£ this be not admitted, many other con- 4. Further ar- sequences also will ensue,* and, amongst the ^^"/univer- rest, the consequence that there will be a third sals being sub- man. Further, also, it is evident that the case ***"*'®*- stands thus, from the following remark, for it is impossible that substance should be compounded &om substances which are inherent in such a manner as to subsist in actuality; for two things thus would subsist in actuality, yet they never would be one thing in actuality. But if they may be two things in potentiality, they will be one; as the two-fold i« compounded of two halves, at least, in potentiality, for actu- ality in the case of others separates them. Wherefore, if the substance be one thing, it will not be compounded from substances that are inherent, and subsisting according to that mode which Democritus mentions correctly; for it is impos- sible, he says, that from two atoms should be generated one, or two from one, for he makes magnitudes that are indivi- sible to be substances. Therefore, is it plain that also in the case of number this will take place in a similar manner^ if number be a composition of monads, as is said by some speculators, for either the duad is not one, or it is not the monad that is involved in this actuality.
But the result which ensues contains a matter 5 ^ ^o^^,t of doubt; for if neither from the universals is it suggested by possible that any substance be compounded, on ' re"o°»n?- account of an animaFs signifying a thing of such a sort^ but not this certain particular thing, neither is it possible that there subsists any substance from substances, in actuality — I mean, that no composite nature can thus subsist; now, on such a supposition, every substance would be a thing that is un- com pounded. Wherefore, neither would there be a definition of any substance. But, assuredly, it seems, at least, to all speculators, and has been laid down originally, that definition is conversant about substance, either solely or prncipally: but now the conclusion drawn is this, that neither is there definition of this, that is, of substance, nor will there be a definition of any one thing in such a case; or, shall we say * Sy nanus sides with the Platonists against Aristotle, and endear ourf to show the inconsistency of the Stagyrite's reasoning hereupon.
0 SOS THE MBTAPUTSIOB OF AfilSTOTLK. [bOCK TI.
that in a certain manner there will be, and in a certain manner there will not be, a definition of substance ) What, however, that is which is afiirmed will be more manifest from the sequel.^ CHAPTER XIV.
This do a Now, from thesc very circumstances is evident touching uni- the rcsult which ensues, to those both who say poBM^he^fei- *^* ideas are as well substances as separable iBcy of the Bubstauccs,^ and who at the same time constitute e theory. ^^^.^ ^^^ ^^ ^^ genus and the diflFerences. For if forms and animal exist in man and in horse, there is, imdoubt- edly, one and the same, or a different animal in number, for by definition it is evident that there is one and the same; for the same definition does he assign who says that they are inherent in each. I^ therefore, there is some man — an actual thing subsisting essentially — that is this certain particular individual thing, and one which has a separate subsistence, it is necessary, also, that those things from which they are composed, as, for example, animal and biped, should signify this certain particular individual thing, and should involve a separable subsistence, and be substances. Wherefore, also,