Having thus brought forward the lea£ng systems 42, Review of of the Naturalists, «aA ascertained their merits and thePiatonie defects, and also having reviewed in part the various Jgjj®^ *" theories of the Supranaturalists, Aristotle now comes ^ ^* ^ to the consideration of what with him was modem philosophy — ^the ideal h^rpothesis of Plato. Platonism he r^ards as, in most of its tenets, in harmony with the Pythagorean {)hflosophy; but still there were many peculiarities to be found therein, which were not shared in common with the Italic sects. The origin of the Platonic philo- sophy, Aristotle is of opinion, lay in a son of reaction against ' the Heraditics, in their theory about the continual flux of things cognisant to the senses. The Theory itself of Ideas seems to have been sug- gested by the speculations of Soorates, and to have been a mere extension of the conclusions he had arrived at in regard of universal definitions.
As to the points of contact between the Platonic and ^^ ^ the Pythagoric schools, Aiistolie remarks that they betwe^n^he^ developed their systems pretty similarly in the main, systems of save inat what the latter denominated imitation, the pJJJ^"*®™*"^ brmer called panicipation; though in reality the same CI) Tb) iMne asMrtioa is made in iMok XII« ZXil ANALYSIS OF AHI8T0TLE*S HETAFHTSICS. [bOOK I thing was meant by these two technical words, uifiTi<ns and iitBt^, Plato recognised the existence, beside sensimes and forms, of mathematical entities, as intermediate between both; the sensibles were regarded merely as substantive representations of the forms — jtJie forms were the causes of these and all other objects — ^the elements of the one were the elements of the other; the assimilation of forms to numbers, and of unity to substance, as well as the recog- nition of the causality of numbers in respect of tie essence of other things, — ^these assertions of the Platonists were parallel with those of the Pythagoreans. Wbereas, however, the Platonic school sought to establish the existence of numbers independent of sensible objects, the I^ha^rics, on the other hand, affirmed that the former entirely constitute! the latter, and they did not contend for the existence of those mathematical media which the Platonists did. These diverg- encies of the philosophy of Plato from that of Pythaewras, Aristoile considers resulted from the logical investigations whicn were pursued by the former, and totally neglected in the schools of the latter. 44. Service ^^^ ^^^y ^ ^^^ Qucstion should be askcd, what serconferred by vice Plato performed for the progress of metaphysical SphV" ^^^ science, Anstotle replies, that it is comprehended m his aetiological system, m which the existence of two dis- tinct genera of causes is acknowledged, namelv, the formal and matermi, because the forms were the causes or the substance of thin^, the t6 rl ecrri, and unitj, as matter was the cause that consti- tutea the forms; so that if this be the case, what novelties are to be found in Platonism that may not be discovered in the systems of the Italics in equal perfection F But, further, as regards their theory, to account for the phenomena of good and evil, the Platonists came short of systemis quite anterior to them, namely, those of Empedocles and Anaxagoras.
^ We have now a valuable summary presented to us by of thia^Sw Aristotle of the results of the foregoii^ review. In the of the Greek first place, the Stagyrite reiterat&s the justice of the ?hap " vii'^ ^ assertion made in the very outset of the inquiry; namely, that aU schools, ancient and modem, prosecuted their »tiological investigations on the assumption of a fourfold classifi- cation of causes — the very same that Aristotle has already established in his Physics. Still, however, their treatment of these causes has been, in general, obscure, and, indeed, partial, for one or two have been exaRed above the rest; and thus a complete examination of the entire four has been nullified in the several theories of these philo- sophers. The material cause has had abundance of attention bestowed iipon it, and by some it has been considered as single, but by others as manifold. And this may be observed in Platonism, where it is assimilated with the great and *he small — t6 fuya km to \uko6v — m the Italit? schools, who fixed upon the Infimte, the r6 dneipop, as 9ich, in the theory of Empedocles about the four elements, and in BOOR I.] 4NALYS1B OF ARISTOTLE's IfETAPBTSICS. IXlil tliat of ABaxagoras, about liis faTomite hvpotliesis of an infinite HomoeomericB. But still the efficient cause has not been entirely forgotten in the Ancient Philosophy, and faint gleams of it maj w discovered in the adoption by certain speculators of sueh principles into their systems as Harmony, Discord, Soul, and Mind. Still less notice has been vouchsafed to Uie formal cause, and the only traces (^ it are to be found in the Pythagoric system of numbers, and in the Ideal HvpoUiesis of Plato. But, after all, even these two schools laboured, under the defects of being partial statements of truth, and it is not so easy to discern in them the material and efficient causes; at least in the Ideal Theory, Plato does not make the forms as matter for objects cognisant by the senses, and, far from the efficient prin- ciple being discoverable therein, the forms he views as causes of immobility rather. And as to the treatment of the final cause in the hands of the ancient philosophers, Aristotle considers that it likewise has come in but for a small share of attention, and that its nature has been imperfectly examined into in such systems as put forward the principles of Harmony, or Mind, or Entitjr and Unity both together, as such. There is nothing, however, definite in their theories, and any statement of the truth seems purely accidental with them. Thus Aristotle finds reason again to congratulate himself upon the correct view he has taken of the Ancient Philosophy, as to its treat- ment of cauBcs, and, further, as to his own classification of causes, as well as the mode of inquiry adopted in regard of them.
In connexion with this review of Platonism, Aristotle ^.fij^ge who g^ces at the systems of those who contended for the recognised one unity of the material cause, and that, too, to the exclu- J5**J2p^ J^'® sion of the other three, and endeavours to point out some of their numerous misapprehensions. Amount the rest of theii errors are stigmatized that of nuUifjrin^ the principle of motion, and that of not attributing to things their formal cause. And, moreover, when they micht have invested with the attribute of unity what we would naturally expect to find thus arrayed, by not taking this course, they have mvolved themselves in inextricable difficulties. This is shown in the case of the four elements, earth, air, water, and fire; and as re^ds the last, this instance brings these philosophers into collision with antiquity, as is proved by the testimony of Hesiod. Nor would the inconsistencies of such a sjrstem of stioloey be dimin- ished by substituting a plurality of material causes in the place Oj merely one, as Empedocles does, nor even by a dualism of such prin dples, as in the theory of Anaxagoras.
And here, again, imstotle has to repeat the grand ^j j^ie grand lurking imperfection in all such systems, namely, that imperfection o. they are completely buried in matter; that they are the wiyphUo- immersed in material speculations, to the exclusion of '^^ ^' others equally important, and the^ have failed to observe, what ia quite apparent in the philosophy ot others, that beside lliose object* \1 IXlV ANALYSIS OP ARI8X0TLE*S METAFHTSICS. [bOOK I.
• which fall under the notice of sense, there are others that are coffni- sant by the mind, and that the latter are as real — ^in fact more red-~ as causes than the former. And this school of the Snpranatnralista has achieved much more towards an advancement of metaphysical science than that of these Naturalists or Physicists but just men- tioned.
Now this fondamental absurdity of the Physicists mental dSfert*^ ^*^ ^^ P^® ^ *^® systems of the SutranaturaJists; absent f^om for although those of the latter are loaded with incon- th* l^***™* ^^ sistencies peculiar to themselves, and though they may catunai^' appear to put forward strange causes, yet they avoid the gross error of the former, who are mere Materialists, and this they do because they derive their principles from supra- sensual sources. And this tells upon their philosophy in seneral, and Ls apparent in the wideness of their speculations, and in the boldness with which they have penetrated into the secret of Nature. And, above all,.what fixes a chasm — ^not to be bridged over — between the schods of the Naturalists and the Supranatiursuists is this, that in the latter there is secured, from the nature of their principles, a necessary transition to a higher order of phenomena; and this is the charm of their philosophy, that it opens up to our view a glimpse into the glorious legions of transcendentalism.^ 49 Thi ^® whole of the foregoing review of the philosophy closed byone^of of the ancicnts is drawn to a dose by an examination the Ideal Hypo- into the Ideal Hypothesis of Plato. The inconsistencies thesis in chap. q£ j-y^ hypothesis are unsparingly exposed; the very arguments brought forward by its advocates in its favour are in reality subversive of it; it is quite insufficient to ac- count for actual phenomena; it brings nothing forward that can advance the interests of science; and therefore for each and all of these reasons is by no means to be received with unhesitating assent.
Likewise is the theory of Plato, in regara of the Satonic tenets, assi^ulation of forms with numbers, attacked, and that of ' the generation of mathematical substances. As to the former, he shows the absurdity of investing numbera with the attri bute of causahty,' which they cannot possess. Ajgain, how wiU you secure the production of one form from many, as is the case with the generation of numbers; and besides all this, such a theory pre- supposes the necessity of the existence of some other desciiption of number, besides that which falls within the province of arithmetic. In his attack on the latter, he stigmatises the over-partiality of the Platonists for mathematics, and their making these studies paramount to all others, though they profess to prosecute them merely in su> lervienoe to and for the promotion of the rest of the sciences (1) Fide concluding remarlcs of this Aaaljraii. (Si Vide book XIII chapter vi BOOK I.] ANALTBIS OF ABI&TOTLF^S JIETAPHT8IGB.
But, in fact, the Platonic system of first principles in 50. The Pi»- ffeueral may be said to strike at the roots of all Jbiow- tonic dpxai ledge whatever, because it is based on the assumption fi"eS{J*^^^ **"" of the discoverability of the elements of all thmgs, irrespective of their many distinctions and divisions. But how is this to be the case P — ^how is one to learn the elements of all things P for, in such an attempt, it is evident that he must disclaim any pre- vious knowled^ of the matter in hand. A person, e.^., learning geometry mav be acquainted witn other things previously, but not so with those aoout which the science is immediately conversant. He must then admit the impossibility of his acquaintance with any pre- cxistent principles; and vet on these, as an essential basis, rests every acquired system of science. Every science, in the mode of acquiring it, is attainable by means of previous data furnished bj demonstiation and definition. For as to any innate knowledge inde- pendent of induction and definition, it is quite contrary to our own experience to say that we possess any such; or, supposing that we do, it is then quite astonishmg that we should ever have been wholly miconscious of our possession of such a treasure.
In conclusion, Aristotle once more appeals to the jj, conclusion history of the Greekphilosophy as a vinmcation of his of book i. the division of causes. He repeats that the ancient or even ^J**"*" modem speculators, with all their ingenuity, could not ^' fix on any other species of cause wmch would not fall under the category of one or other of these; and no argument lies against this, from the obscurity or imperfection of the early systems. That is to be anticipated. The dawn of Philosophy may be compared to one whose articulation is not very finished or matured; and for this very reason, because it is its dawn, when we cannot expect to find its principles enunciated with the same confidence and precision as when men have advanced in speculation, and thus achieved, at the same time, the passage of Philosophy from its early child-like simplicity mto the gravity of a more advanced period of its existence.
BOOK I. THE LESS.
BOOK I. THE LESS.
l^' order to show the connexion between Book I. the 1. connexion Greater, the analysis of which has been just brought to between a conclusion, and Book I. the Less, the consideration of g^Ji ^\ which will occupy us now, — in order to show this con- Book i. the nejuon, we must bear in mind that Aristotle considers ^^^■•' speculative science, properly so called, to be synonymous ^ with truth. Now, speculative science, m the strictest sense of the word, he has already defined Metaphysics to te; and therefore he must needs (1) Alexander Aphrodislecsii on thii ^sage, m veil as Thomaa Aguinaa.
0 XXV i ANALYSIS OP ARIST0TLE*6 METAPHYSICS. [bOOK I behold Ontology from this point of view. Accordingly, we are now favoured with a short synopsis of the relations subsisting between truth and scientific knowledge in general, and of the influence exer- cised by the nature of the rormer on the progress and destinies of the latter.
. An inquiry into the subject of truth is partly difficult about truS7 ^'^^ partly easy: this doffma is capable of verification, partly easy and The difficulty that atten£ philosophers in their pursuit 'aMter 1*°^*' °^ truth, is evinced in the fact that no adequate system of it has been successfully formed; and yet this implies, Ji a certain sense, the facility of such a search. For it shows that many attempts of the sort have been made from time to time, which, though they have turned out to be incomplete, as far as regards the fall attainment of truth, yet have contained in themselves some portion of it, however inconsiderable.* 8 This shows ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ which should teach us the precise the value of degree of value to be attached to the labours oi those previous phiio- ^j^o toil along with us in the paths of knowledge, sop c a ours, f^^ results of their research, when viewed separately in reference to the speculators individually, amongst those who have brought them forward — ^the results may, in this poiat of view, appear insignificant; and yet the entire labours of all together, in their aggregate condition, may amount to something of considerable mag- nitude. It is under the influence of this very principle that Aristotle himself is careful ever to pierce into the very centre of the philo- sophic systems of others, in order that he may, on the one hand, dis- engage therefrom whatever falsehood may lurk therein, and stigmatise it; and that, on the other hand, by a careful analysis, he may mscover whatever truth they contain, and appropriate that to himself.
4 An impor- ^^® ^^U i^^fort^^t principle is laid down in reference tant principle to the difficulties of Speculative truth in general, and as regards it is this — ^that the caiisc of these difficulties may reside *'^* ' not 80 much in the things themselves as in the imperfection of the faculties of the searchers after truth. And this Aristotle illustrates, with so much reality and beauty, by the case of l^ats, whose powers of vision, he says, bear the same proportion to the brightness of the noonday as do the principles of the soul and intellect to the splendour of the phenomena of [Nature. And, more- over, upon this subject we should remember how, from age to age, successive improvements are being made towards the formation of a system of truth in the world; how one generation avails itself of the scientific discoveries that have accumulated together from preceding ages; and how all this stamps on truth itself its noble characterof progressiveness.
s. HowAris- Now, Aristotle, having already established the fact ietie comes to that Metaphysics was a science concerned with causes 5 (1) Fide Dr. Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, book II. chap. L BDOK I.] ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS. XXVft tn order, therefore, from this to demonstrate the reality treat about an of Ontology, he proceeds next to show how, in dealing infinite pro- with stiologicaL speculations, we have something definite KJ'e""'®" <>' to treat about, because we must arrive at some ultimate principle, otherwise we would go ujon the absurd assumption of ar infinite precession of causes. The impossibility of this g r^j^ig i„finiti infinite progression,^ Aristotle demonstrates in the case progression of the material, efficient, final, and formal causes. In disproved. respect of the final cause, he proves, with mnch ability, how that such a supposition would exclude the notion of design from the phenomena of the Universe; and, by destroying the nature of the good (toO dyaOov), would undermine the entire labric of God's moral government over the world. And again, in respect of the formal cause, the same supposition would overturn the reality of all scientific knowledge; for knowledge cannot be attained witnout one's first being conversant with in£vidual objects: and how can this be done. if those objects are infinite?
Thus having combated the objection' against the 7. How we science of the metaphysician, as though it were merely ^ust prosecut* vague and indetermmate, and the creature of his own after ^nSh. fancy, Aristotle glances at what he conceives should be the mode of prosecuting the search after truth, chiefly as a pattern for the imitation of the ontologist; and for this purpose he points out the dangerous extremes, on the one hand, of demanding more precision than the subject requires, and, on the other, of resting satisfied with less accuracy than is essential for the interests of truth. Thus, some demand exactness in everything, and some in nothing, as being what is to them painful and irksome. This dislike of accuracy, pernaps, may spring from the weakness of their mental powers, in not oeing able lo connect together their thoughts with sufficient close- ness. Bnt a great deal of this is traceable to the influence of habit upon our spectdative systems, and to the fact that opinions may be rejected on account of their strangeness by persons who, were they more familiar with them, mig-ht be more inclined to adopt them. And all this is borne out by experience; for instance, in the case of the laws where usage reconciles men with flctions and puerilities. So that the chief point to bear in mind on the subject is this, that different degrees of accuracy are to be adopted in the different sciences; and that, f(»r example, what is suitable for the mathematician in the (1) Vide Dr. Clarke in his Essay on the Being and Attributes of God, where ne refutes the same dogma.
(2) It is at the commencement of the last chapter of this hook that Aristotle seems to recognise the distinction that has he^n established in reference to hit works as acroatic, or acroamatic and exoteric. As to the nature and objects of this division of the Peripatetic philosophy, the student should consult Buhle in his Fre> fhce to his edition of Arisiotle; Blakesley on Aristotle, p. 159, (f^om the Metrop Encycl.) published by Griffin; and Dr. Gillies' Life of Aristotle, prefixed to tb« tnnaUition of the Politics in ** Bohn's Classical Library."
o2 xxviii ANALYSIS OF Aristotle's metaphysics. [booku.
pursuit 3f mathematical truth, is not suitable for the natural phikn sophcr in the pursuit of natural or physical truth.
BOOK II.
nature ^^^» previous to his entering directly upon this meta- of booViL physical investigation that he has undertaten, Aristotle, lustifledin m accordance with the usage of disputants, deems it •hapter i. rcc^uisite first to clear the way of whatever doubts there are that may, m connexion with Metaphysics, require a previous solution. And, after all, this is a wise way of proceeding in this and in all sciences; for judicious doubting wHl conduct us to the dis- covery of truth, because knowledge is often the result of previous doubt; * for persons labouring imder doubt feel Uke captives that are loaded with chams, and that desire to snap them in sunder. £ut, at any rate, for scientific investigators to refuse to entertain any doubts in the outset of their inquiries, would entirely cut off all prospects of advancement; for such might be compared to travellers commenc- ing a journey, but not knowing which was the right road to strike out upon.
2. Doubts Aristotle, accordingly, sets down what he conceives found in to constitute the legitimate subjects of doubt in conbook ii. nexion with Ontology or Metaphysics. And, first, the question may be asked, Is Ontology, as a science of causes, single or manifold?— IS it conversant about the principles of substance merely, or also about those from whence all demonstrative reasoning is derived P And again. Is the science of the metaphysician concerned with substance; and if so, is it with one or many? And as regards substances themselves, are these merely those that are cognisant to the senses, or are there, besides these, others, such as forms and mathematical entities? And again, is Ontology concerned with the accidents of substances, as well as the substances themselves P Further, a doubt arises as to whether it falls within doubtratated. ^^® province of the metaphysician to examine into identity and diversity, similanty and dissimilarity, and such other topics as the Dialecticians strive to arrive at some con- clusion upon, by drawing their investigations from probable opinions. And again, there is the (juestion as to whether genera aie first prin- ciples, and whether, beside matter, there is any absolute cause or not; and if so, whether it is capable of a separate subsistence there- from or not, and is single or manifold? And again, whether there exists anything beside entirety, or not P— what is the number of first (1) Bacon has a similar remark in his observations on Hypothesis, m the De Auf < viantis. book V. chapter iii.
BOOK II.] ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S HETAPHTSIOS. XZh principles P are tbey even limited in number P And again, are the principles of comiptibles and incomij)tibles the same, or whether are ali incorruptible, or of the corruptible are the principles merelj ccrruptibleP Farther arises the question,— one most difficult tc give a reply to, — as to whether entity and unity ccnstitute the sub- sUmce of things P And, again, are first principles universid, or do they subsist as singulars, and if so, whether in potentiality or in energy? And, agam, are numbers, and lengths, and figures, and points, certain substances or not P and if so, are they in a state of actual separation from sensibles or not, or do they subsist as being inherent m them? ^ Now all these questions are discussed in detail to the end of the Second Book. But even the discussion of cuasion o? the first may be regarded as prolonged throughout the these questions entire of the third. And, indeed, it may be observed, JJJifT}^"**^ '** that the examination of these several doubts reappears in various parts of the Metaphysics, up to the very close of the entire Treatise. These questions, likewise, are mooted merely in this book; the reasons for and against are fairly stated, and nothing decisive pronounced thereupon; but, whenever they reappear in the advanced portions of the Metaphysics, it is in order that Aristotle may pronounce his final judgment upon them. The discussion which they do receive in this book is in the order in which they are stated, witn the exception of the last doubts, where such is inverted.
The questions, from the first to that in regard of the genera of substances, we have examined in chapter ii. discussion^' ^ In chapter iii. we have that discussed, in regard to »doptedin whether genera are first principles and elements. In ^°o*^^' chapter iv. Aristyotle exammes as to whether anything subsists inde- pendent of singulars; whether there is anything in existence besides entirety, t6 awoXov, whether the principles of conru])tibles and incorruptibles are the same; whether entity and unity constitute the substance of thin^. In chapter v. we commence with the question. Are numbers, and bodies, and surfaces, and points, substances or notP And tiiis occupies the entire chapt-er. There has been a sort of anticipation in the order of discussion observed; and in chapter vi., which is the last in book IL, Aristotle investigates the remainder of the doubts. For instance, as to whether, besides sensibles and media> there subsist forms; how first principles are disposed in regard of their number;^ as to the mode of tneir subsistence; and as to whether they are as universals or singulars.
These questions are all worthy of our attention; g. Relative though at the same time some are more so than others, importance of Chapter iy. decidedly contains the most valuable dis- Jfe?tionV'^*^ cussions in the entire of book II.; and which, on examination, wiU be found to have an intimate bearing upon Meta* (1) Vide book XII. (2) Fide book XI. chap. viii.
AH ANALYSIS 07 ABI8TOTLE*8 ICJETAFHTSIOS. [BOOK H, physios. ThiB chapter opens with the discussion of the question, as io tho oxistonoe ofan absolute cause independent of matter; and he hows tho absurdity of supposing that there is not, which would be itivolvod in the necessary consequence therefrom, of there being iinthing in existence that could be cognisable by the mind, but that a^l things wo\ild fall under the notice of the senses. And this would fxolmlo tho possibility of any thing like scientific knowledge; for YOU otitinot call a mere exercise of sense, science. But, besides this, such a Btinposition ends in positive Atheism, for we thereby ignore iho pnsaibihty of tho existence of an eternal and ingenerable sub utanoc. And this is most absurd, because generation presupposes a Sfrnomtori and this process cannot go on in a proffression ad Ttfffmfffm^ out \vc must ultimately arrive at what is everlasting and iugoncrablo. But the most interesting question of all, iVuiInt-xuT* bcH?H\i»c it illustrates the connexion fctween Ontology tt«J>M»t>« <ith\\ and ThcoU^v, is one discussed likewise in this fourtl tV«t»» in chapter; namolv, as to whether the principles of «»\«\t>. V. (l^niga corniptilue and incorruptible are one or diffiMvni Aristotle complains that this question, though of vast (mpovtauiH^, has l>ocn overlooked both by ancient and modem phi- losophers.
R. i>i»cuwirtn Now, if we suppose that the principles of mortals oftbu quw- and eternals are the same, how are we to account for *^^'" tho difference in kind that subsists between the two, —