what is the cause of this difference? The old Theogom'sts gave a v'^illy solution of this difficulty, in the essential difference which they sought to establish between gods and men; for it really, after al^ secured no distinction at all between them, and in their system we in vain look for the existence of immc»^ natures. 0 Attempted ^^ *^® solution put forward by Empedocles is polutionof equally irreconcilable; though one is hardly prepared titU dimouity for this in the case of a philosopher whose theories k>-Kmpcdocie8. j^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ consistent with them- selves. Now, Empedocles fancies that he has discovered an adequate cause of this difference in his theory of Harmony and Discord, for he. is for producing aU thingp from the operation of the latter principle jMive the Deity. But this notion is quite subversive of tne essence of the Divine Nature, for it would set God infinitely below any of jiis creatures in wisdom and prudence; e.^. He would not have a knowledge of the elements consequent upon the non-residence of 10. It i8 con- discord in his nature, for like is known by like. But triiry to expe- is this theory borne out by experience? Certainly not: rience. [^ Nature the principles of Harmony and Discord have often results flowing from them quite opposite to those assigred by Bmpedocles. In short, they do not account at all for the cause why «ome thin^ are corruptible and others are incorruptible; and jet ilis constitutes the entii-e difficultv of the assumption, that tht BOOK III. J ANALYSIS OP ARI8T3TTiE*S METAPHYSICS. XXXl principles of comiptibles and incorruptibles, of mortal and inmiortal natures, are the same.
Now this question, as has been remarked, is a most n. The im- fmportant one indeed, on account of its theological po'rtanceof character; but still Aristotle displays no more than gx^'i^gj*"" ordinary interest in the discussion of it; * takes no pains, ^^^ '^^ ' as a Christian metaphysician would do, to make tnis an opportunity for showing the connexion between Metaphysics and Theology, and for explainmff the chief points of his religious system. This we find, however, is the course always' adopted by Aristotle; he demonstrates the inevitable necessity of tne existence of a First Cause; having done so, he does not conceive that he is, as a philosopher, called upon to do any more; and thus he omits, perchance he disdains, to enumerate the practical consequences flowing from the establishment of the dogma, that there exists a Supreme Being over all from the beginning.
It must, notwithstanding, be confessed that the 12. This ques- Stagyrite has handled the question with immense tion skilfully abibfy, and his refutation of the solution put forward fhf8™h5fptCT it by the Natural Philosophers is characterised by that Slain good common sense which Aristotle possessed in so eminent a egree. Do you acknowledge, Aristotle would ask such, the exist- ence of things eternal? You must do so; but then, at the same time, to account for their existence you must assume different priaciples from those that you put forward. You must abandon your present theories. They are very ingenious: but speculation must yield to truth; systems must harmonise with actual phenomena. We cannot do away with facts because inadequate causes are brought forward to account for them.
BOOK III.
Having thus laid before his refers these several ques-.. tions, Aristotle, in the Third Book, proceeds to institute book iii. such inquiries about the subject-matter of Metaphysics, as not merely in themselves render more clear the precise objects and limits of the science, but are also virtual decisions of some of the problems that were proposed for solution in the Second Book.
So that whereas what has gone before is disputative,* 2. Book 11. what follows now is explanatory. And as an elucidation of disputative; (1) There have been found several opportunities of making this same remark hn other parts of this Analysis; for example, book V. chap. i.; book XI. chaps, vii., ▼iii.; and at the end of the Analysis itself, where Aristotle's Theology is briefly examined.
(2) This, in all likelihood, arose from the fact that Aristotle viewed The?los| physically in contradistinction to Plato, who viewed Physics theologically.
(8) This is the expression of Thomas Aquinas XXXii ANALYSTS OF ARISTOTTiB'S METAPHYSICS. [bOOK III, tooox rii. exe- the position that entity, as such, is the subject-matter oi getical. Metaphysics, he in the first place proceeds to show that although the ens, or to &v, admits of manifold subdivisions,* yet that the umty of ontological science js not destroyed thereby, because its inquiries are prosecuted in reference to entity in one general aspect; that is, to entity so far forth as it is entity. And this it is which is the grand characteristic difference between Metaphysics and all other sciences, that whereas the latter merely institute a partial inquiry into entity — ^that is, they have only some n-agment of it for their suoject- matter severally — ^tne former, on the otlier hand, deals with it uni- versally, and contemplates entity, so far forth as it is entity, as wel as whatsoever things as are essentially inherent therein.
Thus, to contend that entity, as far forth as it is proonhaf *^* entity, is the subject-matter of Metaphysics, or, in other Metaphysics is words, that it has a subject-matter, is merely what is ?ity -^chap^S" ^^^® ^^^ evcry system of science, as might be shown in the case of astronomy, grammar, dialectics, and me- chanics. Perhaps the best illustration that can be offered to explain the connexion between Ontology and the rest of the sciences, might be drawn from the relation between pure mathematics and any of those sciences where there is made an application of mathematics to the phenomena of Nature, as in mechamcs and astronomy.
It is in this place likewise that Aristotle announces 4. Entity and the syuonymous nature of entity with unity, and how changeable ^'" ^^^^ to speak of a scicnce of entity is the same thing as terms. to spcak of a scicuce of unity. And this will exmaia why it is the ontologist, in tho prosecution of his inquiries, comes to deal with privation and contrariety. But still all tills need not shake our conviction of the unity of metaphysical philo- sophy, because all such are examined into merely as the affections or passive states of the to ov or t6 tu. Just as in the science of num- bers, oddness, evennes.s, equality, proportion, are investigated into by the arithmetician on the common ground of their all being properties of number as such.
5. Anappa- ^^ there is another analogy which at first sight rent objection would seem to arguc the supernuousness of ontological a real proof of science, but which in reality strongly confinns the oregoing. ^Qj-gg^j^^ y|g^. ^^^^ «,^jj]^ jg \q j^g looked for in the sciences of the soplust and the dialectician. But, indeed, if there was no other argument to prove the necessity of some such science as Metaphysics, one might say with truth that this instance would be sufficient for tliat purpose. For though entity is the subject-matter of both, and both are thus seeminglv elevated to the same position v.ith Ontology, yet their treatment of entity is so very imperfect, so fantastic, so false, that it quite stultifies any speculations they may put forward about the to 01/ or r' 1v. (1) This is controvertea by UenricuB More, in his "Enchiridion Metaphysicom " BOOKIII.J ANALTSIS OF ARISTOTLE's HRTAPHTSICS. XXXill Aristotle now approaches the settlement of a qnes- tion, both sides of wnich have been ab:t;ady dLscussed in!„ regard*of book n, — ^and that is ih reference to how far demon- apoideiktic pnn. strative or apodeiktic principles fall under the depart- jj'P*®* ' ^^*'** ment of the science of Metaphysics. And thei-e can be no doubt, Aristotle thinks, out that these do come within the pro- vince of the ontologist to inquire into, not merely from their belong- ing to all entities, as such, but also from their bemg wholly neglected in the speculations of other sciences, such as those of the geometri- cian or arithmetician. The only exception to this statement is the case of the physical philosophers, whose speculations natui-ally con- duct them to an inquiry into these principles; but even granting that they do so, yet they can never investigate them from that point of view from which Ontology beholds them. For, after aU, phybical is merely a subordinate science when compared with metaphysics; for we must admit that there subsists sometliing that belongs to an order higher up, than what is physical, in the scale of being.
Consequent, then, upon tnis connexion between 7 jjow Aris- Metaphysics and apodeiktic principles, Aristotle is led totie is led into to expose the folly of those sceptics who would endea- J/epJJci*^" °' vour, like the Heraclitics, to suhvert the fundamental axioms that are presupposed in every rational discussion, and upon which, as its pillars, the mighty fabnc of knowledge reposes. But perhaps the best apology that can be made for these sceptics is their Ignorance; and ignorance they certainly do display in denying these mndamental axioms, or, in other words, in supposing that there can possibly be a demonstration of all things. K it be not ignorance not to know where we are to look for demonstration, and where we are not to expect to find it, if this be not ignorance, — and this is what the sceptics are guilty of, — ^pray, Aristotle asks, what is ignorance P Now the mere statement of what the fundamental axiom is which these philosophers would call in question, mode of refuta- would almost be a sufficient refutation of the entire tion as adopted system of thfeir scepticism; for what can be more utterly ^ap.**iv.^ ' ridiculous, and suoversive of every rational principle, than to affirm that the same thing can be and not be at one and the same time. Aristotle, however, ppceeds to lay before his readers a most elaboi ate confutation of this sceptical philosophy, and, as we shall see, he adapts his modes of attack to the kind of adversary he has to deal with.
Now, persons who say that the same thing may and 9. Contradfc- may not be at one and the same time, affirm that con- ^"^ ^^^r\ tradictions are true; aiid that contradictions cannot be *' y ® ' ■• both true, Aristotle den onstratcs by seven arguments. And as a con- firmation of the entire, he proves, in chapter vii., that there cannot subsist any mean between conti*adiction, unless we choose to sweep oway the entire distinction that; lies between truth and falsehood.
ixxiv ANALYSIS OF abistotle's metaphtsigs. [book in.
10 First proof. -^^ ^^® ^^^ argument tliat Ari&totle employs out of the seven is founded on the absurdity into which he drags his adversary, by insisting on his imposing some signification »r other on that whjch he says may be the same and not the same at the «ame time. Now, if his adversary will not submit to this condition, there is no use in arguing further with a man of sudi a frame of mind, because any rational discussion with him would be impossible. lint if, on the other hand, he does submit to this condition, ne must abandon his position of the impossibility of there being anything fixed or certain in reason, for his present admission amounts to demon- stration, because he allows of the existence of some definite object. J And from this argument Aristotle draws the two iiom this proof! following deductions; first, that the name of anything must be significant with the unity of itself; and, secondly, that to suppose at all that being and not being^ are the same, whether we assume such as being the case nominaBy or really, that such a supposition is entirely repugnant to every "human being who has not tnought proper to pervert his notions of right reason.
The second argument which he brings against these prooff &c° sceptics, is that their assertions are quite destructive of the substance and formal principle of things; and this is the same thing as to recognise the existence of nothing save what is an accident. This, however, may be turned against themselves; for if they admit the existence of what is accidental, they must acknowledge what is substantive, for the former could not possibly, m the nature of things, exist without the latter. The third argument IS drawn from the fact that the system of these sceptics, if followed ap, must end in an irrational pantneism. The fourth argument rests on the nature of affirmation and negation, and the fifth on that of truth itself.
13 The racti- ^^ sixth argument is entirely of a practical natuie, cai argument for by it Aristotle shows that the indifference which against the thcsc sceptics assume in their opinions they do not adopt sceptic. ^ ii^gjj. ^^^ conduct. For why, he asks, does a man in his journey to Megara not choose to remain still, and yet be of the opinion that ne is actually journeying thither P If a man, too, walks on the brink of a precipice, you wifl observe the caution which he displays; it is quite plam that he, therefore, does not consider that it would be equally for his advantage to fall down into it and not to do 30. So that this fact, that men practically recognise one tiling to be more eligible than another, is a proof from experience agamst these sceptics.
14. Last proof And the seventh argument is of the same nature with of the same thc sixth; for as the latter turns upon the nature of what '**''• is better or worse, so does the former depend on what IS juore or less. A man who says that four and five are the same^ (I) We have a bjrief examination into the subject of "nonens " in book XIII.
ioes not make a statement equally false with one who affirms that ^ur and a thousand are the same. So that, like these sceptics, to «ay down that one thing is not that thing more than another, is prac- tically negatived by this gradation in both falsehood and truth, which Aristotle establishes hy the foregoing illustration.
And it is the adop^tion of this very absurdity, which 15. The origin Aristotle has thus finished the refutation of in chapter of the system iv., that he considers has given rise to the Protagorean toS^a^v*^**' system of the truth of the apparent, or, in other words, the dogma that all things are true and fedse at the same tune. To the refutation of Protagoras he accordingly proceeds, having first premised tliat this controversy with the sceptics is modified by the Kind of sceptic you are dealing with; for some of them will be brought over by persuasion, and others by force.!For example, if persons entertain these opinions merely m)m want of knowing better, their ignorance is remediable; but if they make these assertions merely for telk's sake, you will have to compel them to resign these sentiments ^or more correct ones, through an elenchtical* argument.
Before giving us a refutation of this Protagorean dogma about the truth of the apparent, Aristotle points explained. ^ out the source of this opinion as springing from sensibles. For the same thing may appear sweet to some and bitter to others; and in general, if all persons were sick or out of their mind except a few, these few would appear to the others to labour under illness, or an aberration of intellect. And this holds good in the case of several of the animal creation, and even with a man himself the same things do not appear the same at different times. So that all this womd seem to bear out the reality of the assertion, that it is what appears to be true that is true. And further, it has produced in men's minds a doubt as to what thiogs are true and what are false. And this has naturally and necessarily led philosophers into a despondency about truth, so that Democritus used to say that there may, perhaps, be 3uch a thing as truth, but that to us it is wrapt in obscurity.
But even after all, this inconsistency in the testimony of our senses would, comparatively speaking, have been invoived*S°' powerless, had not the sceptical tendencies engendered this origin thereby been perpetuated by another opinion, coin- J^®^*^^^**^ cident with this sensational origin of the Protagorean ^ogma; namely, that sense constituted wisdom and prudence, and that, therefore, the judgment of the senses was decisive in the matter of truth and falsehood.^ And all this is proved by a reference to the writings of Democritus, Parmenides, and even Homer him- (1) For the nature of this sort of argument, the student is referred to a note on the first chapter of tbe " Sophistical Elenchi> ' in Mr. Owen's translation of Ailstotle'a Organon, ** Bohn's Classical Library."
(2< This was an ancient controversy, whether tho reuses were to 1>« considered tti eriteria of truth, "an seosus nuncU yen sinfc."
xxxyi ANALYSIS OP aristotle's metaphysics. [book in.
self; so that this system of scepticism naturally arose from con£ning observation merely to objects of sense as one source, and from the ideas which these sceptics had formed by seeing the entire system of nature in motion; for the continued state of change, which was the result of this, precluded the possibility, as they thought, of theie being anything like truth at all.
18. The most But from this last source has proceeded far the most extreme school extreme school of scepticism; namely, that which num- of scepticism. \^qj^^ amongst its adherents Cratylus and Heraclitns, the latter of whom was rebuked by the former for saying that he could not enter the same river twice, when he ought to have said that he could not have done so once. But though there may be some shade of truth in their notions about change, yea, even ad- mitting that they were entirely correct, yet they should remember that there was a certain substance incapable of motion,^ and, there- fore, truth must be found there at least.
And now, having shown the origin of this opinion of tack u^n the *^6 Protagoreans, Aristotle proceeds to offer a direct Protagorean refutation of it, first, in the difference between sensation chM*v^^^ *° and imagination — alaOrjan xal (^in-ao-ta — which prac- tically we must acknowledge; for if a man, while he is in Lybia, dreams that he is at Athens, does he, when he awakes, proceed to walk towards the Odeion? The second argument agaiust it may be found in the fact, that the senses themselves are not en- titled to equal authority under different circumstances; for example, what falls under the sense of sight, the eye can decide upon more effectually than the touch, and the distance as well as magnitude of objects modify the sensations of them. And, thirdly, if this truth of the apparent be allowed, it must inevitably end in a denial of the substance of things and their formal principles; and this will cou" duct these sceptics to a system of nihilism.
20. Protagoras This Same dogma Aristotle continues his attack liirther refuted upon, in chapter vi.; first passing some remarks on the in chap. Yi. practical absurdities of this form of scepticism, which, indeed, the sceptics themselves are forced to acknowledge. The mode of attack which he now pursues is to show that, if the truth of the apparent be admitted, all absolute existences are thereby denied; for the apparent may be true, but relatively only to the Eerson to whom it appears true; e. g. if one thrusts his finger beneath is eye, objects will appear to him to be doubled, though, indeed, he may prove this sensation to be false absolutely (though true rela- tively), by means of verifying it by the sense of touch. In addition (1) The necessity of Aristotle's inresting the First Cause with immobility depends m his principle of there being no infinite progression of causes, which tliere would be if he did not, in his generation of the Universe, and the motion thereof, ultimatelv •iriye at a stage where motion had *.ts rise, and beyond which it was not to be fou.d ^now this was in the sphere of the immorable First Mover.
BOOK lY.] AHALTSI8 OF ABISTOTLS's METAPHTSIOS. XXXVii to all the arguments that have been urged against tliis opinion of Protagoras, about the truth of the apparent, Aristotle's general ground of objection is, that it makes everything relative. And with the statement of this objection he brings to a close his discussion against those who maintained the possibility of opposite assertions 01 the same thing at the same time; adding, that in the impossibility of this being true was involved likewise the impossibilitjr of con** traries being found inherent in the same thing at the same time.
The question now discussed, according to the arrange- ment adoj/ted, is as to whether there is a mean between mean'betSwn contradiction. And Aristotle decides this in thenega- contradiction? tive; first, from the nature of truth and falsehood; J^'ap*"^ *° secondly, from the change necessarily involved in the notion of contradiction; thirdly, from the relation between the understanding, and what may become an object of the understand- ing,— ^which relation is manifested by definition. And this shows the important bearing of definition upon a correct decision in the case ot this opinion, and in respect of all such sceptics the source of refuta- tion may be best drawn from definition.
In bringing book III. to its conclusion, Aristotle •- ^ i i presents us with a sort of summary, or brief repetition, ©fbook iff. of what has gone before in confutation of the sceptics. Some sceptics will have it that nothing is true; some, that all things are true; and some, that all things are true and all things are false. Heraolitus, for example, in affirming that all things are and are not, seemed to make all things true; but Auaxagoras, in his tenet of there being a mean between contradiction, would constitute aU things as false.
As Aristotle, however, has stated at the very outset ^^ Deflnitio of this investigation, in chapter iy., that we must affix asaninstm- Bome signification or other to what is said to exist and ™en* fo' «ft>t- not to exist at the same time; so has he repeated this *°8 *»»« »««?"«• in what he has said, in chapter viL, on the importance of definition: and he now, in conclusion, reiterates this assertion, and puts forward definition as the grand instrument to employ with these sceptics; and he further illustrates his position from the phenomena of rest and motJODL BOOK IV.
BOOK IV.
AuiSTOTLE having now given his readers some idea as j. i>],e natura to the mode in wmch metaphysical science carries on of book iv. a« its investigations, proceeds now to enumerate some of nmons*^^***^" the particulars about which those investigations are concerned; so that in book IY., which is purely a book of defini* tions, we may consider ourselves as furnished with a sort oi termi XZXVlii ANALTSIS OF ARISTOTLB*S METAPHYSICS. [bOOK T iiology or glossary of the leading technical terms of the science. A methodical analysis of each of these terms would be-merely a tran- script of what may be found in the body of the Translation itself; but in its stead will be given an enumeration of all the terms defined, and some remarks on those amongst them that may be considered as the most important in their connexion with Metaphysics. s. Thirty words The terms defined are thirty in number, and are ss defined in foUoW:-— book lY.
I. Principle. II. Cause.
III. Element.
IV. Nature. V. Necessity.
VI. Unity. VII. Entity. VIII. Substance. IX. Sameness. X. Opposition.
XI. Priority and Subsequence. XII. PotentiaUty.
XIII. Quantity.
XIV. Quality. XV. Relation.
XVI. Perfection. XVII. Boundary. XVIII. <' The accovdiflg to Trhieh.** XIX. Disposition. XX. Habit. XXI. Passion. XXII. Privation.
XXIII. Possession.
XXIV. Procession. XXV. Part.
XXVI. Whole. XXVII. Mutilation. XXVIII. Genus.
XXIX. Falsehood.
XXX. Accident.
8. Reiatireim- ^^^ numbers prefixed denote the chapters in which p'ortance of these terms are severally defined: they are all most these terms, important and worthy of our attention, particularly the definitions of Nature and Necessity. The first term defined, namely, dp}^if, or first principle, is one of the highest generalizations about which metaphysical science is in the most eminent degree conversant. Aristotle's analysis of this word is remarkable for the association which he makes of it with the good, r6 dyaOov, and free will. In short, under the aspect of a first principle, he wlQ view Nature, and Intellect, and Free-will, and the Final Cause. As to the meaning of the term Nature, one chief sense of it is the substance of those things that contain in themselves the first principle of motion. The chapter on Necessity, elsewhere stated,' is most valuable, chiefly from the ethical point of view from whence Aristotle beholds the word dvayKoSos under definition. Worthy of note, too, is the chapter on Priority and Subsequence, as well as that on Poteu- tialitv or Capacity; likewise the chapters on Relation, Entirety, and Mutilation.
BOOK V.
After this Book of Definitions, Aristotle proceeds to enter more fully into the subject he has taken in hand; and in resuming the consideration of it, which to a (1) In » note on elup. ▼. book IV.; vide Translation.
BOOK v.] ANALYSIS OF ARlSTOTL£*B METAPHYBICB..XXXtS certain extent was interrupted by the last book, he reaffirms what he has already proved, and that is, that entity, as snch, is the subject^ matter of Metaphysics as a science. Other sciences may institute an examination into some one genus of entity, but Ontology takes cognisance of entity universally— entity, as such, simply considered.
But an a fortiori proof of this may be derived from - ^ >.. physics, which, although it might seem, from its beinc: proof that^n- a speculative science, to argue the superfluousness of toiogy is a sci- ontology,* nevertheless proves that there must exist some ^Jp^i ®°^'^' science to contemplate entity in its entirety, for that only a certain genus of it comes under its own province; viz. that sort of entity that is endued with the capacity of receiving tho motion that may be impressed upon it. And the same may be made to appear in the mode of definition adopted by physical inquirers, for the aspect in which they look at things is in that of their connexion with matter; and therefore there must be^ some science to take cognisance of the immaterial element in entities which will frame its definitions in reference to the formal principles of things. Now this science is the science of the ontologist. The foregoing reason- ing might be confirmed from the instance of mathematical science Lkewise.
But now the whole matter comes to this. We all s. Proper way acknowledge that every science has its own proper of settling tii subject-matter. Physics deal with motive and mate- ^"®***on. rial natures; mathematics with immobile but yet material substances; and so forth in other sciences. Yet there is a something that is not merely immovable, but eternal and immaterial, and yet there is nc science to examine into it. Its existence is just as real, thougl* perhaps not quite so obvious as things movable and material, ana therefore the science that takes cognisance of it b just as resd too, and this is the science of the metaphysician.
And these comparisons between physical, mathe- matical, and metaphysical science bring into light the divisiorf of the threefold division oi speculative philosophy into these speculative three very sciences; namely. Physics, Mathematics, and oJ^chap* 'i ^^^ Metaphysics. The last, however, which is conversant with supra-sensual things must of course institute an inquiry into what may be discovered at the very summit of "Being," and that is what is Divine, and so, in general, into the nature of God, and Meta- physics in this point of view may be styled a science of Theology.
in thus admitting the theological character * of Meta- 5 Admissions physics, and also that Metaphysics, in this point of view, involved in this was amongst the whole order of speculative sciences, division as.
(1) Aristotle's doctrine, however, is that Metaphysics is a transition from Physics to a higher order of phenomena.
(2) The student.is referred to the xemarka on Aristotle's Theology at the close od tills Analysis.
Zi AJTAliTSIS OF AUlSTOTIiSrS METAPSTSIOS. [bOOK V.