'^Ki** * f* *^® ^^® ^^^^ eligible and most entitled to our love and Theology to reverence, Aristotle allows that the discussion of God's Metaphysics, existence and attributes falls necessarily within the pro- vince of the metaphysician. We might, then, expect to find an in- quiry of the sort in this portion of Aristotle^s works, where so fitting an opportunity piesentea itself of his saying something on the subject; but one in vain tries to discover any such investigation. Aristotle could have shown how some mediating principle mi^t have been dis- covered between man's mental and moral faculties, m the fact of our ascending up to a knowledge of God through the exercise^ of reason. Several moral motives might be assigned as sure to act on the heart, in consequence of this previous conclusion at the head. Thus Aris- totle might have gratified his propensity for system, by showing the mutual bond of connexion between ethics and metaphysics through the th^logical element in the science of the latter. That he did not do so, however, is some proof of the vagueness, and looseness, and scantiness of las Theology, and, therefore, for practical purposes, its utter inutility.
No doubt he would have said that he had sufficiently totie would" discussed those subjects that affected the DracticaJ defiend himself interests of mankind in his ethical writings; out this **^*(ie''n * would be no apology for the omission complained of; mo ern. ^^^ though he nas perhaps touched on this subject in his Ethics and Politics, yet he has his eye fixed on man merely in his Bocial and con^regative capacity to the total exclusion of him, con- sidered as a religious being.'
f. Book V. -"^^ ^ return to the Metaphysics, from the point that ciiap. ii. No has given rise to this digression, will bring us to the Mddent°/ **** second chapter of book V. In this second chapter Aristotle shows that though physics is conversant about things that, in their mode of subsistence, admit of accidents, yet that there cannot be a science of accidents; but the true way to state the matter is, to say that there must be a science of that which is neces- sarily presupposed in accidents, that is, substance, and this science is the science oi Metaphysics.
Wh the?* ^ ®^ account of one of the denominations of entity •iiencJof the |>eing according to the accident that Aristotle is led accident is into the inquiry about the science of the accidental; Skitton!' and the result of this inquiry is, that consequent upon there being no science of the accident, tliis is one of the aspects of entity, the consideration of which will be omitted in the Metaphysics.
(1) This method has heen adopted in many of the schools of German philosophy U is, in the present day, however, a settled question that the hprUyri demonstratioi If God s existence must necessarily he an impossibility. Vide Sir William Hamil- Irn's Dissertation on the •♦ Unconditioned" in his Review of Cousin.
(S) FMf« Cicero De Naturft, lib. I chap. ztL BOOK V.J ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLe'S HETAPUTSICS. lU That there is no science of the accident, Aristotle proves by induction from the other sciences, not one of ig iw^gVienoTnf which, practical or speculative, is concerned with the the accident accident, as might be shown in the instances of geo- p"*^®^' metry and of architectural science: the former has nothing to do with what may be accidental with geometric figures, and the latter with what may be an accident to the buildings that are constructed. And all is confirmed from the authority of Plato, who makes the science t)f the sophist, which is not real but apparent science, to be a science i)f the accident. Further, the very nature and cause of the accident reader it an impossibility that there should be a science of it, for in its nature it approximates to nonentity,^ and its cause is not a cause operating always or for the most pirt. Every science, however, is conversant about some sort of entity or other, and about that which subsists either always, or as ii were for the most part; for this is requisite for the formation of its definitions, as well as for the possi- bihty of its knowledge being acquired or communicated to another.
It is, then, as Aristotle has proved, a settled point, that there is no science of the accident, and that entity, existence of the from this point of view, may be omitted; but yet all accident an this is no argument acainst the accident itself, which *^*"<^»'y- has been abresSy defined in book IV. chap. xxx. For to adopt the hypothesis of the non-existence of what is accidental, would be to sav that all things arise from necessity, as Aristotle illustrates, bv asking the question, "Will such a man die by disease or violence? and snows the chain of contingencies that runs through the circum- stances that may bring about the one result or the other. The accident itself, then, certainly exists, and it would be an interesting investigation to determine under what class of caiLse we are to arrange it, whether under that of the material cause, or the final, or the efficient.
But besides this aspect of entitv, there is another of it, which Aristotle omits the consiaeration of, but which aspectl^of the is acquiesced in by the Platonists, namely, its being t6 hv omitted viewed as a sort of synonyme with truth, and nonentity ihapav"*^^" as the same with falsehood. But the truth and false- hood in this case is merely subjective, whereas the metaphysician regards entity objectively; and besides, this consideration of entity amounts to a view of it as of what is compound or discreet, whereas Metaphysics, as a science, has to do with what is uncompounded and pure.
d flii ANALYSIS OF ARI8T0TLE*S kfBTAPUTSICSK. [fiOOK Yt BOOK VI.
1. Importance ^^^ bnnffs US to book VI., wliich is a most impor- of book VI. in tant one indeed, and has an intimate relation with not regard of the merely what has gone before, but with what follows; entire wor. ^^^ ^^ understanding of the distinctions and principles enunciated in this book is essential for the comprehension of the scope and general reasoning of the Metaphysics as a whole. In order to perceive the Oonnexion oetween book V. and book VI., we must bear in mind the fact of the multifarious predication of entity, accord- ing to accident, truth, and falsehood, and the ten categories. Entity, under some of these aspects, has been already taken notice of, and the further consideration of it under them designedly omitted alto- S ether; yet the subject is far from being esJiausted, for we may ivide entity accordmg to the ten categories of substance, quality, quantity, &c. And Aristotle now proceeds to show that the first of tnese, namely, substance, the to ti eort, is what Philosophy primarily and chiefly has busied itself with, as might be proved by a reference to Antiquity. And this is what one should expect; for the first of the categories presupposes the rest as its qualities, and anything like real knowledge of a thing is the knowledge of its substance, and not of its qualities.
And this is important in determining what are to be b k*v?' regarded as substances, and what are not; and the value of a correct settlement of this question will be evinced in the fixedness and definiteness of Ontology as a science, the subject-matter of which comprehends this very substance or t^ ri €OTi. Accordinffly, Aristotle proceeds to inquire what " substance" is: and this being determined, it will be easy to frame distinctions and definitions thereof, ^.y. as to the number and genera of substances. 3 Is there any- ^^^ *^® ^^^^ obvious and geucralljr received accept- thing trans- atiou of the word substance, is that which would connne cendentait ^ ^0 mere objects of sense; but then the question may ^ *^* * be fairly asked, is there no other substance distinct in kind from that which comes under the notice of our senses P And if there is, what is its nature? is it the same as the boundaries of bodies, for instance, a surface, and a line, and a point, and so forth? or is it the same as forms or mathematical entities P Or shall we assume a plurality of such supra-sensual substances, starting, like Speusippus, from unity, and assigning to each substance its own first prmciples, as one set to number, and another to magnitudes? These, however, are not quite the questions that Aristotle proposes to consider at present; they have already had their share of attention, Kod another opportunity will present itself for such an examination.'
(1) As in books XII. and XIII.
BOOK VI.] ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE*B HETAPHTSICS. xliil The precise object at present is to give a faithful re- 4. Diffbrant presentation of what substance — odaia — ^is, and there- senses of th« tore, in chapter iii we find Aristotle entering npon the JSp.!^*"* settlement of tjis question. Now there are four leading acceptations of the word " substance; " namely, the essence, or very nature of a thing — t6 ri ^v tlmi — ^the universal, the genus, and the subject.
This point of view, of the substance, as the subject, 5. What the Aristotle discusses first. What then, he asks, is the j^ bwoMi^vo^ subject? Why, in one way it is the matter, and in another » *^ *p* the form, and. in a third that which is made up of matter and form, viz. the entire, the t6 avvoXov. Now, we mignt at first suppose that matter was the entire subject, and consequently constituted substance; but tiiere is something else essential to the phenomenal manifestation of the matter, but inseparable from it, and that is the form; so that when we speak of the subject as substance, we mean that it is sub- stance manifesting itself to us, not as it is in itself, but in the only way po9Hble for us to apprehend it by, namely, according as it is matter moulded by form mto what results therefrom, and that is entirety, or the rd avvokov. Thus, take the case of a statue; the statue is the r6 wuvokov, made up of the matter of brass manifested under the particular form of a statue. But we know nothing of the substance m itself, except so far forth as it presents itself to us under the appearance of a statue. Now, as to the relation to substance of these three— the matter, the form, and that which results from both, the TO avvokov — as regards matter, Aristotle thinks that the case is plain enough, and therefore will not require discussion; and, aa regards the T6irvvokov\ that will be investigated on another occasion.* The remaining inquiry, therefore, is about the fZ!8or, g, investiga- ihe formal principle of things, the to n rjv €lvai; and ti'on into the accordingly this mquiry is taken up at chapter iv. and '*'** "" *" •^•'*"* pursued from that onwards to the end of chapter xiiL; that is, it may oe said, to the end of book YL Therefore, we have an examination instituted in chapter iv. into the to rt ijv €lvai, or very nature of a It minqS^ thing, and in the outset Ajristotle justifies himself in into the to n q» this proceeding, because, having attained unto a know- *^'"^*' *^^*P- *^* led^ of this^ we will then be able to pass on to more obvious topics; and this is the mode of acquiring information m general, namely, through what is less known to what is more known.
The TO Tt ijv (Ivtu, which, itself, is of a logical import, is oonsidered logically, because it and the absolute or *^' rntial are the same; and this is what is proved in chapter iv. As dis3ussion, however, is, perhaps, more subtle than instructive, it 10 hardly necessary to give here what may be found in the Translatioiu ind therefore the si adent is referred for it to book VI. chapter iv.
( ) At is done in books VII. and VIII.
42 iUf analysis of Aristotle's mistafhtsigb. [book ti.
•. chap.T. ^ chapter v. we' have another question of the same •'question 'as nature as that in chapter iv.; nameb^, as to how defiiiition^ reprds defi- supposing it not to be from addition, would belong to thuu^ tluKt are not simple, bat that involve a connexion with something ebe.^ And in the mscussion of this question he is conducted to tne conclusion, that of substance merely may we ex])e€i to find definition. Agsdn, one may ask the question. Is the' very nature of a thing, and each tning of which it is the very nature, the same, or different r and the answer given by Aristotle is this, that in the case of things predicated absolutelv, the aflirmative of this is true, and that in the case of things acciaental the negative is true, and all this may be employed for the overthrow of the Sophists.
Aristotle now illustrates what he has laid down in re- of wha/Sw***" 8*^ ®^ matter and form by the case of natural, artificial, been laid down and Spontaneous generations. All things that are being *"««"<* ®'''^»> generated are produced from something, that is, from chap*. viL* matter; by something, in this case the form; and into something, that which results from both, the to avvokov — say a plant, or a man. Now, the aim of the Stagyrite in bringing forward the subject of generation, is to confirm what he has already proved; namely, that the etbo^f or form, is an efficient principle operating in every object, to which that object is indebted for the shape it has assumed; in short, it is the producing power, acting on the matter of that object, and which makes it, to our per- ceptions, the object which it is. If this is the case with natural fenerations, it is so with those that are artificial likewise, only that ere the eZdor, or producing power, resides in the soul; for example, the plan of a building pre-exists in the mind of the architect. And here, also, we may observe two distinct stages in all this, which Aristotle denominates by the two words, v6r](rii and iroirja-n, and an explanation of these words will show the process as it goes on.
HoTjo-is means the previous conception which the artist forms in his mind, and iroirja-is is the application actually of this to the matter 1 1 The neces- ^ ^ worked upon. Moreover, that which is true in sitV of under- artificial changes is true also in those that are spon- standing tancous, and tnis, as well as the whole subject of genec ap. ViL ration, is elucidated in chapter vii, which is well worthy of attention, and which if not thoroughly understood, it Ls r'te visionary to hope that we can imbibe the spirit which breathes ough this truly noble portion of the Aristotelian philosophy. This theory of Aristotle about the ctfios is the key to his refu- tation of the Ideal Hypothesis; and nothing so strongly illustrates the difference between the Platonic ani Peripatetic philosophy in eeneral, as this diversity of opinion on the subject of the cu^o; oi foroL BOOK VI.] ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLE's METAPHYSICS. xlt Btt although generation necessarily presupposes a 12. *,^ something tbat Is generated, jet we must not lall into theoryof forms, the error of imagining that this is the form, or that the ®*^P- ^^ form is capable of generation at all; for example, to make a brazen sphere is not to make the sphere, but this form in something else. This spherical appearance arises either from Art, or from Nature, or from Capacity, in the way explained above, that is, provided it has some matter to operate upon. But to say this, is to say that form is not generated, but tiiat wnat is, is the ro trvvoKoVy that which is made \vp of matter and form. All this Aristotle is of opinion inoontestably shows the utter inutility of the Platonic forms for the pni*poses of generation or towards the constituiion of substances, because, in their separation from matter, they are entirely destitute of causality; whereas, causality is essential to them in the Ideal Hypothesis put forward by the Peripatetics; so that forms are not the causes of gene- ration, either as generating causes or in the way of paradigms or exemplars.
The question of generation, however, suggests jg ^ question another, namely, as to why some things are generated as regards from Art and from Chance, and why some things are generation, not. Now, the answer which Aristotle gives to this *^ ^'**' question has been already hinted at above, and it is this: that some tilings, in contradistinction to others which have not, are endued with some latent capacities within themselves of bringing about certain changes in regard of themselves; for example, the wood and bricks of a house do not mould themselves into the form of one, but this is done bv the builder from the operation of his art; but in the promo- tion 01 heat in the body by friction, say for medical purposes, it is merely an emission of the warmth that naturally resides in the body. If, however, we bear in mind the nature of substance and the defi- nitions that have been given of it, Aristotle considers that everything will be plain on this subject, and what applies to the foremost of the categones, may be said to hold good in the case of the other nine.
Aristotle approaches the discussion of another ques- tion, the reply to which is to be found likewise in the 14. Question as distinctions that have already been established: one, he Jj^twee'n^the^" saySy may ask the question how the relation between parts and the the parts and the whole of anything affects the defini- ▼iiole, ehap. x. tion of that thin^. Now this question is obviously suggested by the fact, that in the definition of some things no notice is taken of the parts; for example, in that of a circle; whereas, in the definition of other things, for instance, a syllable, the parts are taken into consideration. So that the reply to this question is as follows tliat in some instances the definition of the parts is inherent in that of the whole, and that in other cases it is not so.
But what, it may be asked, gives rise to this P Why, 15. what glToi tk»t which gives rise to this difference involves the rise to the Xlvi ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLB'S MBTAPHTSIOa [bOOKVI soiutitfn of this solution of the question itself, and it is this, that in the question. Q^e instance we make use of definition by the material parts, and in the other of definition by the formal parts. Now, this will affect the parts themselves, because, iu a formal or logical point of view, we regard the parts as antecedent to the whole; whereas, in a material sense, the whole is antecedent to its parts. Therefore, the entire doubt has arisen from the ambiguity of the word pait; and this ambiguity is produced because part may itself be viewed either in reference to tne matter or the form of tnat which is com- posed of botL 16 This re- ^^^ *^^^ prepares the way for another question in ^ares the^way the ncxt chapter — chapter xi. — ^what sort the parts of for another form are, and what are not parts of form, but of that re^dTthe which, bearing a certain form, involves a connexion parts of form, with matter. This question, however, seems onl^ to be chap. xi. another question (already discussed), but in a different shape, namely, what is the dinerence between formal and material definition. Now, the decision of the one, as well of the other, indeed, will rest upon a distinction that we must always make allowance for in such cases. If we observe one particular form assumed by different sorts of matter — for example, in the case of a brazen circle and a circle of stone — and if the question be asked, what are the parts of the form that is the circle, 'tis plain that, be they what the^ may, they have nothing to do with the wood or the stone, that is, in a logical point of view; M'hereas, if one sort of matter, e. g. brass, invariably assumed the form of a circle, then, in explaining what the parts of the form were, it would be next to impossible — in fact, it would be a coi^tradiction in terms — to describe this form in a state of isolation from the matter which it moulded. Take another instance — a man, whuse form always manifests itself in a combination of flesh and bones, and so forth; what are the parts of the form here P or, rather, is not that question wrongly put, and should we not rather say, what are the parts of the flesh and bones taken in connexion with that form whicn they have invariably assumed in the person of a man P 17 Difficulty Hence then arises the difficidty of defining a thing of logical or by its formal parts, without any reference to the matter formal defi- -^th which they are combined: for it is only under some nition. ioTca. or other that matter makes itself apparent to us. The form is a productive energy that is essential to its phenomenal manifestation: and all this is just what has been alreadv laid down and described, as the key to Aristotle's refutation of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas.
ta w>,„ K««ir The reason why Aristotle is so much busied with the VI. is so much subject 01 definition here, is, because he is exarammg ?fi^id^*^°^* ^^^ ^^® subdivisions of the ovala, or substance, from a n »o»- logical point of view; and we shall see how that £tfte^ BOOEVL] analysis op ARISTOTIiirS METAPHTSICS. xlvfi wards an application is made of these logical principles to substance regarded worn another and different point of view. He is, therefore, careful to say everything that can be said upon the subject; that is, BO far forth as it will not involve a repetition of the statements in regard of definition which are to be found in the Analytics. There remains, however^ one question more on the subject; and that is. How are we to account lor the unity of definition?
The unity of definition would seem to be destroyed jg ^^ j^, ^^^^ by the multiplicity of the qualities of the thmg defined, unity of defi- Tiie decision of this question Aristotle considers as of Jjj^on* chap, vital importance to any inquiry in regard of substance. But the reply to this question seems simple enough, that whether Kre regard definition in reference to the distinctions involved in genus and difference, or not, yet that its unitv, notwithstanding the manifold qualities that are to be included therein, will always be secured bv the unity of the subject of those qualities. And let the chfferential qualities be ever so numerous, yet we must anive at some ultimate distinction which will constitute the substance of the thing, and, consequently, by its unity produce that of the definition.
But there remains another subject for consideration; ^^ ^ Xiamely, the universal; for this comes under our notice uon of" he^*^*^ at present, consequent upon the subdivision of the universal, substance, or ovaia, mto subject, essence, entirety, and ^^'^^' ^"' the universal; and with the first three we have been engaged idready, and decided upon their nature; and, therefore, lastfy re- mains to be investigated " the universal" And what Aristotle chiefly seeks to establish, in regard of the universal, is that it does not constitute a substance, for substance is that about which all things else are predicated, but itself is not predicated of a subject, whereas the universal is always afiurmed of a certain subject.
And now Aristotle brings the whole of the foreffoing reasonings in this book, in their accumulated force, gies^befor? upon the Ideal Hvpothesis, when, in the beginning of bears down the 14th chapter, he exclaims, with an au: of apparent 5fe*oVofPi?* triumph, "Ail these statements lay bare the absurdities cha^.^3dv. * **' that ensue unto those who affirm, both the existence of forms, and forms too in a condition of separability from things." The intimate bearing of these discussions in the sixth book, on the Ideal Theory of Plato, has been already pointed out more than once, and need not be repeated here. Aristotle himself, moreover, merely mentions the fact itself, but does not go into particulars, having already furnished his readers with a demonstration in detail of its fidlacy, and reserving the discussion of it to a future occasion, wliich he actually does resume, as we shall see, in book XTT., chaps, iv and V.
He repeats here, however, what, by implication at 22. The tn- kasti he nas already stated in other parts of book VI.; generabmty of Xlviii ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLE S JIETAPHYSIOS. [bOOKYI forms, namely, the principie of the ingenerability of fonni chap. XV. aii(j their incorruptuiility. But this is not JPlatonism j for the forms in connexion with matter — and that is the only know- ledge that we have of them — are capable of both. And this contin- gent nature of matter itself, implied in the corruptibility of the ro <rvvo\ov, shows that there can oe no definition of sensible singu- lars. Therefore, we are to bear in mind, when any person sets down any definition of singulars, that it is always possinle to over- throw such, on recount of this very inadmissibihty of definition belonging unto what is singular. And what applies to singulars, applies to the ideas which tne Platonists maintain, as capable of a separable subsistence from singulars. They are indefinable likewise; and, in the present case, there is the further reason against the Platonic dogina, from the indefinability of what is eternal.
And this would-be multiplication of substances by virtual confti- ^^® Ideal Hypothesis has led men into the error of con- sionofsub- founding substance with capacity, and of supposing *Sentijaity Certain things to be substances, which in reality were chap"xvi. ' merely potentialities, or capacities. The unity of such, e.g. oi animal with its members, may have misled speculators; but when they should have accomplished the separation of which they were capable, one from another, they would then have seen the true state of the case, and recognised, not substances, but merely elements, or, in other words, matter under different potentialities.
And, therefore, this exposes the Pythagorean theory defect Inth" about unity being the substance of thmgs; for there is ▼6 ev uf the no usc, in searching after the origin — ytucan — of things ^hl^fS^^^i* to adduce the component elements, no matter how subtle or searching your analysis may be; because, unless vou can point to some disposing or producing cause, you will never =irrive at the present phenomena. Accordingly, when people speak of what are substances, they should bear in mind, to avoid mistakes, that substance constitutes a causative principle, and that no amount of potentiality is equipollent with it.