CHAPTER V.
1. The mode of And whereas of all existing potentialities some of different**" *^^ Congenital, as those of the senses, but others capacities into are developed from habit,^ as the ability of actu ity. playing on a flute, and some from discipline, as capacity in the arts, it is necessary that those that are developed from habit and reason should be acquired by re* peated exercises of previous activity, but that those which are not of this description, and such as are concerned with passivity, should not necessarily be acquired in this way. Since, however, that which is endued with potentiality is able to efifect something, both the term " sometimes " and the term << somehow " must one add in the definition, and as many things else as are consequential to this. And some things that subsist according to reason do not possess the potentiality of imparting motion, and their potentialities are accompanied with reason; whereas, as regards other things that are irra- tional, and their potentialities irrational, those, also, it is necessary should subsist in an animated creature, but these in both — now this being the case — ^in respect of potentialities of such a description as this, it is requisite, when, as far as they are endued with capacity in this way, the passive and ' The contents of this chapter are most remarkable, and might bt plaoed side by side with Butler's Analogy, Part I. c. 5.
GH. v.] TRAK8ITI0N OP OAPACITT INTO ACTION. 23d the productive approximate towards each other, that one set of them should be active and the other passive; but it is not necessary that this should take place with those — I mean, with rational — potentialities. For, as regards all of these, each one is productive of one thing; whereas those are pro« ductive of contraries: wherefore, this will at the same time produce contraries — a thing, however, that is impossible. It is necessary, then, that there be something g The t else which may be predominant, and this I call tion of capacity propension, or free-will; for whatsoever is the bioujht about object of a particular propension, this will that through pro- propension authoritatively or rightfully accom- SSilM'am^ plisli,^ when, as far as it is endued with capacity, ^j*j^"* P'*"' it may subsist, and approximate unto the passive. Wherefore, that which is endued with capacity according to reason must altogether compass its object, when it feels an appetite after that unto which it has a capability of attain- ing, and so far as it has this capability. Now, the power to do or accomplish anything subsists when that which is passive is present, and is so disposed. And if this be not the case, there will he no power to accomplish it; for, in the event of none of those things that are extrinsic offering any obstruction, there is no fdrther necessity for adding these words, ** nothing extrinsic offering obstruction," into the definition, for it involves potentiality, as it belongs to a capacity of action; yet it is not so altogether, but when things are disposed in some such manner as that in their case will also external impediments be removed; for these are taken away — I mean, some of those distinctive terms that are contained in the definition. Wherefore, neither will an appetite accomplish two things, or contrary things, even though at the same time it may feel disposed or be actuated by an inordinate desire to accomplish them; for it does not involve power over their attainment in this way at the same time, nor is there present the power of the simultaneous accomplishment of such, since those objects of pursuit over which appetite has control it will accomplish in this manner.
• Wliat Aristotle here says of propension, Butler affirms of tha moral faculty; in short, this necessity of subordination, as well as the fact of its operation, with the Bishop is the experimental proof of the existence of conscience. Vide Sermons, L — ^JIL SS6 THB IIETAPHTSIOS OF iAISTOTLE. [lOOK Till CHAPTER YU 1. Advantage BuT slnco WO have spoken conoeniing poten« tion?nto*the"*^ tiality, suoh as subsists according to motion, let nature of ao- US frame some definitions and distinctions re- tiTity, *i.<P7«ia. ga^j.^ijjg energy, both as to what energy or activity is, and what sort of a thing it is. For the nature of that which is potential, or endued with capacity, likewise, at the same time will be apparent to those who make a division in this matter, because we not only say that this is a thing endued with potentiality or capacity which is fitted by nature to impart motion to something else, or to have motion imparted to itself by something else, either viewed simply or in a certain manner, but we also assert this as being the case after a difierent moda Wherefore, in our investigations we shall also treat of these pointa t. What energy '^^® existence of the thing, however, as the is not, and energy, does not subsist in such a way as when ^ * * ** we speak of a thing in potentiality; now, we mean by a thing subsisting in potentiality, for instance, mercury in the wood, and the half in the whole, because it can be taken away from the whole: and we term that a scientific person in capacity, even though not actually en- gaged in speculation, provided only such may be endued with a capacity for speculative pursuits; and we mean by a thing's subsisting in energy, — now, by an induc- tion of singulars is the assertion evident which we wish to make, and it is not expedient that we should seek after a definition for everything; but it is sufficient to perceive at a glance that which is ajialogous, — now, I say, by a thing's subsisting in energy we mean that it should be as a person engaged in building stands in relation to that which is fit for being built, and the wakeful to the sleeper, and one who sees to one whose eyes are closed, but who nevertheless pos- sesses the power of vision, and as that which involves a separable subsistence from matter to matter, and as that which has been wrought by art to that which is unwrought. After 1 One advantage gained firom the treatment of Ivipytia by Aristotle is to be looked for in the application of these principles of metaphjaica to moral philosophy.
OH.yi.] THE NATUBB OF RNEROT. 28?
this mode,^ then, is energy compared with capacity or poten* tiaiity. By one portion, however, of this difference let energy be distinguished, and that which is endued with potentiality by the other.
All things, however, are not said to subsist in ^ Diflfejcnt energy in a similar way; but either analogically modes of the as this thing in this, or relatively to this; and Sergy!^"" **' that thing in this particular thing, or ^relatively analogically or to this particular thing. For some things ^ ^*^* are as motion in respect of potentiality; but other things are as substance in respect of a certain matter. But the infinite and the void, and such-like things, are said to subsist both in 2)otentiality and energy after another manner different from many entities; as, for example, that which sees, and that which walks, and that which is seen. For sometimes do these things admit of being verified, and simply verified; for the one is an object to be seen, because it is seen, but the other because it is endued with a potenti- ality of being seen; the infinite,* however, does not subsist in potentiality after such a mode as it is likely to be in energy when it involves a separable subsistence: but it does in knowledge, for infinite divisibility is the cause which these persons assign for the subsistence in potentiality amoxmting to this energy; not, however, in respect of its being made to involve a separate subsistenco.^ But since none of those doings of which 4. Energy must there is a termination constitutes an end, but!» distinguish- only some of those that are performed in regard * °°^°^° ^"* of the end, — ^as the actual end of inducing emaciation is emaciation, and when these happen to induce or promote a state of emaciation they are in this way in motion, not being inherent as the things on account of which the motion subsists, — now, on such a supposition, these things do not constitute the method of doing a thing, or, at any rate, such ' These words are supplied by the Translator to keep before the reader Aristotle's point under discussion.
' Vide book X. chap. z.
' All of what follows, almost to the close of the chapter, is omitted by Taylor. I have found it in Bekker, in the Leipsio edition, and In Didot's Paris edition. Its chief aim is to show the connexion between motion and energy.
S38 THE METAPHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK VUk % method as is perfect, that is, involves au end. For thej do not constitute an end, but in that — I mean, the motion- are inherent the end and the method of doing a thing; as^ for example, a man sees, but also he exercises thought, and employs his understanding, and has employed his under- standing, but he does not receive instructioD, and has received instruction, neither is he in a sound state of health, and has he been restored to health; he may live properly, and has lived properly; but also he enjoys the felicity of a regular life, and has enjoyed this felicity; and if this be not the case, he ought at some time or other to inteimit, as when he may induce emaciation; he does not, however, pro- duce this state at present, but he lives, and has lived. 5. Motion falls Therefore, is it proper to denominate some of short of energy, these aforesaid conditions as motions, and some of them as energies or activities; for eveiy motion is im- perfect: as, for instance, emaciation, learning, walkings build- ing; and these are motions, even imperfect ones at least For a person does not walk at the same time that he has walked, nor does a builder construct a house at the same time that he has built one, nor is a thing generated simultaneously with its having been generated in time past, or is motion imparted simultaneously with the communication of motion in time past, but it is a different thing as regards the communication and the reception of motion. Now, a person — to give an illustration — has seen and sees the same thing at the same time, and exercises his understanding, and has exercised his understanding simultaneously in regard of the same thing: a thing of this kind, indeed, do I denominate energy and activity; but I call that motion.^ Therefore, as to the subsistence of a thing in energy — both what it is and what sort of a thing it is — from these and such-like statements let this point be evident to us.
* Tftylor has ^ese words, and ends the chapter with them* CH. VII. J WHEN HAVE WB A SUBSTANCE IN CAPAOITT 1 239 CHAPTER VII.1 CHAPTER VII.1 And \vhen it is that each thing subsists in potentiality, and when it does not, this point thing is said to must now be determined by us; for a thing does JSiiy^onn"" not subsist in potentiality at any time whatso- capacity, mut. ever indiflferently, — thus, for instance, earth, is *"*®^' it, pray, man in potentiality, or is it not? but is this the case rather when seed already is generated, (nor even the case some- bow, perhaps, then;) just, then, as neither by the medicinal art everything would be indifferently reduced to a sound state, nor from chance, but there is something which is 6ndued with a capacity of health, and this is that which subsists in a healthy condition potentially. But the defini- tion of that which by reason of an exercise of intellect is in a state of generation in a condition of actuality, from such a cause as exists potentially, such a definition may be discovered when the process of generation is accomplished by one in the exercise of volition, and in a case where no impediment is offered by external obstructions. Now, this takes place in the instance adduced in the case of a person being reduced to a sound state of health, when there is no obstruction offered by those things that reside in himself.
And the case is similar with a house also in potentiality, if tliere is no hindrance to its construction as a house from ob- stacles discoverable in the builder of that house or the matter of it; and if there is not that which it is requisite should be added, or subtracted, or changed, this constitutes a house in potentiality. And this is the case, likewise, with the rest of those things of which there is a first principle of generation that is extrinsic, and in regard of as many things, doubtless, as are contained in the thing itself in possession of them, what* ever will subsist by means of this, in the absence of ext/ernal impediments offering any hindrance; for example, the seed does not as yet subsist in potentiality, for it is necessary that it also accomplish a change in another body. But when now, by means of its own first principle, it may subsist as a thing * The subject of this chapter will be better understood by corn- Daring what Aristotle says on the subject of capacity in book iy« i^ap xii 240 THE HETAFHTStCS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOR Vm of this kind, it is now this thing in potentiality; and that requires a different first principle, just as earth is not yet a statue in capacity or potentiality, for when it is beuig changed it will become brass.
But what we are speaking of seems to be not a som^rite^* thls particular thing, but a thing composed of lutln ^Mc?5^t *^ ^^ *^* material, just as a chest is not wood, but wooden, nor is the wood earth, but earthy. Again, if earth, after this manner, is not anything else, but ig termed derivatively, or a thing that is composed from that material, in such a case that which subsists invariably in capacity simply is that which is subsequent, just as the chest is neither earthy nor earth, but wooden. For this amounts to the subsistence of the chest in capacity, and this is the matter of the chest, simply cpnsidered as of that which is viewed simply; but of this particular chest is this particular piece of wood the matter.
If, however, there is something primary that is where we can not any longer denominated according to someprtaraiy matter. *^i°g ^^9 ^ * thing composed from that material, this is primary matter; fear example, if earth is of air, and air is not fire, but composed of fire, in this case fire is the primary matter of earth, as this certain particular thing and substance. For in this respect is the universal different from the subject in regard of being the one this certain parti" cular thing contrasted with the other which is not; for, to give an example, man, and body, and soul, are each the subject of passive conditions, — the passive condition, however, is the being musical and white. But when the musical is ingenerated as a capacity, that thing is not styled a musical capacity, but a thing that is musical, and man is not termed whiteness, but a thing that is white, nor walking, or motion, but a thing which walks or is moved, just as a thing that is composed of something else. Now, as regards, then, as many tilings as are denominated in tMs manner, that which is last is subr stance; but in respect of as many things as are not styled in this way, but of which a certain species and this certain particular thing are predicated, that which is last is matter, and a material substance. And therefore it happens correctly that what is composed of the material of something else ii not predicated according to it» matter and its passive oop^ CH. VIII.] E>ERGY PRIOR TO OAFAOITT. 241 ditions, for both of these are indefinite. When, therefore, a thing must be styled as that which subsists m capacity, and when it does not subsist thus, has been declared.
Nature is a CHAPTER VIII.
Since, however, it has been determined in how many ways that which has a priority of subsist- p*otentiiarty''in ence is predicated, it is evident that energy, or fens?o?the activity, is prior to potentiality. Now, I mean by word poten- potehtiality not merely a definite potentiality, ^^^^^' which is styled an alterative first principle in another body, so far forth as it is another, but, in general, every first principle which is the originator of motion or of rest. For Nature,- also, may bo ranked in the same genus with potentiality; for she is a first principle which is fit to be the cause of motion, not, however, in another body, but in itself, so far forth as it is itself.
Therefore, prior to every principle of this sort ^ p^^^^ ^^. is energy, or activity, both in definition and in energy to capa- substance; but it is, also, in a certain respect ^011.^°*^^"^ prior in duration, and in a certain respect it is not so. That, indeed, therefore, it is prior in definition is evident, for that which is potential in regard of its possibility of ener- gizing, or assuming a state of activity, such is a thing that is primarily endued with capacity or potentiality; for example, I speak of one that is skilled in building — now, I mean one that has a capacity of building, and I speak of one that is able to see, and I mean one that possesses the capacity of seeing, and of a thing that may be seen, as that which involves the capacity of being seen: and the same reasoning, also, holds good as regards other things. Wherefore, the definition and knowledge of energy must needs pre-exist the definition and knowledge of potentiality.
But energy,'^ likewise, is in time prior to ^ Anciinthw capacity after this mode: namely, the priority order of its ^ As to a more complete consideration of Nature, in this point of view, the student is referred to the Physics, book II. chap. i. The text is read differently in the Leipsic edition; but the words found there, and not translated above, are quite spurious.
* The important conclusion to which this principle of the piiority ol eneffl^y to capacity conducts ua, has been already taken notice of, p. 227' 242 THE METAPHYSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOK VIIF.
development in of that which actively accomplishes the same fs'energy prior thiug in species, but Dot in number. Now, I to capacity. mean to say this, that, in the case of this parti cular man existing at present according to energy, and in the case of the corn, and the horse, and the person who sees, prior in time are the matter, and the seed, and that which is able to see, which in potentiality constitute nian, and corny and one who sees, but are not as yet these in energy. Prior, however, to these in time are those different things that subsist in energy, and from which these have been generated,* for always from an entity in capacity arises, or is generated, an entity in energy by means of an entity in energy — ^as man is generated from man, a musician by means of a musician— on the condition of something that is primary in its nature always imparting motion: the moving power at present, however, subsists in energy, or activity. But it lias been declared, in our disquisitions concerning substance, that everything that is generated is generated^ from some- thing, and by something, and that this is the same in species. Wherefore, also, it seems to be impossible that a builder be a person not likely to have built anything, or a harpist to be one who has not harped anything; for one who learns to play upon the harp learns to play upon the harp by actimlly playing upon the harp: it is also the case, in like manner, with other artists.
Whence arose the argument, by refutation,' of the Sophists* o°n the Sophists, that one who is not in possession of this subject re- scientific knowledge will accomplish the mastery of that about which such scientific knowledge is conversant, for the learner of a science is not in possession of it. But, in reply to thi>', we may observe, that from the fact that something of that which is being produced, or generated, has been produced, and that, in general, something of that which is being moved has been moved — now, this is evident, according to what has been proved in our disquisitions concerning motion^ * Vide book VI. chap, vii., and book VII. chap. v.
^ ^Keyxos: as to this word, the student is referred for an explanation of it to a note on the first chapter of " The Sophistical Elonchi,** in Mr. Owen's Translation of the Logical Treatises of Aristotle, vol. 11 p. 540, "Bohn's Classical Library."
' Aristotle alludes to the concludiug book of his Physical Ausculta OH. VIU.] IN DEFINITION, TIMB, AND BUBSTi^NGE. 243 — ^the learner, also, in this case, must needs possess some- thing, perhaps, of scientific knowledge. But then, also, by this it is, at any rat«, evident that energy in this way, likewise, is prior to potentiality in regard of generation and time.
But, unquestionably, it is also prior in sub- 5 Energy prici stance, at least, in the first place, indeed, then, to capacity in because those things that are subsequent in gene- *^ *^*»<^®- ration are prior in form and substance; as a man to a child, and a human being to seed: for now the one possesses the form, but the other does not. And, in the second place, this is so because everything that is being produced advances towards a first principle and an end; for the final cause is a firat principle, and the generation or production is on account of the end. But energy is an end, and on account of this is potentiality assumed; for not in order that they may have the power of vision do animals see: but they have the power of vision^ that they may see.
In like manner, also, persons are in possession g. illustrations of the building art, or capacity, that they may of this in art. actually build, and of the speculative art that they may devise systems of speculation; they do not, however, devise specu- lative systems that they may have the speculative capacity, unless those who do so for the sake of meditation: yet these by no means speculate absolutely; but they either speculate in this manner, or the fact is so that they have not in any wise an occasion to speculate. Moreover, matter subsists in potentiality because it may advance onwards to form; but when, at least, it subsists in energy, then doth it subsist in form. In like manner, also, is it the case with other things, and those of which the end is motion. Wherefore, as those engaged in teaching by showing, in the way of example, one energizing— say their pupil — think that they have adduced the end, it is so with Nature in like manner. For, if this be not the case, a circumstance, like the Mercury of Passo,^ will tions, where subjects connected with motion are fully discussed, as well as to the third book of the same Treatise.
^ This remark may be applied to our particular propensions. The latter are not the consequences of our inclinations towards certain objects; but our inclinations towards these objects naturally and neces^ sarily flow from those particular propensions.
^ This Passo was a statuary, ipfioy\v<f>ost and had, amongst many othei'B, made an image of Hermes on a stone; «nd the doubt, as implied b2 244 THE METAFHTBICS OF ARISTOTLE. f^BOOX Tin take place; for scientific knowledge would be obscure a& to whether it might be internal or external, as was the case with l^asso*s Hermes likewise, for an end is the work, and tha work constitutes the energy. Wherefore, the name energy is denominated according to the work, and converges towards actuality.
^ ^^ And since of some things that which is ultiobjection t"*° mate is the use — as, for example, of the power statement^"* of vision the act of vision, and besides this no other work is produced diflferent from the power of vision — ^yet in certain things is there something else generated; for example, from the art of housebuilding a house is produced in addition to the act of building, notwithstand- ing that energy, nevertheless, will be the end of potentiality, in both instances, to be sure, though it is more the end of it in the latter than in the former. For building is contained in that which is being built, and is generated and exists at the same time with the house. Of as many things, therefore, as there is something different (namely, that which is being produced) from their use, of these doth there subsist the energy in that which is being constructed, just as both the building resides in that which is being built, and the weaving in that which is being woven; in like manner, also, is it the case with other things, and, in general, doth motion subsist in tliat to which motion is being imparted. Of as many things, however, as there is not some different work beside the energy, in these is energy inherent; as, for instance, the act, or power, of seeing resides in the pei*son who sees, and theory in the theoriser, and vitality, or life, in the soul: therefore, also, is happiness resident in the soul, for it also constitutes a certain sort of vitality. Wherefore, is it evident, that substance and form are each of them a certain energy. And therefore, according to this reasoning, it is evident that in substance energy is prior to potentiality. And, as we have stated, one in the text, was, a3 to whether it was inside or outside the stone. People said that it could not be outside, for the stone itself was smooth, and presented no apparent inequalities; and that, on the other hand, it was hard to think the image could be within the stone, for the lattev would have manifested one or more joinings, being, perhaps, so to say, •et or embedded in the midst of other stones, whereas there was an itter absence of superficial roughness. Such is the account given by 'hi commentators ty£ the allusion inade in this passage by Aristotle.
CH. VTTI.] ETERNAL EXISTENCES PROVE THIS. 243 energy invariably is antecedent to another in time, up to that which is primarily and eternally the moving cause.'