But. assuredly, also, in a more strict and important sense is energy prior to capacity; ene^Jy "o^capa- for the things that are eternal are in sub- city proved Btance prior to things that are perishable, yet priority of the nothing subsisting: in potentiality is everlasting. coSSptibie!^^ And a reason of this is the following: — every potentiality is at the same time a potentiality of its contra- diction; for that which is not endued with the capacity of existing will not subsist in anything: but everything that is endued with capacity admits of not energizing. Accord- ingly, that thing the existence of which is potential admits of both being and not being: the same thing, then, is that which is potential, or endued with a capacity of both being and not being. But that thing the non-existence of which is potential admits of not being, and that 'which admits of not being is subject to decay, either simply, or it is not this very thing the admissibility of whose non-existence is affirmed, either according to place, or according to quantity, or accord- ing to quality; but simply is a thing exposed to corruptiosi according to substance.
None, then, of those things that are simply incorruptible is an entity in potentiality, simply etenmf does considered; but in a certain respect there is no c°*aJ-{**^®* '" hindrance to this being so; for instance, accord- though, In a ing to quality, or the place where. All things, ^'Jy»i« «ense. it then, subsist in energy: nor, even on the suppo- sition of things being -from necessity, are these things, how- ever, primary, for unless these were so there would be nothing so. Nor, therefore, again, supposing there is any eternal motion, does such a motion subsist in capacity;^ nor, supposing that there is anything that is being eternally moved, such a thing that is being moved does not subsist according to capacity, unless so far as it proceeds from a cer- * rrjs TOW &c2 KivowTos irpdarras ivdpyttas. These words might be regarded as a sort of defiDition of the Divine nature with Aristotle, if the term aKlvrirov were added to qualify the " primum movens.*' Vide book III. chap. 8, and book XI. chap. 7.
2 " Does not subsist in capacity." I have supplied these words t« •omplete the sense.
246 THE METAPHTB1C8 OF ARI8T0TLB. [bOOK YIIL tain quarter, or towards a certain direction. There is no hindrance^ however, to the siibsieteuce of the matter of this.
Wlierefore, the sun and stars, and the entire of this ta the°" firmament, perpetually energize. No apprehen- bodies*^^ sion, alfio, is there lest at any time they may come to a stand-still,^ which dread overwhelms some of the Natural Philosophers. For neither are the heavenly bodies wearied in this operation of revolving, (for their motion does not happen to subsist in regard of the ca- pacity of the contradiction of those,)— as, for example, is the case with things subject to decay — so as to render the con- tinuity of the motion a laborious operation; for substance, which is matter and potentiality, and does not subsist in energy, is the cause of this.
11. What is There is, however, an imitation ^ between things corruptible incorruptible and those that are in a state of after the incor- change; for instance, earth and fire: for these, ruptibie. ^Iso, invariably energize, seeing that they involve motion essentially and in themselves. But all the rest of the potentialities about which we have discoursed, (from the distinctions and definitions that have been framed,) it is evident are conversant about contradiction; for that which is endued with the capacity of imparting motion in this par- ticular way can also do so in another way, and not in this way — I meaUj as many things, at any rate, as subsist as po- tentialities according to a rational principle. Potentialities, however, that are devoid of reason, in respect of presence and absence, will as the same be conversant about contradiction.
12. The fore- I^» then, there are certain natures of such a going exposes sort, or substauccs of such a description, as those an absurdity in,. li. v j* v the ideal speculatora who have been engaged m such theory. theories affirm ideas to be, something would there be which would be skilled in scientific knowledge in a grdtiter degree than science itself, and something would be ' Aristotle invested the stars with divinity, and therefore maintained their imperishableness. Plato, on the other hand, contended that from their being generated they were liable to decay, though it was not at all probable that they would ever smk into corruption. Empedocles ia alluded to in the text, as appears from the Latin version.
* Tho instance given by the commentators is that of fire, which, being coi-ruptible, invariably assumes the same motion with the moon, —an incorruptible substance, ».e. according to the Aristotelian Physics, OH. UL.] SNEBGT SUPERIOR TO OAPAGITT. 247 much more moved than motion itself; for the former rathe? are energies, hut the latter are potentialities of the former. That, therefore, energy is a thing prior both to potentiality, and every alterative first principle, is evident.
CHAPTER IX.
But that also energy ^ is both superior and i. Energy i» mere excellent than potentiality, however ex- Scenence*thMi cellent, is evident from these statements. For capacity. as many things as are denominated according to the being potential, as far as these are concerned, it is the same thing the being what is potential in regard of contraries; for instance, that which is said to be endued with a capacity of health and sickness is the same thing, and that, too, at the same time, for there is the same capacity, or potentiality, of being in a sound state of health and being indisposed, and of being at rest and in motion, and of building and of demolishing what is built, and of being built and falling into ruin.
The capacity, then, of accomplishing contra- g. how enerey ries exists at the same time; but the actual may be inferior subsistence of these contraries at the same time *° ^'^P^^'^^y- is a thing that is impossible: and it is a thing that is im- possible that contrary 2 energies be also present at the same time; for instance, in the case of being healthy and being indisposed. Wherefore, either of these must needs be that which is good, and it must in like manner be possible that this be the case with both or neither. Energy, accordingly, is the more excellent of the two. There is, however, a necessity that, as regards that which is bad, the end and energy should be worse than the potentiality; for that which is endued with capacity, as regards both the contraries, is the same thing.
1 What Aristotle lays down in this chapter will be the more apparent by referring back to the explanatory notes already given on the word iv4py€ia. Vide note, p. 215.
* I have supplied the word " contrary;*' the rest of the sentence ii regarded as spurious, and put within brackets in the Leipsic edition.
218 THE METAFHTSICa OF ARI£rrOTLB. [bOOK ViIX...•II, « It is evident, then, that what is evil is not aDv- Independent thing independent of the things themselves;^ for ew!*™** ^^^' that which is evil is by the constitution of Nature subsequent to that which we term potentiality. Accordingly, neither in those things which subsist from a first principle, and those that are everlasting existences, is there anything that is either evil or anything in the shape of impeifectiou, or aught that has been actually reduced to decay; for a tendency towards decay or corruption belongs to things that are eviL 4. The snperi- But mathematical figures are also discovered •hown'from*^ as Subsisting in energy; for persons discover mathematical such ^ in the act of division; and if such examples. j^^^ ^ieen divided in twain,* these mathematiail figures would have been apparent: but now are they in- herent potentially. Why, let me ask, has a triangle angles equal to two right angles? because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If, therefore, the line about the side be produced, to one who merely glances at the figure the thing is at once obvious. Why, too, in a semicircle, is the angle universally a right angle? because, if there are three equal right lines, or even two at the base, and one right line raised thereupon from the central point, the thing will be obvious to any one at a glance, provided he. be a pei*son that has some knowledge of mathematics. Where- fore, it is evident that mathematical diagrams, subsisting as they do in potentiality, are discovered when they are being reduced to energy; and the cause of this is the following, — • ' Aristotle thus might have taught the Manichasans a better founda- tion to rest their philosophy upon than they actually did.
^ Hiaipovvrts: that is, they bring their mental energies to bear on the subject, and, by making divisions in lines and angles, they demonstrate and make apparent certain properties of figures which are involved in these diagrams potentially prior tc proof, and subsequent to it are discovered subsisting in energy. This I take to be the meaning of the passage.
* On first meeting with this passage, I fancied that Aristotle was all uding to the fact that in the cleavage of crystals we find that they aro subjected, as regards the resulting forms of them, to the most rig^d mathematical laws. But, on reflection, I perceive that he had no puch instance in his eye, though most undoubtedly the case of crystals, — in fact, the whole science of mineralogy. — ^would furnish the mosl doiriplete illustrations of the principle laid dovm here.
CH. X.] RELATION OF ACTUALITY 10 CAPACITY.!i49 that understanding constitutes the energy: wherefore from energy springs potentiality; and, on account of this circum- stance, persons engaged in doing anything are acquainted with that thing, for subsequent in regard of production is energy — I mean, such as subsists according to number.
CHAPTER X.* CHAPTER X.* Since, however, entity and nonentity are de- ^ Reution of nominated partly in accordance with the figures energ^y and ea- of the categories, and partly in accordance with JJd faisehoodi* the capacity, or the energy of these, or in accord- ance with contraries, but since that which is entity, in the strictest sense of the word, is what is true or false, and this in the case of things consists in composition or division, so that one can verify his assertion who considers that which has been divided to be divided, and that which has been compounded to be compounded; but he speaks falsely who, when either things are or when they are not,^ makes assertions about them in a contrary way to that in which they actually subsist: seeing, then, that this is the case, the thing is termed true or fidse; for it is fitting that w& should take into consideration what this is which is termed true or false. For it is not on account of a true supposition, on our parts, of your being white that you are in reality white, but, on account of your being white, we who make this assertion as to your whiteness can verify our assertion.
If, therefore, some things are invariably g. in the case compounded, and involve an impossibility of of compound being divided, but if other things are per- * "*^*' petually in a state of division, and are not endued with a capacity of being put together again, and if some things are the recipients of contraries, in such a case actual existence is the being compounded and the being one thing, but non- ^ Aristotle has already noticed the relation suhsisting between truth and being, and falsehood and non-being; and he proceeds in this cliapter to make some application of it to the case of Zvvafits and ^ it^ iffrlu ^ ovK Iffrlv. These words, in some copies, are printed with the sentence following. I have adopted Taylor's arrangement*.
250 THE METAPHTSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOK^IU 8xistence, the not being compounded, but the being mort than one thing. Respecting, then, admissible or contingent natures, the same opinion becomes false and true; and thif is the case with the same definition, or discursus: and they involve the possibility of true assertions being made of them ia one instance, but false assertions in another. Regarding, however, things that are devoid of a potentiality of being disposed otherwise than they are, a thing in this case is not generated so as at one time to be true, but at another false; but these things are invariably true and in the ^^^ falsc. And, therefore, in regard of incora- case of incom- posite natures, what, let me ask, is the being po8ite natures. ^^ ^^^ ^^^jj^g^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ie truc and the false in respect of these 1 for it is not a thing that is compounded so that it actually involves existence when it may be in a state of composition, but does not involve existence when it may subsist in a stato of division, — as a piece of white wood, or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side, — neither will the true and the false, in like manner, be still inherent, also, in those things — I mean, incomposite natures. Or, shall we say that, as neither that which is true in regard of these, so neither is their actual existence the same; but the one is that which is true, while the other is that which is false? Contact and assertion give us that which is true, for not the same thing is afl&rmation with assertion;* not, however, to pass into contact amounts to ignorance, for deception about the nature of anything has no existence, save by accident. In like manner, also, is it in the case of substances that are uncompounded; for deception in regard of them is not a thing that is possible, s. Application And all such substances subsist in energy, tothe'^^rincMf ^^* ^^ potentiality; for if they subsisted in that truth is potentiality they would be generated, and in more ^\rtth^ process of time would be corrupted; but in the energy than present instance the actual entity is not gene- capaciy. rated, nor is it reduced into corruption, for it would be generated from something. And as regards what- ' ^fxUrts: some of the copies must have aW^curis, from the reference made by the commentators to Aristotle's treatise " On Interpretation," chap, ix., where the subject under discussion is negation and afi&rm« bion. ^(TiSf however, simply means, " assertion " CE. X.J AKIN TO THAT OF TRUTH TO PALSBHOOD. ^^51 soeyer things, therefore, that amount to the existence of any certain particular thing, and its subsistence in energy or activity, as regards these, I say, there is no possibility of labouring under deception, but either one understands ^em or he does not. But the inquiry as to the nature of any- thing is being instituted by us in respect of these natures, as to whether there are things of this sort at aU, or not; and the fact is, the existence of a thing is as that which is true, and its non-existence as that which is false; in one way, if it is that which is compounded, it is true, whereas, in the other, if it is not a composite nature, it is false: and in another way, if we suppose it to exist in this way, it is true, but if not in this way, it is not true. Now, that which is true amounts to the intellectual apprehension of these,^ but that which is &lse does not exist, nor does it amount to deception, but ignorance; not, however, such as may be assimilated unto blindness, for blindness is just as if one, in short, did not possess the capacity of intellectually apprehending any sub- ject. And it is also evident that, respecting things that are immovable, there is no deception as to the time when of their existence, supposing that one consider them as things that are immovable; for instance, the triangle — unless viewed as that which is subject to mutation — a mathematician will not consider as being at one time in possession of angles equal to two right angles, but at another not so, for it would undergo a certain mutation; yet he might consider one thing in this point of view, but not another: for example, that there be no even number, first, or that some are so, but that other numbers are not so. In regard, however, of one thing in number we cannot expect that he should entertain this opinion, for no longer would he do so as regards certain things, yet not as regards others; but he will speak truth or fiUsehood so far as he makes assertions of it as a thing that is invariably disposed in this way.
^ Aristotlo's words are, t6 8^ a\riOh rh voftv avrd: how brief, yet how expressive I BOOK IX/ CHAPTER T. I TT * *!- That unity is denominated in many ways hat r^ gv. denomi- been previously declared m our divisions on its tomot?on?per-* Di^Hifarious predications; ^ and whereas it is ception, and denominated in many ways, there are summarily e ition. arranged four modes of things that are styled one, primarily and essentially, but not according to accident For both that which is continuous, either simply considered, or especially what is so by nature, at least, and not by con- tact, or by a bond of connexion, such is one thing; and that in a more eminent degree is one thing, and prior to these of which the motion is more indivisible, and simple, rather. Moreover, is unity a thing of this sort; and in a more eminent degree is that which is a whole one thing, and that which possesses a certain form and species: but particularly we look for unity if a thing of this sort subsists by the constitu* tion of Nature, and not by violent or abnormal means; in like manner as whatever things are joined together by glue, or by a nail, or by a chain, are one thing, but contains in itself the cause of its own continuity. And it is a thing of this kind in respect of its motion being one and indivisible in place and time; so that it is evident if anything by the constitution of Nature involves a principle of the earliest motion — I mean, such a principle as is primary — that it is the first magnitude; as, for example, I speak of the circular motion of a body,* for this is the earliest motion. Therefore, * In book IX. — according to others, book X. — ^Aristotle having already examined fully into the subject of the t^ Svf comes now to ti*eat of the rd 6v, which, with the ontologist, are interchangeable terms. The points investigated in this book wear a decidedly logical aspect; and it has been thought that there has been some error or confusion in this portion of the Metaphysics.
2 The term ey has already been defined by Aristotle, in book IV. 3hap. vi.
* <l)opa5: I have translated this word " body." It primarily refers to ^b^ actual motion of a body, and then to the body itself which is CH. I.] Nature of unity. 25Z in this way are some things one either as what is con- tinuous or entire; others, however, are one of which the definition may be one. And things of this sort are such aa those of which the intellectual apprehension is one, and such as those of which it is indivisible, and of which there is an indivisible apprehension of what is indivisible in form or number. In number, therefore, is the singular indivisible; but in form that is indivisible which resides in what is an object of knowledge, and in scientific knowledge itself: wherefore, that would be one thing primarily which is tlie cause of the subsistence of unity in substances. Therefore, no doubt, is unity denominated in such many ways, as both that which is continuous by the constitution of Nature, and is an entirety and a singular, and that which is universal. Now, all these are one in respect of the indivisibility-^f the motion of some of them, but of the intellectual perception or the definition of others.
It is requisite, however, to understand that "^^,.
should not assume that the same assertions should tinctions in in- be made alike in the inquiries both as to what ^TSnlty^^'^** sort, of things are styled one, and what is the nature of the existence of unity, and what is the definition of it; for unity is predicated in thus many ways, and each of those things will be one in which any one of these modes will be inherent. The being or existence of unity, however, some- times will be in accordance with one of these, and sometimes with another which also is nearer to the name, but those are one in regard of capacity; just as, also, if it may be expedient to discuss the subject relating to element and cause, it would be necessary, in the treatment of these matters, both to frame distinctions and to assign the definition of the name. For fire,^ in one sense, is an element, — and perhaps, also, with the Infinite ^ in itself this is the case, or it is something else of the sort, — and, in another sense, it is not so; for the essence of element is not the same thing with the essence of fire and of element; but so far fortli as fire is a certain thing and parried along. The subject here glanced at is treated of at large by Aristotle in the eighth book of the Physics, where the perpetuity ol iatural motion is investigated.
' The Leipsic edition puts a stop after o 'oix^lovy — omitted in the text I have followed.
^ The subject of the Infinite is examined into in book X. chap. x.
254 THE HETAPHTSICS OF A.RIBTOTLB. [bOOK IZ.
a certain nat are, so far is it an element; but the name signi- fies that this particular quality is an accident in this, because there is something subsisting from this as from a thing that is primarily inherent. So, also, is it in the case of cause and unity, and all things of this sort. Wherefore, also, the essence or existence of one consists in being indivisible; namely, in being this certain particular thing, and incapable of a separate subsistence either in place or form, or in the faculty of thought, or in that which is entire, and has been made the subject of definition.
g Unity, as a ^^* especially doth the nature or essence of measure,' found unity consist in being the fii-st measure of every n quant ty. g^nus, and the principal portions of quantity;^ for from this quarter, likewise, hath it proceeded to other things, for measure is that whereby quantity is known. But quantity, so far forth as it is quantity, is known either by unity or by number; for every number is known by unity. Wherefore, every quantity, so far forth as it is quantity, is discoverable by unity; and that by which as primary it is known, this itself is one. Wherefore, unity is a first principle of number, so far forth as it is number. And hence, also, in the case of other things, that is denomi- nated a measure whereby as primary each thing is known; and the measure of everything is one in length, in breadth, in depth, in gravity, in velocity. For gravity and velocity are what is common in the case of contraries, for in a twofold sense may each of them be taken; as, for instance, gravity is both that which involves any momentum whatsoever, and that which possesses a supei-abuudance of momentum: and velocity is both that which involves any motion whatever, and an excess of motion; for likewise is there a certain velocity even of that which is slnw, and there is a certain gravity of that which is rather light. . -,, Now, a measure and first principle in all of rivabie from these 18 a sort 01 Unity, and a thmg that is mdi- gar'd^/other" visible; siuce — to give an instance — in lines, also, quantities, c.^. thcv cmplov that which measures a foot as a * " thing that is indivisible: for everywhere, or id * If we do not allow the truth of this view of unity, it is implied, in what Aristotle lays d^wn that even the notion of quantity would bt Inconceivable.
ni. l] ijnitt viewed as a measure. 255 every instance^ do investigators search for measure as a certain unity, and as a thing that is indivisible; and this constitutes what is simple, either in the quality or in the quantity. Wheresoever, indeed, therefore, there does not appear to be anything subtracted or added, this is the most accurate measure. Wherefore, the measure of number^ is the most precise of all measures, for the monad they have posited as in every way indivisible; but, in the case of other things, they imitate a measure of this sort: for from a stadium and a talent, and that which is invariably greater, would anything that has been both added and taken away rather escape our notice, than from that which is less. Wherefore, that from which, considered as primary, a thing does not admit of subsisting according to sense, this all men constitute as a measure, both of things moist and dry, and of gmvity and magnitude; and they imagine that they then know the quantity of a thing when they happen to know it by means of this measure. And, therefore, also, motion do ^nd in regard they measure by a simple motion, and one which of motion. is the most rapid; for this involves the very smallest possible duration.^ Wherefore, in astronomy a unity of this kind is