15. Chap. vii. In chapter viL Aristotle again reverts to the topic favour 5 the ^^ ^^® unity of metaphysical science, notwithstanding unity of the diversity and manifold nature of its subject-matter. Metaphysics. And precisely the same line of argument is adopted as on a former occasion, when precisely the same topic comes under our notice. The other sciences have their own appropriate subject- matter, and why should not the science of the metaphysician have the same? Now persons need not think that metapnysical science is unnecessary, nor that rt speculates merely about what is examined into by the other sciences, for it is this very circumstance that in right earnest establishes the reality of the science of the ontologist; for all the other sciences merely take up a fragment of entity and examine it, whereas, the science of Metaphysics speculates into entity, as such, so far forth as it is entity, that is, simply and univer- sally considered.
16. Aristotle's ^"^^ ^^"^^ ^® again meet with Aristotle's favourite favourite argu- argument for the existence of such a science as Meta* SlstOTce^of physics, drawn from the existence of what is eternal such a science &na Separable, and immovable. All other sciences have as Meta- their respective subject-matter. Here is a something p ysics. ^jjg^^ gyj. |jg proved from an induction of all the sciences, not to be taken notice of by any; therefore we must have a distinct science to take notice of this, and this distinct science is that of the 17. This like- metaphysician. And this very subject it is which testi- J^.s^ow'its fies to the fact of the dignity of Metaphysics as a ^* ^\ ^ science,' for this separable and supra-sensual substance, what is it, as Aristotle will show in book XI., but the Divinity (1) It is hardly a correct use of the term Metaphysics, to predicate itcf the system tf the Scotch philosophers. (1) Fidt book Y. chaps, i. and ii.
BOOK X. J ANALT8IB OF ABISTOTLE^S KETAPHTSICS. Izvii under anotlier name; therefore that science ought to command our homage and reverence, the province of which is to take notice of the nature of God. Here is another place in the Metaphysics where Aristotle had another opportunity ol enlarging upon the subject of Theology, and showing its proper place in, as well as connexion with, the science of Metaphysics. But here, as elsewhere, he neglects to follow up the subject, an omission that is taken notice of in the analysis of that part of book XI. where Aristotle unfolds his notions of God's Being and Attributes. The same point is likewise noticed in the analysis ol book V.
In chapter viii., we again are brought into contact jg ^j^ ^y with a subject already examined into, namely, as to on the science there being a science of the accident; andtne same ®'*J« statement is made here as elsewhere, of there being no **^ *° ' sudi science, and the grounds put forward in both places for this are the same. There is the same practical argument drawn from ex- perience, to show that there is no science of the accident; and the same is shown from the nature of the accident itself, as well as the cause of its subsistence. Now the nature of the accident, we know, is what subsists neither always nor as for the most part, but science is conversant about that which subsists always and for the most part. And farther, we must bear in mind that the cause of what is acoi* dental, is not the same with the cause of what is absolute, otherwise we must adopt a system of universal necessity. Wherefore, on these grounds, in this metaphysical treatise, where entity, as such, is under consideration, this is one of the aspects of it which, with certain others of the same kind, are entirely left out of view by the Stagyrite.
And it is worth while, Aristotle thinks, to notice the 19. The nature connexion between accident and causality noticed in of chance, end what we call chance. But chance does not invalidate **' ^^*P' ^^ the existence of thiogs that are produced according to free-wiU as some final cause. To say, however, that all causes operated merelv according to accident, would be to make them indei^te, which would contradict the fourfold division of them, recognised bv all (dasses of philosophers, and, besides, it would involve Sie additional absurdity of making the accidental prior to the essentiid. But, even assume the phenomena before our eyes as the results of chance, yet this will not in reality annihilate the existence of Mind, or even of a settled constitution and course of Nature.
Thus we see that book X. merely comprises what ^o. Two specu- already has been brought before us at large in books lations peculiar n. and ni.; there are, however, two subjects treated *® ^'^^ X. of in this book, which are peculiarly its own, namely, the nature of motion, chiefly in its relation to energy and potentiality, and, also, that of the Infinite, or t6 airapov.
Now as to motion, we may assume that there are as 21. The subject many species of motion as of entity, because motion ia of motioa Izriii AKALTSIS OF ABISiarLS's MKTAFHTSIOS. ^boOK X treated of in not a tiling that is indepeLdent of eniities themseWcA. ebap. ix. The ciiigf snbdivisiofii oi entity, howcTer, where motion 18 plainly discoverable, is that one which subsists according to capa- city ad[id actuality. Bat now take the case of a brazen statae, and ask yourself, where has the motion come &om that has moulded the hfrass into the form of the statue, and in what does it reside? Does the capacity of the brass constitute this motion, or the energy pre- supposed in the productive powers of the art of the statuary r The tepiv to this seems to be as follows: That the motion does not resiae in the capacity, nor in the enei^, and yet that it is that which secures the transition of what subsists in capacity into a condition of actuality; in short, ''motion," as Aristotle defines it, "is the entelecheia ^ of that wluch is endued with capacitj^, so far forth as it is such." The whole of this chapter is occupied with an elucidation of this principle from practical instances; for example, house-building. He vindicates the view which he has thus taken of motion, reassert- ing that it constitutes an energy and yet an imperfect one; that we must account for its indefiniteness from the fact of its being doubtful as to whether it ought to be classed under capacity or energy; and that all this enhances the difficulty of the matter in hand, though at the same time Aristotle finds no reason to be dissatisfied with the views he has just now put forward.
22. Chap. X. on In the tenth chapter, Aristotle comes to treat of that " the Infinite." ^^ch had already before his time given rise to so much speculation, namely, the Infinite — ^the ro airtipov. In the first place, we are furnished with a sort of negative description of it; for as to a SMsitive definition of the Infinite, that would be out of the question.' \ however, it is what is possessed of a separable subsistence, it is not what is cognisant to our senses; and this we might expect, for on the supposition of its constituting neither magnitude nor pluraHty, and that the substance of it is the infinite and not what is accidental, in such a case it will be indivisible; for if we allow it to be divisible, it will, as a consequence, involve either magnitude or plurality. «- « X, But, besides the indivisibility of the Infinite, we may t'hi fnC7e.' also regard it as devoid of pad;s, for this would presun- pose its analysation into similar parts. As, for example, a part of the air is air; but this, in the case of the Infinite, would be absurd, for the notion we have of it is of what is essentially uncom- pounded. But that the Infinite should subsist in energy, for this reason is impossible, for what part will we particularize as the sub- ject of this energy P for take whatever portion of the Infinite you ^ ish, and it will — it must — be infinite likewise. And, further, it is im- possible for it to subsist in a condition of actuality or entelecheia, for (1) 'EvTcX^x'ta is best translated by the word "actuality."
(2) Vide Cousin in his Psychology, on Locke s theory of the Infinite; Sir William Hamilton on Cousin, in his first Dissertation; and Mr. Calderwood on Sir William HamU*o<%'a theory; and note, p. 805 of the Translmtion.
BOOKS.] ANALYSIS OV ARlSTOTLE*S HETAPHYSICS.
then it mast needs constitute some quantity or other; and this vould presuppose its subsistence in accordance with what is accidental The next thing which Aristotle undertakes to prove 24. The in- in regard of the Infinite is, that it does not reside in finite not to bn objecte that fall under the notice of our senses. And J^JJj^j^g this he proves in two ways: first, from the formal principle of body as what is defined by surfaces; and, secondly, from physical considerations, namely, from the impossibility of its being a composite nature, or even a simple one. We camiot suppose tne Infinite to constitute a composite nature; for how, as is essential to our notion of what is compound, would the elements of the Infinite, supposing it of this description, be limited in their number- how would we equalise them P And, fiither, we are to bear in mind, that body is that which involves an interval in every direction, but that which is infinite must involve such an interval without anj limitation at aU as to direction; so that if body be infinite, it is infinite in every direction. And as to the unity of the Infinite, it is just as fanciful as the unity which Natuial Philosophies lay down as existing beside the elements.
But further, every body cognisant to our senses is in place somewhere, and there is the same place for the priof of thu whole as for the part; take the case of the earth, for from the reia- example. Now apply this to the Infinite; if it is ^S splce?'*^ uniform, it will be then immovable, or it will be always in motion; but this is impossible, for why should it have a motion in any one direction more than another P upwards, more than downwards P Suppose, however, the Infinite were Ukc a clod on the earth's surface, where will it be moved to, or where will it remain at rest P for this is mereljr a part of the whole, and the place of this clod which is con- genial with the substance of the whole earth will have a place of the same sort with the whole, and therefore the place of part of the Infi- nite will* be infinite as well as that of the Infinite itself; but this is absurd. But even supposing the Infinite to be in place, that it will comprise the entire of the place where it is-^yetliow will thii be the case P — what will be its place of rest or of motion, or will it be moved anywhere P If so, it will never come to a stand-still; or euppose it to be at rest everywhere, in that case it will not be moved.
Jff, on the other hand, we suppose that the Infinite is, _,. not uniform, but dissimilar in its component parts, then finite uniform also will the places which they severally occupy be dis-?r diasimiiar similar likewise. And the consequence will be that "»***P«rt*' there will not be one body of the entire save in regard of contact. Then these parts will be infinite or fim'te in species; it is not possible for them to oe all finite, for some of them will be infinite, and some not so, or the entire must be infinite. And this will lead to as infinity of the elements; but supposing this to be impossible, tht Universe must needs then be finite.
Iix ANALYSIS or abisiotle's metafhtsics. [bookx And again, it is, in short, impossible for body to be not be inflnUe. infinite, as well as the place for body, if every body that is cognisant to our senses involves gravity or lightness, for it will be impeUed either towards the centre or upwards; bat it is utterly impossible that any part of the Infinite, whether the half or the whole, should undergo any passive condition whatsoever. For how, pray, wiU you accomplish a division of the Infinite, or how will there 1)6 of the In&iite an upper or lower region, or what is extreme and central F And, besides, what is cognisant to our senses, as just now stated, resides in place; and there are six species of place, not one of which could have any possible relation with what is in&iite. And all the f ore^ing may be confirmed from the fact that the Infinite is not the same in magnitude, and m motion, and in duration, as if it were one deftoite nature. This, I hope, makes somewhat inteUigible Aristotle's vagueness and studied obscurity on this remarluibb •ubject of the Infinite.
28. The nth ^ ^^^ ^^^ remaining chapters of the tenth book and 12th there is not to be found anvthing that can be considered ^'teS'^ith*^?' Mnportant, when compared, with what has gone before, relation of ^ and is about to follow in book XI. They are both motion to occupied with the subject of motion in relation to change. change. There are three changes, either from a subject into a subject, or mm a non-subject into a subject, or from a subject into a non-subject: the first is neither generation nor corruption, the second amounts to generation, and the third to corruption, r^ow, although every motion constitutes a certain change, yet not eveiy change constitutes motion, for generation and corruption are not motions; it is only in regard of the change from a subject into a sulject that we can assume change as eq^uivalent with motion. Now these principles are clearing the way tor what follows in book XI., where he traces up all energy and activity primarily to the First Substance.
The object which Aristotle has in view in chapter xiL, AccSrdIng to** *^® ^* ^^ ^^ ^» ^ ^ provc, in the case of which which of the of the ten categories motion can be said to have an Categories existence, and in the case of which of them it cannot. subsiS? *°° And the conclusion that he comes to is this, that since, for reasons which he states, there cannot be said to exist motion belonging to substance or relation, or action and passion, it remains that such should be found only in quality, quantity, and the place where. The chapter concludes with some dennitions sug. gested bv the point under discussion, namely, definitions of conf act, eonsecutiveness, and local contrariety.
100&X1.J ANALYSIS OV ARISTOTLE's MSTAPHTSIOSL ' Ixil BOOK XI.
We now come to book XI., which is the inore impor- |, ^^y i,^^ taut, as it contains discussions bordering more on xi. more im- Theology than any that have as yet been brought before fhrothcra.*" US. These occur chiefly towards the end, but all that ffoes before it in the opening chapters, as we shall presently see, artt designed by Aristotle to prepare the way for the conclusions whidi he seeks to establish there.
This book opens with an assertion already made by.
Aristotle as to substance, or the ovaia, heins a proper gubstan^, the object of speculation; for the truth of which lie appeab proper subject to the systems of the ancient schools of philosophy. jJapfi.*^**"*' Qualities and passive states no doubt come in for a book'xi. share of inquiry; but still it is so in subservience to an investigation mto substance, which they presuppose. But what science is there that takes cognisance of substance in the way in which Metaphysics does P What science is there that investigates the causes and nrst principles of substance, except that of the metaphysi- cian P And the generally received division of substances ^ Division of into eternal, immovable, and those that fall under the dviat proyee notice of our senses, this very division bears its witness the necwaity to the necessity of the existence of such a science as ^meta^yatea. that of Metaphysics; for though the physical sciences have taken abundant notice ot sensible ^substances, yet where have we any system of philosophy conversant with what is immovable as such, ana with what is eternal as such P There is a verging towards such a science in the systems of mathematicians, as well as in the Ideal Hvpothesis of Plato; but the degree of development attained in either of these cases falls tax short of what is accomplished by the metaphysician in transcendental science.
Now, substance falling under the notice of our senses, ^ change and which is one of the three subdivisions of substance, is causality; that which admits of undergoing change. And change ^**p- **• presupposes a somethmg that is the subject of the change, and in the present case, that is, the matter vXrj. And this will appear at once when we enumerate the various sorts of change: for we are to bear in mind that there are in existence four modes of changes, either according to substance or quiddity; or, secondly, according to quantity; or, thirdly, according to quality; or, lastly, accordinff to tne place where. Now simple generation and corruption belong to the first, and increase and diminution to the third, and alteratioti to the second, and such a thing as orbital motion to the fourth. Now all things whatsoever that involve matter are susceptible of chanfce; Ixxii ▲]NALYS2S OF ABISTOTLB^S METAPHTSIOS. [BOOK Xl for matter itself is one of a tlireefold division of causes into contrariety, privation, and matter.
6. No genera- ^6 ^ure not, however, to suppose that there is a tion of matter generation of matter and form that is of the ra taxora^ chap^^m*' ^^ ^^^ ultimates, so to speak, of objects that fall undei the notice of our senses. Matter, no doubt, admits of change, and this presupposes a something as the cause of that change, as well as sometmng into which a transition is effected; but this proves no generation of matter or form. Matter manifests itself to our senses under a particular form; but this is brought about l^ Art, or Nature, or Chance, or Spontaneity. And these mesdy work on what they abeady find in existence, namely, matter, or the vXi;.
6. An apparent Perhaps, indeed, there may be a sense in which form exception to subsists Separately from tne matter which it monlds. **"• As in the case of a house, the form of which we in a certain sense might say did subsist in the mind of the builder pre- viously to the bricks and timbers assuming the shape of a house. But Aristotle, as he shows at the end of this chapter, will not allow that this is aiw admission of the reality of the Ideal system of Plato.
7. Twofold There is a remark in tms chapter worthy of note, in diflference in which Aristotle expresses a twofold difference in causes causes. ^ resfcct of somc being antecedent and some bein^ coincident with their effects. This distinction we know has been brought forward in the modem controversies about the Theory of Causation, as maybe seen by a reference to the Dissertations of^^the late Sir William Hamilton on that particular subject.
Now, what Aristotle has established thus far in these foregohig re- three chapters of book XI. appears to be this, that lates to what is there is a something that exists as the subject of the to follow. various changes that we observe; and at the same time, that these very changes themselves presuppose some productive and constructive power, which by its emciency gives rise to them. This plainly is laid down with the ulterior purpose of demonstrating the necessity of the existence of a First Cause.
Before proceeding, however, more immediately to p'rinc5)ies^of examine into this subject — I mean, the necessity of the things the existence of a First Cause, some one original and SffSe°nt? primary principle, whereon aU things depend, and from ehap. iv. whencc they flow — ^the question meets us at the threshold. Are the principles of things the same, or different? Are the elements of substances and relatives the same P This question we know has already been discussed in book 11. Strictly speaking, they are not the same; but in one sense, perhaps, they may, and tnat is kot avcCKoyiav — ^analogically. But again, what relation is there between elements and first principles? Are they the same, or different? Now we know that one chief merit of the u^reek philosophy, as developed by Plato and Ariy^otle, Tas bringing fortb BOOK XT.] ANALYSIS OF ARI8T0TLE*S METAFHTSICS. IxXlli into a clear light this very relation between an element and first principle, otoi;(«iov and apxrj' An element and a first lo. Elements principle in one respect are the same, and in another threefold, they are diflferent; they are the same in material things; J^d?' ^^^ but when one passes on to things that faU under the notice of the mind, they then are different, though even here they agree m being both causes. What gives rise to the difference in the latter case is that there intrudes a something that is not found in things purely material, namely, — a motive principfe. And thus will we be led gradually up to the First Cause; and, moreover, will this give rise to a fourfold division of causes, whereas that of elements is merely threefold. , There is, however, another distinciion in entities, and it is this: tliat some of them do, whereas oihers of lies separable^ them.do not, involve a separable subsistence; and it is to and some in- ' the former that we must ascribe the nature of substance, J^J*^*^^®' and which, for this reason, we must regard as causes; because, how can we conceive such a thing, e.ff. as motion, or oassion, without presupposing substance as a condition of both? Now, as to universal causes, these, practically speaking, have no existence — each thing has its own particular versai^cauies. cause — there is no universal man to be found in rerum naturd. Peleus, a particular individual, is the father of another particular individual, Achilles. The true principle of causality is to be looked for, not in mere mental abstractions, out in substances as auch — they are the causes of all things, and are the causes as ener- gies; a principle which will be applied by Aristotle in his attempt to explain the Being and Attributes of God. And on 13. Fourfold examination it will be found that these may be arranged division of under the same four heads of causes which Aristotle *'*"^®*- has already laid down as the divisions whereon all inquiry on setiolo- gical subjects must be based. This fourfold enumeration of causes is no obstacle to the truth of the threefold division of elements or first principles, as already mentioned. The three principles, however, may sometimes be further reduced; for in some cases the principles of all tlungs may be the same, that is, analogically, for the matter a,nd form, and privation, are often merged into unity, by being all alike ar. index of efficiency or a moving principle somewhere.
But now, having thus been engaged in the examina* ^4 consider- tion of two sorts of substances out of the three; namely, ation of the two substances of a physical nature, as they have been J^J^p"^*"*"*" described already; the third also now remains for consi- ^ deration, viz. the immovable one— the waLa aKivrjros, which Aristotl« accordingly proceeds to examine in this and the following chapter.
In the first place, then, it is requisite that this Im- 15. The eter- movable Substance should constitute one that is Eternal, nity otihi% 9» well from the nature of motion * itself, as of sub- 8^^***^®' (1) Fide a previous note in the Analysis, at p. xi(yyL f IXXir ANALTSIS OF A&ISIOTLB's XETAPHTSICa. [bOOK XL stance; that is, primary substance. For primaiy substances, if not admitted as lying beyond the possibilities of being corrupted, ^dll be sufficient to ensure the corruptibility of all things else beside. And as to motion, we know that it cannot admit of being generated or corrupted, for it is what always existed; and it is so with duration likewise. And as the continuity of motion, that is, circular motion, is what we must acknowled^ so must we admit the continuity of time; in fact, as Dr. Clarke in modem times argued, and as Aristotle now implies, time and space ^ are in tbemselTcs infinite, and are to be viewed as the attributes of an Infinite Being. 16 The pri- Further, must these substances not merely be eternal mary substance as being primary, but must be immaterial as bein^ immaterial eternal, and on their eternity and immateriality depend .. ewise. ^j^g connexion of their essence in the energy. And in general we may assume that the eternity or immateriality of these primary substances would be of no practical importance to us, save on the distinct understanding of their subsistence in a condition of f)re-existent enei^y. This principle was quite over- ooked by the old theoffonists as well as the physicists Theology. of antiquity, m their systems: for example, m gene- rating the Universe out of Niglit, as Theologians of those ages did, or in the simultaneous subsistence of all things together, which some of the natural philosophers maintained. This is a serious eiTor, and it may be remarked that the extravagances deducible from tiiese systems are a silent piece of homage to Uie truth of the philo* sophy which Aristotle at present is seeking to establish. Now ail these philosophers and theologians gave quite an inadequate view of things — it was impossible for them to account for the phenomenon of motion except they recognised the previous existence of energy. Matter can never be the instrument in producing its of tiwVheory of ^^^ motion, and it was this difficulty which led to the the perpetuity origin of the theory of the perpetuity of energy, such as of motion. y^Qs advocated by Plato and Leucippus, for these philo- sophers advocated the eternity of motion; but independent of the utter incompleteness of such an account of things, precisely the same objection lies against their theory as that of the theogonists jnst alluded to; namely, that we cannot consistently perceive in what it advances as the original of things, any efficiency or anything that