1 [δ᾽ οὖν EH, οὖν cett.—C.]
* The others being general opinion or original and personal sagacity. Cf. De anim. 417 a 31, 427 Ὁ 25.
ὃ [This interpretation (given by Themistius) of τὸ ἐν ᾧ covers the case of the vibrating or circulating point, but not the difference between walking and rolling (two specifically different modes of traversing the same path). Simplicius (884. 3) observes this and supposes that τὸ ἐν @ means the mode of movement, not the path. But the earlier statement referred to can only be 227 Ὁ 6 ὅταν...ἐν ἀτόμῳ εἴδει ἢ. and this covers both the track and the mode.—C. | 46 PHYSICS, V. rv.
46 PHYSICS, V. rv.
within the genus of quality, but not a species specia- lissima, for changing towards black and changing towards white differ specifically; whereas all changes towards black are identical with each other both in genus and species specialissima, and so are all changes towards white. Whiteness itself, then, can no longer differentiate classes of motion towards itself; hence all such motions are specifically one. Of course, if a certain group forms a genus with respect to its own subdivisions and a species with respect to a higher genus that embraces it and others, its members are the same generically and in a certain sense specific- ally as well, but not in the absolute sense of be- longing to one and the same species spectalissima. Thus ‘ acquiring knowledge by instruction ’ is generic in that many different kinds of knowledge may be gained by instruction, but instruction itself is only one specific way, amongst others,* of coming to belief in things.
The question might be asked whether all motions of an identical mobile from a given position to the same position again (as a single point may move from this place to that again and again) are specific- ally one and the same; if so, then rectilinear and circular motion, or walking and rolling along, would be specifically one and the same. We should reply: It has been laid down that if the path traversed ὃ is specifically of a different kind, as the straight line and the circle are, then the movements are different.
We have now seen what constitutes generic and specific identity of motion.
47 ARISTOTLE 2210 ἁπλῶς δὲ μία κίνησις ἡ TH οὐσίᾳ pia καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ. τίς δ᾽ ἡ τοιαύτη, δῆλον διελομένοις- τρία LA 2 A > θ \ λ΄ ἃ λέ Ἅ ld γάρ ἐστι τὸν ἀριθμὸν περὶ ἃ λέγομεν THY κίνησιν —6, καὶ ἐν @, Kat ὅτε. λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναί 95 τὰ TO κινούμενον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἢ χρυσόν, Kal ἔν τινι τοῦτο κινεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐν τόπῳ ἢ ἐν πάθει, καὶ ποτέ, ἐν χρόνῳ yap πᾶν κινεῖται. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τῷ γένει ἢ τῷ εἴδει μίαν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πράγματι ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἐχομένην" ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἁπλῶς μίαν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις" Kal ἐν 90 ᾧ yap ἕν δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἄτομον (οἷον τὸ εἶδος), Kal TO OTE, οἷον τὸν χρόνον ἕνα καὶ μὴ διαλείπειν, Kal TO κινούμενον ἕν εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (ὥσπερ ’ τὸ λευκὸν μελαίνεσθαι καὶ Ἱζορίσκον βαδίζειν: ἕν / δὲ Κορίσκος καὶ λευκόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός), 2288 μηδὲ κοινόν (εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἅμα δύο ἀνθρώπους 1 [χρυσόν is suspicious. Themistius 175. 6 οἷον τὸν ἄνθρω- πον ἢ τὸ ἄστρον.----(,] 2 [The Oxford translation adopts Bonitz’s insertion after κινεῖται Of τὸ δὲ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ μίαν ἐν τῷ πράγματι ὃ κινεῖται, ‘it is the thing moved that makes the motion one in subject.’—C.]
8 [ἐχομένην Oxford translation (ef. Simplic. 885. 2 ὁ δὲ συνεχὴς χρόνος καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐχομένας ποιεῖ τὰς κινήσεις) - ἐχόμενον ἣν codd.—C.]
« (Or, ‘the medium (viz. the species) must have the (absolute specific) unity of the indivisible species,’ not merely 48 PHYSICS, V. xiv.
(3) But for a change to be absolutely and individu- ally * one,’ it must be not only of one and the same specific nature, but essentially and numerically one change. What sort of change satisfies this descrip- tion will appear on analysis, as follows. There are three things that we speak of as factors of move- ment: the subject, the track followed, and the ‘when’ of the passage. I mean by the ‘ subject’ (say) the man or the gold that shifts from here to there, and by the ‘ track followed’ the actual path or the successive gradations of quality over which the progress extends. The ‘when’ speaks for itself, for all change takes place in time. Of these three things, the unity of the medium through or over which the track passes determines the generic or specific unity of the change, and the continuity of the time occupied determines its unbrokenness; - so that, if we add the identity of the subject, the oneness will be unqualified. For the medium must be one, not only generically but specifically,* and the ‘ when,’ to wit the time of passage, must be un- brokenly one and not intermittent, and that which moves be one essentially and not only incidentally. This last qualification means that if Coriscus, who is pale, is walking and getting bronzed at the same time, though the pallid being who is getting bronzed is also walking yet the identity is only incidental and not essential to either of the two different changes that are taking place. Nor is a movement or progress one and the same (although it be the same in itself and in the time it occupies) if it is made in common by several subjects; for two men may be the generic unity of (say) movement in a straight line and movement in a circle.—C.]
VOL. II E 49 ARISTOTLE 284 ὑγιάζεσθαι τὴν αὐτὴν ὑγίανσιν, οἷον ὀφθαλμίας" σι 10 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μία αὕτη, ἀλλ᾽ εἴδει μία).
Τὸ δὲ Σωκράτη τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τῷ εἴδει, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ χρόνῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλῳ, εἰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται τὸ φθαρὲν πάλιν ἕν γίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ, εἴη ἂν καὶ αὕτη pia εἰ δὲ μή, ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν μία δ᾽ οὔ.
ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν ταύτῃ παραπλησίαν καὶ πότερον μία ἡ ὕγιεια καὶ ὅλως ai ἕξεις Kal τὰ πάθη τῇ οὐσίᾳ εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν: κινούμενα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ ἔχοντα καὶ ῥέοντα. εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ Kal μία ἡ ἕωθεν καὶ viv ὑγίεια, διὰ τί οὐκ ἂν Kal ὅταν διαλιπὼν λάβῃ πάλιν τὴν ὑγίειαν, καὶ αὕτη κἀκείνη μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ av ein; ὁ yap αὐτὸς λόγος. πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅτι εἰ μὲν δύο τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο α [Perhaps a reference to the Pythagorean doctrine of recurrence recorded by Eudemus (Simplic. 732. 30): ‘If one could believe what the Pythagoreans say, that things numerically one and the same recur, I shall be talking to you with my staff in my hand and you will be sitting just as you are now and everything else will be just the same.’
omen - δ0ὺ PHYSICS, V. tv.
in process of being cured of the same disease (say) ophthalmia, and at the same time, yet the cure, or progress to health, though one and the same in kind in both cases, is two cures and not one and the same single cure.
But if Socrates once again passes through the same specific modification that he has passed through before, then, if we consider it possible for that which has perished to come into existence again and be individually and numerically one and the same,* we may say that Socrates is making ‘ one and the same’ recovery, for instance; but if we do not admit the above-named possibility, we shall say that he is making ‘the same’ recovery but not ‘ one and the same.’
Another question, analogous to this, has been raised: Has health, or any other state or affection that occurs in material bodies, an essential unity, since the bodily seat of them is supposed, by some, to be in a perpetual state of movement and flux ὃ ὃ Now, if my health this morning is one and the same state as my health at this moment, why should not the health I lost and then recovered after an interval of time be likewise one and the same numerically? The reasoning seems to be the same. There is, however, this much difference: (a) if this same sub- ject is (at the two different moments) two things in > The Heracleitean doctrine. If our bodies themselves and all the things revealed to us by the senses are momen- tarily mutable, how can there be any enduring identity at all? [φαίνεται may mean: ‘It is an observed fact,’ though the statement that it is observed fact may be put in the mouth of those who raise the question, the physicists mentioned at 265 a 2.—C.]
51 ARISTOTLE 2282 οὕτως τῷ ἀριθμῷ, καὶ τὰς ἔξεις ἀνάγκη (μία yap 15 ἀριθμῷ ἐνέργεια ἑνὸς ἀριθμῷ)" εἰ δ᾽ ἡ ἕξις μία, laws οὐκ ἄν τῳ δόξειέ πω pia Kal ἡ ἐνέργεια εἶναι" ὅταν γὰρ παύσηται βαδίζων οὐκέτι ἔσται ἡ ~~ βάδισις, πάλιν δὲ βαδίζοντος ἔσται. εἰ δ᾽ οὖν μία Kal ἡ αὐτή, ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ av τὸ αὐτὸ ev καὶ 1 [Alexander (Simplic. 889. 8) recorded the reading ὅτι εἰ μὲν δύο οὕτως τῷ ἀριθμῷ, καὶ ras ἕξεις ἀνάγκη, understanding the subject of εἰ μὲν δύο to be τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῇ ἕξει, ὅπερ διὰ τὴν συνεχῆ ῥύσιν οὐ μένει ἕν τῷ ἀριθμῷ. I believe this is right substantially, but the necessary subject cannot be supplied from the context; it must be mentioned. Hence I have retained τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο with mss. other than EH (which have δι’ for τό) and I (which omits τὸ), The objections to supply- ing αἱ ἕξεις as the subject of εἰ μὲν δύο are: (1) This involves changing ἕξεις (before ἀνάγκη) to ἐνεργείας and so introducing a distinction between an actual state (ἕξι) of health and activities (évépyecac) resulting from that state. There is no question of such a distinction in the cases mentioned, but only of slates of health which are actualities (ἐνέργειαι). Activities only come in later in the illustration from walking. (2) The resulting statement does not seem to fulfil the promise of τοσοῦτον διαφέρει by stating any difference that distinguishes the cases in question. But the reading and interpretation must be taken as very uncertain.—C.]
* [My body is the subject (ὑποκείμενον) which has the capacity for states (ἕξεις) of health or disease. Any such és which is actually realized at any moment is, with re- spect to that capacity, an ‘actuality’ (ἐνέργεια). ἐνέργεια here means in particular an actually realized state, though the statement is true if ἐνέργεια is taken also to include any “ activity ᾿ arising from such a state. The argument is: If 52 PHYSICS, V. rv.
the sense under consideration, viz. numerically two, thén it follows at once that its states must be numeri- cally two, for the numerically different subject must have a numerically different actuality*; whereas (δ) if the state is one (over a stretch of time), that may not be considered sufficient ground for saying that the actuality can only be one numerically; for when a man stops walking that act of walking ceases, but (he retains his power of walking and) when he starts again, there will be a second act of walking.® But, apart from that distinction, if we say that my health is one and the same, it may be possible that one and the same thing should cease to be and exist we accept the flux doctrine, that my body becomes a different thing (numerically) from moment to moment, then of course, its actual states, such as health (whether enjoyed continu- ously or at intervals), must also be different things numeri- cally from moment to moment. The change of the subject to a numerically different subject must carry with it a Pumaas = el of all its capacities, states, affections, activities, etc.——C.
> [Supposition (6) abandons the flux doctrine. Aristotle supposes his own view: that the subject with its δυνάμεις and ἕξεις can remain one and the same over a length of time, and its δυνάμεις and ἕξεις can (as in the illustration from walking) have numerically different actualities (ἐνέργειαι) separated by intervals. We can thus assert that my state of health, considered as the actuality of my capacity for health, can subsist either as one and the same actuality continuously from morning till now, or as a series of numerically different actualities separated by intervals of ill-health; just as my one power of walking can have many instances of activity separated by intervals of inactivity.—C.]
53 ARISTOTLE 2284 φθείρεσθαι καὶ εἶναι πολλάκις. αὗται μὲν οὖν 20 εἰσιν at ἀπορίαι ἔξω τῆς νῦν σκέψεως., Ἐπεὶ δὲ συνεχὴς πᾶσα κίνησις, τήν τε ἁπλῶς μίαν ἀνάγκη καὶ συνεχῆ εἶναι (εἴπερ πᾶσα διαιρετή), καὶ εἰ συνεχής, μίαν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶσα γένοιτ᾽ ἂν συνεχὴς πάσῃ, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῷ τυχόντι τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ ὅσων ἕν τὰ ἔσχατα. ἔσχατα δὲ 25 τῶν μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, τῶν δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἄλλα τῷ εἴδει καὶ ὁμώνυμα: πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἅψαιτο ἢ ἕν γένοιτο τὸ ἔσχατον γραμμῆς καὶ βαδίσεως; ἐχόμεναι μὲν οὖν εἶεν ἂν καὶ ai μὴ αὐταὶ τῷ εἴδει μηδὲ τῷ γένει" δραμὼν γὰρ ἄν τις πυρέξειεν εὐθύς, καὶ οἷον ἡ λαμπὰς ἐκ διαδοχῆς φορὰ ἐχομένη, συνεχὴς δ᾽ ov: 80 Κεῖται γὰρ τὸ συνεχές, ὧν τὰ ἔσχατα ἕν. ὥστ᾽ ἐχόμεναι καὶ ἐφεξῆς εἰσι τῷ τὸν χρόνον εἶναι * [A further suggestion for a line of argument that might be taken, if we were to pursue this discussion. Even if we do not take the view put forward in (δ), but suppose that two actual states of health separated by a interval of ill- health are not numerically two actualities but one and the same actuality, that might be defended on the supposition suggested above (228 a 5), that one and the same thing can exist, cease to exist, and come into existence again. I am responsible for the reading and interpretation of this paragraph, as I could not construct any text that would correspond with Dr. Wicksteed’s rendering, which may have been ig tenes amar ie the indivisible monad (Simplic.).—C.] ¢ [λαμπάς was the official name of the torch-race itself, Simplic. 892. 1 quotes Plato, Rep. 328 a λαμπὰς fora...ἀφ᾽ ἵππων τῇ bey.—C.]
4 of. νι 34 note a.
“ [Understanding ἐχόμεναι in the sense defined at 227 a 6 (succession and contact). But Aristotle seems here to use ἐχόμενον loosely, for he has just said that movements which are not even generically the same can be ἐχόμεναι (conse- 54 PHYSICS, V. τν.
again many times over.* However, these problems lie outside our present inquiry.
What constitutes the unity of a movement? Not its indivisibility (for every movement is potentially divisible without limit), but its uninterrupted con- tinuity. Thus if a movement is strictly one, it must be continuous, and if continuous, one. Itis impossible for one movement to be so united with any other movement, taken at random, as to make the two one movement; for continuity is in no case possible be- tween things taken at random, but only between such things as have limiting extremes capable of zdentzfy- ing coincidence; and there are things ® that have no limiting extremes at all, and others whose limiting extremes, though called by the same name of ‘ end,’ are of differing nature; for how can the ‘end’ of a walking come into contact with the ‘end’ of a line and become identical with it? It is true that move- ments differing not only in species but in genus may come next-to-each-other-without-interval, for a man might catch a feverish cold at the moment when he stopped running; and a torch ¢ passed from hand to hand might be carried first by one runner and then by another with no interval between. But the ‘ carryings,’ each pertaining to a different ‘ carrier,’ would not be continuous; for we agreed that things can only be continuous with each other when the end of one and the beginning of the other are identically unified.¢ Thus the running and taking fever are ‘nexts without contact ’ because there is no break of time between them, and on the same ground the two carryings are ‘nexts by contact ’¢ with each other, cutive), but he can hardly mean that they can be in contact.
tire « 55 ARISTOTLE 2884 συνεχῆ, συνεχὲς δὲ τῷ τὰς κινήσεις" τοῦτο δ᾽, 228 ὅταν ἕν TO ἔσχατον γίγνηται ἀμφοῖν. διὸ ἀνάγκη ὃ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ τὴν ἁπλῶς συνεχῆ κίνησιν καὶ μίαν---τῷ χρόνῳ μέν, ὅπως μὴ ἀκινησία μεταξὺ ἢ" ἐν τῷ διαλείποντι γὰρ ἠρεμεῖν ἀνάγκη. πολλαὶ οὖν καὶ ov μία ἢ ft κίνησις, ὧν ἐστιν ἠρεμία μεταξύ! ὥστε εἴ τις / κίνησις στάσει διαλαμβάνεται, οὐ μία οὐδὲ συνεχὴς" διαλαμβάνεται δέ, εἰ μεταξὺ χρόνος. τῆς δὲ τῷ εἴδει μὴ μιᾶς καὶ εἰ μὴ διαλείπεται ὁ χρόνος, ὁ μὲν, χρόνος εἷς, TH εἴδει δ᾽ ἡ κίνησις ἀλλη" THY τὸ μὲν yap μίαν ἀνάγκη Kal τῷ εἴδει μίαν εἶναι, 1 Όι ταύτην ἁπλῶς μίαν οὐκ ἀνάγκη. Tis μὲν οὖν κίνησις ἁπλῶς pia, εἴρηται.
Ἔτι δὲ λέγεται μία καὶ ἡ τέλειος, ἐάν τε κατὰ 2 ένος ἐάν τε κατ᾽ εἶδος ἢ ἐάν τε κατ᾽ οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ Kat ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ τέλειον καὶ ὅλον τοῦ ἑνός. ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε κἂν ἀτελὴς ἦ μία λέγεται, ἐὰν 7} μόνον συνεχής. "Ere δ᾽ ἄλλως παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας λέγεται μία ἢ a 1 [μὲν Bonita: μὲν γὰρ codd.—C.]
α Cf. p. 34 note a.
> [More literally, ‘ Accordingly they (movements falling under different species or genera) are contiguous and next- in-succession by virtue of the continuity of the time, but continuity requires that the movements themselves shall be continuous, é.¢. both must have an identical extremity.’—C. ] ¢ One material entity, one animal, or one man, must be a complete or whole. One mathematical entity, one mathe- matical figure, one circle, 56 PHYSICS, V. rv.
but there is a break in the continuity of the carryings, since the end of the one does not become actually identical with the beginning of the other,* as in the case of continuous movements.’ So that for a move- ment to possess absolute unity and continuity (a) the movement must be specifically the same throughout the course, and (b) the mobile must retain its numer- ical identity, and (c) the time occupied must be ‘ one’ in the sense explained above. The time must be one (i.e. continuously occupied by the motion) so that no intervals may break the movement; for if a move- ment leaves gaps of time, those gaps must needs be occupied by station, and if station is inserted between, the motion is not. single but plural. So if any motion be interrupted by station, it is not one or continuous; and it is so interrupted if there are gaps in the time. Again, if the movement be not of the same kind, even if the time occupied be continuous, the movement is not, for the time is ‘ one,’ but the movements, since they differ in kind, are not; for in order to be one, a movement must have identity of kind, though it may have identity of kind without necessarily being one in every sense. This, then, suffices to define the strict conditions of one-and-the-sameness in movement.
(4) Sometimes we mean to imply, by calling a thing ‘one,’ that it is complete in itself, whether we have the genus or the species or the individual in view.° And so with motion, a whole, complete in itself, may be implied by ‘ oneness.” Sometimes, however, a motion, even if it be not complete, is called ‘ one,’ rovided only that it be continuous.
(5) And in addition to all these meanings, by calling a movement ‘one and the same’ we may imply that it is uniform throughout its course; for though we 57 20 2 or 30 ARISTOTLE ἡ ὁμαλής. ἡ yap ἀνώμαλος ἔστιν ὡς οὐ δοκεῖ μία ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡ ὁμαλής, ὥσπερ ἡ εὐθεῖα: ἡ γὰρ ἀνώμαλος διαιρετή. ἔοικε δὲ διαφέρειν ὡς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. ἔστι δ᾽ ἐν ἁπάσῃ κινήσει τὸ ὁμαλῶς ἢ μή: καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἀλλοιοῖτο ὁμαλῶς, καὶ φέροιτο ἐφ᾽ ὁμαλοῦ (οἷον κύκλου ἢ εὐθείας), καὶ περὶ αὔξησιν ὡσαύτως καὶ φθίσιν. ἀνωμαλίας" δ᾽ ἐστὶ διαφορὰ ὅτε μὲν ἐφ᾽ ᾧ κινεῖται--ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὁμαλὴν εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν μὴ ἐπὶ ὁμαλῷ μεγέθει, οἷον ἡ τῆς κεκλασμένης κίνησις ἢ ἡ τῆς ἕλικος ἢ ἄλλου μεγέθους ὧν μὴ ἐφαρμόττει τὸ τυχὸν ἐπὶ τὸ τυχὸν μέρος---ὅτε δὲ οὔτε ἐν τῷ ποῦ οὔτε ἐν τῷ ποτὲ οὔτε εἰς ὅ, GAN ἐν τῷ ὥς" ταχυ- τῆτι γὰρ καὶ βραδυτῆτι ἐνίοτε διώρισται: ἧς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ τάχος, ὁμαλής, ἧς δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλος. διὸ οὐκ εἴδη κινήσεως οὐδὲ διαφοραὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, ὅτι πάσαις ἀκολουθεῖ ταῖς διαφόροις κατ᾽ εἶδος. ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ βαρύτης καὶ κουφότης ἡ εἰς τὸ αὐτό, οἷον γῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν ἢ πυρὸς πρὸς 1 [ἀνωμαλία E, Oxford translation.—C.] πε του το το RT Ee Oe ee * [Cf. Themist. 176. 23 μᾶλλον δὲ μία κίνησις καὶ ἡ ὁμαλὴ τῆς ἀνωμάλου" τὴν γὰρ ἀνώμαλον διαιρεῖν ἐοίκασιν αἱ ἐξαλλαγαί, and Alex. ap. Simplic. 895. 27. But the sentence may be rendered: ‘ But the difference (between uniform and not uniform) seems to be a difference of degree (rather than of kind),’ and connected with the following statement: ‘It occurs in every sort of movement.’—C.]
δ (‘ Tapering spiral,’ like the convolution (ἐλική) of a snail-shell, Apollonius of Perga (born about 262 B.c.?)
58 PHYSICS, V. rv.
may ascribe a certain unity to a movement that varies in form over different portions of its course, yet that which is uniform (the movement on a straight line, for example) is one in a fuller sense; for you can divide what is not uniform into sections not similar to each other. So that the oneness that includes uniformity seems to be more one than that which does not.? This distinction between uniformity and varioformity applies to all forms of passing-here-to- there; for a change of quality may be uniform, and a local passing from here to there may be over a uni- form course (for instance, on a circle or a straight line), and the same with growth or expansion and its reverse. And it is sometimes in the form of the track that we find the determinant of varioformity in the motion, for there can be no uniformity of motion save over a track of uniform figure, not e.g. over a line bent back at an angle, or a tapering spiral,® or any other figure, parts of which taken at random will not fit upon each other. But sometimes the variation is neither in the form of the track, nor in the continuity or discontinuity of the time occupied, nor in the maintaining or reversing of the direction, but in a quality of the motion itself; for the variation may be in its quickness or slowness, since a motion uniform in speed may be called uniform, and varying in speed varying. It follows that velocity is not special to any one genus of change. Nor is swift and slow movement identical with heaviness and lightness, for heavi- ness always works one way, that of earth to earth, and lightness always the other way, that of fire to first demonstrated, in his lost book On the Cochlias, that one type of helix—the cylindrical—is a uniform curve. Proclus in Huel. Ὁ. 105 Friedlein.—C.]
59 ARISTOTLE 2294 αὗτό. μία μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνώμαλος τῷ συνεχής (ἧττον δέ, ὅπερ τῇ κεκλασμένῃ συμβαΐνει φορᾷ: τὸ ἧττον μίξίς ἀεὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου)" εἰ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν μίαν 5 ἐνδέχεται καὶ ὁμαλὴν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν αἱ ἐχόμεναι καὶ μὴ κατ᾽ εἶδος ai αὗται μία καὶ συνεχής" πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὁμαλὴς ἡ ἐξ ἀλλοιώσεως συγκειμένη καὶ φορᾶς; δέοι γὰρ ἂν ἐφαρμόττειν.
1 [οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν...αἱ αὖται: καὶ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν αἱ (αἱ om. E) μὴ κατ᾽ εἶδος ἐχόμεναι αὗται (ἐχόμεναι καὶ αὗται I) codd. My reading is based on Themistius 177. 12 εἰ τοίνυν τὴν μὲν συνεχῆ καὶ μίαν κίνησιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ ὁμαλὴν εἷναι, τὴν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἴδει διαφερουσῶν κινήσεων συγκειμένην ἀδύνατον ὁμαλὴν εἶναι, οὐκ ἄν wore γένοιτο ἣ τοιαύτη pla συνεχής, ὅτι μηδ᾽ ὁμαλής. I assume that the καὶ μὴ, which does not appear after καὶ ὁμαλὴν in Themistius (its presence or absence there does not affect the argument), was part of an attempt to correct ai wh κατ᾽ εἶδος ἐχόμεναι αὗται. Theargument is: any non-uniform movement can be one in the sense of being continuous (though it has less unity than the uniform); and since any motion of whatever sort that is one can also be uniform, both uniformity and non-uniformity are always compatible with being one and continuous. It follows that a movement composed of consecutive movements of two different kinds cannot be one and continuous; for uniformity is not compatible with change of kind in the movement (¢.9. from alteration to locomotion).—C.]
CHAPTER V ARGUMENT [What is meant by one movement being contrary to another movement or (as considered in the next chapter) to rest?
The possibilities are exhausted by five alternatives. One of these involves only one positive goal, and this is the case of coming-to-be and perishing. The remaining four have two positive goals or opposites (a 8-16).
fire; but swift and slow are common to both alike. A movement that is not uniform, then, may have a certain unity,in virtue of its continuity in time, though a lesser unity than if it were uniform. An instance would be a movement on a line bent back at an angle. This ‘lesser,’ here as elsewhere, implies an admixture of the contrasted principle. And since any kind of continuous change may be either uniform or not, changes that succeed each other without interval, but are not of like kind, cannot be one and continuous; for how could a progress compounded of alternate changes of quality and of place be uniform? If it were, a change of place would be capable of being laid over a change of quality and exactly coinciding with it.
* (Or, ‘ And so neither does that heaviness, or that light- ness, which (causes motion) in the same direction—e.g. the heaviness of earth as compared with earth, or the lightness of fire as compared with fire—(constitute a specific difference).’ One piece of earth may be heavier than another, but both naturally move downwards. Such differences are not * specific,’ as are the heaviness of all earth and the lightness of all fire, which cause these elements to move naturally in opposite directions.—C. ] CHAPTER V ARGUMENT (continued) Two of them may be dismissed, as not yielding actual motions that are in fact contrary, though they may be dis- tinguished conceptually (a 16-27).
Two remain, which are really reducible to one: A * move- ment ’ (change of quality, quantity, or place) is contrary to another when one is from A towards B, the other from B towards A, A and B being opposites. Examples illustrate 10 15 ARISTOTLE ARGUMENT (continued) this. The change with only one positive goal is a ‘ change’ (viz. coming-to-be or werishing), but not ‘ movement’ Movement from or towards an intermediate between two Ett δὲ διοριστέον ποία κίνησις ἐναντία κινήσει" καὶ περὶ μονῆς δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Διαιρετέον δὲ πρῶτον πότερον ἐναντία κίνησις ἡ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ TH εἰς TO αὐτὸ (οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγιείας τῇ εἰς ὑγίειαν), οἷον Kai γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ δοκεῖ, ἐξ ἐναντίων (οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγιείας TH ἐκ νόσου), ς εἰς ἐναντία (οἷον ἡ εἰς ὑγίειαν TH εἰς νόσον), wr ΜΝ ες Νὰ ἐξ ἐναντίου τῇ εἰς ἐναντίον (οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγιείας τῇ εἰς νόσον), ἢ ἡ ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐναντίον TH ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐναντίον (οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγιείας εἰς νόσον τῇ ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίειαν). ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ἕνα τινὰ τούτων εἷναι τῶν τρόπων ἢ πλείους" οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἀντιθεῖναι. Kort δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίου τῇ εἰς ἐναντίον οὐκ ἐναντία (οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγιείας TH εἰς νόσον), ἡ αὐτὴ yap KQL μιᾷ" TO MEVTOL Ύ εἶναι οὐ Ταῦτο AUTALS, WOTEP * [Because in this case there is only one positive goal— existence—with its contradictory, non-existence. In the remaining cases there are two contrary positive goals, and these cases alone are considered in the following context, as alone relevant to ‘ movement,’ i.e. change of quality, quan- tity, or place. We recur to case (1) at 229 b 10, where it appears that this is “ change,’ but not ‘ movement.’—C.]
62 PHYSICS, V. v.
ARGUMENT (continued) opposites may be regarded as movement from or towards one of the opposites (Ὁ 14-21). or definition of ‘ contrary movement’ is stated (b 21-22).
We must further determine what change or transition is contrary to what other, and likewise as to cessation from change.
To begin with: (1) are two movements contrary when the one recedes from, the other approaches, the same thing? So receding from health and approaching health would be contrary movements. This, one would say, holds for coming to be and ceasing to be.* Or (2) should we say that contrary movements recede from the opposite posi- tions—that receding from health is the contrary of receding from sickness? Or (3) is the approaching one opposite (health) contrary to approaching the other (sickness)? Or (4) receding from one opposite to approaching the other? That would be ‘ from health’ contrary to ‘towards sickness.” Or (5) ‘from the one opposite towards the other ’ contrary to ‘from the other towards the one’? That would be ‘from sickness to health’ contrary to ‘from health to sickness.’ [Ὁ must be either one, or more than one, of these, for they exhaust the possibilities of contrast.
Now (4) a movement away from the one opposite and a movement towards the other (e.g. from health and. towards sickness) are not contrary, for they are actually one and the same movement, though con- ceptually they are different aspects of it and differ in their definitions (as, for example, losing health is 63 63 ARISTOTLE 22922000 ταὐτὸ τὸ ἐξ ὑγιείας μεταβάλλειν καὶ τὸ εἰς 25 30 νόσον. οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἐξ ἐναντίου τῇ ἐξ ἐναντίου: ἅμα μὲν γὰρ συμβαίνει ἐξ ἐναντίου καὶ εἰς ἐναντίον (ἢ μεταξύ: ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτου μὲν ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν), ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ εἰς ἐναντίον μεταβάλλειν δόξειεν kay s δι ἂν εἶναι αἴτιον τῆς ἐναντώσεως ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου. ἡ μὲν yap ἀπαλλαγὴ ἐναντιότητος, ἡ δὲ λῆψις" καὶ λέγεται δ᾽ ἑκάστη εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐξ οὗ, οἷον ὑγίανσις ἡ εἰς ὑγίειαν, νόσανσις" δ᾽ ἡ εἰς νόσον. εἴπεται δὴ ἡ εἰς ἐναντία, Kal ἡ εἰς ἐναντία ἐξ f ἐναντίων. τάχα μὲν οὖν συμβαίνει τὰς els ἐναντία καὶ ἐξ ἐναντίων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι tows od ταὐτό (λέγω δὲ τὸ εἰς ὑγίειαν τῷ ἐκ νόσου καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὑγιείας TH εἰς νόσον). ἐπεὶ δὲ διαφέρει μεταβολὴ ae oer ¢ A difference that is very sensible when we are leaving one pleasant company to join another, for instance.
> [That a change towards something intermediate between two opposites may be regarded as a change towards the remoter opposite, is explained below, 229 Ὁ 14.—C.]
¢ Both ὑγίανσις and νόσανσις (elsewhere vécwors) appear to be coined words. The translation has the advantage of the original in so far as it employs one coined word only. Aristotle’s economy of intellectual or imaginative effort in finding illustrations is a noteworthy feature of his style, though when he gives his mind to it he shows him- self a master. [The gist of Aristotle’s remarks is: Nothing is gained by distinguishing case (2) from case (3). The actual movement is the same in both cases, and would more naturally be described in terms of case (3).—C.]
64 PHYSICS, V. v.