64 PHYSICS, V. v.
conceived in reference to health, and approaching disease in reference to disease). Nor (2) should contrary movements be defined as receding from the opposite extremes respectively; for receding from either opposite coincides with approaching the other opposite (or a point between; but of that more hereafter),® but one would look for the principle of opposition rather in approach than in receding; for the one is of the nature of getting hold of an opposite, the other in the nature of escaping from it, and move- ments take their names rather from what they are changing to than from what they are changing from —‘healthening’ for passing from sickness towards health, ‘sickening’ for passing from health towards sickness.° This reduces us to (3) the case of the movement towards one opposite as the contrary of the move- ment towards the other, and (5) the movement from opposite A towards opposite B as the contrary of the movement from B towards A.4 Now movements towards one extreme really coincide with movements away from the other, though they may be distin- guished conceptually: ‘towards health’ from ‘from disease,’ I mean, or ‘from health’ from ‘towards disease.’* And since ‘change’ is a wider term than @ [The phrase ἡ els ἐναντία ἐξ ἐναντίων is used as a com- pendious equivalent for ἡ ἐξ ἐναντίου els ἐναντίον τῇ ἐξ évay- τίου εἰς ἐναντίον above (]. 13).—C.]
ὁ [That is, apart from the (negligible) conceptual differ- ence, case (3) is reducible to case (5), which alone remains. This result of the whole analysis 1s stated in the next sen- tence: One ‘ movement’ (i.e. change of quality, quantity, or place)-—as distinguished from coming-to-be and perishing, which are included in the wider term ‘ change ’--is contrary to another when one is from A towards B, the other from B towards A, A and B being contraries.—C.]
VOL. II F 65 ARISTOTLE 8294 κινήσεως (ἡ ἔκ τινος γὰρ ὑποκειμένου εἴς τι 5 10 ὑποκείμενον μεταβολὴ κίνησίς ἐστιν), ἡ ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐναντίον τῇ ἐξ ἐναντίου εἰς ἐναντίον κίνησις ἐναντία (οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὑγιείας εἰς νόσον τῇ ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίειαν). δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς, ὁποῖα δοκεῖ τὰ ἐναντία εἶναι" τὸ νοσάζεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὑγιάζεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν τῷ ἀπατᾶσθαι μὴ δι’ αὐτοῦ (εἰς ἐναντία γάρ: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπι- στήμην, ἔστι καὶ ἀπάτην καὶ δι’ αὑτοῦ κτᾶσθαι καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλου), καὶ ἡ ἄνω φορὰ τῇ κάτω (ἐναντία γὰρ ταῦτα ἐν μήκε)), καὶ ἡ εἰς δεξιὰ τῇ εἰς ἀριστερά (ἐναντία γὰρ ταῦτα ἐν πλάτει), καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸ ἔμ- προσθεν TH εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν (ἐναντία γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα). ἡ δὲ εἰς ἐναντίον μόνον οὐ κίνησις ἀλλὰ μεταβολή, οἷον τὸ γίγνεσθαι λευκὸν μὴ ἔκ τινος. καὶ ὅσοις δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἐναντίον, ἡ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῇ εἰς αὐτὸ μεταβολῇ ἐναντία" διὸ γένεσις φθορᾷ ἐναντία καὶ ἀποβολὴ λήψει" αὗται δὲ μεταβολαὶ μέν, κινήσεις > of ov.
α [ὑποκείμενον here means ‘something positive,’ τὸ κατα- pace δηλούμενον (as explained at 225 a 6), including the ‘shortage,’ which can be expressed positively (225 Ὁ 3).—C.]
> (Simplic. 904. 1 explains the point of the parenthesis: “being deceived by another’ is the proper antithesis of learning (from another); the antithesis of ὁ being deceived on your own account’ would be ‘ discovery’ (εὕρεσις) on your own account.—C.]
¢ Simplicius justly points out that these directions are purely anthropocentric, the man’s largest dimension ‘ height ’ being taken as ‘length,’ and the other dimensions being decided by the structure of the organism. But no one knew better than Aristotle that such definitions are arbitrary, and that east, for example, is to the right if you are looking north and to the left if you are looking south, and that if 66 ARISTOTLE Τὰς δὲ εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ κινήσεις, ὅσοις τῶν ἐναντίων ἔστι μεταξύ, ὡς εἰς ἐναντία πως θετέον. ὡς ἐναντίῳ γὰρ χρῆται τῷ μεταξὺ ἡ κίνησις, ἐφ ὁπότερα av μεταβάλλῃ, οἷον ἐκ φαιοῦ μὲν εἰς TO λευκὸν ὡς ἐκ μέλανος καὶ ἐκ λευκοῦ εἰς φαιὸν ὡς εἰς μέλαν, ἐκ δὲ μέλανος εἰς φαιὸν ὡς εἰς λευκὸν 20 τὸ φαιόν" TO yap μέσον πρὸς ἑκάτερον λέγεταί πως τῶν ἄκρων, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. Kivnots μὲν δὴ κινήσει ἐναντία οὕτως ἡ ἐξ EVOVTLOV εἰς ἐναντίον Τῇ ἐξ ενάαντιου ELS EVAVTLOV, CHAPTER VI ARGUMENT [In what sense is rest contrary to movement? Generally speaking rest is opposed to movement, as berng the ‘ shortage ’ of movement; and this applies to all species of movement. But the question must be treated in more detail (229 b 23-27).
Every movement involves two opposites A and B. Rest in A is the contrary of movement from A to B, not of move- ment from B to A (Ὁ 27-81).
Rest in A is also opposed to rest in B; while if we oppose rest in A to any movement, that movement can only be move- ment from A to Β (Ὁ 31-230 a 7).
Where there are not two opposites, there is no‘ movement’ 68 PHYSICS, V. v.-vr.
Now movements to something between such opposites as have anything between them are to be regarded in a sense as movements towards one or the other opposite; for the movement either way— from a state between to either opposite, or from either opposite to a state between—makes that state between function as the opposite from which it is receding or towards which it is approaching as the case may be. Thus a thing on the way from grey to white is as though on the way from black, and from white to grey as though to black, and from black to grey as though to white. For, in a sense, that which is between is so called in contrast with either extreme, as we have already noted.* Contrary movements, then, as above defined, are such as pass, the one from this opposite to that, and the other from that to this.
CHAPTER VI ARGUMENT (continued) proper, but only * change’ with one terminal point, viz. the coming-into-being of something or its ceasing-to-be. Here we should not speak of ‘rest’ (the proper opposite of * move- ment’), but of ‘ unchangingness.’ The thing can be un- changingly in being. What is the opposite of this condition? (1) If the alternative to “in being’ is sheer non-existence, there is no opposite condition, for there will be nothing at all to be in any opposite condition. But (2) if by ° that which is not’ we merely mean this ‘ matter’ which has not yet acquired this ἡ form,’ then this matter is something to which we can attribute ἡ unchangingness in not being ’ what it will be when it has acquired the form (a 7-18).
69 ARISTOTLE ARGUMENT (continued) In local change, either movement or rest may be natural or unnatural. Does the same antithesis apply to other kinds of movement and to coming-into-being and perishing? It may be argued that since ‘violence’ is ‘ against nature,’ violent or enforced changes of ali sorts can be called ‘ un- natural.’ So the contrast of ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ is common to all changes and states of rest. In place, for example, the natural motion upwards of fire is contrary (1) to the natural motion downwards of earth, and (2) to its own unnatural motion downwards. So with rest: the unnatural rest above of earth is contrary (1) to its own natural motion downwards, and (2) to its own natural rest below. Thus the 229b23 "Hired δὲ κινήσει οὐ μόνον δοκεῖ κίνησις εἶναι ἐναντία ἀλλὰ καὶ ἠρεμία, τοῦτο διοριστέον. ἁπλῶς 25 μὲν yap ἐναντίον κίνησις κινήσει, ἀντίκειται δὲ > καὶ ἠρεμία (στέρησις γάρ, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς Kal ἡ στέρησις ἐναντία λέγεται), ποιᾷ δὲ ποιά, οἷον τῇ κατὰ τόπον ἡ κατὰ τόπον. ᾿Αλλὰ τοῦτο νῦν λέγεται ἁπλῶς: πότερον γὰρ τῇ ἐνταυθοῖ; μονῇ ἡ ἐκ τούτου ἢ ἡ εἰς τοῦτο κίνησις ἀντίκειται; δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἐπεὶ ἐν δυσὶν 1 [ποιᾷ δὲ ποιά. This correction, also adopted by the Oxford translation, is favoured by the οἷον which follows, and by Philoponus’s paraphrase (858. 32): ποίᾳ δὲ ποία, the reading of all mss. and of Themistius 178. 4 and (apparently) Simplicius 906. 20 may be due to wrong punctuation of the preceding clauses.—C. | 2 [évravdot. At the other place cited in Bonitz’s Index where this form occurs in Aristotle, De caelo 295 Ὁ 23 οὗ δὲ φέρεται κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ μένει ἐνταυθοῖ, there is the variant ἐνταῦθα, but not here. It is hard to believe that Aristotle would choose to use ἐνταυθοῖ here coupled with a word negating motion (though in the De caelo there might be a 70 PHYSICS, V. νι.
ARGUMENT (continued) contrast of natural and unnatural holds of states of rest, as well as of motions (a 18-b 21).
Though we recognize unnatural states of rest, we ought not to speak of them as arising by a process of ‘coming to a standstill.’ This term should be reserved for natural move- ment of a thing to its proper place (Ὁ 21-28).
A thing in process of change (e.g. from health to sickness) is partially still ‘in health,’ partially already ‘in sickness.’ Can we, then, say that staying in health is contrary to * falling sick’? May we say the thing, in so far as it is still in health, 1s in a sense at rest? (Ὁ 28-231 a 2).
Alternative statements of two problems already considered Bur since we find a contrast not only between a given motion and its counter motion but also between experiencing that motion and being at rest from it, we must examine this matter also. For, while the opposite of a motion, in the full and proper sense, is the motion counter to it, absence of motion is also contrasted with motion, as being its non-accomplish- ment (for non-accomplishment is a kind of opposite to the ‘ might be ’), and this holds in each particular category, e.g. local rest is contrasted with local motion.
This statement, however, is too general and needs qualification. Is abiding here opposed to moving hence or to moving hither? Evidently, since a movement must be between two terms 4 and B, sort of attraction to the notion of ‘whither’ in οὗ δὲ φέρεται), while he couples ἐνταῦθα with φέρεσθαι. Perhaps ἐνταυθί should be read in both places.—C.]
τι on 10 ARISTOTLE ἡ κίνησις ὑποκειμένοις, TH μὲν ἐκ τούτου εἰς TO ἐναντίον ἡ ἐν τούτῳ μονή, TH δ᾽ ἐκ τοὐναντίου εἰς τοῦτο ἡ ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ. "Apa δὲ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι αὗται" καὶ yap ἄτοπον εἰ κινήσεις μὲν ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἠρεμίαι ὃ ἀντικείμεναι οὐκ εἰσίν" εἰσὶ δὲ at ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις, οἷον ἡ ἐν ὑγιείᾳ τῇ ἐν νόσῳ ἠρεμίᾳ. κινήσει δὲ τῇ ἐξ ὑγιείας εἰς νόσον τῇ γὰρ ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίειαν ἄλογον (ἡ γὰρ εἰς αὐτὸ κίνησις ἐν ᾧ ἕστηκεν ἠρέμησις μᾶλλόν ἐστιν, 7 συμβαΐνει γε dpa γίγνεσθαι τῇ κινήσει), ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ ταύτην ἢ ἐκείνην εἶναι: οὐ yap ἣ γ᾽ ἐν λευκότητι ἠρεμία ἐναντία TH ἐν ὑγιείᾳ. Ὅσοις δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἐναντία, τούτων μεταβολὴ μὲν ἔστιν ἀντικειμένη ἡ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῇ εἰς αὐτό, κίνησις δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν! οἷον ἡ ἐξ ὄντος TH εἰς ὄν. καὶ μονὴ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀμεταβλησία δέ. καὶ εἰ μέν τι εἴη ὑποκείμενον, ἡ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἀμετα- BAnoia τῇ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι evavtia: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τι TO [L7) OV, ἀπορήσειεν AV TLS TLVL EVAVTLA Ἢ ἐν τῷ * [Simplic. 908. 21, interprets ὑποκείμενον here as the ‘matter’ which gains form in ‘ becoming.’ This can have an existence of its own without the form it may come to gain; so there is something to be in a state of changelessness. But if ‘what is not’ means the absolutely non-existent, there is nothing to be in such a state; so how can there be such a state for nothing to be in?—C.]
12 PHYSICS, V. νι.
12 PHYSICS, V. νι.
movement from 4 to its opposite B will have for its opposite the abiding fixed in A, and movement from B to A will have for its opposite the abiding fixed in B.
At the same time these two fixities are also con- trary to one another; for it would be absurd that there should be contrary movements and not also opposite states of rest, and there are such in fact, namely the states of rest in the opposite terms, e.g. abiding in health is opposed to abiding in sickness. The movement to which abiding in health is opposed is the movement from health to sickness; for it would be absurd to oppose it to the reverse move- ment from sickness to health (since movement to- wards the goal at which the subject is at rest is rather a process of ‘ coming to rest,’ and ‘ coming to rest’ is a process that coincides with the movement towards that goal), and it can only be one or the other of these two movements between health and sickness: no other opposite term can be in question, for that would involve the impossible consequence that rest in (say) ‘ whiteness ᾿ should be opposed to rest in health.
If a term has no opposite, then there can be no “movement ’ from it or to it, but there may be a ‘change ’ from its not being there to its being there and vice versa. In such a case you cannot say that it ‘makes a stay’ in being, or in not being, but only that there is absence of change from being or not- being. Now if there is some subject ὦ that changes from not being this or that into being it, then its not- changing from being that thing is the opposite of its not-changing from not being it. But if that which isn’t the thing does not exist at all, one would be at a loss to express the opposite of the thing’s being in existence and not changing from it, and one could 73 ARISTOTLE 73 ARISTOTLE 280a ὄντι ἀμεταβλησία, καὶ εἰ ἠρεμία ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ~ Ὕ al ἐν τοῦτο, ἢ οὐ πᾶσα ἠρεμία κινήσει ἐναντία, ἢ 7 18 γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ κίνησις. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι ἠρεμία μὲν οὐ λεκτέα, εἰ μὴ καὶ αὗται κινήσεις, ὅμοιον δέ τι καὶ ἀμεταβλησία. ἐναντία δὲ ἢ οὐδενὶ ἢ τῇ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἢ τῇ φθορᾷ (αὕτη γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς, ἡ δὲ γένεσις εἰς ἐκείνην). Απορήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις διὰ τί ἐν μὲν TH κατὰ τόπον 20 μεταβολῇ εἰσὶ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ μοναὶ καὶ κινήσεις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ov, οἷον ἀλλοίωσις ἡ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἡ δὲ παρὰ dvow: οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑγίανσις ἢ ἡ νόσανσις κατὰ φύσιν 7 παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ λεύκανσις ἢ μέλανσις" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως (οὔτε 25 γὰρ αὗται ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι ws φύσει ἢ παρὰ φύσιν, οὔτε αὔξησις αὐξήσει). καὶ ἐπὶ γενέσεως δὲ καὶ φθορᾶς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος" οὔτε yap ἡ μὲν γένεσις κατὰ φύσιν ἡ δὲ φθορὰ παρὰ φύσιν---ἡ yap γήρανσις κατὰ φύσιν--οὔτε γένεσιν ὁρῶμεν τὴν μὲν κατὰ φύσιν τὴν δὲ παρὰ φύσιν. ἢ εἰ ἔστι τὸ Bia παρὰ 30 φύσιν, Kat φθορὰ av εἴη φθορᾷ ἐναντία ἡ βίαιος ὡς παρὰ φύσιν οὖσα τῇ κατὰ φύσιν. ἄρ᾽ οὖν καὶ α [Ceasing-to-be is a change whose starting-point is the thing’s ‘ unchangingness in being.’ This starting-point is also the goal of coming-to-be. So ceasing-to-be is contrary to it in some such way as movement is contrary to rest, while ‘unchangingness in not-being’ is contrary to it in some such way as rest is contrary to rest.—C.]
> {For the doctrine of the natural trend of the elements to their proper regions see Vol. I. Gen. Introd. pp. Ixii ff.
hardly say whether such opposite were or were not a state of rest. If we are to speak of ‘rest’ in such a case, we must either say that ‘rest’ is not always opposed to ‘movement,’ or else that coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are movements. It is clear, then, that since (as we have seen) these are not movements, we must not speak of rest, but call it something analogous to rest, namely unchangingness. Is there, then, an opposite to ‘unchangingness in being’? Not if the non-existence opposed to existence is absolute; but otherwise the non-change of being a thing is opposed either to its non-change in non-existence or to its ceasing-to-be (which is a change from it, whereas genesis is a change to it).4 One might naturally ask why there are natural and unnatural ὃ movings and abidings in locality, but not in other ways of passing from this to that. For instance, there is no natural or unnatural change of quality, for getting health is no more natural or un- natural than sickening, nor is growing white more or less natural than growing black; and in the same way neither are growth and shrinkage opposed to each other as one natural and the other unnatural, nor is one growth opposed to another in that way. And so again with coming-to-be and perishing, for neither is coming-to-be natural and perishing unnatural (for growing old is natural) nor do we dis- tinguish between natural and unnatural coming-to-be. We may answer that if by ‘ unnatural ’ we mean ἡ en- forced’ ° then perishing may be opposed to perishing if the one is natural and the other enforced. Is there, ¢ (For the contrast between natural and enforced or un- natural movement see Book IV. chap. viii., 215 a 2.—C.]
75 ARISTOTLE 2804 γενέσεις εἰσὶν ἔνιαι βίαιοι καὶ οὐχ εἱμαρμέναι, αἷς 280» ἐναντίαι at κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὐξήσεις βίαιοι καὶ φθίσεις, οἷον αὐξήσεις ai τῶν ταχὺ διὰ τρυφὴν ἡβώντων, καὶ ot σῖτοι οἱ ταχὺ ἁδρυνόμενοι καὶ μὴ πιληθέντες; ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἀλλοιώσεως πῶς; ἢ ὡσαύτως" elev γὰρ dv τινες βίαιοι, at δὲ φυσικαΐ, οἷον οἱ 5 ἀφιέμενοι μὴ ἐν κρισίμοις ἡμέραις, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν κρισίμοις" of μὲν οὖν παρὰ φύσιν ἠλλοίωνται οἱ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν. ἔσονται δὴ ἐναντίαι αἵ φθοραὶ ἀλλήλαις, οὐ γενέσει. καὶ τί γε κωλύει; ἔστι γὰρ ὥς" καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἡ μὲν ἡδεῖα ἡ δὲ λυπηρὰ εἴη" ὥστ᾽ οὐχ ἁπλῶς φθορὰ φθορᾷ ἐναντία, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἡ τὸ μὲν τοιαδὲ ἡ δὲ τοιαδὲ αὐτῶν ἐστιν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν ἐναντίαι κινήσεις Kal ἠρεμίαι τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον εἰσίν" οἷον ἢ ἄνω τῇ κάτω. τόπου γὰρ ἐναντιώσεις αὗται: φέρεται δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄνω φορὰν φύσει TO πῦρ, τὴν δὲ κάτω ἡ γῆ, Kal ἐναντίαι 15 αὐτῶν αἱ φοραί: τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἄνω μὲν φύσει, κάτω 1 [δὴ HI Simplic. 911. 24: δ᾽ cett. In Themistius 179. 6 the mss, vary.—-C. ] α [Simplicius 911. 13 sees a reference to the ‘ Gardens of Adonis.’ ‘These were baskets or pots filled with earth, in which wheat, barley, lettuces, fennel, and various kinds of flowers were sown and tended for eight days, chiefly or 76 PHYSICS, V. νι.
76 PHYSICS, V. νι.
then, such a thing as coming-into-being which is en- forced and out of the naturally ordained way, and so contrary to natural coming-into-being, and are there forced growings and shrinkages, such as a youth’s rapid growth to maturity due to luxury, or the rapid ripening of corn that is not packed solidly in the mould?2 And how about qualitive modifications? It is the same with these, we may say: some may be considered forced and some natural; for instance re- covery from a fever is a natural alteration if it occurs on a critical day, unnatural if the day is not critical. We shall, then, have perishings contrary in this respect rather to each other than each to an opposite coming- to-be. Whynot? Forinasense there are such, since one might be easy and another grievous, so that, if one way of perishing were not unqualifiedly opposed to another, yet they might be contrasted in so far as they have contrary qualities. It is, then, universally true that movements and states of rest are contrary in the manner just described. Take for instance the contrariety of upward and downward movement and of rest above and rest below. These are contrarieties in respect of place; and of the movements concerned, the natural movement of fire is upward, of earth down- ward, and these movements of theirs are contrary; moreover, for fire upward movement is natural, downexclusively by women. Fostered by the sun’s heat, the plants shot up rapidly, but having no root they withered as rapidly away, and at the end of eight days were carried out with the images of the dead Adonis, and flung with them into the sea or into springs.’ Frazer, Adonis Attis Osiris ὃ [{2.6. the contrast of natural and unnatural occurs (as has just been argued) in all types of movement, and also in the opposition of movement to rest.—C.]
17 4 ARISTOTLE δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἐναντία ye ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ τῇ παρὰ φύσιν. Kat μοναὶ 6 ὡσαύτως: ἡ yap ἄνω μονὴ τῇ ἄνωθεν κάτω κινήσει ἐναντία, γιίγ- νεται δὲ TH γῇ ἡ μὲν μονὴ ἐκείνη παρὰ φύσιν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις αὕτη κατὰ φύσιν. wore [κινήσει 20 (μονῇ μονὴ ἐναντία ἡ παρὰ φύσιν τῇ κατὰ 25 φύσιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἡ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐναντία οὕτως) ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἔσται αὐτῶν---ὖ ἄνω ἢ ἡ κάτω---ἡ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν. χει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν ef ἔστι πάσης ἠρεμίας τῆς μὴ ἀεὶ γένεσις, καὶ αὕτη τὸ ἵστασθαι. τοῦ δὴ παρὰ φύσιν μένοντος, οἷον τῆς γῆς ἄνω, εἴη ἂν γένεσις" ὅτε dpa ἐφέρετο ἄνω Bia, ἵστατο. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἱστάμενον ἀεὶ δοκεῖ φέρεσθαι θᾶττον, τὸ δὲ Bia 1 (I have inserted μονῇ because, if κινήσει is retained, this sentence is a mere repetition of the previous one, is redundant in itself, and leaves the argument incomplete. Sense and symmetry require the statement that the natural rest is opposed to the unnatural rest of the same element. This statement was promised above, and is implied in the parallel passage below, 231 a 13-17. If μονῇ had dropped out, κινήσει might easily be wrongly supplied.—C.]
« [Aristotle’s answer seems to be that, though any state of rest which is not permanent must have come to be, the process by which an unnatural state of rest comes to be must not be identified with ‘coming to a standstill’—a term which should be reserved for the termination of a natural movement.—C. | » [Logic requires us to understand τοῦ rapa φύσιν μένοντος (τῆς ἠρεμίας) γένεσις ἂν eln.—C.]
¢ [6.9. a stone falls faster and faster in its natural movement 78 PHYSICS, V. νι.
ward movement unnatural, and its natural movement is certainly contrary to its unnatural movement. Also the same contrast of natural and unnatural applies to the “ staying where it is ’ of each element. ‘ Staying above’ is contrary to motion from above downwards, and for earth staying above is an unnatural occurrence, while motion from above downwards is natural. And accordingly, one staying will be contrary to another— the unnatural staying contrary to the natural staying of the same thing (just as the unnatural movement was contrary to the natural movement of the same thing); for one of the two stayings—staying above or staying below as the case may be—will be natural, the other unnatural.
The further question arises, whether every state of rest which does not exist at all times has a coming- into-being, and whether this coming-into-being can be identified with ‘coming to a standstill.’* Now when a thing is in an unnatural state of rest—when earth, for instance, stays aloft—that state of rest ὃ must have a coming-into-being; and (if this is identi- fied with “coming to a standstill’) that will mean that the earth in question was ‘coming to a standstill’ at a time when it was being forced upwards against its nature. But a thing that is coming to a standstill seems always to be moving with a quickening velocity, whereas what is forced against its nature is always losing velocity. So (if we identify the coming-to-be of an unnatural state of rest with ‘coming to a stand- still,’ and an unnatural movement cannot be said to come to a standstill), we shall have a thing which towards the earth, but loses speed if you throw it up ‘ vio- lently ’ into the air.—C.]
19 ARISTOTLE 280} τοὐναντίον. οὐ γενόμενον apa ἠρεμοῦν ἔσται ἠρεμοῦν. ἔτι δοκεῖ τὸ ἵστασθαι ἢ ὅλως εἶναι τὸ εἰς τὸν αὑτοῦ τόπον φέρεσθαι ἣ συμβαΐνειν ἅμα. Eye. δ᾽ ἀπορίαν εἰ ἐναντία ἡ μονὴ ἡ ἐνταῦθα τῇ ἐντεῦθεν κινήσει" ὅταν yap κινῆται ἐκ Tovdl ἢ 80 καὶ ἀποβάλλῃ, ἔτι δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ ἀποβαλλόμενον" wor εἰ αὕτη 7° ἠρεμία ἐναντία τῇ ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τοὐναντίον κινήσει, ἅμα ὑπάρξει τἀναντία. ἢ πῇ ἠρεμεῖ, εἰ ἔτι μένει; ὅλως δὲ τοῦ κινουμένου τὸ 2818 μὲν ἐκεῖ, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει: διὸ καὶ μᾶλλον κίνησις κινήσει ἐναντίον ἢ ἠρέμησις.
t pant reads εἰ for ἔτι {τι E), with a comma before it.—C.
2 [H, incorporating here the statement which Aristotle implies and ought to have made explicitly (viz. that ‘ coming to a stand’ should be strictly reserved for natural move- ments), reads: ἔτι δοκεῖ τὸ ἵστασθαι κυρίως λέγεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον τόπον ἰόντος, GAN οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν, ἢ ὅλως, κτλ. This (omitting ἀλλ) was also read by Simplicius (914. 15). Dr. Wicksteed adopted this reading, but regarded it as doubtful, adding a note: ‘ Aristotle may be taken to mean that a lump of earth which “stays up,” however it got there, is not really “ at rest’’ there, because it would go down if not forcibly held up. Therefore the violent movement that brought it there cannot properly be said to have been “bringing it to a state of rest.””’ The meaning of ‘coming to a standstill’ and its relation to motion and rest are discussed in Book VI. chap. viii. The string of ἀπορίαι, of which this is the first, are so carelessly jotted down that it is no good trying to restore a complete and logical sense by emendation.—C. ] 3 [αὕτη ἡ: αὐτὴ ἡ 1: ἡ αὐτὴ FH: ambiguo Εἰ: αὐτὴ cett.
ne 80 PHYSICS, V. νι.
will be in a state of rest without ever having come to be in a state of rest—an absurd conclusion. Besides it is generally recognized that ‘coming to a standstill’ is either identical with a thing’s moving to its proper place or a concomitant of that motion.@ Again it may be questioned whether ‘staying in a place’ is really the contrary of ‘moving out of it’®; for when a thing starts moving out of its place or parting with some condition, it seems still to possess the condition it is losing, so that if the very being in it is the contrary of moving out of it towards the opposite, it combines two contraries. Or can it still ‘be said to be at rest in some sort as long as any of it is left there? At any rate, whenever anything is in process of shifting, some of it is in the state it occupied and is leaving, and some of it in the state it is changing into. So one counter movement is more perfectly contrary to the other than is the ‘staying in place’ which it abolishes.¢ > (This was asserted at 229 Ὁ 29, where the example was * staying in health ’ and ‘ movement from health to sickness.’ In such cases, rather than in locomotion, the change seems gradual and the changing thing ‘ appears still to possess (in some degree) the condition that is being lost.’ Probably Aristotle has such changes chiefly in mind here; the word ‘place ’ does not occur. The whole question is more care- fully considered in Book VI. chap. v.—C.]
¢ (Themistius paraphrases ἠρέμησις by μονή, but ἠρέμησις might mean the process of coming to rest. The sentence may be an afterthought, meaning: A thing in process of change is partly in the state it is leaving, partly in the state it is changing into (and in which it will come to rest); and that is another reason for saying that the contrary of a move- ment is a movement (in the reverse direction) rather than a coming to rest (which coincides with the movement and has the same goal).—C.]
VOL. II G 81 5 10 15 ARISTOTLE Kai περὶ μὲν κινήσεως Kal ἠρεμίας, καὶ πῶς ἑκατέρα μία, καὶ τίνες ἐναντίαι τίσιν, εἰρηται.
᾿Απορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἵστασθαι, / εἰ Kat ὅσαι παρὰ φύσιν κινήσεις, ταύταις ἔστιν Ἁ εν Ἁ ἐφ ἠρεμία ἀντικειμένη. εἶ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔσται, ἄτοπον" μένει γάρ. βίᾳ δέ: ὥστ᾽ ἠρεμοῦν τι ἔσται οὐκ ἀεὶ ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἔσται- ea > “a ὥσπερ yap κινεῖται παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἠρεμοῖ ἄν τι 4 παρὰ φύσιν. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔστιν ἐνίοις κίνησις κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, οἷον πυρὶ ἡ ἄνω κατὰ φύσιν ἡ δὲ κάτω παρὰ φύσιν, πότερον αὕτη ἐναντία ἢ ἡ τῆς γῆς (αὕτη γὰρ φέρεται κατὰ φύσιν κάτω); ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἄμφω, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡσαύτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν' κατὰ φύσιν, ws κατὰ φύσιν οὔσης τῆς αὐτοῦ: ἡ δ᾽ ἄνω τοῦ πυρὸς τῇ κάτω ὡς ἡ κατὰ φύσιν οὖσα τῇ παρὰ rey rey 1 [ἀλλ ἡ wer...ἄνω, Oxford translation: ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὡς κατὰ φύσιν οὔσης τῆσδ᾽ αὐτοῦ: ἡ ἄνω Bekker: ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὡς κατὰ φύσιν κατὰ φύσιν οὖσα τῆσδ᾽ αὐτοῦ. ἡ ἄνω ἘΠ: ἡ (before ἄνω) om. E:: Simplic. (paraphr.) 919, 23 ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν τῆς γῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῇ τοῦ πυρὸς κατὰ φύσιν ws κατὰ φύσιν ἄμφω, ἡ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς παρὰ φύσιν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ ὡς ἡ παρὰ φύσιν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν.
I have adopted the Oxford translator’s reading as the easiest correction of Bekker’s text, but should not construe it: ‘the natural motion of earth is contrary inasmuch as the motion of fire is also natural.’ I should understand ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν (Sc. τῆς γῆς κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις) κατὰ φύσιν (ἐναντία ἐστὶν) ὡς, κτλ. ‘ But the one (last mentioned, viz., the natural downward movement of earth) is a natural contrary, the motion of fire (to which it is opposed) being (also) a natural motion.’ Possibly the original text was something like: ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν (86. τῆς γῆς κάτω) ws κατὰ φύσιν ζοῦσα TH κατὰ φύσιν» οὔσῃ: ἡ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄνω [τοῦ πυρὸς] τῇ κάτω, ὡς κτλ.----Ο,] 82 PHYSICS, V. νι.
Let this suffice for movement and staying still, and in what the unity of each consists, and which are contrary to which.
Yet another question occurs concerning the coming of things to a stand: Is there a state of rest opposed to such movements as are against nature and enforced? It would be absurd that there should not be; for the thing does stay where it is. On the other hand, this is the result of ‘violence’; so we shall have some- thing that zs in a non-permanent state of rest without ever having come to be in that state.® But clearly there must be such a state of rest; for just as things are moved against their nature, so a thing can be at rest against its nature.: ¢ Also since some things move both in accordance with their nature and against it, as fire goes up by nature and down by force, is its own down-going or that of the earth the contrary of its up-going (for it is earth that goes down by nature)? Obviously both its own down-going and that of earth are contrary to it, but not in the same sense. For one is a natural opposition of direction between things whose nature it is to go one this way and the other that. The other is an opposition between the natural up and the unα [The last sentence of the Book. The followmg para- graphs were omitted in some mss. known to Simplicius (918. 11), as in some of ours, and passed over by Porphyry and Themistius. They may be alternative drafts of the corre- sponding paragraphs above.—C.]
> {This conclusion is as obscure as the similar statement in the earlier paragraph (b 21 ff.), of which this seems to be a doublet. The suppressed premiss is: there is no coming- to-a-stand in the case of violent or unnatural motion.—C. | ¢ (This paragraph states again a question answered at 83 ARISTOTLE 2814 φύσιν οὔσῃ. ὁμοίως δὲ Kal ταῖς povats: tows δ᾽ ἠρεμίᾳ κίνησίς πῃ ἀντικεῖται.
α (i.e. the natural abiding of fire aloft is opposed (a) to the natural abiding of earth below and (6) to its own unnatural abiding below. But in another sense (as stated in the previous paragraph) we must recognize as the opposite 84 PHYSICS, V. νι.
natural down of the same body. There is a similar opposition between abidings in position of the two bodies, though it may be said that, in a sense, a state of rest has for its opposite (not an opposite state of rest, but) a motion.@ of an unnatural state of rest the corresponding unnatural motion.—C.]
85 BOOK VI INTRODUCTION Tux aim of this book is (1) to demonstrate the continuity of Magnitude, Time, and Change, involving their illimit- able divisibility by indivisible boundaries; and (2) to expose the fallacies which result from the denial of this.
The first three Chapters deal with the conceptions of ‘a continuum,’ ‘ indivisibles,’ ‘ illimitable divisibility,’ ‘ continuity,’ and the relation between time and movement.
In Chapter i. Aristotle defines and distinguishes the terms ‘ continuous,’ ‘ contiguous,’ and ‘ next-in-succes- sion,’ and shows that indivisibles cannot constitute a continuum.
In Chapter ii. he distinguishes between illimitable exten- sion and unlimited divisibility. This gives the clue to the provisional refutation of Zeno’s First and Second Dilemmas. Then comes a demonstration that a limited time cannot suffice for illimitable movement, nor can a limited move- ment occupy illimitable time. It appears to rest on the false assumption that anything less than an illimitable must be limited. Only uniform movement is considered here.
In Chapter iii. he proves that there can be neither rest nor motion in the indivisible ‘now.’
The next five Chapters deal with Change and Movement and the relations between the ἡ factors ’ of Change.
Chapter iv. treats of the divisibility of ‘ movement ’— embracing change of quality, quantity, and position. It begins with an examination of the condition of a thing which is in the act of changing; and goes on to the 86 PHYSICS, VI. INTRODUCTION analysis of movement into factors, with a demonstration that each factor is divisible, and that its divisibility in- volves a corresponding divisibility of the movement. This is elaborated in Bk. VIII. chaps. vii. and viii., where it is shown that a break in the continuity of any factor breaks that of the movement. So that a movement is continuous only when all its factors are so (see also Bk. V. chap. iii. p. 87 and note ¢ on Ὁ. 36). This demonstration is an essential step in the discussion of the nature of eternal movement.
In Chapter v. he shows that the ‘ end’ or consummation of a process of change is not a (divisible) part, but the final (indivisible) /imiz, of the process, and that the primary time at which the process is finished is an (indivisible) ‘now.’ Whereas the ‘ beginning’ is a (divisible) part of the process: for the process has not yet begun at its initial limit, and is already in progress before any subsequent point on its course; so there is no indivisible instant at which the process is beginning, and no irreducible ‘ be- ginning ’ to the process, and the primary time when the process is beginning is a divisible period; and it is a divisible part of the subject which first accomplishes a change. He points out the distinction between direct and indirect divisibility.