' Matt. xxi. 9.
CHAP. 45 [xXXVin.J — WHY CAIN HAS BEEN BY SOME THOUGHT TO HAVE HAD CHILDREN BY HIS MOTHER EVE. THE SINS OF RIGHTEOUS MEN. WHO CAN BE BOTH RIGHTEOUS, AND YET NOT WITHOUT SIN.
When he says this, he forgets what he had himself said not long before: " After the human race had multiplied, it was possible that in the crowd the Scripture may have neglected to notice the sins of all men." If indeed he had borne this well in mind, he would have seen that even in one man there was such a crowd and so vast a number of slight sins, that it would have been impossible (or, even if possible, not desirable) to describe them. For only such are recorded as the due bounds allowed, and as would, by few examples, serve for instructing the reader in the many cases where he needed warning. Scripture has indeed omitted to mention concerning the few persons who were then in existence, either how many or who they were, — in other words, how many sons and daughters Adam and Eve begat, and what names they gave them; and from this I circumstance some, not considering how many j things are quietly passed over in Scripture, have gone so far as to suppose that Cain cohabited 1 with his mother, and by her had the children which are mentioned, thinking that Adam's sons j had no sisters, because Scripture failed to mention j them in the particular place, although it after- wards, in the way of recapitulation, implied what I it had previously omitted, — that "Adam begat ] sons and daughters," - without, however, drop- ping a syllable to intimate either their number or the time when they were born. In like manner it was unnecessary to state whether Abel, not- withstanding that he is righdy styled " righteous," ever indulged in immoderate laughter, or was ever jocose in moments of relaxation, or ever looked at an object with a covetous eye, or ever plucked fruit to extravagance, or ever suffered indigestion from too much eating, or ever in the midst of his prayers permitted his thoughts to wander and call him away from the purpose of his devotion; as well as how frequently these and many other similar failings stealthily crept over his mind. And are not these failings sins, about which the apostle's precept gives us a general admonition that we should avoid and restrain them, when he says: " Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts there- of? " ^ To escape from such an obedience, we have to struggle in a constant and daily conflict against unlawful and unseemly inclinations. Only let the eye be directed, or rather abandoned, to an object which it ought to avoid, and let the mischief strengthen and get the mastery, and * Gen. V. 4.
3 Rom. vi. 12.
Chap. 48.]
ON NATURE AND GRACE.
^Z7 adultery is consummated in the body, which is committed in the heart only so much more quickly as thought is more rapid than action and there is no impediment to retard and delay it. They who in a great degree have curlied this sin, that is, this appetite of a corrupt affection, so as not to obey its desires, nor to " yield their members to it as instruments of unrighteous- ness," ' have fairly deserved to be called righteous persons, and this by the help of the grace of God. Since, however, sin often stole over them in very small matters, and when they were off their guard, they were both righteous, and at the same time not sinless. To conclude, if there was in right- eous Abel that love of God whereby alone he is truly righteous who is righteous, to enable him, and to lay him under a moral obligation, to ad- vance in holiness, still in whatever degree he fell short therein was of sin. And who indeed can help thus f:illing short, until he come to that mighty power thereof, in which man's entire infirmity shall be swallowed up?
CHAP. 46 [XXXIX.] — SHALL WE FOLLOW SCRIP- TURE, OR ADD TO ITS DECLARATIONS?
It is, to be sure, a grand sentence with which he concluded this passage, when he says: "What we read, therefore, let us believe; and what we do not read, let us deem it wicked to add; and let it suffice to have said this of all cases." On the contrary, I for my part say that we ought not to believe even everything that we read, on the sanction of the apostle's advice: " Read all things; hold fast that which is good." ^ Nor is it wicked to add something which we have not read; for it is in our power to add something which we have dona fide experienced as witnesses, even if it so happens that we have not read about it. Perhaps he will say in reply: " When I said this, I wa-s treating of the Holy Scriptures." Oh how I wish that he were never willing to add, I will not say anything but what he reads in the Scriptures, but in opposition to what he reads in them; that he would only faithfully and obedi- ently hear that which is written there: " By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men; in which all have sinned; " 3 and that he would not weaken the grace of the great Physician, — all by his un- willingness to confess that human nature is corrupted! Oh how I wish that he would, as a Christian, read the sentence, " There is none other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved; " •♦ and that he would not so uphold the possibility of human nature, as to believe that man can be saved by free will without that Name!
' Rom. vi. 13. * Acts iv. 12.
^ I Thess. V. 21.
3 Rom. V. 12.
CHAP. 47 [xL.] — FOR WH.Vr PELAGIUS THOUGHT THAT CHRIST IS NECESSARY TO US.
Perhaps, however, he thinks the name of Christ to be necessary on this account, that by His gos- pel we may learn how we ought to live; but'^not that we may be also assisted by His grace, in order withal to lead good lives. Well, even this consideration should lead him at least to confess that there is a miserable darkness in the human mind, which knows how i,t ought to tame a lion, but knows not how to live. To know this, too, is it enough for us to have free will and natural law? This is that wisdom of word, whereby " the cross of Christ is rendered of none effect." 5 He, however, who said, " I will destroy the wis- dom of the wise," '' since that cross cannot be made of none effect, in very deed overthrows that wisdom by the foolishness of preaching whereby believers are healed. For if natural capacity, by help of free will, is in itself sufficient both for dis- covering how one ought to live, and also for leading a holy life, then " Christ died in vain," 7 and therefore also " the offence of the cross is ceased." ^ Why also may I not myself exclaim? — nay, I will exclaim, and chide them with a Christian's sorrow, — "Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by nature; ye are fallen from grace; " '^ for, "being ignorant of God's righteousness, and wishing to establish your own righteousness, you have not submitted yourselves to the righteous- ness of God." '° For even as "Christ is the end of the law," so likewise is He the Saviour of man's corrupted nature, " for righteousness to every one that believeth." " CHAP. 48 [XLI.] — HOW THE TERM " ALL " IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD.
His opponents adduced the passage, "All have sinned," '^ and he met their statement founded on this with the remark that " the apostle was mani- fesdy speaking of the then existing generation, that is, the Jews and the Gentiles; " but surely the passage which I have quoted, " By one man sin entered the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men; in which all have sinned," ^ embraces in its terms the generations both of old and of modern times, both ourselves and our posterity. He adduces also this pas- sage, whence he would prove that we ought not to understand all without exception, when "all" is used: — " As by the oftence of one," he says, " upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of One, upon all men unto justifi- cation of life." '3 " There can be no doubt," he says, " that not all men are sanctified by the righteousness of Christ, but only those who are 1^.8 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
[Chap. 49.
willing to obey Him, and have been cleansed in the washing of His baptism." Well, but he does not prove what he wants by this quotation. For as the clause, " By the offence of one, upon all men to condemnation," is so wordetl that not one is omitted in its sense, so in the correspond- ing clause, " By the righteousness of One, upon all men unto justification of life," no one is omitted in its sense, — not, indeed, because all men have faith and are washed in His baptism, but because no man is justified unless he believes in Christ and is cleansed by His baptism. The term "<?//" is therefore used in a way which shows that no one whatever can be supposed able to be saved by any other means than through Christ Himself. For if in a city there be ap- pointed but one instructor, we are most correct in saying: That man teaches all in that place; not meaning, indeed, that all who live in the city take lessons of him, but that no one is instructed unless taught by him. In like manner no one is justified unless Christ has justified him.'
CHAP. 49 [XLII.] A MAN CAN BE SINLESS, BUT ONLY BY THE HELP OF GRACE. IN THE SAINTS THIS POSSIBILITY ADVANCES AND KEEPS PACE WITH THE REALIZATION.
"Well, be it so," says he, " I agree; he testifies to the fact that all were sinners. He says, in- deed, what they have been, not that they might not have been something else. Wherefore," he adds, " if all men could be proved to be sinners, it would not by any means prejudice our own definite position, in insisting not so much on what men are, as on what they are able to be." He is right for once to allow that no man living is justified in God's sight. He contends, how- ever, that this is not the question, but that the point hes in the^possibility of a man's not sin- ning,— on which subject it is unnecessary for us to take ground against him; for, in truth, I do not much care about expressing a definite opin- ion on the question, whether in the present life there ever have been, or now are, or ever can be, any persons who have had, or are having, or are to have, the love of God so perfecdy as to admit of no addition to it (for nothing short of this amounts to a most true, full, and perfect right- eousness). For I ought not too sharply to con- tend as to when, or where, or in whom is done that which I confess and maintain can be done by the will of man, aided by the grace of God. Nor do I indeed contend about the actual possibility, forasmuch as the possibility under dispute advances with the realization in the saints, their human will being healed and helped; whilst "the love of God," as fully as our healed and cleansed nature can possibly receive it, " is shed abroad ' Compare De Peccatorum Meritis et Remiisione, i. 55.
in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given to us."^ In a better way, therefore, is God's cause promoted (and it is to its promotion that our author professes to apply his warm defence of nature) when He is acknowledged as our Saviour no less than as our Creator, than when His succour to us as Saviour is impaired and dwarfed to nothing by the defence of the creature, as if it were sound and its resources entire.
CHAP. 50 [XLIII.] — GOD COMMANDS NO IMPOSSI- BILITIES.
What he says, however, is true enough, " that God is as good as just, and made man such that he was quite able to live without the evil of sin, if only he had been wiUing." For who does not know that man was made whole and faultless, and endowed with a free will and a free ability to lead a holy life? Our present inquiry, however, is about the man whom " the thieves " ^ left half dead on the road, and who, being disabled and pierced through with heavy wounds, is not so able to mount up to the heights of righteousness as he was able to descend therefrom; who, more- over, if he is now in " the inn," ■* is in process of cure. God therefore does not command impos- sibilities; but in His command He counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in what you cannot do. Now, we should see whence comes the possibility, and whence the impossibility. This man says: " That pro- ceeds not from a man's will which he can do by nature." I say: A man is not righteous by his will if he can be by nature. He will, however, be able to accomplish by remedial aid what he is rendered incapable of doing by his flaw.
CHAP. 5 1 [XLIV.] STATE OF THE QUESTION BETWEEN THE PELAGIANS AND THE CATHOLICS. HOLY MEN OF OLD SAVED BY THE SELF-SAME FAITH IN CHRIST WHICH WE EXERCISE.
But why need we tarry longer on general statements? Let us go into the core of the question, which we have to discuss with our opponents solely, or almost entirely, on one par- ticular point. For inasmuch as he says that " as far as the present question is concerned, it is not pertinent to inquire whether there have been or now are any men in this life without sin, but whether they had or have the ability to be such persons; " so, were I even to allow that there have been or are any such, I should not by any means therefore affirm that they had or have the ability, unless justified by the grace of God through our Lord " Jesus Christ and Him cruci- fied." 5 For the same faith which healed the saints of old now heals us, — that is to say.
2 Rom. V. 5.
Rather, " robbers; ' Chap. 55.]
ON NATURE AND GRACE.
139 faith " in the one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus," ' — faith in His blood, faith in His cross, faith in His death and resurrection. As we therefore have the same spirit of faith, we also beheve, and on that ac- count also speak.
CHAP. 52. — THE WHOLE DISCUSSION IS ABOUT GRACE.
Let us, however, observe what our author an- swers, after laying before himself the question wherein he seems indeed so intolerable to Chris- tian hearts. He says: " But you will tell me this is what disturbs a great many, — that you do not maintain that it is by the grace of God that a man is able to be without sin." Certainly this is what causes us disturbance; this is what we object to him. He touches the very point of the case. This is what causes us such utter pain to endure it; this is why we cannot bear to have such points debated by Christians, owing to the love which we feel towards others and towards themselves. Well, let us hear how he clears himself from the objectionable character of the question he has raised. " What blind- ness of ignorance," he exclaims, " what sluggish- ness of an uninstructed mind, which supposes that that is maintained and held to be without God's grace which it only hears ought to be attributed to God! " Now, if we knew nothing of what follows this outburst of his, and formed our opinion on simply hearing these words, we might suppose that we had been led to a wrong view of our opponents by the spread of report and by the asseveration of some suitable wit- nesses among the brethren. For how could it have been more pointedly and truly stated that the possibility of not sinning, to whatever ex- tent it exists or shall exist in man, ought only to be attributed to God? This too is our own affirmation. We may shake hands.
CHAP. 53 [XLV.] PELAGIUS DISTINGUISHES BE- TWEEN A POWER AND ITS USE.
Well, are there other things to listen to? Yes, certainly; both to listen to, and correct and guard against. " Now, when it is said," he says, " that the very abihty is not at all of man's will, but of the Author of nature, — that is, God, — how can that possibly be understood to be without the grace of God which is deemed espe- cially to belong to God? " Already we begin to see what he means; but that we may not lie under any mistake, he explains himself with greater breadth and clearness: "That this may become still plainer, we must," says he, " enter on a somewhat fuller discussion of the point. Now we affirm that the possibility of anything ' I Tim. ii. 5.
lies not so much in the ability of a man's will as in the necessity of nature." He then pro- ceeds to illustrate his meaning by examples and similes. " Take," says he, " for instance, my ability to speak. That I am able to speak is not my own; but that I do speak is my own, — that is, of my own will. And because the act of my speaking is my own, I have the power of alternative action, — that is to say, both to speak and to refrain from speaking. But because my ability to speak is not my own, that is, is not of my own determination and will, it is of necessity ^ that I am always able to speak; and though I wished not to be able to speak, I am unable, nevertheless, to be unable to speak, unless per- haps I were to deprive myself of that member whereby the function of speaking is to be per- formed." Many means, indeed, might be mentioned whereby, if he wish it, a man may deprive himself of the possibility of speaking, without removing the organ of speech. If, for instance, anything were to happen to a man to destroy his voice, he would be unable to speak, although the members remained; for a man's voice is of course no member. There may, in short, be an injury done to the member internally, short of the actual loss of it. I am, how- ever, unwilling to press the argument for a word; and it may be replied to me in the contest. Why, even to injure is to lose. But yet we can so contrive matters, by closing and shutting the mouth with bandages, as to be quite incapable of opening it, and to put the opening of it out of our power, although it was quite in our own power to shut it while the strength and healthy exercise of the limbs remained.
CHAP. 54 [xLVl] THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN NECESSITY AND FREE WILL.
Now how does all this apply to our subject? Let us see what he makes out of it. " ^Vhat- ever," says he, " is fettered by natural necessity is deprived of determination of will and delib- eration." Well, now, here lies a question; for it is the height of absurdity for us to say that it does not belong to our will that we wish to be happy, on the ground that it is absolutely impossible for us to be unwilling to be happy, by reason of some indescribable but amiable coercion of our nature; nor dare we maintain that God has not the will but the necessity of righteousness, because He cannot will to sm.
CHAP. 55 [xLVIl] — THE SAME CONTINUED.
Mark also what follows. " We may perceive," says he, " the same thing to be true of hearing, ^ Necesse est me semper loqiii posse. This obscure sentence seems tf) point to Pel.igius' former statement: Cujusqiie rei possibili- tatem non tarn in arbitrii humani potestate quam in naturte necessi- tate consistere.
140 THE WORKS OF ST. AUGUSTIN.
[Chap. 56.
smelling, and seeing, — that to hear, and to smell, and to see is of our own power, while the ability to hear, and to smell, and to see is not of our own power, but lies in a natural neces- sity." Either I do not untlerstand what he means, or he does not himself. For how is the possibility of seeing not in our own power, if the necessity of not seeing is in our own power because blindness is in our own power, by which we can deprive ourselves, if we will, of this very ability to see? How, moreover, is it in our own power to see whenever we will, when, without any loss whatever to our natural struc- ture of body in the organ of sight, we are un- able, even though we wish, to see, — either by the removal of all external lights during the night, or by our being shut up in some dark place? Likewise, if our ability or our inability to hear is not in our own power, but lies in the necessity of nature, whereas our actual hearing or not hearing is of our own will, how comes it that he is inattentive to the fact that there are so many things which we hear against our will, which penetrate our sense even when our ears are stopped, as the creaking of a saw near to us, or the grunt of a pig? Although the said stopping of our ears shows plainly enough that it does not lie within our own power not to hear so long as our ears are open; perhaps, too, such a stopping of our ears as shall deprive us of the entire sense in question proves that even the ability not to hear lies within our own power. As to his remarks, again, concerning our sense of smell, does he not display no little careless- ness when he says " that it is not in our own power to be able or to be unable to smell, but that it is in our own power " — that is to say, in our free will — "to smell or not to smell?" For let us suppose some one to place us, with our hands firmly tied, but yet without any injury to our olfactory members, among some bad and noxious smells; in such a case we altogether lose the power, however strong may be our wish, not to smell, because every time we are obliged to draw breath we also inhale the smell which we do not wish.
CHAP. 56 [XLVIII.] — THE ASSISTANCE OF GRACE IN A PERFECT NATURE.
Not only, then, are these similes employed by our author false, but so is the matter which he wishes them to illustrate. He goes on to say: " In like manner, touching the possibility of our not sinning, we must understand that it is of us not to sin, but yet that the ability to avoid sin is not of us." If he were speaking of man's whole and perfect nature, which we do not now possess ( " for we are saved by hope: but hope that is seen is not hope. But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it" '), his language even in that case would not be correct to the effect that to avoid sin- ning would be of us alone, although to sin would be of us, for even then there must be the help of God, which must shed itself on those who are willing to receive it, just as the light is given to strong and healthy eyes to assist them in their function of sight. Inasmuch, however, as it is about this present life of ours that he raises the question, wherein our corruptible body weighs down the soul, and our earthly tabernacle depresses our sense with all its many thoughts, I am astonished that he can with any heart sup- pose that, even without the help of our Saviour's healing balm, it is in our own power to avoid sin, and the ability not to sin is of nature, which gives only stronger evidence of its own corrup- tion by the very fact of its failing to see its taint.
CHAP. 57 [XLIX.] — IT DOES NOT DETRACT FROM god's almighty power, that HE IS INCAPABLE OF either SINNING, OR DYING, OR DESTROYING HIMSELF.
" Inasmuch," says he, " as not to sin is ours, we are able to sin and to avoid sin." What, then, if another should say: " Inasmuch as not to wish for unhappiness is ours, we are able both to wish for it and not to wish for it? " And yet we are positively unable to wish for it. For who could possibly wish to be unahppy, even though he wishes for something else from which unhap- piness will ensue to him against his will? Then again, inasmuch as, in an infinitely greater degree, it is God's not to sin, shall we therefore venture to say that He is able both to sin and to avoid sin? God forbid that we should ever say that He is able to sin! For He cannot, as foolish persons suppose, therefore fail to be almighty, because He is unable to die, or because He cannot deny Himself. What, therefore, does he mean? by what method of speech does he try to persuade us on a point which he is himself loth to consider? For he advances a step fur- ther, and says: " Inasmuch as, however, it is not of us to be able to avoid sin; even if we were to wish not to be able to avoid sin, it is not in our power to be unable to avoid sin." It is an involved sentence, and therefore a very obscure one. It might, however, be more plainly ex-