C. Schaarschmidt: Benedicti de Spinoza " Korte Verhandeling van God..." (Dutch text and Latin introduction). Amsterdam, 1869.
Spinoza' s Kurzgefasste Abhandung (German translation). Third edition, Leipzig, 1907.
C. Sigwart: Spinoza's Kurzer Tractat (German translation with Introduction and Notes). Freiburg, 1870.
]. Van Vloten: Ad Benedicti de Spinoza Opera...Supple- mentum (Dutch text with Latin translation). Amster Van Vloten and Land's edition of Spinoza's complete works gives the text in vol. ii. of the 1882 edition, and in vol. iii. of the 1895 edition.
B. OTHER WORKS R. Avenarius: Ueber die beiden erst en Phasen des Spinozischen Pantheismus. Leipzig, 1868.
A. Baltzer: Spinoza's Entwickelungsgang. Kiel, 1888. E. Boehmer: Benedicti de Spinoza Tractatus de Deo...Lineamenta. Halle, 1852. L. Busse: Beitriige zur Entwickelungsgeschichte Spinozas.
cxxviii INTRODUCTION J. Freudenthal: Spinoza und die Scholastik (in the " Philosophische Anfsatze" dedicated to Zeller). Leipzig, Spinozastudien ("Zeitschrift fiir Philosophic," vols.
Ueber die Entwicklung der Lehre vom psychophysischen Parallelismus bei Spinoza ("Archiv fiir gesamte Psychologic," ix.). 1907. C. Gebhardt: Spinozas Abhandlung ueber die Verbesserung des Verstandes. Heidelberg, 1905.
M. Joel: Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas. Breslau, 1871. C. Sigwart: Spinozas neuentdeckter Tractat. Gotha, 1866. A. Trendelenburg: Ueber die aufgefundenen Ergdnzungen zu Spinozas Werken (in " Historische Beitrage," vol. iii.).
Berlin, 1867.
Various references to the Short Treatise occur also in the following more general works on the life or the philosophy of Spinoza: R. A. Duff: Spinoza s Political and Ethical Philosophy.
Glasgow, 1903.
K. Fischer: Spinoza. 4th ed. Heidelberg, 1898. J. Freudenthal: Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas. Leipzig, 1899. Das Leben Spinozas. Stuttgart, 1904. H. H. Joachim: A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. Oxford, J. Martineau: A Study of Spinoza. 3rd ed. London, 1895. Sir F. Pollock: Spinoza. 2nd ed. London, 1899. E. E. Powell: Spinoza and Religion. Chicago, 1906. A. Rivaud: Les Notions d'Essence et d'E%istence dans la Philo sophie de Spinoza. Paris, 1906.
EXPLANATIONS OF SIGNS, &c.
A stands for the older manuscript of the Short Treatise.
B stands for the later manuscript of the Short Treatise.
Where nothing is stated to the contrary the Translation follows A.
*...* Words, &c., between asterisks are in B, but not in A.
[ ] Words in square brackets are those of the translator; but ]* When there are asterisks outside the brackets, then B has the words in such brackets.
f is used as a reference-mark to notes which are given in A.
I is used as a reference-mark to notes indicating different readings, &c.
"..." Occasionally words are put in inverted commas to draw attention to the fact that they are used in a peculiar sense.
Explanations of difficult words and passages will be found at the end of the volume (p. 165 ff) arranged according to chapter and page.
Beginners may omit, on a first reading, most ot the foot-notes in the Translation.
SPINOZA'S SHORT TREATISE ON GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING [TITLE-PAGE IN A] SHORT TREATISE ON GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING Previously written in the Latin tongue by B.D.S. for the use of his disciples who wanted to devote themselves to the study of Ethics and true Philosophy. And now translated into the Dutch lan guage for the use of the Lovers of Truth and Virtue: so that they who spout so much about it, and put their dirt and filth into the hands of simpletons as though it were ambergris, may just have their mouths stopped, and cease to pro fane what they do not understand: God, themselves, and how to help people to have regard for each other's well- being^ and how to heal those whose mind is sick, in a spirit of tenderness and tolerance, after the example of the Lord Christ, our best Teacher ^ X [TITLE-PAGE IN B] ETHICA OR MORAL SCIENCE COMPOSED IN TWO PARTS WHICH TREAT I. OF GOD'S EXISTENCE, and Attributes II. OF MAN, with reference to the character and origin of his Passions, the use of his reason in this respect, and the means whereby he is edu cated to his Happiness and supreme freedom ALSO AN APPENDIX, containing a brief account of the nature of Substance — as well as that of the human Soul, and its union with the Body COMPOSED BY BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA -- WULM-JV-tSfa y Z^L- TABLE OF CONTENTS; OF THE FOLLOWING Two BOOKS, NAMELY: THE FIRST BOOK TREATING OF GOD AND WHAT PERTAINS TO HIM, CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS CHAP. PAGE I. THAT GOD EXISTS 15 II. WHAT GOD is 21 [FIRST DIALOGUE] 32 [SECOND DIALOGUE] 36 III. THAT GOD is A CAUSE OF ALL THINGS 41 IV. ON GOD'S NECESSARY ACTIVITY 43 V. ON DIVINE PROVIDENCE 47 VI. ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION 48 VII. ON THE ATTRIBUTES WHICH DO NOT PERTAIN TO GOD 52 VIII. ON " NATURA NATURANS" 56 IX. ON " NATURA NATURATA " 57 X. WHAT GOOD AND EVIL ARE 59 THE SECOND BOOK TREATING OF THE PERFECTION OF MAN SO THAT HE MAY BE IN A POSITION TO BECOME UNITED WITH GOD :HAP. PAGE [PREFACE] 63 I. ON OPINION, BELIEF, AND KNOWLEDGE 67 II. WHAT OPINION, BELIEF, AND CLEAR KNOWLEDGE ARE 69 B has no Table of Contents 9 io TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE III. THE ORIGIN OF PASSION. PASSION ARISING FROM OPINION 70 IV. WHAT COMES FROM BELIEF, AND ON THE GOOD AND EVIL OF MAN 74 V. ON LOVE 78 VI. ON HATRED 82 VII. ON JOY AND SORROW 85 VIII. ESTEEM AND CONTEMPT 87 IX. HOPE AND FEAR go X. ON REMORSE AND REPENTANCE 94 XI. ON DERISION AND JESTING 95 XII. ON GLORY, SHAME, AND SHAMELESSNESS 96 XIII. ON FAVOUR, GRATITUDE, AND INGRATITUDE 93 XIV. ON GRIEF 99 XV. ON THE TRUE AND THE FALSE 102 XVI. ON THE WILL 105 XVII. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WILL AND DESIRE 112 XVIII. ON THE USES OF THE FOREGOING 115 XIX. ON OUR HAPPINESS 118 XX. CONFIRMATION OF THE FOREGOING 126 XXL ON REASON 131 XXII. ON TRUE KNOWLEDGE, REGENERATION, &c. 133 XXIII. ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 136 XXIV. ON GOD'S LOVE OF MAN 138 XXV. ON DEVILS 143 XXVI. ON TRUE FREEDOM 144 [APPENDIX I.] ON GOD 153 [APPENDIX II.] ON THE HUMAN SOUL 157 c*Z/JtjCJZ~ i >stst [MONNIKHOFF'S VERSES FACING SPINOZA'S PORTRAIT IN A] EDICTUS DE Cm natujra,Deus,rerum ciu cog-mtus ordo Hoc Spinola ftalru coiifpicieiidus erat.
Expreflere viri faciein.ietl pm^ere mentetn Zettxidis artifices non valwere itianvis.
Ilia vi^ei Tcnplis: illic luDlimia tractat: Huiicquicun^uecupis nofcere.fci-ipta leg-e.
FIRST PART ON GOD [FIRST PAGE OF A] CHAPTER I i THAT GOD EXISTS As regards the first,! namely, whether there is a God, this, we say, can be proved.
*!.* In the first place, a priori thus: 1. Whatever we clearly and distinctly know to belong to the nature t of a thing, we can also truly affirm of that thing. Now we can know clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the nature of God; 10 Therefore...Otherwise also thus: tt 2. The essence of things are from all eternity, and unto all eternity shall remain im mutable; The existence of God is essence; Therefore...t Understand the definite nature through which a thing is what it is, and which can by no means be removed from it without at the same time destroying that thing: thus, for instance, it 20 belongs to the essence of a mountain that it should have a valley, or the essence of a mountain is that it has a valley; JJ| this is truly eternal and immutable, and must always be included in the concept of a mountain, even if it never existed, or did not exist now.
t B: this.
It B omits these three words.
JJt B simply: to the essence of a mountain belongs a valley.
15 16 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING If man has an idea of God, then God f must exist formaliter; Now, man has an idea of God; Therefore...The first we prove thus: If there is an idea of God, then the cause thereof must exist formaliter, and contain in itself all that the idea has objective; 10 Now there is an idea of God; Therefore...In order to prove the first part of this argument we state the following principles, namely: 1. That the number of knowable things is in finite; 2. That a finite understanding cannot apprehend the infinite; 3. That a finite understanding, unless it is deter mined by something external, cannot through 20 itself know anything; because, just as it has no power to know all things equally, so little f From the definition which follows in chapter 2, namely, that God has infinite attributes, we can prove his existence thus: Whatever we clearly and distinctly see to belong to the nature of a thing, that we can also with truth affirm of that thing; now to the nature of a being that has infinite attributes belongs existence, which is an attribute; therefore...To assert that this may well be affirmed of the idea, but not of the thing itself, is false: for the Idea does not really consist of the attribute which belongs to this 30 being, so that that which is affirmed is [affirmed] neither of the thing, nor of that which is affirmed of the thing; so that there is a great difference between the Idea and the Ideatum: therefore what is affirmed of the thing is not affirmed of the Idea, and vice versa. [Text corrupt. See Commentary.]
THAT GOD EXISTS 17 also has it the power to begin or to commence i to know this, for instance,! sooner than that, or that sooner than this. Since, then, it can do neither the one nor the other it can know nothing. The first (or the major premiss) is proved thus: If the imagination of man were the sole cause of his ideas, then it would be impossible that he should be able to apprehend anything, but he can apprehend something; 10 Therefore...The first Jt is proved by the first principle, namely, that the knowable things are infinitely numerous. Also, following the second principle, man cannot know all, because the human understanding is finite, and if not determined by external things to know this sooner than that, and that sooner than this, then according to the third principle it should be impossible for it to know anything.!
J B omits " for instance."
Jt Instead of this paragraph B has the following: Again, since 20 according to the first principle the knowable things are infinite, and according to the second principle the finite understanding cannot comprehend everything, and according to the third principle it has not the power to know this sooner than that, and that sooner than this, it would be impossible for it to know anything, if it were not determined thereto by external things.
t Further, to say that this idea is a fiction, this also is false: for it is impossible to have this [idea] if it [the ideatum\ does not exist; this is shown on page 16, and we also add the following: It is quite true that when an idea has first come to us from a 30 particular thing, and we have generalised it in abstracto, then our understanding may fancy various things about it, and we can add to it many other attributes abstracted from other things. But it is impossible to do this without a prior knowledge of the things them selves from which these abstractions have been made. Once, how ever, it is assumed that this idea [of God] is a fiction, then all other i8 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i From all this the second point is proved, namely, that the cause of a man's ideas is not his imagination but some external cause, which compels him to apprehend one thing sooner than another, and it is no other than this, that the things whose essentia objectiva is in his understanding exist formaliter, and are nearer to him than other things. If, then, man has the idea of God, it is clear that God must exist formaliter, though not eminenter, as there is ideas that we have must be fictions no less. If this is so, whence 10 comes it that we find such a great difference among them? For as regards some we see that it is impossible they should exist; e.g., all monsters supposed to be composed of two natures, such as an animal that should be both a bird and a horse, and the like, for which it is impossible to have a place in Nature, which we find differently constituted; J other ideas may, but need not, exist; whether, however, they exist or do not exist, their essence is always necessary; such is the idea of a triangle, and that of the love in the soul apart from the body, &c.; so that even if I at first thought that I had imagined these, I am nevertheless compelled afterwards 20 to say that they are, and would be, the same no less even if neither I nor anybody had ever thought about them. They are, conse quently, not merely imagined by me, and must also have outside me a subjectum other than myself, without which subjectum they cannot be. In addition to these there is yet a third idea, and it is an only one; this one carries with it necessary existence, and not, like the foregoing, the mere possibility of existence: for, in the case of those, their essence was indeed necessary, but not their existence, while in its case, both its existence and its essence are necessary, and it is nothing without them. I therefore see now 3° that the truth, essence, or existence of anything never depends on me: for, as was shown with reference to the second kind of ideas, they are what they are independently of me, whether as regards their essence alone, or as regards both essence and existence. I find this to be true also, indeed much more so, of this third unique J In B the whole of this first part of the note is given in the body of the text, while the rest is given as a note on " other ideas," eight lines above.
THAT GOD EXISTS 19 nothing more real or more excellent beside or outside him. r Now, that man has the idea of God, this is clear, because he knows his attributes,! which attributes cannot be derived from [man] himself, because he is imperfect. And that he knows these attributes is evident from this, namely, that he knows that the infinite cannot be obtained by putting together divers finite parts; that there cannot be two t infinites, but idea; not only does it not depend on me, but, on the contrary, he alone tt must be the subjectum of that which I affirm of him. Con sequently, if he did not exist, I should not be able to assert anything 10 at all about him; although this can be done in the case of other things, even when they do not exist. He must also be, indeed, the subjectum of all other things.
From what has been said so far it is clearly manifest that the idea of infinite attributes in the perfect being is no fiction; we shall, however, still add the following: According to the foregoing consideration of Nature, we have so far not been able to discover more than two attributes only which belong to this all-perfect being. And these give us nothing adequate to satisfy us that this is all of which this perfect being consists, 20 quite the contrary, we find in us a something which openly tells us not only of more, but of infinite perfect attributes, which must belong to this perfect being before he can be said to be perfect. And whence comes this idea of perfection? This something cannot be the outcome of these two [attributes]: tor two can only yield two, and not an infinity. Whence then? From myself, never; else I must be able to give what I did not possess. Whence, then, but from the infinite attributes themselves which tell us that they are, without however telling us, at the same time, what they are: for only of two do we know what they are. 30 t His attributes; it is better [to say], because he knows what is proper to God; for these things [infinity, perfection, &c.] are no attributes of God. Without these, indeed, God could not be God, but it is not through them [that he is God], since they show nothing substantial, but are only like adjectives which require substantives or their explanation.
I B omits " two."
tt B omits "alone."
20 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i only one; that it is perfect and immutable, for we know that nothing seeks, of itself, its own annihilation, and also that it cannot change into anything better,t because it is perfect, which it would not be in that case, or also that such a being cannot be subjected to anything outside it, since it is omnipotent, and so forth.
From all this, then, it follows clearly that we can prove both a priori and a posteriori that God exists. Better, in deed, a priori. For things which are proved in the latter 10 way [a posteriori] must be proved through their external causes, which is a manifest imperfection t in them, inas much as they cannot make themselves known H through themselves, but only through external causes. God, how ever, who is the first cause of all things, and also the cause of himself [causa sui~\, makes himself known through him self. Hence one need not attach much importance to the saying of Thomas Aquinas, namely, that God could not be proved a priori because he, forsooth, has no cause.
f The cause of this change would have to be either outside, or 20 in it. It cannot be outside, because no substance which, like this, exists through itself depends on anything outside it; therefore it is not subject to change through it. Nor can it be in it: because no thing, much less this, desires its own undoing • all undoing comes from outside. *Again, that there can be no finite substance is clear from this, because in that case it would necessarily have to have something which it had from nothing: which is impossible; for whence has it that wherein it differs from God? Certainly not from God; for he has nothing imperfect or finite, &c.: whence, therefore, but from nothing? * 30 J B: an extreme imperfection. Jt B omits " known."
CHAPTER II i WHAT GOD IS Now that we have proved above that God is, it is time to show what he is. Namely, we say that he is a being of whom all or infinite attributes are predicated,^ of which attri butes every one is infinitely perfect in its kind. Now, in order to express our views clearly, we shall premise the four following propositions: i. That there is no finite substance, tt but that every substance must be infinitely perfect in its kind, that is to 10 say, that in the infinite understanding of God no substance can be more perfect than that which already exists in Nature.
t The reason is this, since Nothing can have no attributes, the All must have all attributes; and just as Nothing has no attribute because it is Nothing, so that which is Something has attributes because it is Something. Hence, the more it is Something, the more attributes it must have, and consequently God being the most perfect, and all that is Anything, he must also have infinite, perfect, and all attributes. ° ft Once we can prove that there can be no Finite Substance^ then zK substance must without limitation belong to the divine being. We do it thus: i. It must either have limited itself or J some other must have limited it. It could not have done so itself, because having been infinite it would have had to change its whole essence. Nor can it be limited by another: for this again must be either finite or infinite; the former is impossible, therefore the latter; therefore it [i.e., the other thing] is God. He must, then, have made it finite because he lacked either the power or the will [to make it infinite]: but the first [supposition] is contrary to his 30 J B inserts here 2.
21 22 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i 2. That there are not two like substances.
3. That one substance cannot produce another.
4. That in the infinite understanding of God there is no other substance than that which is formaliter in Nature.
As regards the first, namely, that there is no finite sub stance, &c., should any one want to maintain the opposite, we would ask the following question, namely, whether this substance is finite through itself, whether it has made 10 itself thus finite and did not want to make itself less finite; or whether it is thus finite through its cause, which cause omnipotence, the second is contrary to his goodness. J 2. That there can be no finite substance is clear from this, namely, that, if so, it would necessarily have something which it would have from Nothing, which is impossible. For whence can it derive that wherein it differs from God? Certainly not from God, for he has nothing imperfect or finite, £c. So, whence then but from Nothing? Therefore there is no substance other than infinite. Whence it follows, that there cannot be two like infinite sub- 20 stances; for to posit such necessitates limitation. And from this, again, it follows that one substance cannot produce another; thus: The cause that we might suppose to produce this substance must have the same attribute J J as the one produced, and also either just as much perfection JJJ or more or less. The first supposition is not possible, because there would then be two like [substances]. The second also not, because in that case there would be a finite [substance]. Nor the third, because something cannot come from nothing. — Moreover, if the finite Hl~t came from the infinite, then the infinite JJttt would also be finite, &c.
30 Therefore one substance can not produce another. And from this, again, it follows that all substance must exist "formaliter" for if it did not exist, there would be no possibility for it to come into existence.
J B omits here the next five lines, which it has already given at the end of the last note in the first chapter. H B: attributes. Ill B omits the seven words — "and also...perfection."
Hill B: the cause.
WHAT GOD IS 23 either could not or would not give more? The first i [alternative] is not true, because it is impossible that a substance should have wanted to make itself finite, especially a substance which had come into existence through itself. Therefore, I say, it is made finite by its cause, which is necessarily God. Further, if it is finite through its cause, this must be so either because its cause could not give more, or because it would not give more. That he should not have been able to give more would contradict his omnipotence; f that he should not have been willing 10 to give more, when he could well do so, savours of ill- will, which is nowise in God, who is all goodness and perfection.
As regards the second, that there are not two like substances, we prove this on the ground that each substance is perfect in its kind; for if there were two alike they would necesf To say to this that the nature of the thing required such [limitation] and that it could not therefore be otherwise, that is no reply: for the nature of a thing can require nothing while it does not exist. Should you say that one may, nevertheless, see what 20 belongs to the nature of a thing which does not exist: that is true as regards its existence, but by no means as regards its essence. And herein lies the difference between creating and generating. To create is to posit a thing quo ad essentiam et existentiam simul [i.e., to give a thing both essence and existence]; while in the case of generation a thing comes forth quo ad existentiam solam [i.e., it only receives existence]. And therefore there is now in Nature no creation but only generation. So that when God creates he creates at once the nature of the thing with the thing itself. He would therefore show ill-will if (from lack of 30 will, and not of power) he created the thing in such a way that it should not agree with its cause in essence and existence. However, what we here call creation can really not be said ever to have taken place, and it is only mentioned to indicate what we can say about it, if we distinguish between creating and generating.
24 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i sarily limit one another, and would consequently not be infinite, as we t have already shown before.
As to the third, namely, that one substance cannot produce another: should any one again maintain the opposite, we ask whether the cause, which is supposed to produce this substance, has or has not the same attributes as the produced [substance]. The latter is impossible, because something cannot come from nothing; therefore the former. And then we ask whether in the attribute which 10 is presumed to be the cause of this produced [substance], there is just as much perfection as in the produced substance, or less, or more. Less, we say, there cannot be, for the reasons * given* above. More, also not, we say, because in that case this second one would be finite, which is opposed to what has already been proved by us. Just as much, then; they are therefore alike, and It are two like substances, which clearly conflicts with our previous demonstration. Further, that which is created is by no means produced from Nothing, but must necessarily 20 have been produced from something existing. But that something should have come forth from this, and that it should none the less have this something even after it has issued from it, that we cannot grasp with our under standing. Lastly, if we would seek the cause of the substance which is the origin of the things which issue from its attribute, then it behoves us to seek also the cause of that cause, and then again the cause of that cause, et sic in infmitum; so that if we must necessarily stop and halt somewhere, as indeed we must, it is necessary to stop 30 at this only substance.
As regards the fourth, that there is no substance or attribute in the infinite understanding of God other than what exists " formaliter" in Nature, this can be, and is, proved by us: (i) from the infinite power of God, since in him there can I B: I. tJ B has " or," and omits " are."
WHAT GOD IS 25 be no cause by which he might have been induced to i create one sooner or more than another; (2) from the simplicity of his will; (3) because he cannot omit to do what is good, as we shall show afterwards; (4) because it would be impossible for that which does not now exist to come into existence, since one substance cannot produce another. And, what is more, in that case there would be more infinite substances not in existence than there are in existence, which is absurd, t From all this it follows then: that of Nature all in all is predicated, and that consequently 10 Nature consists of infinite attributes, each of which is perfect in its kind. And this is just equivalent to the definition usually given of God.
Against what we have just said, namely, that there is no thing in the infinite understanding of God but what exists formaliter in Nature, some want to argue in this way: If God has created all, then he can create nothing more; but that he should be able to create nothing more conflicts with his omnipotence; therefore...Concerning the first, we admit that God can create 20 nothing more. And with regard to the second, we say that we own, if God were not able to create all that could be created, then it would conflict with his omnipotence; but that is by no means the case if he cannot create what is self-contradictory; as it is, to say that he has created all, and also that he should be able to create still more. Assuredly it is a far greater perfection in God that he has created all that was in his infinite understanding than if he had not created it, or, as they say, if he had never been able to create it. But why say so much about it? Do they not 30 themselves argue thus, t or must they not argue thus t B omits this sentence.
f That is, whenever we make them argue from this admis sion, namely, that God is omniscient, then they cannot but argue thus.
26 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i * from God's omniscience*: If God is omniscient then he can know nothing more; but that God can know nothing more is incompatible with his perfection; therefore...? But if God has all in his understanding, and, owing to his infinite perfection, can know nothing more, well then, why can we not say that he has also created all that he had in his understanding, and has made it so that it exists or should exist formatter in Nature?
Since, then, we know that all alike is in the infinite 10 understanding of God, and that there is no cause why he should have created this sooner and more than that, and that he could have produced all things in a moment, so let us see, for once, whether we cannot use against them the same weapons which they take up against us; namely, thus: If God can never create so much that he cannot create more, then he can never create what he can create; but that he cannot create what he can create is self-contra dictory. Therefore...