10 or Peter, because this alone exists in Nature, and they can not be defined without their essence. Therefore, as above — it follows that good and evil are not things or actions which exist in Nature.
SECOND PART ON MAN AND WHAT PERTAINS TO HIM * PREFACE* HAVING, in the first part, discoursed on God, and on the universal and infinite things, we shall proceed now, in the second part, to the treatment of particular and finite things; though not of all, since they are innumerable, but we shall only treat of those which concern man; and, in the first place, we shall consider here what man is, in so far as he consists of certain modes (contained in the two attributes which we have remarked in God). I say of certain modes, for I by no means think that man, in so far as he consists of Jo spirit, soul,f or body, is a substance. Because, already at the f i. Our soul is either a substance or a mode; it is not a sub stance, because we have already shown that there can be no finite substance; it is therefore a mode.
2. Being a mode, then, it must be such either of "substantial" extension or of " substantial " thought; not of extension, because, &c.; therefore of thought.
3. " Substantial " Thought, since it cannot be finite, is infinitely perfect in its kind, and an attribute of God.
4. Perfect thought must have a Knowledge, Idea, or mode of 20 thought of all and everything that is real, of substances as well as of modes, without exception.
5. We say, that is real, because we are not speaking here of a Knowledge, Idea, &c., which completely knows the nature of all things as involved in their essence, apart from their individual existence, but only of the Knowledge, Idea, &c., of the particular things which are constantly coming into existence.
6. This Knowledge, Idea, &c., of each particular thing which happens to be real is, we say, the soul of this particular thing.
7. All and sundry particular things that are real, have become 3° such through motion and rest, and this is true of all the modes of " substantial " extension which we call bodies.
8. The differences among these result solely from the varying 64 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i beginning of this book, we proved (i) that no substance can have a beginning; (2) that one substance cannot produce another; and lastly (3), that there cannot be two like sub stances.
As man has not been in existence from eternity, is finite, and is like many men, he can be no substance; so that all that he has of thought are only modes of the attribute thought which we have attributed to God. And, again, all that he has of form, motion, and other things, are likewise [modes] of the 10 other attribute which is attributed *by us* to God.
And although from this, [namely,] that the nature of man can neither be, nor be understood without the attributes which we ourselves admit to constitute substance, some try to prove that man is a substance, yet this has no other ground than false suppositions. For, since the nature of proportions of motion and rest, through which this is so, and not so — this is this, and not that.
9. From such proportion of motion and rest comes also the existence of our body; of which, consequently, no less than of all 20 other things, there must be a Knowledge, an Idea, &c., in the thinking thing, and hence at once also our soul.
10. This body of ours, however, had a different proportion of motion and rest when it was an unborn embryo; and in due course, when we are dead, it will have a different proportion again • none the less there was at that time [before our birth], and there will be then [after death] an idea, knowledge, &c., of our body in the thinking thing, just as there is now; but by no means the same [idea, &c.], since it is now differently proportioned as regards motion and rest.
30 ii. To produce, in " substantial " thought, such an idea, know ledge, mode of thought as ours now is, what is required is, not any body you please (then it would have to be known differently from what it is), but just such a body having this proportion of motion and rest, and no other: for as the body is, so is the Soul, Idea, Knowledge, &c.
12. As soon, then, as a body has and retains this proportion [which our body has], say, e.g., of i to 3, then that soul and that PREFACE 65 matter or body existed before the form of this human body i existed, that nature cannot be peculiar to the human body, because it is clear that during the time when man was not, it could never belong to the nature of man.
And what they set up as a fundamental principle, [namely,] that that pertains to the nature of a thing, without which the thing can neither be, nor be understood, we deny. For we have already shown that without God no thing can be or be under stood. That is, God must first be and be understood before these particular things can be and be understood. We have 10 also shown that genera do not belong to the nature of definition, but that only such things as cannot exist without others, can also not be understood without these. This being so, what kind of a rule shall we, then, state, whereby it shall be known what belongs to the nature of a thing?
body will be like ours now are, being indeed constantly subject to change, but to none so great that it will exceed the limits of i to 3; though as much as it changes, so much also does the soul always change. 20 13. And this change in us, resulting from other bodies acting upon us, cannot take place without the soul, which always changes correspondingly, becoming aware of the change. And [the consciousness of] J this change is really what we call feeling.Jt 14. But when other bodies act so violently upon ours that the proportion of motion [to rest] cannot remain i to 3, that means death, and the annihilation of the Soul, since this is only an Idea, Knowledge, &c., of this body having this proportion of motion and rest. 30 15. Still, since it [the soul] is a mode in the thinking substance it could also know, and love this [substance] as well as that of extension, and by uniting with substances (which remain always the same) it could make itself eternal.
I This emendation was suggested by Boehmer. Jl Gevoel [sensibility?].
66 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING Well, the rule is this: That belongs to the nature of a thing, without which the thing can neither be, nor be under stood; not merely so, however, but in such wise that the judgment must be convertible, that is, that the predicate can neither be, nor be understood without the thing. Of these modes, then, of which man consists, we shall begin to treat at the commencement of the following first chapter.
CHAPTER I j ON OPINION, BELIEF, AND KNOWLEDGE To begin our consideration of the modes t of which man consists, we shall state, (i) what they are, (2) their effects, and (3) their cause.
As regards the first, let us begin with those that are first known to us: namely, certain ideas or the consciousness of the knowledge of ourselves, and of the things which are outside us.
Now we get these ideas ft (i) either merely through I0 belief (which belief arises either from experience, or from hearsay), (2) or, in the second place, we acquire them by way of a true belief, (3) or, thirdly, we have them as the result of clear and distinct conception.
The first is commonly subject to error.
The second and third, however, although they differ from one another, cannot err.
To make all this somewhat clearer and more intelligible, we shall give the following illustration taken from the Rule of Three. 20 Some one ttt has just heard it said that if, in the Rule of Three, the second number is multiplied by the third, and then divided by the first, a fourth number will then be obtained which has the same relation to the third as the f The modes of which Man consists are ideas, differentiated as Opinion, true Belief, and clear and distinct Knowledge, produced by objects, each in its own way.
ft These ideas of this Belief are put first on page 69; here and there they are also called opinion, which they really are.
ttt This one merely forms an opinion, or, as is commonly said, 30 believes through hearsay only. [B omits this note.]
67 68 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i second has to the first. And notwithstanding the possi bility that he who put this before him might have been lying, he still made his calculations accordingly, and he did so without having acquired any more knowledge of the Rule of Three than a blind man has of colour, so that whatever he may have said about it, he simply repeated as a parrot repeats what it has been taught.
Another,t having a more active intelligence, is not so easily satisfied with mere hearsay, but tests it by some 10 actual calculations, and when he finds that they agree with it, then he gives credence to it. But we have rightly said that this one also is subject to error; for how can he possibly be sure that his experience of a few particulars can serve him as a rule for all?
A third,ff who is not satisfied with hearsay, because it may deceive, nor with experience of a few particulars, because this cannot possibly serve as a rule, examines it in the light of true Reason, which, when properly applied, has never deceived. This then tells him that on account of 20 the nature of the proportion in these numbers it had to be so, and could not happen otherwise.
A fourth, fit however, having the clearest knowledge of all, has no need of hearsay, or experience, or the art of reason ing, because by his penetration he sees the proportion in t all such calculations immediately.^ f This one thinks or believes not simply through hearsay, but from experience: and these are the two kinds of people who have [mere] opinions. [B omits this note.]
ft This one is certain through true belief, which can never 30 deceive him, and he is properly called a believer.
ttt But this last one is never [merely] of opinion, nor a [mere] believer, but sees the things themselves, not through something else, but through the things themselves.
tt B adds here, in the body of the text, the substance of the above two notes on the third and fourth kinds of knowledge.
CHAPTER II i WHAT OPINION, BELIEF, AND CLEAR KNOWLEDGE ARE WE come now to the consideration of the effects of the different grades of knowledge, of which we spoke in the preceding chapter, and, in passing as it were, we shall explain what(Opinion, Belief, and clear Knowledge are.
The first [kind of knowledge], then, we call Opinion, the second Belief, but the third is what we call clear Knowledge.^ 10 We call it Opinion because it is subject to error, and has no place when we are sure of anything, but only in those cases when we are said to guess and to surmise. The second we call Belief, because the things we apprehend only with our reason are not seen by us, but are only known to us through the conviction of our understanding that it must be so and not otherwise. But we call that clear Knowledge which comes, not from our being convinced by reasons, but from our feeling and enjoying the thing itself, and it surpasses the others by far. 20 After these preliminary remarks let us now turn to their effects. Of these we say this, namely, that from the first proceed all the " passions" which are opposed to good reason; from the second, the good desires; and from the third, true and sincere Love, with all its offshoots.
We thus maintain that Knowledge is the proximate cause of all the " passions " in the soul. For we consider it once for all impossible that any one, who neither thinks nor knows in any of the preceding ways and modes, should be capable of being incited to Love or Desire or any other 30 mode of Will.
t B omits this sentence. 69 i CHAPTER III THE ORIGIN OF PASSION. PASSION DUE TO OPINION HERE, then, let us see how, as we have said, the passions derive their origin from opinion. To do this well and intelligently we shall take some special ones, and prove what we say by using these as illustrations.
Let Surprise, then, be the first. This is found in one who knows a thing after the first manner [of Knowledge]; t for, 10 since from a few particulars he draws a conclusion which is general, he stands surprised whenever he sees anything that goes against his conclusion; t like one who, having never seen any sheep except with short tails, is surprised at the sheep from Morocco which have long ones. So it is J A refers to the following note already here; B, at the next semi-colon.
f This should on no account be taken to mean that a formal inference must always precede astonishment; on the contrary, it exists also without that, namely, when we tacitly believe that a thing 20 is [always] so, and not different from what we are accustomed to see it, hear or think about it, &c. For example, Aristotle says, a dog is a barking animal, therefore he concludes, whatever barks is a dog; but when a peasant says a dog, he means tacitly just the same that Aristotle did with his definition. So that when the peasant hears the barking he says, a dog; and so, if they had heard some other kind of animal bark, the peasant, who had drawn no [explicit] inference, would stand just as astonished as Aristotle, who had drawn an inference. Furthermore, when we become aware of something about which we had never thought before, it is not really such the 30 like of which, whether as a whole or in part, we have not known before, only it is not so constituted in all respects, or we have never been affected by it in the same way, &c.
70 THE ORIGIN OF PASSION 71 related of a peasant that he had persuaded himself that i beyond his fields there were no others, but when he hap pened to miss a cow, and was compelled to go and look for her far away, he was surprised at the great number of fields that there were beyond his few acres. And, to be sure, this must also be the case with many Philosophers who have persuaded themselves that beyond this field or little globe, on which they are, there are no more [worlds] (because they have seen no others). But surprise is never felt by him who draws true inferences. This is the first. 10 The second is Love.l Since this arises either from true ideas, or from opinion, or, lastly, from hearsay only, we shall see first how [it arises] from opinion, then how [it arises] from [true] ideas; for the first tends to our ruin, and the second to our supreme happiness; and then [we shall see how it arises] from the last.
t The substance of the next three paragraphs is given in the following simpler order in B: The second is Love. This arises either, i, from hearsay, or 2, from opinion, or 3, from true ideas. 20 As regards the first, we generally observe it in the attitude of children to their father; because their father tells them this or that is good they incline towards it, without knowing anything more about it. We see it also in those who, from Love, give their lives for the Fatherland, and also in those who from hearsay about something fall in love with it.
As regards the second, it is certain that whenever any one sees, or thinks he sees, something good, he is always inclined to unite himself with it, and, for the sake of the good which he discerns therein, he chooses it as the best, outside which he then knows 30 nothing better or more agreeable. Yet if ever it happens (as it mostly does happen in these things) that he gets to know something better than this good at present known to him, then his love changes immediately from the one (first) to the other (second). All this we shall show more clearly when we treat of the freedom of man.
As to love from true ideas, as this is not the place to speak of it, we shall pass it over for the present. [See note f on page 72.]
72 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i As regards the first, it is certain that whenever any one sees, or thinks he sees, something good, he is always inclined to unite himself with it, and, for the sake of the good which he discerns therein, he chooses it as the best, outside which he then knows nothing better or more agreeable. Yet if ever it happens (as it mostly does happen in these things) that he gets to know something better than this good at present known to him, then his love changes immediately from the one (first) to the other (second). All this we shall 10 show more clearly when we treat of the freedom of man.
As to love from true ideas,t since this is not the the place to speak of it, we shall pass it over now, and speak of the third, and last, namely, the Love that comes from hearsay only. This we generally observe in the attitude of children to their father: because their father tells them that this or that is good they incline towards it, without knowing any thing more about it. We see it also in those who from Love give their lives for the Fatherland, and also in those who from hearsay about some thing fall in love with it.
20 Next, Hatred, the exact opposite of love, arises from error which is the outcome of opinion. For when some one has come to the conclusion that a certain thing is good, and another happens to do something to the detri ment of the same thing, then there arises in him a hatred against the one who did it, and this, as we shall explain afterwards, could never happen if the true good were known. For, in comparison with the true good, all indeed that is, or is conceived, is naught but wretchedness itself; and is not such a lover of what is wretched much more 30 deserving of pity than of hatred?
Hatred, lastly, comes also from mere hearsay, as we see it in the Turks against Jews and Christians, in the Jews f Love that comes from true ideas or clear knowledge is not considered here, as it is not the outcome of opinion; see, however, chapter xxii. about it.
THE ORIGIN OF PASSION 73 against the Turks and Christians, in the Christians against the i Jews and Turks, &c. For, among all these, how ignorant is the one multitude of the religion and morals of the others!
Desire. Whether (as some will have it) it consists only in a longing or inclination to obtain what is wanting, or (as others will have it t) to retain the things which we already enjoy, it is certain that it cannot be found to have come upon any one except for an apparent good [sub speciebom]. It is therefore clear that Desire, as also Love which we have already discussed, is the outcome of the first kind of know- 10 ledge. For if any one has heard that a certain thing is good, he feels a longing and inclination for the same, as may be seen in the case of an invalid who, through hearing the doctor say that such or such a remedy is good for his ailment, at once longs for the same, *and feels a desire for it.* Desire arises also from experience, as may be seen in the practice of doctors, who when they have found a certain remedy good several times are wont to regard it t as some thing unfailing.
All that we have just said of these, the same we can say 20 of all other passions, as is clear to every one. And as, in what follows, we shall begin to inquire which of them are rational, and which of them are irrational, we shall leave the subject now, and say no more about it.
What has now been said of these few though most important [passions] can also be said of all others; Jt and with this we conclude the subject of the Passions which arise from Opinion.
f The first definition is the best, because when the thing is enjoyed the desire ceases; the form [of consciousness] which then 30 prompts us to retain the thing is not desire, but a fear of losing the thing loved.
t B: are wont to resort to it.
t| B omits the first half of the concluding sentence ('« What...others ").
i CHAPTER IV WHAT COMES FROM BELIEF; AND ON THE GOOD AND EVIL OF MAN SINCE we have shown in the preceding chapter how the Passions arise from the error of Opinion, let us now see here the effects of the two other modes of Knowing. And first of all, [the effect] of what we have called True Belief.t This shows us, indeed, what a thing ought to be, but not 10 what it really is. And this is the reason why it can never unite us with the object of our belief. I say, then, that it only teaches us what the thing ought to be, and not what it is; between these two there is a great difference. For, as we remarked a propos of the example taken from the rule of three, when any one can, by the aid of proportion, find a fourth number that shall be related to the third as the second is to the first, then (having used division and multiplication) he can say that the four numbers must be proportional; f Belief is a strong proof based on Reasons, whereby I am con- 20 vinced in my mind that the thing is really, and just such, outside my understanding, as I am convinced in my mind that it is. I say, a strong proof based on Reasons, in order thereby to distinguish it both from Opinion, which is always doubtful and liable to error, and from Knowledge which does not consist in being convinced by Reasons, but in an immediate union with the thing itself. I say, that the thing is really and just such outside my understanding — really, because reasons cannot deceive me in this, for otherwise they would not be different from opinion. Just such, for it can only tell me what the thing ought to be, and not what it really is, otherwise 30 it would not be different from Knowing. Outside, for it makes us enjoy intellectually not what is in us, but what is outside us.
74 ON THE GOOD AND EVIL OF MAN 75 and although that is so, he speaks of it none the less as of a i thing that is beyond him. But when he comes to see the proportion in the way which we have shown in the fourth J example, then he says with truth that the thing is so, because then it is in him and not beyond him. * Let * this * suffice * as regards the first [effect].
The second effect of true belief is that it brings us to a clearer understanding, through which we love God, and thus it makes us intellectually aware of the things which are not in us, but outside us. 10 The third effect is, that it gives us the knowledge of good and evil, and shows us all the passions which should be suppressed. And as we have already said that the passions which come from opinion are liable to great evil, it is worth the pains to see how these also are sifted out by this second kind of knowledge, so that we may see what is good and what is bad in them.
To do so conveniently, let us, using the same method as before, look at them closely, so that we may know through it which of them should be chosen and which rejected, ao But, before proceeding to this, let us first state briefly what is the good and evil of man.
We have already said before that all things are necessarily what they are, and that in Nature there is no good and no evil. So that whatever we want man to be * [in this respect] * must refer to his kind, which is nothing else than a thing of Reason. And when we have conceived in our mind an Idea of a perfect man, it should make us look (when we examine ourselves) to see whether we have any means of attaining to such perfection. 30 Hence, then, whatever advances us towards perfection, we call good, and, on the contrary, what hinders, or also what does not advance us toward it, bad.
I must therefore, I say, conceive a perfect man, if I want I A: third; B: fourth.
76 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i to assert anything concerning the good and evil of man, because if I were to consider the good and evil * of some individual man,* say, e.g., of Adam, I should be confusing a real thing (ens reale) with a thing of Reason (ens Rationis], which must be most scrupulously avoided by an upright Philosopher, for reasons which we shall state in the sequel, or on another occasion. Furthermore, since the destiny of Adam, or of any other individual creature, is not known to us except through the result, so * it follows * that what we 10 can say even of the destiny of man must be based on the idea which our understanding forms of a perfect man,t which destiny, since it is a thing of Reason, we may well know; so also, as already remarked, are good and evil, which are only modes of thinking.
To come gradually to the point: We have already pointed out before how the movement, passions, and activities of the soul arise from ideas, and these ideas we have divided into four kinds, namely, [according as they are based on] mere hearsay, experience, belief, clear knowledge. And from 20 what we have now seen of the effects of all these, it is evident that the fourth, namely, clear knowledge, is the most perfect of all. For opinion often leads us into error. True belief is good only because it is the way to true knowledge, and awakens us to things which are really lovable. So that the final end that we seek, and the highest that we know, is true knowledge. But even this true knowledge varies with the objects that come before it: the better the object is with which it happens to unite itself, so much the better also is this knowledge. And, for this reason, he is the most perfect 30 man who is united with God (who is the most perfect being of all), and so enjoys him.
f For from no individual creature can one derive an Idea that is perfect; for the perfection of this object itself, [that is,] whether it is really perfect or not, cannot be deduced except from a general perfect Idea, or Ens Rationis.
ON THE GOOD AND EVIL OF MAN 77 Now, in order to find out what is good and bad in the affects or passions, let us, as suggested, take them one by one. And first of all, Surprise. This, since it arises either from ignorance or prejudice, is an imperfection in the man who is subject to this perturbance. I say an imper fection, because, through itself, surprise does not lead to any evil.
i CHAPTER V ON LOVE LOVE, which is nothing else than the enjoyment of a thing and union therewith, we shall divide according to the quali ties of its object; the object, that is, which man seeks to enjoy, and to unite himself with.
Now some objects are in themselves transient; others, indeed, are not transient by virtue of their cause. There is yet a third that is eternal and imperishable through its own 10 power and might.
The transient are all the particular things which did not exist from all time, or I have had a beginning.
The others are all those modes:ft which we have stated to be the cause of the particular modes.
But the third is God, or, what we regard as one and the same, Truth.
Love, then, arises from the idea and knowledge that we have of a thing; and according as the thing shows itself greater and more glorious, so also is our love greater. 20 In two ways it is possible to free ourselves from love: either by getting to know something better, or by discovering that the loved object, which is held * by us* to be some thing great and glorious, brings in its train much woe and disaster.
It is also characteristic of love that we never think of emancipating ourselves from it (as from surprise and other passions); and this for the following two reasons: (i) because it is impossible, (2) because it is necessary that we should not be released from the same.
78 ON LOVE 79 It is impossible because it does not depend on us, but i only on the good and useful which we discern in the object; it is necessary that these should never have become known to us, if we would not * or should not * love it; and this is not a matter of our free choice, or dependent on us, for if we knew nothing, it is certain that we should also be nothing.
It is necessary that we should not be released from it, because, owing to the weakness of our nature, we could not exist without enjoying something with which we become 10 united, and from which we draw strength.
Now which of these three kinds of objects are we to choose or to reject?
As regards the transient (since, as remarked, we must, owing to the weakness of our nature, necessarily love something and become united with it in order to exist), it is certain that our nature becomes nowise strengthened through our loving, and becoming united with, these, J for they are weak themselves, and the one cripple cannot carry the other. And not only do they not advance us, but 20 they are even harmful to us. For we have said that love is a union with the object which our understanding judges to be good and glorious; and by this we mean such a union whereby both the lover H and what is loved become one and the same thing, or together constitute one whole. He, therefore, is indeed always wretched who is united to transient things. For, since these are beyond his power, and subject to many accidents, it is impossible that, when they are affected, he should be free from these affects. And, consequently, we conclude: If those who love transient 30 things that have some measure of reality are so wretched, how wretched must they be who love honour, riches, and pleasures, which have no reality whatever!
t B: with things which are transient, tt A and B: love.
8o GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i Let this suffice to show us how Reason teaches us to keep away from things so fleeting. For what we have just said shows us clearly the poison and the evil which lurk con cealed in the love of these things. But we see this yet incomparably clearer when we observe from what glorious and excellent a good we are kept away through the enjoy ment of this.
We said before that the things which are transient are beyond our power. * But * let us be well understood; we 10 do not mean to say that we are a free cause depending upon nothing else; only when we say that some things are in, others beyond our power, we mean by those that are in our power such as we can produce through the order of or together with Nature, of which we are a part; by those which are not in our power, such as, being outside us, are not liable to suffer any change through us, because they are very far removed from our real essence as thus fashioned by Nature.
To proceed, we come now to the second kind of objects, 20 which though eternal and imperishable, are not such through their own power, t However, if we institute a brief inquiry here, we become immediately aware that these are only mere modes which depend immediately on God. And since the nature of these is such, they cannot be conceived by us unless we, at the same time, have a conception of God. In this, since he is perfect, our Love must necessarily rest. And, to express it in a word, if we use our understanding aright it will be impossible for us not to love God.
The Reasons why, are clear. First of all, because we find 30 that God alone has essence only, and all other things are not essences but modes. And since the modes cannot be rightly understood without the entity on which they im mediately depend; and [as] we have already shown before I B continues: "but are modes which depend immediately on God " — and omits the next sentence.
ON LOVE 81 that if, when loving something, we get to know a better i thing than that which we then love, we always prefer it immediately, and forsake the first; it follows, therefore, incontrovertibly that when we get to know God, who has all perfection in himself, we must necessarily love him.