Secondly, if we use our understanding well in acquiring a knowledge of things, then we must know them in [relation to] their causes. Now then, since God is a first cause of all other things, therefore, from the nature of the case (ex rerum natura), the knowledge of God is, and remains, I0 before the knowledge of all other things: because the knowledge of all other things must follow from the know ledge of the first cause. And true love results always from the knowledge that the thing is glorious and good. What else, then, can follow but that it can be lavished upon no one more ardently than upon the Lord our God? For he alone is glorious, and a perfect good.
So we see now, how we can make love strong, and also how it must rest only in God.
What more we had still to say about love, we shall bear 2o in mind to say t it when we consider the last kind of knowledge. In what follows here we shall inquire, as we promised before, as to which of the passions we are to entertain, which we are to reject.
A: do.
i CHAPTER VI ON HATRED HATRED is an inclination to ward off from us that which has caused us some harm.! Now it is to be remarked that we perform our actions in two ways, namely, either with or without passion. With passion, as is commonly seen in the [conduct of] masters towards their servants who have done something amiss. Without passion, as is related of Socrates, who, when he was compelled to chastise his slave for [the 10 latter's own] good, never did so when he felt that he was enraged against his slave.
Now that we see that our actions are performed by us either with, or without passion, we think that it is clear that those things which hinder or have hindered us can be removed, when necessary, without any perturba tion on our part. And so, which is better: that we should flee from the things with aversion and hatred, or that, with the strength of reason, we should (for we think it possible) endure them without loss of temper? First of all, it is 20 certain that when we do what we have to do without passion, then no evil can result therefrom. And, since there is no mean between good and evil, we see that, as it is bad to do anything in a passion, so it must be good to act without it.
But let us examine whether there is any harm in fleeing from things with hatred and aversion.
As regards the hatred which comes from opinion, it is certain that it should have no place in us, because we know that one and the same thing is good for us at one time, bad 30 IB: let or hindrance.
82 ON HATRED 83 for us at another time, as is always the case with medicinal i herbs.
It therefore depends, in the end; on whether the hatred arises in us only through opinion, and not also through true reasoning. But to ascertain this properly we deem it right to explain distinctly what hatred is, and to distinguish it from aversion.
Now I say that Hatred is a perturbation of the soul against some one who has done some ill to us willingly and knowingly. But aversion is the perturbation which arises I0 in us against a thing on account of some infirmity or injury which we either know or think is in it by nature. I say, by nature; for when we do not suppose * or think* that it is so, then, even if we have suffered some hindrance or injury from it, we have no aversion for it, because we may, on the con trary, expect something useful from it. Thus, when some one is hurt by a stone or a knife, he does not on that account feel any aversion for the same.
After these observations let us now briefly consider the consequences of both of them. From hatred there ensues 20 sorrow; and when the hatred is great, it produces anger, which not only, like hatred, seeks to flee from what is hated, but also to annihilate it, when that is practicable: from this great hatred comes also envy. But from aversion there comes a certain sorrow, because we consider ourselves to be deprived of something which, since it is real, must always have its essence and perfection.
From what has just been said it may be easily understood that, if we use our Reason aright, we can feel no hatred or aversion for anything, because, if we do, we deprive our- 30 selves of that perfection which is to be found in everything.!
t B continues: " while, on the contrary, if we want anything we must contrive to improve whatever we want from nature, whether for our own sake, or for the sake of the thing itself " — and omits the next sentence.
84 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i We see likewise with our Reason that we can never [reason- ably] feel any hatred whatever against anybody, because whatsoever exists in Nature, if we entertain any wish about it, then we must always improve it, whether for our sake or for the sake of the thing itself. And since a perfect man is the best thing *for us* that we know of all that we have around us or before our eyes, it is by far the best both for us and for all people individually that we should at all times seek to educate them to this perfect state. For only then can we 10 reap the greatest benefit from them, and they from us. The means thereto is, to give regard to them always in the manner in which we are constantly taught and exhorted to do by our good Conscience; for this never prompts us to our undoing, but always to our happiness *and well- being.* In conclusion, we say that Hatred and Aversion have in them as many imperfections as Love, on the con trary, has perfections. For this always produces improve ment, invigoration, and enlargement, which constitute 20 perfection; while Hatred, on the contrary, always makes for desolation, enervation, and annihilation, which con stitute imperfection itself.
CHAPTER VII i ON JOY AND SORROW!
HAVING seen that Hatred and Surprise II are such that we may freely say, that they can have no place in those who use their understanding as they should, we shall now proceed in the same manner to speak of the other passions. To begin with, Desire and Joy shall come first. Since these arise from the same causes from which love ensues, we shall only say concerning them that we must remember and call to mind what we then said; and with 10 this we leave the subject.
We turn next to Sorrow, of which we may say that it arises only from opinion and imagination *which follows* therefrom: for it comes from the loss of some good.
Now we have already remarked above, that whatso ever we do should tend towards progress and amelioration. But it is certain that so long as we are sorrowing we render ourselves unfit to act thus; on this account it is necessary that we should free ourselves from it. This we can do by thinking of the means whereby we may recover what we 20 have lost, if it is in our power to do so. If not, [we must reflect] that it is just as necessary to make an end of it,ttt lest we fall a prey to all the miseries *and disasters* which sorrow necessarily brings in its train. And either course * must be adopted* with joy; for it is foolish to try to restore and make good a lost good by means of a self-sought and provoked evil.
I B: On Desire and Joy. JJ B: Hatred and Aversion.
ItJ B: Sorrow.
85 86 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i Lastly, he who uses his understanding aright must neces sarily know God first. Now God, as we have shown, is the highest good and all that is good. Hence it follows incontrovertibly, that one who uses his understanding aright can fall a prey to no sorrow. How should he? since he finds repose in that good which is all that is good, and in which there is the fulness of all joy and contentment.!
Sorrow, then, comes from opinion or want of understand ing, as explained.!!
10 J B abridges the paragraph as follows: Lastly, he who uses his understanding aright must necessarily know that God is the first and the highest; and rest in him as this supreme good: whence it follows that, since he finds therein all joy and full contentment, no sorrow can befall him.
It B omits the last sentence.
CHAPTER VIII T ON ESTEEM AND CONTEMPT, &c. I WE shall now proceed to speak of Esteem and Contempt, of Self-respect and Humility, of Conceit and Culpable Humility. We shall take them in the above order, and try to distinguish accurately what is good and what is bad in them.
Esteem and Contempt are felt in so far as we know a thing to be something great or small, be this great or little thing in us or outside us.tt Self-respect does not extend [to anything] outside us, I0 and is only attributed to one who knows the real worth of his perfection, dispassionately and without seeking esteem for himself.
Humility is felt when any one knows his own imperfec tion, without regard to the contempt [of others] for him self;JJt so that Humility does not refer to anything outside the humble man.
Conceit is this, when some one attributes to himself a perfection which is not to be found in him.
Culpable humility is this, when some one attributes to 20 himself an imperfection which he has not. I am not speaking of those hypocrites who, without meaning it, J B enumerates all the topics in the heading of this and the following chapters.
J B begins this chapter as follows: In order to distinguish thoroughly the good and evil in these Passions we shall take them up in turn, beginning with Esteem and Contempt, which refer to something known that is in or outside us, the first relating to some thing great, the last, to something small.
JtJ B: without any self-contempt. 3o 88 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i humble themselves in order to deceive others; I but only of those who really think they have the imperfections which they attribute to themselves.
From these observations it is sufficiently evident what good and evil there is in each of these passions. For, as regards Self-respect and Humility, these showtheir excellence through themselves. For we say that the possessor there of knows his perfection and imperfection for what it is.tt And this, according to what Reason teaches us, is the 10 most important thing for the attainment of our perfection. Because if we know exactly our powers and perfection, we see thereby clearly what it is we have to do in order to attain our good end. And, on the other hand, if we know our fault and frailty, then we know what we have to avoid.
As regards Conceit and Culpable Humility, the definition of them already shows * sufficiently* that they arise from a certain opinion; for we said that it [conceit] is attributed to one who ascribes to himself a certain perfection, although he does not possess it, and culpable humility is the precise 20 opposite.
From what has just been said it is evident, then, that just as Self-respect and True Humility are good and salutary, so, on the contrary, Conceit and Culpable Humility are bad and pernicious. For those [Self-respect and True Humility] not only put their possessor into a very good attitude, but are also, besides, the right ladder by which we may rise to supreme bliss. But these [Conceit and Culpable Humility] not only prevent us from attaining to our perfection, but also lead us to utter ruin. Culpable Humility is what pre- 30 vents us from doing that which we should otherwise have to do in order to become perfect; we see this, for instance, in the case of the Sceptics, who, just because they deny that t B: who without really meaning it make a show of humbling themselves simply in order to deceive others. B: for their true worth.
ON ESTEEM AND CONTEMPT, &c. 89 man can attain to any truth, deprive themselves thereof i through this very denial. Conceit *on the other hand* is what makes us undertake things which tend straight to our ruin; as is seen in the case of all those who had the conceit, and have the conceit, that they stood, and stand, wondrously well in the opinion of God, and consequently brave fire and water, and thus, avoiding no danger, and facing every risk, they die most miserably.
As regards Esteem and Contempt, there is no more to be said about them, we have only to recall to memory what 10 we said before about Love.
i CHAPTER IX ON HOPE AND FEAR, &c.
WE shall now begin to speak of Hope and Fear, of Confi dence, Despair, and Vacillation, of Courage, Boldness and Emulation, of Pusillanimity and Timidity, *and lastly of Jealousy,* and, as is our wont, we shall take them one by one, and then indicate which of these can hinder us, and which can profit us. We shall be able to do all this very easily, if only we attend closely to the thoughts that we can 10 have about a thing that is yet to come, be it good, be it bad.
*The ideas which we have about things have reference either 1. To the things themselves; or, 2. To the person who has the ideas.* The ideas that we have as regards the thing itself are these, either the thing is regarded by us as accidental, that is as something which may come or may not come, or [we think] that it necessarily must come. So much as regards 20 the thing itself.
Next, as regards him who thinks about the thing, the case is this: he must do something either in order to advance the thing, or in order to prevent it. Now from these thoughts all these passions result as follows: when we think that a certain thing which is yet to come is good and that it can happen, the soul assumes, in consequence of this, that form which we call hope, which is nothing else than a certain kind of joy, though mingled with some sorrow.
30 And, on the other hand, if we judge that that which may 90 ON HOPE AND FEAR, &c. 91 be coming is bad, then that form enters into our soul which i we call fear.
If, however, the thing is regarded by us as good, and, at the same time, as something that necessarily must come, then there comes into the soul that repose which we call confidence; which is a certain joy not mingled with sorrow, as hope is.
But when we think that the thing is bad, and that it necessarily must come, then despair enters into the soul; which is nothing else than a certain kind of sorrow. 10 So far we have spoken of the passions considered in this chapter, and given positive definitions of the same, and have thus stated what each of them is; we may now proceed in a converse manner, and define them negatively. We hope that the evil may not come, we fear lest the good should not come, we are confident that the evil will not come, we despair because the good will not come.
Having said this much about the passions in so far as they arise from our thoughts concerning the thing itself, we have now to speak of those which arise from the 20 thoughts relating to him who thinks about the thing; namely: If something must be done in order to bring the thing about, and we come to no decision concerning it, then the soul receives that form which we call vacillation. But when it makes a manly resolve to produce the thing, and this can be brought about, then that is called courage; and if the thing is difficult to effect, then that is called intrepidity or bravery.
When, however, some one decides to do a thing because 30 another (who had done it first) has met with success, then we call it emulation. * Lastly,* If any one knows what he must decide to do in order to advance a good thing, and to hinder a bad one, and yet does not do so, then we call it pusillanimity; and when the 92 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i same is very great, we call it timidity. Lastly, jealousness or jalousie is the anxiety which we feel that we may have the sole enjoyment and possession of something already acquired.
Since we know now whence these passions originate, it will be very easy for us to show which of them are good, and which are bad.
As regards Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, and Jealousy, it is certain that they arise from a wrong opinion. For, as 10 we have already shown above, all things have their neces sary causes, and must necessarily happen just as they do happen. And although Confidence and Despair seem to have a place in the inviolable order and sequence of causes t *or to confirm the same,* yet (when the truth of the matter is rightly looked into) that is far from being the case. For Confidence and Despair never arise, unless Hope and Fear (from which they derive their being) have preceded them. For example, if any one thinks that something, for which he still has to wait, is good, then he receives that form in 20 his soul which we call Hope; and when he is confident about *the aquisition of* the supposed good, his soul gains that repose which we call Confidence. What we are now saying about confidence, the same must also be said about Despair. But, according to that which we have said about Love, this also can have no place in a perfect man: be cause they presuppose things which, owing to the mutability to which they are subject (as remarked in our account of Love), we must not become attached to; nor (as shown in our account of Hatred) may we even have an aversion to 30 them. The man, however, who persists in these passions is at all times subject to such attachment and aversion.
As regards Vacillation, Pusillanimity, and Timidity, these betray their imperfection through their very character and nature: for whatsoever they do to our advantage comes I A adds here: (because there all is inviolable and unalterable.)
ON HOPE AND FEAR, &c. 93 only negatively from the effects of their nature. For i example, some one hopes for something which he thinks is good, although it is not good, yet, owing to his vacilla tion or pusillanimity, he happens to lack the courage neces sary for its realisation, and so it comes about that he is negatively or by accident saved from the evil which he thought was good. These *Passions,* therefore, can also have no place whatever in the man who is guided by true Reason.
Lastly, as regards Courage, Boldness, and Emulation, 10 about these there is nothing else to be said than that which we have already said about Love and Hatred.
i CHAPTER X ON REMORSE AND REPENTANCE ON the present occasion we shall speak, though briefly, about remorse and repentance. These never arise except as the result of rashness; because remorse comes only from this, that we do something about which we are then in doubt whether it is good, or whether it is bad; and repent ance, from this, that we have done something which is bad.
10 And since many people (who use their understanding aright) sometimes (because they lack that habitual readiness which is required in order that the understanding may at all times be used aright) go astray, it might perchance be thought that such Remorse and Repentance might soon set them right again, and thence it might be inferred, as the whole world does infer, that they are good.! If, however, we will get a proper insight into them, we shall find that they are not only not good, but that they are, on the con trary, pernicious, and that they are consequently bad. For 20 it is obvious that we always succeed better through Reason and the love of truth than through remorse and sorrow. They are, therefore, pernicious and bad, because they are a certain kind of sorrow, which [sorrow] we have already shown above to be injurious, and which, for that reason, we must try to avert as an evil, and consequently we must likewise shun and flee from these also, which are like it.
J B continues: but, on the other hand, when we look into the matter thoroughly the case is quite otherwise, for we shall find that 30 they are not only not good...94 CHAPTER XI i ON DERISION AND JESTING DERISION and jesting rest on a false opinion, and betray an imperfection in him who derides and jests.
The opinion on which they rest is false, because it is supposed that he who is derided is the first cause of the effects which he produces, and that they do not necessarily (like the other things in Nature) depend on God. They betray an imperfection in the Derider; because either that which is derided is such that it is derisible, or it is not 10 such. If it is not such, then it shows bad manners, to deride that which is not to be derided; if it is such, then they [who deride it] show thereby that they recognise some imperfection in that which they deride, which they ought to remedy, not by derision, but much rather by good reasoning.
Laughter does not refer to another, but only to the man who observes some good in himself; and since it is a certain kind of Joy, there is nothing else to be said about it than what has already been said about Joy. 1 speak of such laughter as is caused by a certain Idea which provokes t 20 one to it, and not at all of such laughter as is caused by the movement of the [vital] spirits; as to this (since it has no reference to good or to evil) we had no intention to speak of it here.
As to Envy, Anger, Indignation, we shall say nothing about them here, but only just refer back to what we have already said above concerning hatred.
t B continues thus: the laugher thereto without any reference to good or evil, and not at all of such laughter as is caused in him by the movement of the [vital] spirits; it was not our intention to 30 speak of this. Again,...95 i CHAPTER XII ON GLORY, SHAME, AND SHAMELESSNESS WE shall now also briefly consider glory, shame, and shame- lessness.l The first tt is a certain kind of Joy which every one feels in himself whenever he becomes aware that his conduct is esteemed and praised by others, without regard to any other advantage or profit which they may have in view.
Shame is a certain * kind of * sorrow which arises in one 10 when he happens to see that his conduct is despised by others, without regard to any other disadvantage or injury that they may have in view.
Shamelessness is nothing else than a want, or shaking off, of shame, not through Reason, but either from innocence of shame, as is the case with children, savage people, &c., or because, having been held in great contempt, one goes now to any length without regard for anything.
Now that we know these passions, we also know, at the same time, the vanity and imperfection which they have in 20 them. For Glory and Shame are not only of no advantage, because of what we have observed in their definitions, but also (inasmuch as they are based on self-love, and on the opinion that man is the first cause of his action, and there fore deserving of praise and blame) they are pernicious and must be rejected.
I will not, however, say that one ought to live among men in the same way that one would live away from them, where Glory and Shame have no place; quite the contrary, t B omits this sentence.
So tt A: De eerste [The first]; B: De eere [Glory].
96 ON GLORY, SHAME, AND SHAMELESSNESS 97 I admit that we are not only free to utilise them, when we i apply them in the service of mankind and for their amelioration, but that we may even do so at the price of curtailing our o\vn (otherwise perfect and legitimate) freedom. For example: if any one wears costly clothes in order to be respected, he seeks a Glory which results from his self-love without any consideration for his fellow-men; but when some one observes that his wisdom (wherewith he can be of service to his neighbours) is despised and trampled under foot * simply * because he is dressed in I( shabby clothes, then he will do well if (from the motive to help them) he provides himself with clothes to which they cannot take exception, thereby becoming like his fellow- man in order that he may win over his fellow-man.
Further, as regards Shamelessness, this shows itself to be such that in order to see its deformity all that we need is merely its definition, and that will be enough for us.
i CHAPTER XIII ON FAVOUR, GRATITUDE, AND INGRATITUDE Now follows [the consideration] of favour, gratitude, and ingratitude. As regards the first two, they are the inclina tions which the soul has to wish and to do some good to one's neighbour. I say, to wish, [this happens] when good is returned to one who has done some good; I say, to do, [this is the case] when we ourselves have obtained or received some good.
I0 I am well aware that almost all people consider these affects to be good; but, notwithstanding this, I venture to say that they can have no place in a perfect man. For a perfect man is moved to help his fellow-man by sheer necessity only, and by no other cause, and therefore he feels it all the more to be his duty to help the most godless, seeing that his misery and need are so much greater.
Ingratitude is a disregard * or shaking off * of Gratitude, as Shamelessness is of Shame, and that without any rational ground, but solely as the result either of greed or of 20 immoderate self-love; and that is why it can have no place in a perfect man.
98 CHAPTER XIV i ON GRIEF GRIEF shall be the last of which we shall speak in our treat ment of the passions, and with it we will conclude. Now grief is a certain kind of sorrow arising from the contem plation of some good which we have lost, and [lost] in such a way that there is no hope of recovering the same. It makes its imperfection so manifest that as soon as we only examine it we think it bad. For we have already shown above that it is bad to bind and link ourselves to things which 10 may easily, or at some time, fail us, and which we cannot have when we want them. And since it is a certain kind of sorrow, we have to shun it, as we have already remarked above, when we were treating of sorrow.
I think, now, that I have already shown and proved sufficiently that it is only True Belief or Reason that leads us to the knowledge of good and evil. And so when we come to prove that Knowledge is the first and principal cause t of all these passions, it will be clearly manifest that if we use our understanding and Reason aright, it should 20 be impossible for us ever to fall a prey to one of these * passions* which we ought to reject. I say our Under standing, because I do not think that Reason alone is com petent to free us from all these: as we shall afterwards show in its proper place.
We must, however, note here as an excellent thing about the passions, that we see and find that all the passions which I B omitted " cause," but the word seems to have been inserted recently — perhaps by Van Vloten, as a marginal pencil note suggests. 30 99 TOO GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i are good are of such kind and nature that we cannot be or exist without them, and that they belong, as it were, to our essence; such is the case with Love, Desire, and all that pertains to love.
But the case is altogether different with those which are bad and must be rejected by us; seeing that we cannot only exist very well without these, but even that only then, when we have freed ourselves from them, are we really what we ought to be.
10 To give still greater clearness to all this, it is useful to note that the foundation of all good and evil is Love bestowed on a certain object: for if we do not love that object which (nota bene) alone is worthy of being loved, namely, God, as we have said before, but things which through their very character and nature are transient, then (since the object is liable to so many accidents, ay, even to annihilation) there necessarily results hatred, sorrow, &c., according to the changes in the object loved. Hatred, when any one deprives him of what he loves. Sorrow, 20 when he happens to lose it. Glory, when he leans on self- love. Favour and Gratitude, when he does not love his fellow-man for the sake of God.
But, in contrast with all these, when man comes to love God who always is and remains immutable, then it is impossible for him to fall into this welter of passions. And for this reason we state it as a fixed and immovable principle that God is the first and only cause of all our good and delivers us from all our evil.
Hence it is also to be noted * lastly,* that only Love, &c., 30 are limitless: namely, that as it increases more and more, so also it grows more excellent, because it is bestowed on an object which is infinite, and can therefore always go on increasing, which can happen in the case of no other thing except this alone. And, maybe, this will after- ON GRIEF 101 wards give us the material from which we shall prove i the immortality of the soul, and how or in what way this is possible.!
Having so far considered all that the third kind of It effect of true belief makes known we shall now proceed to speak, * in what follows,* of the fourth, and last, effect which was not stated by us on page 75-111 £ B: And this will give us the material from which we shall, in the 23rd chapter, make out a case for, and prove, the immortality of the Soul. [A marginal note in A also refers to chapter xxiii.] 10 It A and B: or.
~t~tt A gives this sentence in a foot-note • B in the body of the text, as above.
CHAPTER XV i ON THE TRUE AND THE FALSE LET us now examine the true and the false, which indicate to us the fourth, and last, consequence of true belief. Now, in order to do this, we shall first state the definitions of Truth and Falsity. Truth is an affirmation (or a denial) made about a certain thing, which agrees with that same thing; and Falsity is an affirmation (or a denial) about a thing, which does not agree with the thing itself. But this 10 being so, it may appear that there is no difference between the false and the true Idea, or, since the [affirmation or] denial of this or that are mere J modes of thought, and [the true and the false Idea] differ in no other way II except that the one agrees with the thing, and the other does not, that they are therefore, not really, but only logically Jtt different; and if this should be so, one may justly ask, what advantage has the one from his Truth, and what harm does the other incur through his falsity? and how shall the one know that his conception or Idea agrees 20 with the thing more than the other does? lastly, whence does it come that the one errs, and the other does not?
To this it may, in the first place, serve as an answer that the clearest things of all make known both themselves and Literally " true," but the translator probably mistook merus for verus.
It In B this sentence begins as follows: " But since the affirma tion or denial of this or that are mere J modes of thought, there seems to be no difference between the true and the false idea except that," &c.
30 Itt door reeden [through reason.]
ON THE TRUE AND THE FALSE 103