also what is false, in such a manner that it would be a great i folly to ask how we are to become aware of them: for, since they are said to be the clearest of all, there can never be any other clearness through which they might be made clear; it follows, therefore, that truth at once reveals itself and also what is false, because truth is made clear through truth, that is through itself, and through it also is falsity made clear; but falsity is never revealed and made mani fest through itself. So that any one who is in possession of the truth cannot doubt that he possesses it, while one »o who is sunk in falsity or in error can well suppose that he has got at the truth; just as some one who is dreaming can well think that he is awake, but one who is actually awake can never think that he is dreaming.
These remarks also explain to some extent what we said about God being the Truth, or that the Truth is God himself.
Now the reason why the one is more conscious of his truth than the other is, is because the Idea of [his] affirma tion (or denial) entirely agrees with the nature of the thing, 20 and consequently has more essence.! It may help some to grasp this better if it be observed that Understanding (although the word does not sound like it) is a mere or pure passivity; that is, that our soul is changed in such a way that it receives other modes of thought, which it did not have before. Now when some one, in consequence of the whole object having acted upon him, receives corre sponding forms or modes of thought, then it is clear that he receives a totally different feeling of the form or character of the object than does another who has not 3° had so many causes [acting upon him], and is therefore moved to make an affirmation or denial about that thing by J B:...because in the former case the Idea of the affirmation (or denial) which entirely agrees with the nature of the thing has so much more essence.
io4 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING 1 a different and slighter action (because he becomes aware of it only through a few, or the less important, of its attri butes). t From this, then, we see the perfection of one who takes his stand upon Truth, as contrasted with one who does not take his stand upon it. Since the one changes easily, while the other does not change easily, it follows therefrom that the one has more stability and essence than the other has: likewise, since the modes of thought which agree with the thing have had more causes [to produce .o them] they have also more stability and essence in them: and, since they entirely agree with the thing, it is impos sible that they should after a time be made different or undergo some change, * all the less so * because we have already seen before that the essence of a thing is unchange able. Such is not the case with falsity. And with these remarks all the above questions will be sufficiently answered.
I Text imperfect. See Commentary.
CHAPTER XVI i ON THE WILL Now that we know the nature of Good and Evil, Truth and Falsity, and also wherein the well-being of a perfect man consists, it is time to begin to examine ourselves, and to see whether we attain to such well-being voluntarily or of necessity.
To this end it is necessary to inquire what the Will is, according to those who posit a Will,t and wherein it is different from Desire. Desire, we have said, is the inclina- I0 tion which the soul has towards something which it chooses as a good; whence it follows that before our desire inclines towards something outside, we have already inwardly decided that such a thing is good, and this affirmation, or, stated more generally, the power to affirm and to deny, is called the Will.t It thus turns on the question whether our Affirmations are made voluntarily or necessarily, that is, whether we can t Now the Will, regarded as Affirmation or Decision * is different 20 from true Belief and from Opinion. It * differs from True Belief in this, that it extends also to that which is not truly good; and this is so because it lacks that conviction whereby it is clearly seen that it cannot be otherwise; in the case of true belief there is, and must be, this conviction, because from it none but good desires emanate.
But it also differs from Opinion in this, that it can sometimes be quite infallible and certain; this is not the case with Opinion, which consists in guessing and supposing.
So that we can call it Belief in so far as it can proceed with 30 certainty, and Opinion in so far as it is subject to error.
io6 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i make any affirmation or denial about a thing without some external cause compelling us to do so. Now we have already shown that a thing which is not explained t through itself, or whose existence does not pertain to its essence, must necessarily have an external cause; and that a cause which is to produce something must produce it necessarily; it must therefore also follow that each separate act of willing t this or that, each separate act of affirming or denying this or that of a thing, these, I say, must also 10 result from some external cause: so also the definition which we have given of a cause is, that it cannot be free.
Possibly this will not satisfy some who are accustomed to keep their understanding busy with things of Reason more t B: which does not exist.
t It is certain that each separate volition must have an external cause through which it comes into being; for, seeing that existence does not pertain to its essence, its existence must necessarily be due to the existence of something else.
20 As to the view that the efficient cause JJ thereof is not an Idea but the human Will itself, and that the Understanding is a cause without which the will can do nothing, so that the Will in its un determined form, and also the Understanding, are not things of Reason, but real entities — so far as I am concerned, whenever I consider them attentively they appear to be universals, and I can attribute no reality to them. Even if it be so, however, still it must be admitted that Willing is a modification of the Will, and that the Ideas are a mode of the Understanding; the Understanding and the Will are therefore necessarily distinct, and really distinct sub- 30 stances, because [only] substance is modified, and not the mode itself. As the soul is said to direct these two substances, it must be a third substance. All these things are so confused that it is impossible to have a clear and distinct conception about them. For, since the Idea is not in the Will, but in the Understanding, and in consequence of the rule that the mode of one substance cannot pass over into the other substance, love cannot arise in the Jt A: the idea of the efficient cause.
ON THE WILL 107 than with Particular things which really exist in Nature; i and, through doing so, they come to regard a thing of Reason not t as such, but as a real thing, tt. For, because man has now this, now that volition, he forms in his soul a general mode which he calls Will, just as from this man and that man he also forms the Idea of man; ttt and because he does not adequately distinguish the real things from the things of Reason, he comes to regard the things of Reason as things which really exist in Nature, and so he regards himself as a cause of some things. This happens 10 not infrequently in the treatment of the subject about which we are speaking. For if any one is asked why people want this or that, the answer usually given is, because they have a will. But, since the Will, as we have said, is only will: because to will something when there is no idea of that thing in the willing power involves self-contradiction. If you say that the Will, owing to its union with the Understanding, also becomes aware of that which the Understanding understands, and thus also loves it, * one may retort to this: * but since awareness is also an apprehension, mi it is therefore also a mode of understand- 20 ing; following the above, however, this cannot be in the Will, even if its union [with the Will] were like that of the soul and body. For suppose that the body is united with the soul, as the philosophers generally maintain, even so the body never feels, nor does the soul become extended. IltiJ. When they say that the Soul directs both the Understanding and the Will, this is * not only * inconceivable, * but even self-contradictory,* because by saying so they seem to deny that the will is free, which is opposed to their J B: no more.
tt: B continues: and thus regard themselves as the cause of 30 some things; as happens not infrequently in the matter about which we are at present speaking.
Jit B continues: if then the question is asked, why people want this or that, they answer...
I A: an apprehension [or "conception"] and a confused idea. HI 1 1 A continues: For then a Chimera, in which we conceive two sub stances, might become one; this is false.
io8 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING * an Idea of our willing this or that, and therefore only a mode of thought, a thing of Reason, and not a real thing, nothing can be caused by it; for out of nothing, nothing comes. And so, as we have shown that the will is not a thing in Nature, but only in fancy, I also think it unneces sary to ask whether the will is free or not free.
I say this not [only] of will in general, which we have shown to be a mode of thought, but also of the particular act of willing this or that, which act of willing some have 10 identified with affirmation and denial. Now this should be clearly evident to every one who only attends to what we have already said. For we have said £ that the underview. But, to conclude, I have no inclination to adduce all my objections against positing a created finite substance. I shall only show briefly that the Freedom of the Will does not in any way accord with such an enduring creation; namely, that the same activity J J is required of God in order to maintain * a thing * in existence as to create it, and that otherwise the thing could not last for a moment; as this is so, nothing can be attributed to it.Jtt 20 But we must say that God has created it just as it is; for as it has no power to maintain itself in existence while it exists, much less, then, can it produce something by itself. If, therefore, any one should say that the soul produces the volition from itself, then I ask, by what power? Not by that which has been, for it is no more; also not by that which it has now, for it has none at all whereby it might exist or last for a single moment, because it is continuously created anew. Thus, then, as there is no thing that has any power to maintain itself, or to produce anything, there remains nothing but to conclude that God alone, therefore, is and 30 must be the efficient cause of all things, and that all acts of Volition are determined by him * alone.* £ In B this paragraph begins thus: " Now in order to understand whether we are really free, or not free in any particular act of willing, that is of affirming or denying this or that, we must recall to our memory what we have already said, namely,..."
JJ B:...such an enduring creation [as they admit; for, if one and the same activity...HI B:...as this is so, no causality can be attributed to the thing.
ON THE WILL 109 standing is purely passive; it is an awareness, in the i soul, of the essence and existence of things; so that it is never we who affirm or deny something of a thing, but it is the thing itself that affirms or denies, in us, something of itself.
Possibly some will not admit this, because it seems to them that they are well able to affirm or to deny of the thing something different from what they know about the thing. But this is only because they have no idea of the conception which the soul has of the thing apart from or 10 without the words I [in which it is expressed]. It is quite true that (when there are reasons which prompt us to do so) we can, in words or by some other means, represent the thing to others differently from what we know it to be; but we can never bring it so far, either by words or by any other means, that we should feel about the things differently from what we feel about them; that is impossible, and clearly so to all who have for once attended to their understanding itself apart from the use of words or other significant signs. 20 Against this, however, some perchance may say: If it is not we, but the thing itself, that makes the affirmation and denial about itself in us, then nothing can be affirmed or denied except what is in agreement with the thing; and conse quently there is no falsity. For we have said that falsity consists in affirming (or denying) aught of a thing which does not accord with that thing; that is, what the thing does not affirm or deny about itself. I think, however, that if only we consider well what we have already said about Truth and Falsity, then we shall see at once that these objections 3° have already been sufficiently answered. For we have said that the object is the cause of what is affirmed or denied t B:...because they make no distinction between the idea which the soul has of a thing, and the words in which the same is expressed.
H no GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i thereof,! be it true or false: * falsity arising thus,* namely, because, when we happen to know something * or a part * of an object, we imagine tt that the object (although we only know very little of it) nevertheless affirms or denies that of itself as a whole; this takes place mostly in feeble souls, which receive very easily a mode or ttt an idea through a slight action of the object, and make no further affirmation or denial apart from this.
Lastly, it might also be objected that there are many 10 things which we * sometimes * want and [sometimes also] do not want, tttt as, for example, to assert something about a thing or not to assert it, to speak the truth, and not to speak it, and so forth. But this results from the fact that Desire is not adequately distinguished from Will, ttttt For the Will, according to those who maintain that there is a Will, is only the activity of the understanding whereby we affirm or deny something about a thing, with regard to good or evil. Desire, however, is the disposition of the soul to obtain or to do something for the sake of the good or evil 20 that is discerned therein; so that even after we have made an affirmation or denial about the thing, Desire still remains, namely, when we have ascertained or affirmed that the thing t A:...the cause of that about which something is affirmed or denied; B: the cause of our affirmation or denial thereof,...tt B continues: that the whole is such; this takes place...ttt B omits "a mode or."
tttt B continues: or about which we [sometimes] assert some thing, and [sometimes] do not assert it...
ttttt B continues as follows: For, although they are both ol 30 them an affirmation or denial of a thing, they nevertheless differ in this that the last occurs without regard, and the first with reference, to the good or evil which is discerned in the thing: so that, even after we have made the affirmation or denial about the thing, the Desire itself remains, namely, to obtain or to do what we have ascertained or affirmed to be good, so that the Will may well exist without the Desire, but not the Desire without the Will.
ON THE WILL in is good; such is the Will, according to their statements, i while desire is the inclination, which we only subsequently feel, to advance it — so that, even according to their own statements, the Will may well exist without the Desire, but not the Desire without the Will, which must have preceded it.
All the activities, therefore, which we have discussed above (since they are carried out through Reason under the appearance of good, or are hindered by Reason under the appearance of evil) can only be subsumed under that inch- 10 nation which is called Desire, and by no means under the designation of Will, which is altogether inappropriate.
i CHAPTER XVII ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WILL AND DESIRE Now that it is known that we have no * free * will to make an affirmation or a denial, let us just see what is the correct and true distinction between will and desire, or what may the Will be which was called by the Latins voluntas. t According to Aristotle's definition, Desire appears to be a genus containing two species. For he says that the 10 Will is the longing or inclination which one feels towards that which * is or * seems good. Whence it appears to me that by Desire (or cupiditas) he means any inclination, be it towards good, be it towards evil; but when the inclination is only towards what is * or appears to be * good, or when the man who has such inclination, has it under the appearance of good, then he calls it voluntas or good will; while, if it is bad, that is, when we observe in another an inclination towards something which is bad, tt he calls that voluptas or bad will. So that the inclination of the soul is 20 not something whereby affirmations or denials are made, but only an inclination to obtain something which appears to be good, and ttt to flee from what appears to be bad.
It, therefore, remains to inquire now whether the Desire is free or not free. In addition to what we have already said, namely, that Desire depends on the idea of its objects, and that this understanding must have an external cause, and in addition also to what we have said about the will, it still t B adds: or good will.
tt B: and if, on the contrary, it is bad, or towards evil...
DISTINCTION BETWEEN WILL AND DESIRE 113 remains to prove that Desire is not free. Many people, i although they see quite well that the knowledge which man has of various things is a medium through which his longing or inclination passes over from one thing to another, yet fail to observe what that may be which thus lures the inclination from the one to the other.
However, to show that this inclination of ours is not of our own free will (and in order to present vividly before our eyes what it is to pass over, and to be drawn, from one thing to another), we shall imagine a child becoming aware 10 of something for the first time. For example, I hold before him a little Bell, which produces a pleasant sound for his ears, so that he conceives a longing for it; consider now whether he could really help feeling this longing or desire. If you say, Yes, then I ask, how, through what cause * is this to happen *? Certainly not through something which he knows to be better, because this is all that he knows; nor, again, through its appearing to be bad to him, for he knows nothing else, and this pleasure is the very best that has ever come to him. But perchance he has the freedom to banish 20 from him the longing which he feels; whence it would follow that this longing may well arise in us without our free will, but that all the same we have in us the freedom to banish it from us. This freedom, however, will not bear examination; for what, t indeed, might it be that shall be able to annihilate the longing? The longing itself? Surely no, for there is nothing that through its own nature seeks its own undoing. What then might it ultimately be that shall be able to wean him from his longing? Nothing else, forsooth, except that in the natural order and course of 3° things he is affected by something which he finds more pleasant than the first. And, therefore, just as, when we were considering the Will, we said that the human Will is nothing IB: I say that this freedom will not stand the slightest test. This will be clearly evident; for what,...u4 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i but this and that Volition, so also man has no other than this and that Desire which is caused by this and that idea; J Desire [in the abstract] is not anything actually existing in Nature, but is only an abstraction from the particular acts of desiring this or that. Desire, then, as it is not really any thing, can also not really cause anything. So that when we say that Desire is free, it is just as much as if we said that this or that Desire is its own cause — that is, that before it existed it had already arranged that it should exist; which 10 is absurdity itself, and cannot be.
I B concludes this chapter as follows: If then we say that Desire is free, it is just as if we had said that this or that Desire is the cause of itself, and, already before it existed, had brought it about that it should exist: which is absurdity itself and is impossible. And Desire, regarded as a universal, being nothing but an abstrac tion from the particular acts of desiring this or that, and, beyond this, not actually existing in Nature, can, as such, also cause nothing.
CHAPTER XVIII i ON THE USES OF THE FOREGOING THUS we see now that man, being a part of the whole of Nature, on which he depends, and by which also he is governed, cannot of himself do anything for his happiness and well-being; let us, then, just see what Uses we can derive from these propositions of ours. And this [is] all the more [necessary] because we have no doubt that they will appear not a little offensive to some.
In the first place, it follows therefrom that we are truly m servants, aye, slaves, of God, and that it is our greatest perfection to be such necessarily. For, if we were thrown back upon ourselves, and thus not dependent on God, we should be able to accomplish very little, or nothing, and that would justly give us cause to lament our lot; especially so in contrast with what we now see, namely, that we are dependent on that which is the most perfect of all, in such a way that we exist also as a part of the whole, that is, of him; and we contribute, so to say, also our share to the realisation of so many skilfully ordered and perfect works, 20 which depend on him. I Secondly, this knowledge brings it about that we do not grow proud when we have accomplished something excel lent (which pride causes us to come to a standstill, because £ B: In the first place, because we depend on that which is the most perfect of all, in such a way that, being also a part of the whole, that is, of him, we also contribute our share to the realisation of so many skilfully ordered and perfect works, which depend on him, it follows therefore that we are God's servants, and that it is our greatest perfection to be such necessarily. 30 n6 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i we think that we are already great, and that we need do nothing further; thereby militating precisely against our own perfection, which consists in this — that we must at all times endeavour to advance further and further); but that, on the contrary, we attribute all that we do to God, who is the first and only cause of all that we accomplish and succeed in effecting.
Thirdly, in addition to the fact that this knowledge inspires us with a real love of our neighbour, it shapes us 10 so that we never hate him, nor are we angry with him, but love to help him, and to improve his condition. All these are the actions of such men as have great perfection or essence.
Fourthly, this knowledge also serves to promote the greatest Common Good, because through it a judge can never side with one party more than with the other, and when compelled to punish the one, and to reward the other, he will do it with a view to help and to improve the one as much as the other.
20 Fifthly, this knowledge frees us from Sorrow, from Despair, from Envy, from Terror, and other evil passions, which, as we shall presently say, constitute the real hell itself.
Sixthly, J this knowledge brings us so far that we cease to stand in awe of God, as others do of the Devil (whom they imagine), lest he should do them harm. For why indeed should we fear God, who is the highest good itself, through whom all ihings are what they are, and also we who live in him?
30 * Seventhly,* this knowledge also brings us so far that we attribute all to God, love him alone because he is the most glorious and the most perfect, and thus offer ourselves up entirely to him; for these really constitute both the true service of God and our own eternal happiness and bliss.
J A adds: and lastly.
ON THE USES OF THE FOREGOING 117 For the sole perfection and the final end of a slave and of a i tool is this, that they duly fulfil the task imposed on them. For example, if a carpenter, while doing some work, finds his Hatchet of excellent service, then this Hatchet has thereby attained its end and perfection; but if he should think: this Hatchet has rendered me such good service now, therefore I shall let it rest, and exact no further service from it, then precisely this Hatchet would fail of its end, and be a Hatchet no more. Thus also is it with man, so long as he is a part of Nature he must follow the laws of 10 Nature, and this is divine service; and so long as he does this, it is well with him. But if God should (so to say) will that man should serve him no more, that would be equiva lent to depriving him of his well-being and annihilating him; because all that he is consists in this, that he serves God.
i CHAPTER XIX ON OUR HAPPINESS Now that we have seen the advantages of this True Belief, we shall endeavour to fulfil the promise we have made, namely, to inquire whether through the knowledge which we already have (as to what is good, what is evil, what truth is, and what falsity is, and what, in general, the uses of all these are), whether, I say, we can thereby attain to our well- being, namely, the Love of God (which we have remarked to 10 be our supreme happiness), and also in what way we can free ourselves from the passions which we have judged to be bad. To begin with the consideration of the last, namely, of the liberation from the passions,! I say that, if we suppose that they have no other causes than those which we have assigned to them, then, provided only we use our understanding aright, as we can do very easily ft (now that we have a f All passions which come in conflict with good Reason (as is shown above) arise from Opinion. All that is good or bad in them, is shown to us by True Belief; these, however — both, or either of