We said before that in Nature there can be nothing of which there should not be an Idea in the soul of that same thing.f And according as the thing is either more or less perfect, so also is the union and the influence of the Idea 10 with the thing, or with God himself, less or more perfect. For as the whole of Nature is but one only substance, and one whose essence is infinite, all things are united through Nature, and they are united into one [being], namely, God. And now, as the body is the very first thing of which our soul becomes aware (because as already remarked, no thing can exist in Nature, the Idea of which is not in the thinking thing, this Idea being the soul of that thing) so that thing must necessarily be the first cause of the Idea.tt But, as this Idea can by no means find rest in the know- 20 ledge of the body without passing on to the knowledge of that without which the body and Idea could neither be, nor be understood, so (after knowing it first) it becomes united with it immediately through love. This union is better understood, and one may gather what it must be like, from its action with the body, in which we see how through f This also explains what we said in the first part, namely, that the infinite understanding must exist in Nature from all eternity, and why we called it the son of God. For, as God existed from eternity, his Idea must also be in the thinking thing, that is, in him- 30 self *from eternity*, objective this Idea coincides with himself; see page 57.
ft That is J our soul being an Idea of the body derives its first being from the body, but JJ it is only a representation of the body, both as a whole and in its parts, in the thinking thing.
J B inserts "in" after "is." }{ A: for; B: but.
TRUE KNOWLEDGE, REGENERATION, &c. 135 knowledge of, and feelings towards corporeal things, there i arise in us all the effects which we are constantly becoming aware of in the body, through the movements of the [vital] spirits; and therefore (if once our knowledge and love come to embrace that without which we can neither be, nor be understood, and which is in no way corporeal) how incomparably greater and more glorious will and must be the kind of effects resulting from this union; for these must necessarily be commensurate with the thing with which it is united. And when we become aware of these 10 *excellent* effects, then we may say with truth, that we have been born again. For our first birth took place when we were united with the body, through which the activities and movements of the [vital] spirits have arisen; but this our other or second birth will take place when we become aware in us of entirely different effects of love, commensu rate with the knowledge of this incorporeal object, and as different from the first as the corporeal is different from the incorporeal, spirit from flesh. And this may, therefore, all the more justly and truly be called Regeneration, inas- 20 much as only from this love and union does Eternal and unchangeable existence ensue, as we shall prove.
1 CHAPTER XXIII 1 CHAPTER XXIII ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IF only we consider attentively what the Soul is, and whence its change and duration originate, then we shall easily see whether it is mortal or immortal.
Now we have said that the Soul is an Idea which is in the thinking thing, arising from the reality of a thing which exists in Nature. Whence it follows that according to the duration and change of the thing, so must also be the 10 duration and change of the Soul. We remarked, at the same time, that the Soul can become united either with the body of which it is the Idea, or with God, without whom it can neither be, nor be known.
From this, then, it can easily be seen, (i) that, if it is united with the body alone, and that body happens to perish, then it must perish also; for when it is deprived of the body, which is the foundation of its love, it must perish with it. But (2) if it becomes united with some other thing which is and remains unchangeable, then, on the 20 contrary, it must also remain unchangeable *and lasting.* For, in that case, through what shall it be possible for it to perish? J Not through itself; for as little as it could begin to exist through itself when it did not yet exist, so I B concludes this chapter as follows: For that which alone is the cause of the existence of a thing, must also, when it is about to pass away, be the cause of its non-existence, simply because itself is changing or passing away; or that whereof it is the cause must be able to annihilate itself; but as little as a thing can begin to exist through itself when it does not yet exist, so little also can it 30 change or perish through itself, now that it does exist.
ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 137 little also can it change or perish * through itself,* now that it does exist.
Consequently, that thing which alone is the cause of its existence, must also (when it is about to perish) be the cause of its non-existence, because it happens to change itself or to perish.
i CHAPTER XXIV ON GOD'S LOVE OF MAN THUS far we have shown sufficiently, we think, what our love of God is, also its consequences, namely, our eternal duration. So we do not think it necessary here to say any thing about other things, such as joy in God, peace of mind, &c., as from what has been said it may easily be seen what there is to or should be said about them. Thus (as we have, so far, only considered our love of God) 10 it still remains to be seen whether there is also a divine love of us, that is, whether God also loves mankind, namely, when they love him. Now, in the first place, we have said that to God no modes of thought can be ascribed except those which are in his creatures; therefore, it cannot be said that God loves mankind, much less [can it be said] that he should love them because they love him, or hate them because they hate him. For in that case we should have to suppose that people do so of their own free will, and that they do not depend on a first cause; which 20 we have already before proved to be false. Besides, this would necessarily involve nothing less than a great muta bility on the part of God, who, though he neither loved nor hated before, would now have to begin to love and to hate, and would be * induced or * made to do so by some thing supposed to be outside him; but this is absurdity itself.
Still, when we say that God does not love man, this must not be taken to mean that he (so to say) leaves man to pursue his course all alone, but only that be- so cause man together with all that is, are in God in such ON GOD'S LOVE OF MAN 139 a way,:f and God consists of all these in such a way, therefore, i properly speaking, there can be in him no love for something else: since all form only one thing, which is God himself.
From this it follows also that God gives no laws to man kind so as to reward them when they fulfil them *[and to punish them when they transgress them,]* or, to state it more clearly, that God's laws are not of such a nature that they could be transgressed. For the regulations imposed by God on Nature, according to which all things come into existence and continue to exist, these, if we will call them 10 laws, are such that they can never be transgressed; such, for instance, is [the law] that the weakest must yield to the strongest, It that no cause can produce more than it contains in itself, and the like, which are of such a kind that they never change, and never had a beginning, but all things are subjected and subordinated to them. And, to say briefly something about them: all laws that cannot be transgressed, are divine laws; the reason [is this], because whatsoever happens, is not contrary to, but in accordance with, his own decision. All laws that can be transgressed are human laws; 20 the reason [is this], because all that people decide upon for their own well-being does not necessarily, on that account, tend also to the well-being of the whole of Nature, but may, on the contrary, tend to the annihilation of many other things.
When the laws of Nature are stronger, the laws of men are made null; the divine laws are the final end for the sake of which they exist, and not subordinate; human [laws] are not.Jtt Still, HII notwithstanding the fact that t B continues as follows: that God thus consists of them only, therefore, it must be so conceived that, properly speaking...30 tt B: the weaker must yield to the stronger.
ttt B: The Divine Laws are the final end for which they exist, and are not subordinate: but not so the Human Laws \ for when the Laws of Nature are stronger than these they are annihilated.
tttt A: For; B: Still.
140 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i men make laws for their own well-being, and have no other end in view except to promote their own well-being by them, this end of theirs may yet (in so far as it is subordinate to other ends which another has in view, who is above them, and lets them act thus as parts of Nature) serve that end [which] coincides with the eternal I laws established by God from eternity, and so, together with all others, help to accomplish everything. For example, although the Bees, in all their work and the orderly discipline which they 10 maintain among themselves, have no other end in view than to make certain provisions * for themselves * for the winter, still, man who is above them, has an entirely different end in view when he maintains and tends them, namely, to obtain honey for himself. So also [is it with] man, in so far as he is an individual thing and looks no further than his finite character can reach; but, in so far as he is also a part and tool of the whole of Nature, this end of man cannot be the final end of Nature, because she is infinite, and must make use of him, together also with all other 20 things, as an instrument.
Thus far [we have been speaking] of the law imposed by God; it is now to be remarked also that man is aware of two kinds of law even in himself; tl I mean such a man who uses his understanding aright, and attains to the know ledge of God; and these [two kinds of law] result from his fellowship with God, and from his fellowship with the modes of Nature. Of these the one is necessary, and the other is not. For, as regards the law which results from his fellowship with God, since he can never be otherwise 30 but must always necessarily be united with him, therefore t B: beginningless.
^J B continues: i. In him who uses his understanding aright and attains to the knowledge of God; these result from his fellow ship with God. 2. Those which result from his fellowship with the modes of Nature.
ON GOD'S LOVE OF MAN 141 he has, and always must have before his eyes the laws by i which he must live for and with God. But as regards the law which results from his fellowship with the modes, since he can separate himself from men, this is not so necessary.
Now, since we posit such a fellowship between God and men, it might justly be asked, how God can make himself known to men, and whether this happens, or could have happened, by means of spoken words, or directly *through himself,* without using any other thing to do it with.
We answer,! not by means of words, in any case; for 10 in that case man must have known the signification of the words before they were spoken to him. For example, if God had said to the Israelites, / am Jehovah your God, then they would have had to know first, apart from these words, that God existed, It before they could be assured * thereby * that it was he * [who was speaking to them].* For they already knew quite well then that the voice, thunder and lightning were not God, although the voice proclaimed that it was God. And the same that we say here about words, we also mean to hold good of all 20 external signs.
We consider it, therefore, impossible that God should make himself known to men by means of external signs.ttt And we consider it to be unnecessary that it should happen through any other thing than the mere essence of t B: To this we answer that such [a thing] can never happen by means of words; for, in that case, man would have had to know the signification of the words before the outward communication was made to him through them. When, for example, God said to 30 the Israelites,...tt A: dat hy God was [that he was God]; B: dat God was [that God existed].
ttt B continues: this self-revelation must therefore take place solely through the essence of God and the understanding of man; K 142 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i God and the understanding of man; for, as the Under standing is that in us which must know God, and as it stands in such immediate union with him that it can neither be, nor be understood without him, it is incontrovertibly evident from this that no thing can ever come into such close touch with the Understanding as God himself can. It is also impos sible to get to know God through something else. i. Be cause, in that case, such a thing would have to be better known to us than God himself, which is in open conflict 10 with all that we have hitherto clearly shown, namely, that God is a cause both of our knowledge and of all essence, and that without him all individual things not only cannot exist, but cannot even be understood. 2. Because we can never attain to the knowledge of God through any other thing, the nature of which is necessarily finite, even if it were far better known to us; for how is it possible that we should infer an infinite and limitless thing from a * finite and * limited thing? For even if we did observe some effects or work in Nature the cause of which was unknown 20 to us, still it would be impossible for us to conclude from this that there must be in Nature an infinite and limitless thing in order to produce this result. For how can we know whether many causes have concurred in order to produce this, or whether there was only one? Who is to tell us?
We therefore conclude, finally, that, in order to make himself known to men, God can and need use neither words, nor miracles, nor any other created thing, but only himself.
CHAPTER XXV 1 ON DEVILS WE shall now briefly say something about devils, whether they exist or do not exist, and it is this: If the Devil is a thing that is once for all opposed to God, and has absolutely nothing from God, then he is precisely iden tical with Nothing, which we have already discussed before.
If, with some, we represent him as a thinking thing that absolutely neither wills nor does any good, and so sets him self, once for all, in opposition to God, then surely he is 10 very wretched, and, if prayers could help, then one ought to pray for his conversion.
But let us just see whether such a wretched thing could even exist for a single moment. And, if we do so, we shall immediately find out that it cannot; for whatever duration a thing has results entirely from the perfection of the thing, and the more essence and godliness things possess, the more lasting are they: therefore, as the Devil has not the least perfection in him, how should he then, I think to myself, be able to exist? Add to this, that the persistence 20 or duration of a mode of the thinking thing only results from the union in which such a mode is, through love, joined to God. As the precise opposite of this union is supposed in the case of the Devils, they cannot possibly exist.!
As, however, there is no necessity whatever why we should posit the existence of Devils, why then should they be posited? For we need not, like others, posit Devils in order to find [in them] the cause of Hatred, Envy, Wrath, and such-like passions, since we have found this sufficiently, without such fictions. 30 t A: not exist. M3 i CHAPTER XXVI ON TRUE FREEDOM BY the assertion of what precedes £ we not only wanted to make known that there are no Devils, but also, indeed, that the causes (or, to express it better, what we call Sins) which hinder us in the attainment of our perfection are in our selves. We have also shown already, in what precedes, how and in what manner, through reason as also tt through the fourth kind of knowledge, we must attain to our blessed- 10 ness, and how the passions * which are bad and should be banished * must be done away with: not as is commonly urged, namely, that these [passions] must first be subdued before we can attain to the knowledge, and consequently to the love, of God. That would be just like insisting that some one who is ignorant must first forsake his ignorance before he can attain to knowledge. ttt But [the truth is] this, that only knowledge can cause the disappearance thereof — as is evident from all that we have said. Similarly, it may also be clearly gathered from the above that without Virtue, 20 or (to express it better) without the guidance of the Under standing, all tends to ruin, so that we can enjoy no rest, and we live, as it were, outside our element. So that even if from the power of knowledge and divine love there accrued to the understanding not an eternal rest, such as we have shown, but only a temporary one, it is our duty to t B: of the preceding chapter. JJ B omits these four words.
ttJ B continues thus: but just as knowledge alone can cause the annihilation of this (as is evident from all that we have said) so it 30 may likewise be clearly gathered from the above...ON TRUE FREEDOM 145 seek even this, since this also is such that if once we taste i it we would exchange it for nothing else in the world.
This being so, we may, with reason, regard as a great absurdity what many, who are otherwise esteemed as great theologians, assert, namely, that if no eternal life resulted from the love of God, then t they would seek what is best for themselves: as though they could discover anything better than God! This is just as silly as if a fish (for which, of course, it is impossible to live out of the water) were to say: if no eternal life is to follow this life in the 10 water, then I will leave the water for the land; It what else, indeed, can they say to us who do not know God?
Thus we see, therefore, that in order to arrive at the truth of what we assert for sure concerning our happiness and repose, we require no other principles except only this, namely, to take to heart our own interest, which is very natural in all things. ttt And since we find that, when we pursue sensuousness, pleasures, and worldly things, we do not find our happiness in them, but, on the contrary, our ruin, we therefore choose the guidance of our understanding. 20 As, however, this can make no progress, unless it has first attained to the knowledge and love of God, therefore it was highly necessary to seek this (God); and as (after the fore going reflections and considerations) we have discovered that he is the best good of all that is good, we are compelled to stop and to rest here. For we have seen that, outside him, there is nothing that can give us any happiness. And it is a true freedom to be, and to remain, bound with the loving chains of his love.
Lastly, we see also that reasoning is not the principal 3° thing in us, but only like a staircase by which we can climb £ B continues thus: people would seek and consider pleasures of sense, merriment, and worldly enjoyments: as though...
It B continues: so it is also with the foregoing; for, what else,...B omits this sentence.
146 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i up to the desired place, or like a good genius which, with out any falsity or deception, brings us tidings of the highest good in order thereby to stimulate us to pursue it, and to become united with it; which union is our supreme happiness and bliss.
So, to bring this work to a conclusion, it remains to indicate briefly what human freedom is, and wherein it consists. For this purpose I shall make use of these following propositions, as things which are certain and 10 demonstrated.
i. The more essence a thing has, so much more has it also of activity, and so much less of passivity. For it is certain that what is active acts through what it has, and that the thing which is passive is affected through what it has not.
2. All passivity that passes from non-being to being, or from being to non-being, must result from some external agent, and not from an inner one: because no thing, con sidered by itself, contains in itself the conditions that will 20 enable it to annihilate itself when it exists, or to create itself when it does not exist.
3. Whatever is not produced by external causes can have nothing in common with them, and can, consequently, be neither changed nor transformed by them.
And from these last two [propositions] I infer the follow ing fourth proposition: 4. The effect of an immanent or inner cause (which is all one to me) cannot possibly pass away or change so long as this cause of it remains. For such an effect, just as it 30 is not produced by external causes, so also it cannot be changed [by them]; following the third proposition. And since no thing whatever can come to naught except through external causes, it is not possible that this effect should be liable to perish so long as its cause endures; following the second proposition.
ON TRUE FREEDOM 147 5. The freest cause of all, and that which is most appro- i priate to God, is the immanent: for the effect of this cause depends on it in such a way that it can neither be, nor be understood without it, nor is it subjected to any other cause; it is, moreover, united with it in such a way that together they form one whole.
Now let us just see what we must conclude from the above propositions. In the first place, then, 1. Since the essence of God is infinite, therefore it has an infinite activity, and an infinite negation of passivity, 10 following the first proposition; and, in consequence of this, the more that, through their greater essence, things are united with God, so much the more also do they have of activity, and the less of passivity: and so much the more also *are they* free from change and corruption.
2. The true Understanding can never perish; for in itself it can have no cause to destroy itself, following the second proposition. And as it did not emanate from external causes, but from God, so it is not susceptible to any change through them, following the third proposition. And since 20 God has produced it immediately and he is only t an inner cause, it follows necessarily that it cannot perish so long as this cause of it remains, following the fourth proposition. Now this cause of it is eternal, therefore it is too.
3. All the effects of the *true* understanding, which are united with it, are the most excellent, and must be valued above all the others; for as they are inner effects, they must be the most excellent; following the fifth proposition; and, besides this, they are also necessarily eternal, because their cause is such. 30 4. All the effects which we produce outside ourselves are the more perfect, the more they are capable of becoming united with us, so as to constitute one and the same nature with us; for in this way they come nearest to inner J A: is not only.
148 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i effects. For example, if I teach my neighbours to love pleasure, glory, avarice, then whether I myself also love these or do not love them, whatever the case may be, I deserve to be punished, this is clear. Not so, however, when the only end that I endeavour to attain is, to be able to taste of union with God, and to bring forth true ideas, and to make these things known also to my neighbours; for we can all participate equally in this happiness, as happens when it creates in them J the same desire that I have, thus causing 10 their Jt will and mine to be one and the same, constituting one and the same nature, agreeing always in all things.Jtt From all that has been said it may now be very easily conceived what is human freedom,! which I define to be this: it is, namely, a firm reality which our understanding t A: him. tt A: his.
HI Instead of the three preceding paragraphs, B has the following: 2. As (according to Proposition II.) no thing can be a cause of its own annihilation, nor, if it is not the effect of any external cause, 20 can it (according to Proposition III.) be changed by such, but (according to Proposition IV.) the effect of an inner cause can neither pass away, nor change so long as this cause thereof endures; it follows that the true understanding, since it is produced by no external cause, but immediately by God, is, through this cause, eternal and immutable, can neither perish nor change, but, with it, necessarily remains eternal and lasting.
3. Since the inner effects of an immanent cause (according to Proposition V.) are the most excellent of all, all the effects of the true understanding which are united therewith, must also be valued 3° above all others, and [must] necessarily be eternal with their cause. Whence it follows that 4. The more perfect the effects are which we produce outside us, the more capable are they of becoming united with us so as to constitute one and the same nature with us. It is thus when, f The servitude of a thing consists in being subjected to external causes, freedom, on the contrary, in not being subjected to them, but freed from them.
ON TRUE FREEDOM 149 acquires through direct union with God, so that it can bring i forth ideas in itself, and effects outside itself, in complete harmony with its nature; without, however, its effects being subjected to any external causes, so as to be capable of being changed or transformed by them. Thus it is, at the same time, evident from what has been said, what things there are that are in our power, and are not sub jected to any external causes; we have likewise also proved here, and that in a different way from before, the eternal and lasting duration of our understanding; and, lastly, 10 which effects it is that we have to value above all others.
So,! to make an end of all this, it only remains for me still to say to my friends to whom I write this:tt Be not astonished at these novelties; for it is very well known to you that a thing does not therefore cease to be true because it is not accepted by many. And also, as the character of the age in which we live is not unknown to you, I would beg of you most earnestly to be very careful about the com munication of these things to others. I do not want to say that you should absolutely keep them to yourselves, but only 20 that if ever you tU begin to communicate them to anybody, through my union with God, I conceive true ideas, and make them known to my neighbours, so that they may likewise participate with me in this happiness, and so that there arises in them a desire like mine, making their will one and the same with mine, so that we thus constitute one and the same nature, agreeing in all things.
I In the margin of this paragraph A has the following note: the author's entreaty to those for whom, at their request, he had dictated this treatise, and therewith the conclusion of all.