It B continues: that they should not be astonished at the 30 novelties (which they might find here); since a thing does not therefore cease to be true when it is not accepted by many.
ttt B continues: wish to communicate them to others, then you shall have no other object in view except only the Happiness of your neighbour; being at the same time clearly assured that the reward of your labour will not disappoint you therein.
150 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING 1 then let no other aim prompt you except only the happiness of your neighbour, being at the same time clearly assured by him that the reward will not disappoint your labour. Lastly, if, on reading this through, you should meet with some difficulty about what I state as certain, I beseech you that you should not therefore hasten at once to refute it, before you have pondered it long enough and thoughtfully enough, and if you do this I feel sure that you will attain to the}: enjoyment of the fruits of this tree which you promise 10 yourselves.
J B concludes: desired END.
TEAOS [THE END] APPENDICES [APPENDIX I] i *ON GOD* AXIOMS 1. Substance is, by its nature, prior to ail its modifications.
2. Things which are different are distinguished either realiter or modaliter.
3. Things which are distinguished realiter either have different attributes, such as Thought and Extension, or are referred to different attributes, as in the case of Under standing and Motion; one of which belongs to Thought, 10 and the other to Extension.
4. Things which have different attributes, as also the things which belong to different attributes, do not have anything the one of the other.
5. That which has not in itself something of another thing, can also not be a cause of the existence of such another thing.
6. It is impossible that that which is a cause of itself should have limited itself.
7. That by which the things are sustained is by its nature prior to t such things. 20 PROPOSITION I To no substance that exists can one and the same attri bute be ascribed that is ascribed to another substance; or (which is the same) in Nature there cannot be two sub stances, unless they are distinguished realiter.tl I A: the first (prior) in; B: prior to.
Jt B:...in Nature there cannot be posited two substances of one and the same nature.
154 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING 1 PROOF If there are two substances, then they are distinct; and consequently (Axiom 2) £ they are distinguished either realiter or modaliter; not modaliter, for in that case the modes would by their nature be prior to the substance, which is contrary to the first axiom; therefore, realiter; and consequently, what is predicated of the one cannot be predicated of the other, which is what we intended to prove.
10 PROPOSITION II One substance cannot be the cause of the existence of another substance.
PROOF Such a cause;annot contain in itself anything of such an effect (Prop, i); because the difference between them is real, and therefore it cannot (Axiom 5) produce it.JJ PROPOSITION III Every attribute or substance ttt is by nature infinite, and supremely perfect in its kind.
20 PROOF No substance is produced by another (Prop. 2) and conse quently, if it exists, it is either an attribute of God, or it has been its own cause outside God. If the first, then it is necessarily infinite, and supremely perfect in its kind, such t A gives the references to Axioms and Propositions in the margin; B, in the text.
JJ A adds: (existence); B:...and therefore the one cannot produce the other.
HI A: all attributes or substance; B: all substance or its attri- 3o butes.
APPENDIX I 155 as are all other attributes of God. If the second, then it is also necessarily such because (Axiom 6) it could not have limited itself.
PROPOSITION IV To such an extent does existence pertain by nature to the essence of every substance,! that it is impossible to posit in an infinite understanding the Idea of the essence of a substance that does not exist in Nature.
PROOF The true essence of an object Jt is something which is 10 realiter different from the Idea of the same object; and this something exists (Axiom 3) either realiter, or is contained in some other thing which exists realiter; from which other thing this essence cannot be distinguished realiter, but only modaliter; such are all the essences of the things ttt which we see, which before they yet existed were already contained in extension, motion, and rest, and when they do exist are not distinguished from extension realiter } but only modaliter. Moreover, it would involve self-contradiction to suppose that the essence of a substance tttt is contained thus 20 in some other thing; because in that case it could not be distinguished from this realiter, contrary to the first proposi tion; also, it could in that case be produced by the subject which contains it, contrary to the second proposition; and lastly, it could not by its nature be infinite and supremely perfect in its kind, contrary to the third proposition.
t A: to every essence of substance; B: to the essence of a substance.
t J B:...of the object of an idea.
B: essences or things. 30 A: that an essence of the substance; B: that an essence of substance.
156 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING Therefore, as its essence is not contained in any other thing, it must be a thing that exists through itself.
COROLLARY Nature is known through itself, and not through any other thing. It consists of infinite attributes every one of them infinite and perfect in its kind; to its essence pertains existence, so that outside it there is no other essence or existence, and it thus coincides exactly with the essence of God who alone is glorious and blessed.
[APPENDIX II] * ON THE HUMAN SOUL * As man is a created finite thing, &c., it necessarily follows that what he has of Thought, and what we call the Soul, is a mode £ of the attribute which we call Thought, and that nothing else except this mode belongs to his essence: so much so that when this mode comes to naught, the soul perishes also, although the above attribute remains un changed. Similarly as regards Jt what he has of Extension; what we call Body is nothing else than a mode of the other 10 attribute which we call Extension; when this is destroyed, the human body also ceases to be, although the attribute Extension remains unchanged.
Now in order to understand what this mode is, which we call Soul, and how it derives its origin from the body, and also how its change (only) depends on the body (which to me constitutes the union of soul and body), it must be observed: I. That the most immediate mode of the attribute which we call thought contains objective the formal essence of all things; so much so, that if one could posit a real thing 20 whose essence was not objective in the above-named attri bute, then this would not be infinite, nor supremely perfect in its kind; contrary to what has already been proved in the third proposition. And since, as a matter of fact, Nature or God is one being of which infinite attributes are predi cated, and which contains in itself all the essences of created things, it necessarily follows that of all this there is produced tl B omits " as regards," and inserts " and " after " Extension."
158 GOD; MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING in Thought an infinite Idea, t which comprehends objective the whole of Nature just as it is realiter.
2. It is to be observed that all the remaining modes, such as Love, Desire, Joy, *&c.,* derive their origin from this first immediate mode; and that, too, in such wise, that if it did not precede, then there could be no love, desire, * nor joy,* &c. Whence it clearly follows that the natural love which prompts everything to preserve its body (I mean the mode) It cannot have any other origin than in the Idea 10 or the " objective " essence of such body which is in the thinking attribute. Further, since for the real existence of an Idea (or " objective " essence) no other thing is required than the thinking attribute and the object (or " formal" essence), it is certain, as we have said, that the Idea, or the "objective" essence, is the most immediate t mode of the * thinking * attribute. And, consequently, there can be in the thinking attribute no other mode, that should belong to the essence of the soul of every ttt thing, except only the Idea, which must be in the thinking attribute when its 20 object exists: for such an idea brings with it the remaining modes of Love, Desire, * joy,* &c. Now as the Idea comes from the existence of the object, therefore according as the object changes or perishes, so its Idea must change or perish, and such being the case, it is that which is united with the object. tttt t I call that mode the most immediate mode, which, in order to exist, requires no other mode in the same attribute.
J A: it necessarily follows that of all that which is produced in Thought there is an infinite Idea...; B:...that there is 30 produced in thought an infinite idea thereof...It B omits the words in brackets.
til A: gelijken [like]; B: iegelijk'n [every].
Hit B:...so this idea of it must change or perish in the same degree or measure of change or annihilation, because it is thus- united with the object.
APPENDIX II 159 Lastly, if we should want to proceed and ascribe to the i essence of the soul that through which it can be real, we shall be able to find nothing else than the attribute [Thought] and the object of which we have just been speaking; and neither of these can belong to the essence of the Soul, as the object has nothing of Thought, and is realiter different from the Soul.! And with regard to the attribute, we have also proved already that it cannot pertain to the above-mentioned essence, as appears even more clearly from what we said subsequently; II for the attribute as attribute IK is not 10 united with the object, since it neither changes nor perishes, although the object changes or perishes.
Therefore the essence of the soul consists in this alone, namely, in the existence of an Idea or " objective " essence in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact exists in Nature. I say, of an object which in fact exists, 6-c., without more particulars, so as to include under this not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have also each its soul, just as in the case of extension. And in order 20 that this definition may be somewhat more fully understood, it should be borne in mind what I have already said when speaking about the attributes, which, I said, are not different as regards their existence,tltt for they are themselves the " subjects " of their essences; also that the essence of every one of the modes is contained in the above-named attributes, * and, lastly, that all the attributes are attributes * of One infinite Being. Wherefore also, in the ninth chapter of the First Part, I called this Idea a creation created immediately by God; since it contains objective the " formal " essence of all 30 B: as the object of Thought has nothing thereof, but is realiter different from it.
B: as will be seen trom what we shall say later.
! B omits "as attribute."
!! B omits the nine words that follow.
160 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING 1 things, I without omission or addition. And this is neces sarily but one, considering that all the essences of the attributes, and the essences of the modes comprehended in these attributes, are the essence of one only infinite being, II But it has still to be remarked that these modes, now under consideration, [even when] none of them exists, are nevertheless equally comprehended in their attributes; and as there is no inequality whatever in the attributes, nor yet in the essences of the modes, there can be no particu- 10 larity in the idea when there is none in Nature. But as soon as ever some of these modes take on their particular existence, and thereby become in some way different from their attributes (because then their particular existence, which they have in the attribute, is the "sub ject" of their essence), then there shows itself a particu larity in the essences of the modes, and consequently in the " objective " essences of these which are necessarily comprehended in the Idea, HI And this is the reason why we said, in the definition, that the Idea llll arises from 20 an object, Hill which really exists in Nature. And with this we think we have sufficiently explained what kind of a thing the soul is in general, understanding by this expres sion not only the Ideas which arise from *the existence of* corporeal modes, but also those which arise from the existence of every mode of the remaining attributes.
I B:...I called the thinking attribute, or the understand ing in the thinking thing, a son, product, or creation created immediately by God, since it contains the " objective " essence of all things...30 H B omits this sentence, and continues: For it has to be remarked...HI B: in the Thinking Attribute.
Hll B: the soul, the idea, or objective essence in the thinking attribute (which is all one to me) arises...lllll B: from the essence of an object...APPENDIX II 161 But, since we have no such knowledge of the remaining i attributes as we have of extension, let us just see whether, having regard to the modes of extension, we can discover a more special definition, and one that shall be more appro priate to express the essence of our souls, for this is the real task before us. Now we shall presuppose here, as something already demonstrated, that extension contains no other modes than motion and rest, and that every particular material thing is nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and rest, so much so indeed that, even if extension 10 contained nothing else except motion only or rest only, then no particular thing could be shown or exist in the whole of extension; the human body, therefore, is nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and rest. Now the " ob jective essence " of this actual ratio * of motion and rest * which is in the thinking attribute, this (we say) is the soul of the body; so that whenever one of these two modes changes into more or less (motion or rest) I the Idea * or the soul * also changes accordingly. For example, when the [amount of] rest happens to increase, while the [quantity 20 of] motion is diminished, then there is produced thereby that pain or sorrow which we call cold; but if, on the contrary, this [increase] takes place in the [amount of] motion, then there is produced thereby that pain which we call heat. It And so when it happens that the degrees of motion and rest are not equal in all the parts of our body, but that some have more motion and rest than others, there I B: whenever one 01 these two modes, be it motion or rest, changes into more or less...II B continues as follows: But if the proportion of motion and 30 rest is not the same in all the parts of our body, but some of them are provided with more motion or rest than the others, there arises thence a difference of feeling: such as we experience when we are struck with a cane in the eyes or on the hands. Moreover, when the external causes happen to be different, and have not all the 162 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING i arises therefrom a t difference of feeling (and thence arises the different kind of pain which we feel when we are struck in the eyes or on the hands with a cane), It And when it happens that the external causes, which bring about these changes, are different from one another, and have not all the same effect, then there results from this a difference of feeling in one and the same part (and from this results the difference of feeling according as one and the same hand is struck with a piece of wood or of iron), tt And, again, 10 if the change which occurs in a part restores it to its first proportion *of motion and rest,* there arises from this that joy which we call repose, pleasurable activity, and cheerful ness. Lastly, now that we have explained what feeling is, we can easily see how this gives rise to an Idea reflexiva, or the knowledge of oneself, Experience and Reasoning. And from all this (as also because our soul is united with God, and is a part of the infinite Idea, arising immediately from God) there can also be clearly seen the origin of clear knowledge, and the immortality of the soul. But, for the 20 present, what we have said must be enough.
same effect, there results therefrom a difference ot feeling in one and the same part: such as \ve experience when the same hand is struck with a piece of wood or of iron. But when the change which occurs in some part restores it to its previous proportion of motion and rest, there arises...It A gives the words in brackets immediately after "happens.''
COMMENTARY Several of the conceptions which are either tacitly taken up or expressly defined by Spinoza are no longer familiar to us, and have to be learned like the vocabulary of a foreign tongue; with the additional disadvantage that our common English supplies no corresponding terms, the very moulds having been broken and cast away in which the thoughts were shaped." — MARTI NEAU.
COMMENTARY [The numbers in large type refer to the pages of the translation those in smaller type to the lines.']
TITLE-PAGES, ETC.
4. THE Preface on the title-page of A must have been written by an ardent follower of Spinoza, not by Spinoza himself. Hence Monnikhoff felt justified in substituting a new title- page (6), not offensive to the theologians. The engraved Portrait in A (which is reproduced here) is the same as that found in some copies of the Opera Posthuma, and was prob ably inserted in A by Monnikhoff, who also wrote the verses facing it. It is uncertain whether the portrait was engraved during the life-time of Spinoza. According to Rieuwertsz, as reported by Dr. Hallmann in 1704 (see Introduction, p. civ.), it was engraved some three or four years after the death of Spinoza, probably from the Wolfenbiittel portrait (see p. xcvii.).
The verses facing the portrait have been rendered by Dr. Willis as follows: " Here Art presents us with Spinoza's lace, Wherein deep lines of sober thought we trace • Yet is the mental likeness better shown To those who read and make his works their own."
FIRST PART The First Part is devoted to the consideration of God, His existence, attributes, &c. The same ground was sub- 1 66 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING sequently covered in the First Part of the Ethics (De Deo). This and other resemblances to the Ethics naturally sug gested that the Short Treatise was an early draft of the Ethics. Monnikhoff actually put Ethica on the title-page of B, and the Short Treatise is sometimes referred to as the " small Ethics."
CHAPTER I CHAPTER I 15. The opening is remarkably abrupt. The expression "as regards the first" suggests a preceding enumeration of topics about to be discussed, but no such enumeration is given, unless it be on the title-page of the Treatise, namely, God, Man, &c. Monnikhoff tried to avoid this crudity by substituting "this" for "the first." But the abruptness remains, and is the more striking because so many of the other chapters begin with an enumeration of the topics to be discussed. Freudenthal has suggested that the original opening may have been as follows: " Man has an idea of God as a Being consisting of infinite attributes, each of which is infinitely perfect in its kind. First, we will show that such a Being exists, and then we shall give our views as to what He is. As regards the first..." This conjecture is based partly on the second sentence in chapter ii., which seems to have been misplaced.
It is noteworthy that Spinoza begins with proofs that God is, and only then proceeds to determine what He is. The reason may have been this. He was teaching people who were already fairly familiar with the fundamentals of the Cartesian philosophy. He therefore commenced with the Cartesian proofs of God's existence, and gradually led up to his own comparatively strange conception of God. This kind of pedagogic method is not uncommon in the history of philosophy. Kant, e.g., started from the then current psychology and gradually led up to very different, almost startling results.
COMMENTARY 167 The proofs themselves are mainly (though not altogether) Cartesian. (See Meditations, III. and V., and the Appendix in the translation of Descartes' Method, &c., by John Veitch). Unlike Descartes, however, Spinoza attaches the greatest weight to the a priori arguments.
15, 5. A priori. An argument is said to be a priori when it proceeds from the character of a thing to its implications, from conditions to consequences, or from causes to effects. It is said to be a posteriori when it proceeds from conse quences to conditions, or from effects to causes. These terms also have other meanings, but not in Spinoza.
15, 6ff. The underlying thought is expressed in Spinoza's Principia Philosophic? Cartesiancz, I. Def. ix. " When we say that something is contained in the nature or concept of a certain thing, that is the same as saying that it is true of that thing, or that it can be truly affirmed of that thing."
15, 7. The word "nature" here means "character" or " essence." More commonly it means the material world, or (in Spinoza and Bruno, e.g.) even the entire universe. Note t was intended to guard against this ambiguity.
15, 13. "Essence" is one of the most difficult terms in Spinoza's vocabulary. In the Cogitata Metaphysica it is said to be " nothing else than that mode by which created objects are comprehended in the attributes of God." Briefly, the essence of a thing is its share of, or participation in, ultimate reality. In the case of God, essence and exist ence coincide. In the case of other things their existence as relatively independent entities is distinct from their essence.
" Eternity," in its stricter sense, does not mean " incessant duration in time," but reality independently of time or beyond it.
15, 1 6. "The existence of God is essence." Compare Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed, I. Ivii. — " It is known that existence is an accident [ = quality] appertaining to all 168 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING things, and therefore an element superadded to their essence. This must evidently be the case as regards everything the existence of which is due to some cause; its existence is an element superadded to its essence. But as regards a being whose existence is not due to any cause — God alone is that being, for His existence, as we have said, is absolute — existence and essence are perfectly identical. He is not a substance to which existence is joined as an accident, as an additional element. His existence is always absolute, and has never been a new element or an accident in Him" (Friedlander's translation, 2nd ed., p. 80).
15, 21 /. Such merely verbal alternations show that the Treatise was never properly edited. Cf. 25, 31.
The illustration is the same as in Descartes' fifth Medita tion.
16, 2. The reference-mark t is apparently misplaced, because the note referred to really follows up the preceding a priori arguments, and therefore belongs to 15, 17.
16, 3. Fonnaliter = actually or objectively (in the modern sense). The identification of fonnalis and actualis in medieval philosophy was due to the influence of Aristo- telianism. According to Aristotle, individual things are compounds of Matter and Form, and Form is the more important of the two. Matter is the as yet imperfect or the merely potential, which requires Form to make it actual. Hence during the supremacy of Aristotelian philosophy in the Middle Ages, Matter was identified with Potentiality, and Form with Actuality, so that j or malls = actualis.
16, 9. " Objective " = in thought, or subjectively (in the modern sense). The present use of the terms "subjective" and " objective" is the reverse of former usage. By " subject" (subjectum = VTTOKZIJULWOV) used to be meant the substrate or concrete reality supporting or " underlying " its properties, and hence also the subject of predication, because in predication these properties or qualities are COMMENTARY 169 COMMENTARY 169 generally predicated of their " subject." (For an illustra tion of the older use of the term "subject," see, e.g., 18, 23). By " object" (objectum = OLVTIKSIIULWOV), on the other hand, was meant something which consisted in " lying opposite" or before the mind (quatenus objicitur intellcctui), so that "objective " referred only to the sphere of thought. This usage is already met with in the writings of Duns Scotus (died 1308), and continued, with some modifications, right into the eighteenth century — Berkeley, e.g., still used " real " as an antithesis to " objective." The noun " object " (objectum) acquired its present meaning long before the adjective did. Already Descartes used to term " objects " for " things" (" in objectis, hoc est in rebus." — Principia Phil.). The transition to the present meaning of " subjective " was probably brought about by the<application of the term subjec- tum to the soul as distinguished from (or as the bearer of) its " objective " ideas. (Leibniz, e.g., used the expression: " subjectwm ou Tame meme.") Hence '• subjective" came to indicate whatever had reference to the soul.
16, 29 ff. The text is obscure and most probably corrupt. " Want de Idea en bestaat niet materialiter van de eigen- schap die tot dit \veezen behoort, alzo dat net geen 't welk bevestigt wordt, en is noch van de zaak noch van dat geen 't welk van de zaak bevestigt word;..." Sigwart translates as though " van de eigenschap " followed imme diately after "Idea"— " the Idea of the attribute which belongs to this being does not exist materialiter..." Freudenthal has suggested the insertion of "van de Idea" between " het geen 't welk" and "bevestigt" — "so that that which is affirmed [of the Idea] is..." But the note remains obscure. Perhaps the meaning intended was this. The ontological argument maintains that the essence of God involves His existence, or (expressed more generally) that the essential attributes of a certain Ideatum [=the object represented by an idea] imply the presence of yet 170 GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING