30 egere claritudine quam sibi praestare non possit atque ob id aliqua ex parte uideatur abiectius." "Non possum," inquam, " quin hoc uti est ita etiam cele- berrimum esse confitear." "Consequens igitur est ut claritudinem superioribus tribus nihil differre fatea- 35 mur." "Consequitur," inquam. " Quod igitur nullius egeat alieni, quod suis cuncta uiribus possit, quod sit clarum atque reuerendum, nonne hoc etiam constat esse laetissimum? " " Sed unde huic," inquam, " tali maerorullusobrepatne cogi tare quid em possum; quare 40 plenum esse laetitiae, si quidem superiora manebunt, necesse est confiteri." " Atqui illud quoque per eadem necessarium est sufficientiae, potentiae, clari- tudinis, reuerentiae, iucunditatis nomina quidem esse diuersa, nullo modo uero discrepare substantiam."
45 " Necesse est," inquam. " Hoc igitur quod est unum simplexque natura, prauitas humana dispertit et dum rei quae partibus caret partem conatur adipisci, nee portionem quae nulla est nee ipsam quam minime affectat assequitur." " Quonam," inquam, " modo? " 50"Qui diuitias," inquit, "petit penuriae fuga, de potentia nihil laborat, uilis obscurusque esse mauult, multas etiam sibi naturales quoque subtrahit uolup- 258 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
other things?" "There can be no doubt of this/' quoth I. " Let us add respect then to sufficiency and power, so that we judge these three to be one." " We must add it if we confess the truth."
"What now," quoth she, " thinkest thou this to be obscure and base, or rather most excellent and famous? Consider whether that which thou hast granted to want nothing, to be most potent, and most worthy of honour, may seem to want fame, which it cannot yield itself, and for that cause be in some respect more abject." " I must needs confess," quoth I, "that, being what it is, this is also most famous." " Consequently then we must acknowledge that fame differeth nothing from the former three." "We must so," quoth I. "WTherefore that which wanteth nothing, which can perform all things by its own power, which is famous and respected, is it not manifest that it is also most pleasant.? " To which I answered: " How such a man should fall into any grief, I can by no means imagine. Wherefore if that which we have said hitherto be true, we must needs confess that he is most joyful and content." "And by the same reason it followeth that sufficiency, power, fame, respect, pleasure have indeed divers names, but differ not in substance." "It followeth indeed," quoth I. "This then, which is one and simple by nature, man's wickedness divideth, and while he endeavoureth to obtain part of that which hath no parts, he neither getteth a part, which is none, nor the whole, which he seeketh not after." "How is this?" quoth I. " He who seeketh after riches/' quoth she, "to avoid want, taketh no thought for power, he had rather be base and obscure, he depriveth himself even of many natural pleasures that he may not lose the 259 BOETHII tates, ne pecuniam quam parauit amittat. Sed hoc modo ne sufficientia quidem oontingit ei quern 65 ualentia deserit, quern molestia pungit, quern uilitas abicit, quern recondit obscuritas. Qui uero solum posse desiderat, profligat opes, despicit uoluptates honoremque potentia carentem gloriam quoque nihili pendit. Sed lumc quoque quam multa deficiant 60 uides. Fit enim ut aliquando necessariis egeat, ut anxietatibus mordeatur cumque haec depellere nequeat, etiam id quod maxime petebat potens esse desistat. Similiter ratiocinari de honoribus, gloria, uoluptatibus licet. Nam cum unumquodque horum 65 idem quod cetera sit, quisquis horum aliquid sine ceteris petit, ne illud quidem quod desiderat appre- hendit." "Quid igitur? " inquam. "Si qui cuncta simul cupiat adipisci, summam quidem ille beatitu- dinis uelit. Sed num in his earn reperiet, quae demon- 70 strauimus id quod pollicentur non posse conferre? " " Minime," inquam. " In his igitur quae singula quaedam expetendorum praestare creduntur, beati- tudo nullo modo uestiganda est." " Fateor," in quam, "et hoc nihil dici uerius potest." " Habes 75 igitur," inquit, " et formam falsae felicitatis et causas. Deflecte nunc in aduersum mentis intuitum; ibi enim ueram quam promisimus statim uidebis." " Atqui haec," inquam, " uel caeco perspicua est eamque tu paulo ante monstrasti, dum falsae causas 80 aperire conaris. Nam nisi fallor ea uera est et perfecta felicitas quae sufficientem, potentem, reueren- dum, celebrem laetumque perficiat. Atque ut me interius animaduertisse cognoscas, quae unum horum, 260 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
money which he hath gotten. But by this means he attaineth not to sufficiency, whom power forsaketh, whom trouble molesteth, whom baseness maketh abject, whom obscurity overwhelmeth. Again, he that only desireth power, consumeth wealth, despiseth pleasures, and setteth light by honour or glory, which is not potent. But thou seest how many things are wanting to this man also. For sometimes he wanteth necessaries, and is perplexed with anxieties, and being not able to rid himself, ceaseth to be powerful, which was the only thing he aimed at. The like discourse may be made of honours, glory, pleasures. For since every one of these things is the same with the rest, whosoever seeketh for any of them without the rest obtaineth not that which he desireth." "What then?" quoth I. "If one should desire to have them all together, he should wish for the sum of happiness, but shall he find it in these things which we have showed cannot perform what they promise? " " No," quoth I. " Wherefore we must by no means seek for happiness in these things which are thought to afford the several portions of that which is to be desired." "I confess it," quoth I, "and nothing can be more true than this." "Now then," quoth she, " thou hast both the form and causes of false felicity; cast but the eyes of thy mind on the contrary, and thou shalt presently espy true happiness, which we promised to show thee." "This," quoth 1, "is evident, even to him that is blind, and thou showedst it a little before, while thou endeavouredst to lay open the causes of the false. For, if I be not deceived, that is true and perfect happiness which maketh _a man sufficient, potent, respected, Jtamgus, joyful.. And that thou mayest know that I understood thee aright, that 261 BOETHII quoniam idem cuncta sunt, ueraciter praestare potest 85 hanc esse plenam beatitudinem sine ambiguitate cognosce." "O te alumne hac opinione felicem, si quidem hoc," inquit, " adieceris..." " Quidnam? " inquam. "Essene aliquid in his mortalibus caducisque rebus putas quod huiusmodi statum possit afferre? " 90 " Minime," inquam, " puto idque a te, nihil ut amplius desideretur, ostensum est." " Haec igitur uel imagines ueri boni uel inperfecta quaedam bona dare mortalibus uidentur, uerum autem atque perfectum bonum conferre non possunt." " Assentior," in- 95 quam. " Quoniam igitur agnouisti quae uera ilia sit, quae autem beatitudinem mentiantur, nunc superest ut unde ueram bane petere possis agnoscas." "Id quidem," inquam, " iam dudum uehementer exspecto."
" Sed cum, ut in Timaeo l Platoni," inquit, "nostro 100 placet, in minimis quoque rebus diuinum praesidium debeat implorari, quid nunc faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem reperire mereamur? " " Inuocandum," inquam, " rerum omnium patrem, quo praetermisso nullum rite fundatur exordium."
105 " Recte," inquit, ac simul ita modulata est.
IX.
" O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas TeiTarum caelique sator qui tempus ab aeuo Ire iubes stabilisque martens das cuncta moueri, Quern non externae pepulerunt fingere causae 1 uti Timaeo codd. optimi.
~* Cf. Tim. 27.
6 This poem is a masterly abridgment of the first part of the Timaeus, and was eagerly fastened on by commen tators of the early Middle Ages whose direct knowledge of Plato was confined to the translation of that dialogue by Chalcidius. 262 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
which can truly perform any one of these because they are all one, I acknowledge to be full and perfect happiness." "O my scholar, I think thee happy by having this opinion, if thou addest this also." " What? " quoth I. " Dost thou imagine that there is any mortal or frail thing which can cause this happy estate?" "I do not," quoth I, "and that hath been so proved by thee, that more cannot be desired." "Wherefore these things seem to afford men the images of the true good, or certain unperfect goods, but they cannot give them the true and perfect good itself." "I am of the same mind," quoth I. "Now then, since thou knowest wherein true happi ness consisteth, and what have only a false show of it, it remaineth that thou shouldst learn where thou mayest seek for this which is true." "This is that," quoth I, " which I have long earnestly expected." " But since, as Plato teacheth (in Timaeus),a we must implore God's assistance even in our least affairs, what, thinkest thou, must we do now, that we may deserve to find the seat of that sovereign good?" "We must," quoth I, " invocate the Father of all things, without whose remembrance no beginning hath a good foundation." "Thou sayest rightly," quoth she, and withal sung in this sort.
IX."
IX."
" O Thou, that dost the world in lasting order guide, Father of heaven and earth, Who makest time swiftly slide, And, standing still Thyself, yet fram'st all moving laws, Who to Thy work wert moved by no external cause: 263 BOETHII 5 Materiae fluitantis opus., uerum insita summi Forma boni liuore carens, tu cuncta superno Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse Mundum mente gerens similique in imagine formans Perfectasque iubens perfectum absoluere partes.
10 Tu numeris elementa ligas ut frigora flammis Arida conueniant liquidis, ne purior ignis Euolet aut mersas deducant pondera terras. Tu triplicis mediam naturae cuncta mouentem Conectens animam per consona membra resoluis.
15 Quae cum secta duos motum glomerauit in orbes, In semet reditura meat mentemque profundam Circuit et simili conuertit imagine caelum. Tu causis animas paribus uitasque minores Prouehis et leuibus sublimes curribus aptans 20 In caelum terramque seris quas lege benigna Ad te conuersas reduci facis igne reuerti. Da pater augustam menti conscendere sedem, Da fontem lustrare boni, da luce reperta In te conspicuos animi defigere uisus. 264 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
But by a sweet desire, where envy hath no place, Thy goodness moving Thee to give each thing his grace, Thou dost all creatures' forms from highest patterns take, From Thy fair mind the world fair like Thyself doth make. Thus Thou perfect the whole perfect each part dost frame. Thou temp'rest elements, making cold mixed with flame And dry things join with moist, lest fire away should fly, Or earth, opprest with weight, buried too low should lie.
Thou in consenting parts fitly disposed hast Th' all-moving soul in midst of threefold nature placed, Which, cut in several parts that run a different race, Into itself returns, and circling doth embrace The highest mind, and heaven with like proportion drives. Thou with like cause dost make the souls and lesser lives, Fix them in chariots swift, and widely scatterest O'er heaven and earth; then at Thy fatherly behest They stream, like fire returning, back to Thee, their God. Dear Father, let my mind Thy hallowed seat ascend, Let me behold the spring of grace and find Thy light, That I on Thee may fix my soul's well cleared sight.
265 BOETHI1 25 Dissice terrenae nebulas et pondera molis Atque tuo splendore mica! Tu namque serenum, Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis, Principium, uector, dux, semita, terminus idem.
X.
Quoniam igitur quae sit imperfecti, quae etiam perfecti boni forma uidisti, nunc demonstrandum reor quonam haec felicitatis perfectio constituta sit. In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquod 6 huiusmodi bonum quale paulo ante definisti in rerum natura possit exsistere, ne nos praeter rei subiectae ueritatem cassa cogitationis imago decipiat. Sed quin exsistat sitque hoc ueluti quidam omnium fons bonorum negari nequit. Omne enim quod 10 inperfectum esse dicitur, id inminutione perfecti inperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere inperfectum quid esse uideatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit. Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud quod inper- 15 fectum perhibetur exstiterit ne fingi quidem potest. Neque enim ab deminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum coepit exordium, sed ab iiitegris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema atque effeta dilabitur. Quod si, uti paulo ante monstrauimus, est quaedam 20 boni fragilis inperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non potest dubitari." " Firmissime," inquam, " uerissimeque conclusum est." " Quo uero," inquit, " habitet, ita considera. Deum rerum omnium principem bonum esse communis humanorum con- <* Cf. the string of nouns in Tr. iv. (supra, p. 70 ad fin.). 266 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
Cast off the earthly weight wherewith I am opprest, Shine as Thou art most bright, Thou only calm and rest To pious men whose end is to behold Thy ray, Who their beginning art, their guide, their bound, and way.* X.
Wherefore since thou hast seen what is the form of perfect and imperfect good, now I think we must show in what this perfection of happiness is placed. And inquire first whether there can be any such good extant in the world, as thou hast defined; lest, contrary to truth, we be deceived with an empty show of thought. But it cannot be denied that there is some such thing extant which is as it were the fountain of all goodness. For all that is said to be imperfect is so termed for the want it hath of per fection. Whence it followeth that if in any kind we find something imperfect, there must needs be something perfect also in the same kind. For if we take away perfection we cannot so much as devise how there should be any imperfection. For the nature of things began not from that which is defective and not complete, but, proceeding from entire and absolute, falleth into that which is extreme and enfeebled. But ff, as we showed before, there be a certain imperfect felicity of frail goods, it cannot be doubted but that there is some solid and perfect happiness also." "Thou hast," quoth I, "concluded most firmly and most truly." " Now where this good dwelleth," quoth she, " con sider this. The common conceit of men's minds proveth that God the Prince of all things is good.
267 BOETHII 25 ceptio probat animorum. Nam cum nihil deo melius excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est bonum esse quis dubitet? Ita uero bonum esse deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse conuincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium 30 princeps esse non poterit. Erit enim eo praestan- tius aliquid perfectum possidens bonum, quod hoc prius atque antiquius esse uideatur; omnia namque perfecta minus integris priora esse claruerunt. Quare ne in infinitum ratio prodeat, confitendum est sum- 35 mum deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissi- mum. Sed perfectum bonum ueram esse beatitudinem constituimus; ueram igitur beatitudinem in summo deo sitam esse necesse est." "Accipio," inquam, "nee est quod contradici ullo modo queat." "Sed 40 quaeso," inquit, " te uide quam id sancte atque inuiolabiliter probes quod boni summi surnmum deum diximus esse plenissimum." " Quonam," inquam, "modo?" " Ne hunc rerum omnium patrcrn illud summum bonum quo plenus esse perhibetur uel 45 extrinsecus accepisse uel ita naturaliter habere prae- sumas, quasi habentis dei habitaeque beatitudinis diuersam cogites esse substantiam. Nam si extrin secus acceptum putes, praestantius id quod dederit ab eo quod acceperit existimare possis. Sed hunc 60 esse rerum omnium praecellentissimum dignissime confitemur. Quod si natura quidem inest, sed est ratione diuersum, cum de rerum principe loquamur deo, fingat qui potest: quis haec diuersa coniunxerit? Postremo quod a qualibet re diuersum est, id non 56 est illud a quo intellegitur esse diuersum. Quare 268 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. 111.
For, since nothing- can be imagined butter than God, who doubteth but that is good than which is nothing better? And reason doth in such sort demonstrate God to be good that it convinceth Him to be perfectly good. For unless He were so, He could not be the chief of all things. For there would be something better than He, having perfect goodness, which could seem to be of greater antiquity and eminence than He. For it is already manifest that perfect tilings were before the im perfect. Wherefore, lest our reasoning should have no end, we must confess that the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign and perfect goodness. But we have concluded that perfect goodness is true happi ness, wherefore true blessedness must necessarily be placed in the most high God." "I agree," quoth I, "neither can this be any way contradicted." "But I pray thee," quoth she, "see how boldly and inviolably thou approvest that which we said, that ' the Sovereign God is most full of sovereign goodness." "How?" quoth I. "That thou presumest not that this Father of all things hath either received from others that sovereign good with which He is said to l)e replenished, or hath it naturally in such sort that thou shouldst think that the substance of the blessedness which is had, and of God who hath it, were diverse. For if thou thinkest that He had it from others, thou mayest also infer that he who gave it was better than the receiver. But we most worthily confess that He is the most excellent of all things. And if He hath it by nature, but as a diverse thing, since we speak of God the Prince of all things, let him that can, invent who united these diverse things. Finally, that which is different from anything, is not that from which it is understood to 269 BOETHII quod a summo bono diuersum est sui natura, id summum bonum non est — quod nefas est de eo cogitare quo nihil constat esse praestantius. Omnino enim nullius rei natura suo principle melior poterit 60 exsistere, quare quod omnium principium sit, id etiam sui substantia summum esse bonum uerissima ratione concluserim." " Rectissime," inquam. " Sed summum bonum beatitudinem esse concessum est." "Ita est," inquam. "Igitur," inquit, "deum esse 65 ipsam beatitudinem necesse est confiteri." " Nee propositis," inquam, " prioribus refragari queo et illis hoc inlatum consequens esse perspicio."
" Respice/' inquit, " an hinc quoque idem firmius approbetur, quod duo summa bona quae a se diuersa 70 sint esse non possunt. Etenim quae discrepant bona, non esse alterum quod sit alterum liquet; quare neutrum poterit esse perfectum, cum alterutri alterum deest. Sed quod perfectum non sit, id summum non esse manifestum est; nullo modo igitur 75 quae summa sunt bona ea possunt esse diuersa. Atqui et beatitudinem et deum sumrnum bonum esse collegimus; quare ipsam necesse est suinmam esse beatitudinem quae sit summa diuinitas." " Nihil," inquam, "nee reapse uerius1 nee ratiocinatione firmius 80 nee deo dignius concludi potest." " Super haec," inquit, " igitur ueluti geometrae solent demonstratis propositis aliquid inferre quae porismata ipsi uocant, ita ego quoque tibi ueluti corollarium dabo. Nam quoniam beatitudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati, 85 beatitude uero est ipsa diuinitas, diuinitatis adeptione 1 reapse uerius Schfpss; re ab seuerius uel re ipsa uerius codd. opt.
<* Vide supra, Tr. iii. p. 40. 270 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
differ. Wherefore that which is naturally different from the sovereign good, is not the sovereign good itself. Which it were impious to think of God, than whom, we know certainly, nothing is better. For doubtless the nature of nothing can be better than the beginning of it. Wherefore I may most truly con clude that which is the beginning of all things to be also in His own substance the chlefest good." " Most rightly," quoth I. " But it is granted that the chiefest good is blessedness? " " It is," quoth I. " Wherefore," quoth she, " we must needs confess that blessedness itself _ is jGqd/' "I can neither contradict," quoth I, " thy former propositions, and I see this illation followeth from them."
" Consider," saith she, " if the same be not more firmly proved hence, because there cannot be two chief goods, the one different from the other. For it is manifest that of those goods which differ, the one is not the other, wherefore neither of them can be perfect, wanting the other. But manifestly that which is not perfect, is not the chiefest, wherefore the chief goods cannot be diverse. Now we have proved that both blessedness and God are the chiefest good, wherefore that must needs be the highest blessedness which is the highest divinity." " There can be nothing," quoth I, " concluded more truly than this, nor more firmly in arguing, nor more worthy God himself." " Upon this then," quoth she, "as the geometricians" are wont, out of their propositions which they have demonstrated, to infer something which they call porismata (deduc tions) so will I give thee as it were a corollanum. For since that men are made blessed by the obtaining of blessedness, and blessedness is nothing- else but divinity, it is manifest that men are made 271 BOETHII 271 BOETHII beatos fieri manifestum est: sed uti iustitiae adep- tione iusti, sapientiae sapientes fiunt, ita diuinitatem adeptos deos fieri simili ratione necesse est. Omnis igitur beatus deus, sed natura quidem unus; participa- 90 tione uero nihil prohibet esse quam plurimos." "Et pulchrum," inquam, "hoc atque pretiosum, siue porisma siue corollarium uocari rnauis." " Atqui hoc quoque pulchrius nihil est, quod his annectendum esse ratio persuadet." "Quid?" inquam. 95 " Cum multa/' inquit, " beatitudo continere uidea- tur, utrumne haec oinnia unum ueluti corpus beati- tudinis quadam partium uarietate coniungant an sit eorum aliquid quod beatitudinis substantiam com- pleat, ad hoc uero cetera referantur?" " Vellem," 100 inquam, " id ipsarum rerum commemoratione pate- faceres." " Nonne," inquit, " beatitudinem bonum esse censemus? " "Ac summum quidem," inquam. "Addas," inquit, "hoc omnibus licet. Nam eadem sufficientia summa est, eadem summa potentia, reue- 105 rentia quoque, claritas ac uoluptas beatitudo esse iudicatur. Quid igitur? Haecine omnia bonum — sufficientia potentia ceteraque — ueluti quaedam beatitudinis membra sunt an ad bonum ueluti ad uerticem cuncta referuntur? " " Intellego," inquam, 110 "quid intiestigandum proponas, sed quid constituas audire desidero." " Cuius discretionem rei sic accipe. Si haec omnia beatitudinis membra forent, a se quoque inuicem discreparent. Haec est eiiim partium natura ut unum corpus diuersa componant. Atqui 115 haec omnia idem esse monstrata sunt; minime igitur membra sunt. Alioquin ex uno membro beatitudo uidebitur esse coniuncta — quod fieri nequit." "Id quidem," inquam, "dubium non est, sed id quod 272 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. III.
blessed by the obtaining of divinity. And as men are made just by the obtaining of justice, and wise by the obtaining of wisdom, so they who obtain divinity must needs in like manner become gods. Wherefore everyone that is blessed is a god, but by nature there is only _pne__God; but there jmay be many Jjy participation." "This is," quoth I, " an excellent and precious porisma or corollarium." " But there is nothing more excellent than that which reason persuadeth us to add." " What? " quoth I.
" Since/' quoth she, " blessedness seemeth to con tain many things, whether do they all concur as divers parts to the composition of one entire body of blessed ness, or doth some one of them form the substance of blessedness to which the rest are to be referred? " " I desire," quoth I, " that thou wouldst declare this point, by the enumeration of the particulars." " Do we not think," quoth she, " that blessedness is good? " ' Yea, the chiefest good," quoth I. " Thou mayest," quoth she, " add this to them all. For blessedness is accounted the chiefest sufficiency, the chiefest power, respect, fame, and pleasure. What then? Are all these — sufficiency, power, and the rest — the good, in the sense that they are members of it, or rather are they referred to good as to the head? " "I under stand," quoth I, " what thou proposest, but I desire to hear what thou concludest." " This is the decision of this matter. If all these were members of blessed ness, they should differ one from another. For this is the nature of parts, that being divers they compose one body. But we have proved that all these are one arid the same thing. Wherefore they are no members, otherwise blessedness should be compacted of one member, which cannot be." " There is no doubt of this," quoth I, " but I expect that which is K 273 BOETHII restat exspecto." " Ad bonum uero cetera referri 120 palam est. Idcirco enim sufficientia petitur quoniam bonum esse iudicatur, idcirco potentia quoniam id quoque esse creditur bonum; idem de reuerentia, claritudine, iucunditate coniectare licet. Omnium igitur expetendorum summa atque causa bonum 125 est. Quod enim neque re neque similitudine ullum in se retinet bonum, id expeti nullo modo potest. Contraque etiam quae natura bona non sunt, tamen si esse uideantur, quasi uere bona sint appetuntur. Quo fit uti summa, cardo atque causa expetendorum 130 omnium bonitas esse iure credatur. Cuius uero causa quid expetitur, id maxime uidetur optari, ueluti si salutis causa quispiam uelit equitare, non tarn equitandi motum desiderat quam salutis effectum. Cum igitur omnia boni gratia petantur, non ilia 135 potius quam bonum ipsum desideratur ab omnibus. Sed propter quod cetera optantur, beatitudinem esse concessimus; quare sic quoque sola quaeritur beati tude. Ex quo liquido apparet ipsius boni et beati- tudinis unam atque eandem esse substantiam."