309 BOETHII tissimum esse censeres, ita eum qui expetendorurn 90 finem quo nihil ultra est apprehendit, potentissimum necesse est iudices. Ex quo fit quod huic obiacet, ut idem scelesti, idem uiribus omnibus uideantur esse deserti. Cur enim relicta uirtute uitia sectantur? Inscitiane bonorum? Sed quid eneruatius ignorantiae 95 caecitate? An sectanda nouerunt? Sed transuersos eos libido praecipitat. Sic quoque intemperantia fragiles qui obluctari uitio nequeunt. An scientes uolentesque bonum deserunt, ad uitia deflectunt? Sed hoc modo non solum potentes esse sed omnino 100 esse desinunt. Nam qui communem omnium quae sunt finem relinquunt, pariter quoque esse desistunt. Quod quidem cuipiam mirum forte uideatur, ut malos, qui plures hominum sunt, eosdem non esse dicamus; sed ita sese res habet. Nam qui mail sunt eos malos 105 esse non abnuo; sed eosdem esse pure atque sim- pliciter nego.
Nam uti cadauer hominem mortuum dixeris, simpliciter uero hominem appellate non pcvssis, ita uitiosos malos quidem esse concesserim, sed esse 110 absolute nequeam confiteri. Est enim quod ordinem retinet seruatque naturam; quod uero ab hac deficit, esse etiam quod in sua natura situm est derelinquit. 'Sed possunt,' inquies, cmali.' Ne ego quidem negauerim, sed haec eorum potentia non a uiribus 115 sed ab imbecillitate descendit. Possunt enim mala quae minime ualerent, si in bonorum efficientia manere potuissent. Qua« possibilitas eos euidentius nihil posse demonstrat. Nam si, uti paulo ante collegimus, malum nihil est, cum mala tantummodo 310 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
force judge him most powerful who obtaineth the end of all that can be desired, beyond which there is nothing. Hence that which " is opposite also followeth, that the same men are wicked and destitute of all forces. For why do they follow vices, forsaking virtues? By ignorance of that which is good? But what is more' devoid of strength than blind ignorance? Or do they know what they should embrace, but passion driveth them headlong the contrary way? So also intemperance makes them frail, since they cannot strive against vice. Or do they wittingly and willingly forsake goodness, and decline to vices? But in this sort they leave not only to be powerful, but even to be at al'l. For they which leave the common end of all things which are, leave also being. Which may perhaps seem strange to some, that we should say that evil men are not at all, who are the greatest part of men: but yet it is so. For I deny not that evil men are evil, but withal I say that purely and simply they are not.
For as tliou mayest call a carcase a dead man, but not simply a man, so 1 confess that the vicious are evil, but T cannot grant that they are absolutely. For that is which retaineth order, and keepeth nature, but that which faileth from this leaveth also to be that which is in his own nature. But them wilt say that evil men can do many things, neither will I deny it, but this their power proceedeth not from forces but from weakness. For they can do evil, which they could not do if they could have remained in the performance of that which is good. Which possibility declareth more evidently that they can do nothing. For if, as we concluded a little before, eyiljsjjothingj since they can only do evil, i( 311 BOETHII 120 possint, nihil posse improbos liquet." " Perspicuum est." " Atque ut intellegas quaenam sit huius potentiae uis, summo bono nihil potentius esse paulo ante definiuimus." " Ita est," inquam. " Sed idem/' inquit, " facere malum nequit." " Minime." " Est 125 igitur/' inquit, " aliquis qui omnia posse homines putet?" " Nisi quis insaniat, nemo." " Atqui idem possunt mala." " Vtinam quidem," inquam, "non possent." " Cum igitur bonorum tantnmmodo potens possit omnia, non uero queant omnia potentes etiam 130 malorum, eosdem qui mala possunt minus posse mani- festum est. Hue accedit quod omnem potentiam inter expetenda numerandam omniaque expetenda referri ad bonum uelut ad quoddam naturae suae cacumen ostendimus. Sed patrandi sceleris possi- 135 bilitas referri ad bonurn non potest; expetenda igitur non est. Atqui omnis potentia expetenda est; liquet igitur malorum possibilitatem non esse potentiam. Ex quibus omnibus bonorum quidem potentia, malorum uero minime dubitabilis apparet 140 infirmitas ueramque illam Platonis esse sententiam liquet solos quod desiderent facere posse sapientes, improbos uero exercere quidem quod libeat, quod uero desiderent explere non posse. Faciunt enirn quaelibet, dum per ea quibus delectantur id bonum 145 quod desiderant se adepturos putant; sed minime adipiscuntur, quoniam ad beatitudinem probra non ueniunt, CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
is manifest that the wicked can do nothing." "It is most manifest." "And that thou mayest under stand what the force of this power is; we determined a little before that there is nothing more powerful than the Sovereign Goodness." "It is true," quoth I. "But He cannot, do evil.' "No." "Is there any then/' quoth she, " that think that men can do all things? " " No man, except he be mad, thinketh so." " Hut yet men can do evil." " I would to God they could not," quoth I. "Since therefore he that can only do good, can do all things, and they who can do evil, cannot do all things, it is manifest that they which can do evil are less potent. Moreover, we have proved that all power is to be accounted among those things which are to be wished for, and that all such things have reference to goodness, as to the very height of their nature. Hut the possibility of committing wickedness cannot have reference to goodness. Wherefore it is not to be wished for. Yet all power is to be wished for; and consequently it is manifest, possibility of evil is no power. By all which the power of the good and the undoubted infirmity of evil appeareth. And it is manifest that the sentence of Plato is true: that only wise men can do that which they desire, and that the wicked men practise indeed what they list, but cannot perform what they would. For they do what they list, thinking to obtain the good which they desire by those things which cause them delight; but they obtain it not, because shameful action cannot arrive to happiness."
L2 313 BOETHII II.
Quos uides sedere celsos solii culmine reges Purpura claros nitente saeptos tristibus armis Ore toruo comminantes rabie cordis anhelos, Detrahat si quis superbis uani tegmina cultus, 6 lam uidebit intus artas dominos ferre catenas. Hinc enim libido uersat auidis corda uenenis, Hinc flagellat ira mentem fluctus turbida tollens Maeror aut captos fatigat aut spes lubrica torquet Ergo cum caput tot unum cernas ferre tyrannos, 10 Non facit quod optat ipse dominis pressus iniquis.
III.
Videsne igitur quanto in caeno probra uoluantur, qua probitas luce resplendeat? In quo perspicuum est numquam bonis praemia numquam sua sceleribus deesse supplicia. Rerum etenim quae geruntur illud 5 propter quod unaquaeque res geritur, eiusdem rei praemium esse non iniuria uideri potest, uti currendi in stadio propter quam curritur iacet praemium corona. Sed beatitudinem esse idem ipsum bonum 314 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV. II.
The kings whom \ve behold In highest glory placed, And with rich purple graced, Compassed with soldiers bold; Whose countenance shows fierce threats, Who with rash fury chide, If any strip the pride From their vainglorious feats; He'll see them close oppressed Within by galling chains.
For filthy lust there reigns And poisoneth their breast, Wrath often them perplexeth Raising their minds like waves, Sorrow their power enslaves And sliding hope them vexeth.
So many tyrants still Dwelling in one poor heart, Except they first depart She cannot have her will.
III.
Seest thou then in what mire wickedness wallows, and how clearly honesty shineth? By which it is manifest that the good are never without rewards, nor the evil without punishments. For in all things that are done that for which anything is done may deservedly seem the reward of that action, as to him that runneth a race, the crown for which he runneth is proposed as a reward. But we have showed that blessedness is the selfsame goodness for which all 315 BOETHII propter quod omnia geruntur ostendimus. Est igitur 10 humanis actibus ipsum bonum ueluti praemium commune propositum. Atqui hoc a bonis non potest separari neque enim bonus ultra iure uocabitur qui careat bono; quare probos mores sua praemia non relinquunt. Quantumlibet igitur saeuiant mali, 15 sapienti tamen corona non decidet, non arescet. Neque enim probis animis proprium decus aliena decerpit improbitas. Quod si extrinsecus accepto laetaretur, poterat hoc uel alius quispiam uel ipse etiam qui contulisset auferre; sed quoniam id sua 20 cuique probitas confert, turn suo praemio carebit, cum probus esse desierit. Postremo cum omne praemium idcirco appetatur quoniam bonum esse creditur, quis boni compotem praemii iudicet ex- pertem? At cuius praemii? Omnium pulcherrimi 25 maximique. Memento etenim corollarii illius quod paulo ante praecipuum dedi ac sic collige: cum ipsum bonum beatitude sit, bonos omnes eo ipso quod boni sint fieri beatos liquet. Sed qui beati sint deos esse coimenit. Est igitur praemium bonorum quod nullus 30 deterat dies, nullius minuat potestas, nullius fuscet improbitas, deos fieri. Quae cum ita sint, de malorum quoque inseparabili poena dubitare sapiens nequeat. Nam cum bonum malumque item poenae atque prae mium aduersa fronte dissideant, quae in boni praemio 35 uidemus accedere eadem necesse est in mali poena contraria parte respondeant. Sicut igitur probis probitas ipsa fit praemium, ita improbis nequitia ipsa CONSOLAT. PHJI.OROPH. IV.
things are done. Wherefore this goodness is pro posed as a common reward for all human actions, and this cannot be separated from those who are good. For he shall not rightly be any longer called good, who wanteth goodness; wherefore virtuous manners are not left without their due rewards. And how much so ever the evil do rage, yet the wise man's crown will not fade nor wither. For others' wickedness depriveth not virtuous minds of their proper glory. But if he should rejoice at any thing which he hath from others, either lie who gave it, or any other might take it away. But because every man's virtue is the cause of it, then only he shall want his reward when he leaveth to be virtuous. Lastly, since every reward is therefore desired because it is thought to be good, who can judge him to be devoid of reward, which hath goodness for his possession? But what reward hath he? The most beautiful and the greatest that can be. For remember that corollarium a which I presented thee with a little before, as with a rare and precious jewel, and infer thus: Since that goodness itself is happiness, it is manifest that all good men even by being good are made happy- But we agreed that happy men are gods. Wherefore the reward I of good men, which no time can waste, no man's power diminish, no man's wickedness obscure, is to become gods. Which things being so, no wise man can any way doubt of the inseparable punish ment of the evil. For since goodness and evil, punishment and reward, are opposite the one to the other, those things which we see fall out in the reward of goodness must needs be answerable in a contrary manner in the punishment of evil. Where fore as to honest men honesty itself is a reward, so 317 BOETHI1 supplicium est. lam uero quisquis afficitur poena, malo se affectum esse non dubitat. Si igitur sese 40 ipsi aestimare uelint, possuntne sibi supplicii expertes uideri quos omnium malorum extrema nequitia non affecit modo uerum etiam uehementer infecit? Vide autem ex aduersa parte bonorum, quae improbos poena comitetur. Omne namque quod sit unum 45 esse ipsumque unum bonum esse paulo ante didicisti, cui consequens est ut omne quod sit id etiam bonum esse uideatur. Hoc igitur modo quidquid a bono deficit esse desistit; quo fit ut mali desinant esse quod fuerant, sed fuisse homines adhuc ipsa humani 50 corporis reliqua species ostentat. Quare uersi in malitiam humanam quoque amisere naturam. Sed cum ultra homines quemque prouehere sola probitas possit, necesse est ut quos ab humana condicione deiecit, infra hominis meritum detrudat improbitas.
55 Etienit igitur, ut quern transformatum uitiis uideas hominem aestimare non possis. Auai'itia feruet alienarum opum uiolentus ereptor? Lupi similem dixeris. Ferox atque inquies linguam litigiis exercet? Cani comparabis. Insidiator occultus subripuisse 60 fraudibus gaudet? Vulpeculis exaequetur. Irae in- temperans fremit? Leonis animum gestare credatur. Pauidus ac fugax non metuenda formidat? Ceruis similis habeatur. Segnis ac stupidus torpit? Asinum uiuit. Leuis atque inconstans studia permutat?
318 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
to the wicked their very wickedness is a punishment. And he that is punished doubteth not but that he is afflicted with the evil. Wherefore if they would truly consider their own estate, can they think themselves free from punishment, whom wickedness, the worst of all evils, doth not only touch but strongly infect? But weigh the punishment which accompanieth the wicked, by comparing it to the reward of the virtuous. For them learnedst not long before that whatsoever is at all is one, and that unity is goodness, by which it followeth that what- soever is must also be good. And in this manner, whatsoever falleth from goodness ceaseth to be, by which it followeth that evil men leave to be that which they were, but the shape of men, which they still retain, showeth them to have been men: wherefore by embracing wickedness they have lost the nature of men. But since virtue alone can exalt us above men, wickedness must needs cast those under the desert of men, which it hath bereaved of that condition. Wherefore thou canst not account him a man whom thou seest transformed by vices. Is the violent extorter of other men's goods carried away with his covetous desire? Thou mayest liken him to a wolf. Is the angry and unquiet man always contending and brawling? Thou mayest compare him to a dog. Doth the treacherous fellow rejoice that he hath deceived others with his hidden frauds? Let him be accounted no better than a fox. Doth the outrageous fret and fume? Let him be thought to have a lion's mind. Is the fearful and timorous afraid without cause? Let him be esteemed like to* hares and deer. Is the slow and stupid always idle? He liveth an ass's life. Doth the light and unconstant change his courses? He is nothing 319 BOETHII 65 Nihil auibus differt. Foedis inmundisque libidinibus immergitur? Sordidae suis uoluptate detinetur. Ita fit ut qui probitate deserta homo esse desierit, cum in diuinam condicionem transire non possit, uertatur in beluam.
III.
Vela Neritii ducis Et uagas pelago rates Eurus appulit insulae, Pulchra qua residens dea 5 Solis edita semine Miscet hospitibus nouis Tacta carmine pocula.
Quos ut in uarios modos Vertit herbipotens manus, 10 Hunc apri facies tegit, Ille Marmaricus leo Dente crescit et unguibus.
Hie lupis nuper additus, Flere dum parat, ululat. 15 Ille tigris ut Indica Tecta mitis obambulat.
Sed licet uariis malis Numen Arcadis alitis Obsitum miserans ducem 20 Peste soluerit hospitis, lam tamen mala remiges Ore pocula traxerant, lam sues Cerealia a Literally " Marniaric,"i.«. properly, the region between Egypt and the great Syrtis; generally, African, cf. Lucan iii. 293.
6 Literally, " rove tame round the house."
c i.e. Mercury who was born in Arcadia; cf. Virg.
Aen. viii. 129-138.
320 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
different from the birds. Is he drowned in filthy and unclean lusts? He is entangled in the pleasure of a stinking sow. So that he who, leaving virtue, I ceaseth to be a man, since he cannot be partaker of '. the divine condition, is turned into a beast.
III.
The sails which wise Ulysses bore, And ships which in the seas long time did stray The eastern wind drave to that shore Where the fair Goddess Lady Circe lay, Daughter by birth to Phoebus bright, Who with enchanted cups and charms did stay Her guests, deceived with their delight And into sundry figures them did change, Being most skilful in the might And secret force of herbs and simples strange; Some like to savage boars, and some Like lions fierce, which daily use to range Through Libya,*1 in tooth and claw become.
Others are changed to the shape and guise Of ravenous wolves, and waxing dumb Use howling in the stead of manly cries.
Others like to the tiger rove 6 Which in the scorched Indian desert lies.
And though the winged son of Jove c From these bewitched cups' delightful taste To keep the famous captain strove, Yet them the greedy mariners embraced With much desire, till turned to swine 321 BOETHII Glande pabula uerterant 25 Et nihil manet integrum Voce corpore perditis. Sola mens stabilis super Monstra quae patitur gemit. O leuem nimium manum 80 Nee potentia gramma, Membra quae ualeant licet, Corda uertere non ualent! Intus est hominum uigor Arce conditus abdita. 85 Haec uenena potentius Detrahunt hominem sibi Dira quae penitus meant Nee nocentia corpori Mentis uulnere saeuiunt."
IV.
Turn ego: " Fateor," inquam, "nee iniuria dici uideo uitiosos, tametsi human! corporis speciem seruent, in beluas tamen animorum qualitate mutari; sed quorum atrox scelerataque mens bonorum pernicie 5 saeuit, id ipsum eis licere noluissem." " Nee licet," inquit, " uti conuenienti monstrabitur loco. Sed tamen si id ipsum quod eis licere creditur auferatur, magna ex parte sceleratorum hominum poena releuetur. Etenim quod incredibile cuiquam forte 10 uideatur, infeliciores esse necesse est malos, cum cupita perfecerint, quam si ea quae cupiunt implere non possint. Nam si miserum est uoluisse praua, potuisse miserius est, sine quo uoluntatis miserae 322 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
Instead of bread they fed on oaken mast.
Ruined in voice and form., no sign Remains to them of any human grace; Only their minds unchanged repine To see their bodies in such ugly case.
O feeble hand and idle art Which, though it could the outward limbs deface, Yet had no force to change the heart.
For all the force of men given by God's arm Lies hidden in their inmost part.
The poisons therefore which within them swarm More deeply pierce, and with more might, For to the body though they do no harm, Yet on the soul they work their spite."
IV.
Then said I, " I confess and perceive that thou affirmest not without cause that the vicious, though they keep the outward shape of men, are in their inward state of mind changed into brute beasts. But I would have had them whose cruel and wicked heart rageth to the harm of the good, restrained from executing their malice." " They are restrained," quoth she, " as shall be proved in convenient place. But yet if this liberty which they seem to have be taken away, their punishment also is in great part released. For (which perhaps to some may seem incredible) evil men must necessarily be more unhappy when they have brought to pass their purposes than if they could not obtain what they desire. For if it be a miserable thing to desire that which is evil, it is more miserable to be able to perform it, without which the miserable will could 323 BOETHII langueret effectus. Itaque cum sua singulis miseria 15 sit, triplici infortunio necesse est urgeantur quos uideas scelus uelle, posse, perficere." " Accedo," inquam, " sed uti hoc infortunio cito careant patrandi sceleris possibilitate deserti uehementer exopto." "Carebunt," inquit, "ocius quam uel tu forsitari uelis 20 uel illi sese aestiment esse carituros. Neque enim est aliquid in tarn breuibus uitae metis ita serum quod exspectare longum immortalis praesertim animus putet: quorum magna spes et excelsa facinorum machina repentino atque insperato saepe fine de- 25 struitur, quod quidem illis miseriae modum statuit.
Nam si nequitia miseros facit, miserior sit necesse est diuturnior nequam; quos infelicissimos esse iudicarem, si non eorum malitiam saltern mors extrema finiret. Etenim si de prauitatis infortunio 30 uera conclusimus, infinitam liquet esse miseriam quam esse constat aeternam." Turn ego: " Mira quidem/' inquam, " et concessu difficilis inlatio, sed his earn quae prius concessa sunt nimium conuenire cognosce." " Recte," inquit, "aestimas. Sed qui conclusion] 35 accedere durum putat, aequum est uel falsum aliquid praecessisse demonstret uel collocationem proposi- tionum non esse efficacem necessariae conclusionis ostendat; alioquin concessis praecedentibus nihil prorsus est quod de inlatione causetur. Nam hoc 40 quoque quod dicam non minus mirum uideatur, sed ex his quae sumpta sunt aeque est necessarium." 324 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
not have any effect. Wherefore since everyone of these hath their peculiar misery, they must of force be oppressed with a threefold wretchedness, whom thou seest desire, be able, and perform wickedness." "I grant it," quoth I, "but earnestly wish that they may soon be delivered from this misery, having lost the power to perform their malice." " They will lose it," quoth she, "sooner than perhaps either thou wouldst, or they themselves suppose. For in the short compass of this life there is nothing so late that any one, least of all an immortal soul, should think it long in coming; so that the great hope and highest attempts of the wicked are many times made frustrate with a sudden and unexpected end, which in truth setteth some end to their misery.
For if wickedness make men miserable, the longer one is wicked, the more miserable he must needs be; and 1 should judge them the most unhappy men that may be, if death at least did not end their malice. For if we have concluded truly of the misery of wickedness, it is manifest that the wretchedness which is everlasting must of force be infinite." " A strange illation," quoth I, "and hard to be granted; but I see that those things which were granted before agree very well with these." "Thou thinkest aright," quoth she, " but he that findeth difficulty to yield to the conclusion must either show that something which is presupposed is false, or that the combination of the propositions makes not a necessary conclusion; otherwise, granting that which went before, he hath no reason to doubt of the inference. For this also which I will conclude now will seem no less strange, and yet followeth as necessarily out of those things which are already assumed." " What? " quoth I.
325 BOETHII "Quidnam?" inquam. " Feliciores," inquit, "esse improbos supplicia luentes quam si eos nulla iustitiae poena coerceat. Neque id nunc tnolior quod cuiuis 45 ueniat in mentem, corrigi ultione prauos mores et ad rectum supplicii terrore deduci, ceteris quoque exemplum esse culpanda fugiendi, sed alio quodam modo infeliciores esse improbos arbitror impunitos, tametsi nulla ratio correctionis, nullus respectus 50 habeatur exempli." " Et quis erit," inquam, " praeter hos alius modus?" Et ilia: "Bonos/' inquit, "esse Felices, malos uero miseros nonne concessimus? " " Ita est," inquam. " Si igitur," inquit, " miseriae cuiuspiam bonum aliquid addatur, nonne felicior est 55 eo cuius pura ac solitaria sine cuiusquam boni ad- mixtione miseria est?" "Sic/' inquam, "uidetur." " Quid si eidem misero qui cunctis careat bonis, praeter ea quibus miser est malum.aliud fuerit adnexum, nonne multo infelicior eo censendus est 60 cuius infortunium boni participatione releuatur?" " Quidni? " inquam. " Sed puniri improbos iustum, impum'tos uero elabi iniquum esse manifestum est." "Quis id neget? " "Sed ne illud quidem," ait, " quisquam negabit bonum esse omne quod iustum 65 est contraque quod iniustum est malum." Liquere, respondi.1 " Habent igitur improbi, cum puniuntur, quidem boni aliquid adnexum poenam ipsam scilicet quae ratione iustitiae bona est, idemque cum supplicio carent, inest eis aliquid ulterius mali ipsa impunitas 70 quam iniquitatis merito malum esse confessus es."
1 Sed puniri...respondi quae infra (in pay. 328 /. 73) post ultioni puniti in codiclbus habentur hue transponenda esse censuit P. Langenus, demonstrauit A. Enqelbrecht.
326 CONSOLAT. PHILOSOPH. IV.
" That wicked men," quoth she, " are more happy being punished than if they escaped the hands of justice. Neither do I now go about to show that which may come into every man's mind, that evil customs are corrected by chastisement, and are reduced to virtue by the terror of punishment, and that others may take example to avoid evil, but in another manner also I think vicious men that go unpunished to be more miserable, although we take no account of correction and pay no regard to example.'' " And what other manner shall this be," quoth I, " besides these? " " Have we not granted," quoth she, " that the good are happy, and the evil miserable?" "'We have," quoth I. "If then," quoth she, " something that is good be added to one's misery, is he not happier than another whose misery is desolate and solitary, without any participa tion of goodness?" "So it seemeth," quoth I. " What if there be some other evil annexed to this miserable man who is deprived of all goodness, besides those which make him miserable, is he not to be accounted much more unhappy than he whose misery is lightened by partaking of goodness?" "Why not?" quoth I. " But it is manifest that it is just that the wicked be punished, and unjust that they should go unpunished." " Who can deny that?" " But neither will any man deny this," quoth she, " that whatsoever is ijlgti_is_SQo.d, and contrariwise, that whatsoever is unjust, is_.evil/' "Certainly," I answered. "Then the wicked have some good annexed when they are punished, to wit, the punish ment itself, which by reason of justice is good, and when they are not punished, they have a further evil, the very impunity which thou hast deservedly granted to be an evil because of its injustice." "I