35 bam quod acceperam, sed frequentis consilii iteratione ruminabam. Tandem igitur patuere pulsanti animo fores et ueritas inuenta quaerenti omnes nebulas Eutychiani reclusit erroris. Vnde mihi maxime subiit admirari, quaenam haec indoctorum hominum 40 esset audacia qui inscientiae uitium praesumptionis atque inpudentiae nube conentur obducere, cum non 0 Obviously his father-in-law Symmachus. • Vide p. 76, eius cuius soleo iudicio, etc.
74 CONTRA EVTYCHRN this assertion I began to inquire what difference there can be between unions formed from two natures and unions which consist in two natures, for the point which the bishop who wrote the letter refused to pass over because of its gravity, seemed to me of importance and not one to be idly and carelessly slurred over. On that occasion all loudly protested that the differ ence was evident, that there was no obscurity, con fusion or perplexity, and in the general storm and tumult there was no one who really touched the edge of the problem, much less anyone who solved it.
I was sitting a long way from the man whom I especially wished to watch," and if you recall the arrangement of the seats, I was turned away from him, with so many between us, that however much I desired it I could not see his face and expression and glean therefrom any sign of his opinion. Personally, indeed, I had nothing more to contribute than the rest, in fact rather less than more. I, no more than the others, had any view about the question at issue, while my possible contribution was less by one thing, namely, the false assumption of a knowledge that I had not got. I was, I admit, much put out, and being overwhelmed by the mob of ignorant speakers, I held my peace, fearing lest I should be rightly set down as insane if I held out for being sane among those madmen.'' So I continued to ponder all the questions in my mind, not swallowing what I had heard, but rather chewing the cud of constant meditation. At last the door opened to my insistent knocking, and the truth which I found cleared out of my way all the clouds of the Eutychian error. And with this discovery a great wonder came upon me at the vast temerity of unlearned men who use the cloak of impudent presumption to cover up the 75 BOETHII 75 BOETHII modo saepe id quod proponatur ignorant, uerum in huiusmodi contentionibus ne id quidem quod ipsi loquantur intellegant, quasi non deterior fiat in- 45 scientiae causa, dum tegitur.
Sed ab illis ad te transeo, cui hoc quantulumcumque est examinandum prius perpendendumque transmitto. Quod si recte se habere pronuntiaueris, peto ut mei nominis hoc quoque inseras chartis; sin uero uel 50 minuendum aliquid uel addendum uel aliqua muta- tione uariandum est, id quoque postulo remitti, meis exemplaribus ita ut a te reuertitur transcribendum. Quae ubi ad calcem ducta constiterint, turn demum eius cuius soleo iudicio censenda transmittam. Sed 55 quoniam semel res a conlocutione traiisferturad stilum, prius extremi sibique contrarii Nestorii atque Eutychis summoueantur errores; post uero adiuuante deo, Christiariae medietatem fidei temperabo. Quoniam uero in tota quaestione contrariarum sibimet ai/ato-ewv 60 de personis dubitatur atque naturis, haec primitus definienda sunt et propriis diiFerentiis segreganda.
I.
Natura igitur aut de solis corporibus dici potest aut de solis substantiis, id est corporeis atque incor- poreis, aut de omnibus rebus quae quocumque modo esse dicuntur. Cum igitur tribus modis natura dici 6 possit, tribus modis sine dubio definienda est. Nam si de omnibus rebus naturam dici placet, talis definitio 0 Cf. infra, de Cons. i. pr. 4 (p. 142) oportet uulnui detegas.
b Vide supra, p. 75, and De Trin. p. 3.
76 CONTRA EVTYCHEN vice of ignorance, for not only do they often fail to grasp the point at issue, but in a debate of this kind they do not even understand their own statements, forgetting that the case of ignorance is all the worse if it is not honestly admitted.0 I turn from them to you, and to you I submit this little essay for your first judgment and consideration. If you pronounce it to be sound I beg you to place it among the other writings of mine which you possess; but if there is anything to be struck out or added or changed in any way, I would ask you to let me have your suggestions, in order that I may enter them in my copies just as they leave your hands. When this revision has been duly accomplished, then I will send the work on to be judged by the man to whom I always submit everything.6 But since the pen is now to take the place of the living voice, let me first clear away the extreme and self-contradictory errors of Nestorius and Eutyches; after that, by God's help, I will temperately set forth the middle way of the Christian Faith. But since in this whole question of self-contradictory heresies the matter of debate is Persons and Natures, these terms must first be defined and distinguished by their proper differences.
I.
I.
Nature, then, may be affirmed either of bodies alone or of substances alone, that is, of corporeals or incorporeals, or of everything that is in any way capable of affirmation. Since, then, nature can be affirmed in three ways, it must obviously be defined in three ways. For if you choose to affirm nature of the totality of things, the definition will be of such 77 BOETHII dabitur quae res omnes quae sunt possit iricludere. Erit ergo huiusmodi: " natura est earum rerum quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi pos- 10 sunt." In hac igitur definitione et accidentia et substantiae definiuntur; haec enim omnia intellectu capi possunt. Additum uero est " quoquo modo," quoniam deus et materia integro perfectoque in tellectu intellegi non possunt, sed aliquo tamen 15 modo ceterarum rerum priuatione capiuntur. Idcirco uero adiunximus "quae cum sint," quoniam etiam ipsum nihil significat aliquid sed non naturam. Neque enim quod sit aliquid sed potius non esse significat; omnis uero natura est. Et si de omnibus 20 quidem rebus naturam dici placet, haec sit naturae definitio quam superius proposuimus. Sin uero de solis substantiis natura dicitur, quoniam substantiae omnes aut corporeae sunt aut incorporeae, dabimus definitionem naturae substantias significant! huius- 25 modi: " natura est uel quod facere uel quod pati possit." "Pati" quidem ac "facere," ut omnia corporea atque corporeorum anima; haec enim in corpore et a corpore et facit et patitur. "Facere" uero tantum ut deus ceteraque diuina. Habes igitur 30 definitionem eius quoque significationis naturae quae tantum substantiis applicator. Qua in re substantiae quoque est reddita definitio. Nam si nomen naturae substantiam monstrat, cum naturam descripsimus substantiae quoque est assignata descriptio. Quod si 35 naturae nomen relictis incorporeis substantiis ad cor- porales usque contrahitur, ut corporeae tantum sub stantiae naturam habere uideantur, sicut Aristoteles 78 CONTRA EVTYCHEN a kind as to include all things that are. It will accordingly be something of this kind: " Nature belongs to those things which, since they exist, can in some measure be apprehended by the mind." This definition, then, includes both accidents and substances, for they all can be apprehended by the mind. But I add " in some measure " because God and matter cannot be apprehended by mind, be it never so whole and perfect, but still they are appre hended in a measure through the removal of accidents. The reason for adding the words, " since they exist," is that the mere word "nothing" denotes something, though it does not denote nature. For it denotes, indeed, not that anything is, but rather non-existence; but every nature exists. And if we choose to affirm " nature " of the totality of things, the definition will be as we have given it above.
But if "nature" is affirmed of substances alone, we shall, since all substances are either corporeal or incorporeal, give to nature denoting substances a de finition of the following kind: " Nature is either that which can act or that which can be acted upon." Now the power to act and to suffer belongs to all corporeals and the soul of corporeals; for it both acts in the body and suffers by the body. But only to act belongs to God and other divine substances.
Here, then, you have a further definition of what nature is as applied to substances alone. This defini tion comprises also the definition of substance. For if the word nature signifies substance, when once we have defined nature we have also settled the defini tion of substance. But if we neglect incorporeal substances and confine the name nature to corporeal substances so that they alone appear to possess the nature of substance — which is the view of Aristotle 79 BOETHII ceterique et eiusmodi et multimodae philosophiae sectatores putant, definiemus earn, ut hi etiatn qui 40 naturam non nisi in corporibus esse posuerunt. Est autem eius definitio hoc modo: " natura est motus principium per se non per accidens." Quod "motus principium " dixi hoc est, quoniam corpus omne habet proprium rnotum, ut ignis sursum, terra deorsum.
45 Item quod " per se principium motus " naturam esse proposui et non " per accidens/' tale est, quoniam lectum quoque ligneum deorsum ferri necesse est, sed non deorsum per accidens fertur. Idcirco enim quia lignum est, quod est terra, pondere et grauitate 50 deducitur. Non enim quia lectus est, deorsum cadit, sed quia terra est, id est quia terrae contigit, ut lectus esset; unde fit ut lignum naturaliter esse dicamus, lectum uero artificialiter. Est etiam alia significatio naturae per quam dicimus diuersam esse 55 naturam auri atque argenti in hoc proprietatem rerum monstrare cupieiites, quae significatio naturae definietur hoc modo: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia." Cum igitur tot modis uel dicatur uel definiatur natura, tarn catholici 60 quam Nestorius secundum ultimam definitionern duas in Christo naturas esse constituunt; neque enim easdem in deum atque hominem differentias conuenire.
II.
Sed de persona maxim e dubitari potest, quaenam ei definitio possit aptari. Si enim omnis habet natura 80 CONTRA EVTYCHEN and the adherents both of his and various other schools — we shall define nature as those do who have only allowed the word to be applied to bodies. Now, in accordance with this view, the definition is as follows: " Nature is the principle of movement properly inherent in and not accidentally attached to bodies." I say "principle of movement" because every body has its proper movement, fire moving up wards, the earth moving downwards. And what I mean by " movement properly inherent and not acci dentally attached " is seen by the example of a wooden bed which is necessarily borne downward and is not carried downward by accident. For it is drawn down ward by weight and heaviness because it is of wood, i.e. an earthly material. For it falls down not because it is a bed, but because it is earth, that is, because it is an accident of earth that it is a bed; hence we call it wood in virtue of its nature, but bed in virtue of the art that shaped it.
Nature has, further, another meaning according to which we speak of the different nature of gold and silver, wishing thereby to point the special property of things; this meaning of nature will be defined as follows: " Nature is the specific difference that gives form to anything." Thus, although nature is de scribed or defined in all these different ways, both Catholics and Nestorians firmly hold that there are in Christ two natures of the kind laid down in our last definition, for the same specific differences cannot apply to God and man.
II.
But the proper definition of Person is a matter of very great perplexity. For if every nature has D 81 BOETHII personam, indissolubilis nodus est, quaenam inter naturam personamque possit esse discretio; aut si 5 non aequatur persona naturae, sed infra terminum spatiumque naturae persona subsistit, difficile dictu est ad quas usque naturas persona perueniat, id est quas naturas conueniat habere personam, quas a personae uocabulo segregari. Nam illud quidem 10 manifestum est personae subiectam esse naturam nee praeter naturam personam posse praedicari. Vesti- ganda sunt igitur haec inquirentibus hoc modo.
Quoniam praeter naturam non potest esse persona quoniamque naturae aliae sunt substantiae, aliae acci- 15 dentes et uidemus personam in accidentibus non posse constitui (quis enim dicat ullam albedinis uel nigre- dinis uel magnitudinis esse personam?), relinquitur ergo ut personam in substantiis dici conueniat. Sed substantiarum aliae sunt corporeae, aliae incorporeae.
20 Corporearum uero aliae sunt uiuentes, aliae minime; uiuentium aliae sunt sensibiles, aliae minime; sen- sibilium aliae rationales, aliae inrationales. Item in- corporearum aliae sunt rationales, aliae minime, ut pecudum uitae; rationalium uero alia est inmutabilis 25 atque inpassibilis per naturam ut deus, alia per creationem mutabilis atque passibilis, nisi inpassibilis gratia substantiae ad inpassibilitatis nrmitudinem per- mutetur ut angelorum atque animae. Ex quibus omnibus neque in non uiuentibus corporibus personam 30 posse dici manifestum est (nullus enim lapidis ullam dicit esse personam), neque rursus eorum uiuentium quae sensu carent (neque enim ulla persona est a For a similar example of the method of diuisio cf. Cic. De Off. ii. 3. 11. Cf. also Isag. Porph. edit, prima, i. 10 (ed. Brandt, p. 29).
82 CONTRA EVTYCHRN person, the difference between nature and person is a hard knot to unravel; or if person is not taken as the equivalent of nature but is a term of less scope and range, it is difficult to say to what natures it may be extended, that is, to what natures the term person may be applied and what natures are dissociate from it. For one thing is clear, namely that nature is a substrate of Person, and that Person cannot be predicated apart from nature.
We must, therefore, conduct our inquiry into these points as follows.
Since Person cannot exist apart from a nature and since natures are either substances or accidents and we see that a person cannot come into being among accidents (for who can say there is any person of white or black or size?), it therefore remains that Person is properly applied to substances. But of substances, some are corporeal and others incorporeal. And of corporeals, some are living and others the reverse; of living substances, some are sensitive and others insensitive; of sensitive substances, some are rational and others irrational."1 Similarly of incorporeal substances, some are rational, others the reverse (for instance the animating spirits of beasts); but of rational substances there is one which is immutable and impassible by nature, namely God, another which in virtue of its creation is mutable and passible except in that case where the Grace of the im passible substance has transformed it to the unshaken impassibility which belongs to angels and to the soul.
Now from all the definitions we have given it is clear that Person cannot be affirmed of bodies which have no life (for no one ever said that a stone had a person), nor yet of living things which lack sense (for 83 BOETHII arboris), nee uero eius quae intellectu ac ratione deseritur (nulla est enim persona equi uel bouis 35 ceterorumque animalium quae muta ac sine ratione uitam solis sensibus degunt), at hominis dicimus esse personam, dicimus dei, dicimus angeli. Rursus sub- stantiarum aliae sunt uniuersales, aliae particular es. Vniuersales sunt quae de singulis praedicantur ut 40 homo, animal, lapis, lignum ceteraque huiusmodi quae uel genera uel species sunt; nam et homo de singulis hominibus et animal de singulis animalibus lapisque ac lignum de singulis lapidibus ac lignis dicuntur. Particularia uero sunt quae de aliis minime 45 praedicantur ut Cicero, Plato, lapis hie unde haec Achillis statua facta est, lignum hoc unde haec mensa composita est. Sed in his omnibus nusquam in uniuersalibus persona dici potest, sed in singularibus tantum atque in imliuiduis; animalis enim uel gene- 50 ralis hominis nulla persona est, sed uel Ciceronis uel Platonis uel singulorum indiuiduorum personae singulae nuncupantur.
III.
Quocirca si persona in solis substantiis est atque in his rationabilibus substantiaque omnis natura est nee in uniuersalibus sed in indiuiduis constat, reperta personae est definitio: "naturae rationabilis 5 indiuidua substantial' Sed nos hac definitione earn quam Graeci vrroo-Tao-iv dicunt terminauimus. Nomen enim personae uidetur aliunde traductum, ex his scilicet personis quae in comoediis tragoediisque a Boethius's definition of persona was adopted by St. Thomas (S. i. 29. 1), was regarded "as classical by the Schoolmen, and has the approval of modern theologians. Cf. Dorner, Doctrine of Christ, iii. p. 311.
84 CONTRA EVTYCHEN neither is there any person of a tree), nor finally of that which is bereft of mind and reason (for there is no person of a horse or ox or any other of the animals which dumb and unreasoning live a life of sense alone), but we say there is a person of a man, of God, of an angel. Again, some substances are universal, others are particular. Universal terms are those which are predicated of individuals, as man, animal, stone, stock and other things of this kind which are either genera or species; for the term man is applied to individual men just as animal is to individual animals, and stone and stock to individual stones and stocks. But particulars are terms which are never predicated of other things, as Cicero, Plato, this stone from which this statue of Achilles was hewn, this piece of wood out of which this table was made. But in all these things person cannot in any case be applied to universals, but only to particulars and individuals; for there is no person of a man if animal or general; only the single persons of Cicero, Plato, or other single individuals are termed persons.
III.
III.
Wherefore if Person belongs to substances alone, and these rational, and if every nature is a substance, existing not in universals but in individuals, we have found the definition of Person, viz.: " The individual substance of a rational nature." " Now by this defini tion we Latins have described what the Greeks call vTrocrrao-ts. For the word person seems to be borrowed from a different source, namely from the masks which in comedies and tragedies used to signify the 85 BOETHII eos quorum interest homines repraesentabant. Per- 10 sona uero dicta est a personando circumflexa paen- ultima. Quod si acuatur antepaenultima, apertissime a sono dicta uidebitur; idcirco autem a sono, quia concauitate ipsa maior necesse est uoluatur sonus. Graeci quoque has personas Trpoo-wTra uocant ab eo 15 quod ponantur in facie atque ante oculos obtegant uultum: Trapa TOV 7iy>os TOVS WTTUS Ttdf&Oau. Sed quoniam personis inductis histriones indiuiduos homi nes quorum intererat in tragoedia uel in comoedia ut dictum est repraesentabant, id est Hecubam uel 20 Medeam uel Simonem uel Chremetem, idcirco cete- ros quoque homines, quorum certa pro sui forma esset agnitio, et Latini personam et Graeci TiyxxrwTro. nuncupauerunt. Longe uero illi signatius naturae rationabilis indiuiduam subsistentiam tm-oo-Tacrews no- '25 mine uocauerunt, nos uero per inopiam significantium uocum translaticiam retinuimus nuncupationem, earn quarn illi VTTOO-TOCTIV dicunt personam uocantes; sed peritior Graecia sermonum vTrmrracriv uocat indiuiduam subsistentiam. Atque, uti Graeca utar oratione in 30 rebus quae a Graecis agitata Latina interpretatione translata sunt: at owriat ev /xty rots KaBoXov clvat SvvavTat, ' fv 8e rots drdyuois KCU Kara yue/aos /AOVOIS v(f)UTTavTa.L, id est: essentiae in uniuersalibus quidem esse possunt, in solis uero indiuiduis et particularibus 35 substant. Intellectus enim uniuersaliuin rerum ex particularibus sumptus est. Quocirca cum ipsae sub- sistentiae in uniuersalibus quidem sint,in particularibus uero capiant substantiam, iure subsistentias particu lar! ter substantes I'Troo-racrets appellauerunt. Neque " Implying a short penultimate. 86 CONTRA EVTYCHEN different subjects of representation. Now persona " mask " is derived from personare, with a circumflex on the penultimate. But if the accent is put on the antepenultimate a the word will clearly be seen to come from sonm " sound/' and for this reason, that the hollow mask necessarily produces a larger sound. The Greeks, too, call these masks Trpoo-wTra from the fact that they are placed over the face and conceal the countenance from the spectator: -n-apa TOV TT/OOS TOWS (uTras Ti()e<rdai. But since, as we have said, it was by the masks they put on that actors played the different characters represented in a tragedy or comedy — Hecuba or Medea or Simon or Chremes, — so also all other men who could be recognized by their several characteristics were designated by the Latins with the term persona and by the Greeks with Trpoo-wTra. But the Greeks far more clearly gave to the individual subsistence of a rational nature the name iiTroo-racrts, while we through want of appropriate words have kept a borrowed term, calling that persona which they call vTroo-racm; but Greece with its richer vocabulary gives the name iVoo-racrts to the individual subsistence. And, if I may use Greek in dealing with matters which were first mooted by Greeks before they came to be interpreted in Latin: al ova-cat (V [M£v rots KadoXov etvou Suvavrcu • «r 6e rots aro/zois Kal Kara (j.epos fioyots v^Ldravro.!^ that is: essences indeed can have potential existence in universals, but they have particular substantial existence in particulars alone. For it is from particulars that all our comprehension of universals is taken. Where fore since subsistences are present in universals but acquire substance in particulars they rightly gave the name I'Troa-rao-ts to subsistences which acquired substance through the medium of particulars. For 87 BOETHII 40 enim pensius subtiliusque intuenti idem uidebit.ui esse subsistentia quod substantia.
Nam quod Graeci owrtoxrw uel ovo-Lwa-Oai dicunt, id nos subsistentiam uel subsistere ap})ellamus; quod uero illi viroo-raa-iv uel V(/>urracr$ai, id nos substantiam 45 uel substare interpretamur. Subsistit enim quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non indiget. Substat autem id quod aliis accidentibus subiectum quoddam, ut esse ualeant, subministrat; sub illis enim stat, dum subiectum est accidentibus. Itaque genera uel species 50 subsistunt tantum; neque enim accidentia generibus speciebusue contingunt. Indiuidua uero non modo subsistunt uerum etiam substant, nam neque ipsa indigent accidentibus ut sint; informata enim sunt iam propriis et specificis differentiis et accidentibus 55 ut esse possint ministrant, dum sunt scilicet subiecta. Quocirca civai atque ovcnwa-dai esse atque subsistere, v<£i'o-Tacr0ai uero substare intellegitur. Neque enim uerborum inops Graecia est, ut Marcus Tullius alludit, sed essentiam, subsistentiam, substantiam, personam 60 totidem nominibus reddit, essentiam quidem ovviav, subsistentiam uero oucrtwcrtv, substantiam UTrooracrti/, personam TT/OOO-WTTOV appellans. Ideo autem t>7roo"rucms Graeci indiuiduas substaritias uocauerunt, quoniam ceteris subsunt et quibusdam quasi accidentibus sub- 65 positae subiectaeque sunt; atque idcirco nos quoque eas substantias nuncupamus quasi subpositas, quas illi 1 vTrocrTao-ets, cumque etiam irpoa-MTra nuncupent easdem substantias, possumus nos quoque nuncupare personas. Idem est igitur ova-iav esse quod essentiam, idem 70 ovcrtoxrtv quod subsistentiam, idem vTroo-rao-iv quod substantiam, idem TrpocrwTrov quod personam. Quare autem de inrationabilibus animalibus Graecus VTTO- (TTavLv non dicat, sicut nos de eisdem nomen sub- 1 quas illi Vallinus; quasi uel quas codd. meliores. 88 CONTRA EVTYCHEN to no one using his eyes with any care or penetra tion will subsistence and substance appear identical. For our equivalents of the Greek terms owriWis ovcriMo-Oai are respectively subsisienlia and subsistere, while their I'TrocrTacris uc/Hcrracr^ai are represented by our substantia and substare. For a thing has subsist ence when it does not require accidents in order to be, but that thing has substance which supplies to other things, accidents to wit, a substrate enabling them to be; for it "substands " those things so long- as it is subjected to accidents. Thus genera and species have only subsistence, for accidents do not attach to genera and species. But particulars have not only subsistence but substance, for they, no more than generals, depend on accidents for their Being; for they are already provided with their proper and specific differences and they enable accidents to be by supplying them with a substrate. Wherefore esse and subsistere represent eivai and ora-LwrOat, while substare represents v^ia-raa-Oat.. For Greece is not, as Marcus Tullius a playfully says, short of words, but provides exact equivalents for esscntia, subsistentia, substantia and persona — ovtria for essentia, ovo-tWts for subsistentia, uTroo-rao-ts for substantia, ny>6creo7rov for per sona. But the Greeks called individual substances viTrocrracrets because they underlie the rest and offer support and substrate to what are called accidents; and we in our term call them substances as being substrate — wocrTCMms, and since they also term the same substances -n-poa-Mrra, we too may call them persons. So ovcria is identical with essence, ovtrtwris with subsistence, uTrooracris with substance, Trpoo-wTrov with person. But the reason why the Greek does not use wTToo-rao-ts of irrational animals while we apply " Tusc. ii. 15. 3o.
D2 89 BOETHII stantiae praedicamus, haec ratio est, quoniam nomen 75 hoc melioribus applicatum est, ut aliqua id quod est excellentius, tametsi non descriptione naturae secundum id quod i><£to-Tacr0cu atque substare est, at certe uTTocrrao-ews uel substantiae uocabulis discerneretur.
Est igitur et hominis quidem essentia, id est ova-La., 80 et subsistentia, id est OTJO-UOCTIS, et viroa-rcuris, id est substantia, et irpocnaTrov, id est persona; owria quidem atque essentia quoniam est, oiVtWts uero atque subsistentia quoniam in nullo subiecto est, uVoo-rao-is uero atque substantia, quoniam subest 85 ceteris quae subsistentiae non sunt, id est oixriwcreis; est Trpoo-wTTov atque persona, quoniam est rationabile indiuiduum. Deus quoque et ova-ia est et essentia, est enim et maxima ipse est a quo omnium esse pro- ficiscitur. Est ovtrt&xrtSj id est subsistentia (subsistit 90 enim nullo indigens), et v(f>Lo-Tao-6ai.; substat enim. Vnde etiam dicimus unam esse oucrtav uel oixriaxriv, id est essentiam uel subsistentiam deitatis, sed tres vTroorao-ets, id est tres substantias. Et quidem secun- dum hunc modum dixere unam trinitatis essentiam,