95 tres substantias tresque personas. Nisi enim tres in deo substantias ecclesiasticus loquendi usus exclu- deret, uideretur idcirco de deo dici substantia, non quod ipse ceteris rebus quasi subiectum supponeretur, sed quod idem omnibus uti praeesset ita etiam quasi 100 principium subesset rebus, dum eis omnibus oixriwcr$ou uel subsistere subministrat.
IV.
Sed haec omnia idcirco sint dicta, ut differentiam 0 For a similar submission of his own opinion to the usage of the Church cf. the end of 2V. i. and of Tr. ii.
90 CONTRA EVTYCHEN the term substance to them is this: This term was applied to things of higher value, in order that what is more excellent might be distinguished, if not by a definition of nature answering to the literal meaning of v<j>i(rra(rdaL = substare, at any rate by the words uTrocrrao-t? = substantia.
To begin with, then, man is essence, i.e. oiWu, subsistence, i.e. ovcriVrts, wroerracris, i.e. substance, Trpoo-wTTov, i.e. person: ova- to. or essentia because he is, oixrtWis or subsistence because he is not accidental to any subject, vTroo-rao-is or substance because he is subject to all the things which are not subsistences or oi'crtdjcrets, while he is TrpocruTrov or person because he is a rational individual. Next, God is oiVi'u or essence, for He is and is especially that from which proceeds the Being of all things. To Him belong ovaidxrts, i.e. subsistence, for He subsists in absolute independence, and v^urraa-Oai, for He is substantial Being. Whence we go on to say that there is one ovcria or oiVtwo-ts, i.e. one essence or subsistence of the Godhead, but three vTroo-racreis or substances. And indeed, following this use, men have spoken of One essence, three substances and three persons of the Godhead. For did not the language of the Church forbid us to say three substances in speaking of God," substance might seem a right term to apply to Him, not because He underlies all other things like a substrate, but because, just as He excels above all things, so He is the foundation and support of things, supplying them all witli oiVrtdxrtfui or sub sistence.
IV.
You must consider that all I have said so far has been for the purpose of marking the difference 91 BOETHII naturae atque personae id est ouo-ias atque {iT monstraremus. Quo uero nomine unumquodque oporteat appellari, ecclesiasticae sit locutionis arbi- 5 trium. Hoc interim constet quod inter naturam pei'sonamque differre praediximus, quoniam natura est cuiuslibet substantiae specificata proprietas, persona uero rationabilis naturae indiuidua sub- stantia. Hanc in Christo Nestorius duplicem esse 10 constituit eo scilicet traductus errore, quod putauerit in omnibus naturis dici posse personam. Hoc enim praesumpto, quoniam in Christo duplicem naturam esse censebat, duplicem quoque personam esse con- fessus est. Qua in re eum falsum esse cum definitio 16 superius dicta conuincat, turn haec argumentatio euidenter eius declarabit errorem. Si enim non est Christi una persona duasque naturas esse manifestum est, hominis scilicet atque dei (nee tarn erit insipiens quisquam, utqui utramque earum a ratione seiungat), 20 sequitur ut duae uideantur esse personae; est enim persona ut dictum est naturae rationabilis indiuidua substantia.
Quae est igitur facta hominis deique coniunctio? Num ita quasi cum duo corpora sibimet apponuntur, 25 ut tantum locis iuncta sint et nihil in alterum ex alterius qualitate perueniat? Quern coniunctionis Graeci modum Ka.ro. -Tra.pa.Qta-Lv uocant. Sed si ita humanitas diuinitati coniuncta est, nihil horum ex utrisque confectum est ac per hoc nihil est Christus.
30 Nomen quippe ipsum unum quiddam significat singularitate uocabuli. At si duabus personis manen- tibus ea coniunctio qualem superius diximus facta est naturarum, unum ex duobus effici nihil potuit; 92 CONTRA EVTYCHEN CONTRA EVTYCHEN between Nature and Person, that is, owna and vTruo-Tao-is. The exact terms which should be applied in each case must be left to the decision of ecclesi astical usage. For the time being let that distinction between Nature and Person hold which I have affirmed,, viz. that Nature is the specific property of any substance, and Person the individual substance of a rational nature. Nestorius affirmed that in Christ Person was twofold, being led astray by the false notion that Person may be applied to every nature. For on this assumption, understanding that there were in Christ two natures, he declared that there were likewise two persons. And although the defini tion which we have already given is enough to prove Nestorius wrong, his error shall be further declared by the following argument. If the Person of Christ is not single, and if it is clear that there are in Him two natures, to wit, divine and human (and no one will be so foolish as to fail to include either in the definition), it follows that there must apparently be two persons; for Person, as has been said, is the in dividual substance of a rational nature.
What kind of union., then, between God and man has been effected? Is it as when two bodies are laid the one against the other, so that they are only joined locally, and no touch of the quality of the one reaches the other — the kind of union which the Greeks term Kara TrapdOfa-iv " by juxtaposition "? But if humanity has been united to divinity in this way no one thing has been formed out of the two, and hence Christ is nothing. The very name of Christ, indeed, denotes by its singular number a unity. But if the two persons continued and such a union of natures as we have above described took place, there could be no unity formed from two things, for nothing could ever 93 BOETHII omnino enim ex duabus personis nihil umquam fieri 35 potest. Nihil igitur unum secundum Nestorium Christus est ac per hoc omnino nihil. Quod enim non est unum, nee esse omnino potest; esse enim atque unum conuertitur et quodcumque unum est est. Etiam ea quae ex pluribus coniunguntur 40 ut aceruus, chorus, unum tamen sunt. Sed esse Christum manifeste ac ueraciter confitemur; unum igitur esse dicimus Christum. Quod si ita est, unam quoque Christi sine dubitatione personam esse necesse est. Nam si duae personae essent, unus 45 esse non posset; duos uero esse dicere Christos nihil est aliud nisi praecipitatae mentis insania. Cur enim omnino duos audeat Christos uocare, unum hominem alium deum? Vel cur eum qui deus est Christum uocat, si eum quoque qui homo est Christum est 50 appellaturuSj cum nihil simile, nihil habeant ex copulatione coniunctum? Cur simili nomine diuer- sissimis abutatur naturis, cum, si Christum definire cogitur, utrisque ut ipse dicit Christis non possit unam definitionis adhibere substantiam? Si enim 55 dei atque hominis diuersa substantia est unumque in utrisque Christi riomen nee diuersarum coniunctio substantiarum unam creditur fecisse personam, aequi- uocum riomen est Christi et nulla potest definitione concludi. Quibus autem umquam scripturis nomen 60 Christi geminatur? Quid uero noui per aduentum saluatoris efFectum est? Nam catholicis et fidei ueritas et raritas miraculi constat. Quarn enim magnum est quamque noutim, quam quod semel nee ullo alio saeculo possit euenire, ut eius qui solus 65 est deus natura cum humana quae ab eo erat diuer- <* Cf. the discussion of aequiuoca = 6/j.(i)vvfji.os in Isag. Porph. Vide Brandt's Index.
9* CONTRA EVTYCHEN possibly be formed out of two persons. Therefore Christ is, according to Nestorius, in no respect one, and therefore He is absolutely nothing. For what is not one cannot exist either; because Being and unity are convertible terms, and whatever is one is. Even things which are made up of many items, such as a heap or chorus, are nevertheless a unity. Now we openly and honestly confess that Christ is; therefore we say that Christ is a Unity. And if this is so, then without controversy the Person of Christ is one also. For if the Persons were two He could not be one; but to say that there are two Christs is nothing else than the madness of a distraught brain. Could Nestorius, I ask, dare to call the one man and the one God in Christ two Christs? Or why does he call Him Christ who is God, if he is also going to call Him Christ who is man, when his combination gives the two no common factor, no coherence? Why does he wrongly use the same name for two utterly different natures, when, if he is compelled to define Christ, he cannot, as he himself admits, apply the substance of one definition to both his Christs? For if the substance of God is different from that of man, and the one name of Christ applies to both, and the combination of different substances is not believed to have formed one Person, the name of Christ is equivocal a and cannot be comprised in one definition. But in what Scriptures is the name of Christ ever made double? Or what new thing has been wrought by the coming of the Saviour? For the truth of the faith and the unwontedness of the miracle alike remain, for Catholics, unshaken. For how great and unprece dented a thing it is — unique and incapable of repeti tion in any other age — that the nature of Him who is God alone should come together with human nature 95 BOETHII sissima conueniret atque ita ex distantibus naturis una fieret copulatione persona! Secundum Nestorii uero sententiam quid contingit noui? "Seruant," inquit, "proprias humanitas diuinitasque personas."
70 Quando enim non fuit diuinitatis propria humanita- tisque persona? Quando uero non erit? Vel quid amplius in lesu generatione contingit quam in cuius- libet alterius, si discretis utrisque personis discretae etiam fuere naturae? Ita enim personis manentibus 75 illic nulla naturarum potuit esse coniunctio, ut in quolibet homine, cuius cum propria persona subsistat, nulla est ei excellentissimae substantiae coniuncta diuinitas. Sed fortasse lesum, id est personam hominis, idcirco Christum uocet, quoiiiam per earn 80 mira quaedam sit operata diuinitas. Esto. Deum uero ipsum Christ! appellatione cur uocet? Cur uero non elementa quoque ipsa simili audeat appellare uocabulo per quae deus mira quaedam cotidianis motibus operatur? An quia inrationabiles sub- 85 stantiae non possunt habere personam qua l Christ! uocabulum excipere possint 2? Nonne in sanctis hominibus ac pietate conspicuis apertus diuinitatis actus agnoscitur? Nihil enim intererit, cur non sanctos quoque uiros eadem appellatione dignetur, 90 si in adsumptione humanitatis non est una ex con- iunctione persona. Sed dicat forsitan, " Illos quoque Christos uocari fateor, sed ad imaginem ueri Christ!." Quod si nulla ex homine atque deo una persona coniuncta est, omnes ita ueros Christos arbitrabimur 95 ut hunc qui ex uirgine genitus creditur. Nulla quippe in hoc adunata persona est ex dei atque hominis copulatione sicut nee in eis, qui dei spiritu 1 quae codd. 8 possit Vallinus.
96 CONTRA EVTYCHEN which was entirely different from God to form from different natures by conjunction a single Person! But now, if we follow Nestorius, what happens that is new? "Humanity and divinity/' quoth he, "keep their proper Persons." Well, when had not divinity and humanity each its proper Person? And when, we answer, will this not be so? Or wherein is the birth of Jesus more significant than that of any other child, if, the two Persons remaining distinct, the natures also were distinct? For while the Persons remained so there could no more be a union of natures in Christ than there could be in any other man with whose substance, be it never so perfect, no divinity was ever united because of the subsistence of his proper person. But for the sake of argument let him call Jesus, i.e. the human person, Christ, because through that person God wrought certain wonders. Agreed. But why should he call God Himself by the name of Christ? Why should he not go on to call the very elements by that name? For through them in their daily movements God works certain wonders. Is it because irrational substances cannot possess a Person enabling them to receive the name of Christ? Is not the operation of God seen plainly in men of holy life and notable piety? There will surely be no reason not to call the saints also by that name, if Christ taking humanity on Him is not one Person through conjunction. But perhaps he will say, " I allow that such men are called Christs, but it is because they are in the image of the true Christ." But if no one Person has been formed of the union of God and man, we shall consider all of them just as true Christs as Him who, we believe, was born of a Virgin. For no Person has been made one by the union of God and man either in Him or in them who by the.
97 BOETHII de uenturo Christo praedicebant, propter quod etiam ipsi quoque appellati sunt Christi. lam uero sequitur, 100 ut personis manentibus nullo modo a diuinitate humanitas credatur adsumpta. Omnino enim dis- iuncta sunt quae aeque personis naturisque separan- tur, prorsus inquam disiuncta sunt nee magis inter se homines bouesque disiuncti quam diuinitas in 105 Christo humanitasque discreta est, si mansere per- sonae. Homines quippe ac boues una animalis com- munitate iunguntur; est enim illis secundum genus communis substantia eademque in uniuersalitatis collectione natura. Deo uero atque homini quid 110 non erit diuersa ratione disiunctum, si sub diuersitate naturae personarum quoque credatur mansisse dis- cretio? Non est igitur saluatum genus humanum, nulla in nos salus Christi generatione processit, tot prophetarum scripturae populum inlusere credentem, 115 omnis ueteris testamenti spernatur auctoritas per quam salus mundo Christi generatione promittitur. Non autem prouenisse manifestum est, si eadem in persona est quae in natura diuersitas. Eundem quippe saluum fecit quern creditur adsumpsisse; 120 nulla uero intellegi adsumptio potest, si manet aeque naturae personaeque discretio. Igitur qui adsumi manente persona non potuit, iure non uidebitur per Christi generationem potuisse saluari. Non est igitur per generationem Christi hominum saluata 125 natura, — quod credi nefas est.
Sed quamquam permulta sint quae hunc sensum inpugnare ualeant atque perfringere, de argumen- torum copia tamen haec interim libasse sufficiat.
b For a similar reductio ad absurdum ending in quod nefas est see Tr. iii. (supra, p. 44) and Cons. v. 3 (infra, p. 374).
98 CONTRA EVTYCHEN Spirit of God foretold the coming Christ, for which cause they too were called Christs. So now it follows that so long as the Persons remain, we cannot in any wise believe that humanity has been assumed by divinity. For things which differ alike in persons and natures are certainly separate, nay absolutely separate; man and oxen are not further separate than are divinity and humanity in Christ, if the Persons have remained. Men indeed and oxen are united in one animal nature, for by genus they have a common substance and the same nature in the collection which forms the universal." But God and man will be at all points fundamentally different if we are to believe that distinction of Persons continues under difference of nature. Then the human race has not been saved, the birth of Christ has brought us no salvation, the writings of all the prophets have but beguiled the people that believed in them, contempt is poured upon the authority of the whole Old Testament which promised to the world salvation by the birth of Christ. It is plain that salvation has not been brought us, if there is the same difference in Person that there is in Nature. No doubt He saved that humanity which we believe He assumed; but no assumption can be conceived, if the separation abides alike of Nature and of Person. Hence that human nature which could not be assumed as long as the Person continued, will certainly and rightly appear incapable of salvation by the birth of Christ. Wherefore man's nature has not been saved by the birth of Christ — an impious conclusion.6 But although there are many weapons strong enough to wound and demolish the Nestorian view, let us for the moment be content with this small selection from the store of arguments available.
99 BOETHII V.
Transeundum quippe est ad Eutychen qui cum a ueterum orbitis esset euagatus, in contra rium cucurrit errorem asserens tantum abesse, ut in Christo geinina persona credatur, ut ne naturam 5 quidem in eo duplicem oporteat confiteri; ita quippe esse adsumptum hominem, ut ea sit adunatio facta cum deo, ut natura humana non manserit. Huius error ex eodem quo Nestorii fonte prolabitur. Nam sicut Nestorius arbitratur non posse esse naturam 10 duplicem quin persona fieret duplex, atque ideo, cum in Christo naturam duplicem confiteretur, duplicem credidit esse personam, ita quoque Eutyches non putauit naturam duplicem esse sine duplicatione personae et cum non confiteretur duplicem esse per- 15 sonano, arbitratus est consequens, ut una uideretur esse natura. Itaque Nestorius recte tenens duplicem in Christo esse naturam sacrilege confitetur duas esse personas; Eutyches uero recte credens unam esse personam impie credit unam quoque esse 20 naturam. Qui conuictus euidentia rerum, quando- quidem manifestum est aliam naturam esse hominis aliam dei, ait duas se confiteri in Christo naturas ante adunationem, unam uero post adunationem. Quae sententia non aperte quod uult eloquitur. Vt 25 tamen eius dementiam perscrutemur, adunatio haec aut tempore generationis facta est aut tempore resurrectionis. Sed si tempore generationis facta est, uidetur putare et ante generationem fuisse humanam carnem non a Maria sumptam sed aliquo a The ecclesiastical uia media, with the relegation of opposing theories to the extremes, which meet in a common fount of falsity, owes something to Aristotle and to our author. Vide infra, p. 118.
100 CONTRA EVTYCHEN V.
I must now pass to Eutyches who, wandering from the path of primitive doctrine,, lias rushed into the opposite error a and asserts that so far from our having to believe in a twofold Person in Christ, we must not even confess a double Nature; humanity, he maintains, was so assumed that the union with Godhead involved the disappearance of the human nature. His error springs from the same source as that of Nestorius. For just as Nestorius deems there could not be a double Nature unless the Person were doubled, and therefore, confessing the double Nature in Christ, has perforce believed the Person to be double, so also Kutyches deemed that the Nature was not double unless the Person was double, and since he did not confess a double Person, he thought it a necessary consequence that the Nature should be regarded as single. Thus Nestorius, rightly holding Christ's Nature to be double, sacrilegiously professes the Persons to be two; whereas Eutyches, rightly believing the Person to be single, impiously believes that the Nature also is single. And being confuted by the plain evidence of facts, since it is clear that the Nature of God is different from that of man, he declares his belief to be: two Natures in Christ before the union and only one after the union. Now this statement does not express clearly what he means. However, let us scrutini/e his extravagance. It is plain that this union took place either at the moment of conception or at the moment of resurrection. But if it happened at the moment of conception, Eutyches seems to think that even before conception He had human' flesh, not taken from Mary but 101 BOETHI1 30 modo alio praeparatam, Mariam uevo uirginem appositam ex qua caro nasceretur quae ab ea sumpta non esset, illam uero carnem quae antea fuerit esse et diuisam atque a diuinitatis substantia separatam; cum ex uirgine natus est, adunatum esse deo, ut una 35 uideretur facta esse natura. Vel si haec eius sententia non est, ilia esse poterit dicentis duas ante adunationem, unam post adunationem, si adunatio generatione perfecta est, ut corpus quidem a Maria sumpserit, sed, antequam sumeret, diuersam deitatis 40 humanitatisque fuisse naturam; sumptam uero unam factam atque in diuinitatis cessisse substantiam. Quod si hanc adunationem non putat generatione sed resurrectione factam, rursus id duobus fieri arbi- trabitur modis; aut enim genito Christo et non 45 adsumente de Maria corpus aut adsumente ab eadem carnem, usque dum resurgeret quidem, duas fuisse naturas, post resurrectionem unam factam. De quibus illud disiunctum nascitur, quod interro- gabimus hoc modo: natus ex Maria Christus aut 50 ab ea carnem humanam traxit aut minime. Si non confitetur ex ea traxisse, dicat quo homine indutus aduenerit, utrumne eo qui deciderat praeuaricatione peccati an alio? Si eo de cuius semine ductus est homo, quern uestita diuinitas est? Nam si ex 55 semine Abrahae atque Dauid et postremo Mariae non fuit caro ilia qua natus est, ostendat ex cuius hominis sit carne deriuatus, quoniam post primum hominem caro omnis humana ex humana carne deducitur. Sed si quern dixerit.hominem a quo 102 CONTRA EVTYCHEN prepared in some other way, while the Virgin Mary was brought in to give birth to flesh that was not taken from her; that this flesh, which already existed, was apart and separate from the substance of divinity, but that when He was born of the Virgin it was united to God, so that the Nature seemed to be made one. Or if this be not his opinion, since he says that there were two Natures before the union and one after, supposing the union to be established by conception, an alternative view may be that Christ indeed took a body from Mary but that before He took it the Natures of Godhead and manhood were different: but the Nature assumed became one with that of Godhead into which it passed. But if lie thinks that this union was effected not by conception but by resurrection, we shall have to assume that this too happened in one of two ways; either Christ was conceived and did not assume a body from Mary or He did assume flesh from her, and there were (until indeed He rose) two Natures which became one after the Resurrection. From these alternatives a dilemma arises which we will examine as follows: Christ who was born of Mary either did or did not take human flesh from her. If Eutyches does not admit that He took it from her, then let him say what manhood He put on to come among us — that which had fallen through sinful disobedience or another? If it was the man hood of that man from whom all men descend, what manhood did divinity invest? For if that flesh in which He was born came not of the seed of Abraham and of David and finally of Mary, let Eutyches show from what man's flesh he descended, since, after the first man, all human flesh is derived from human flesh. But if he shall name any child of man beside 103 BOETHII 60 generatio sumpta sit saluatoris praeter Mariam uirginem, et ipse errore confundetur et adscribere mendacii notam summae diuinitati inlusus ipse uidebitur, quando quod Abrahae atque Dauid promittitur in sanctis diuinationibus, ut ex eorum semine toti 65 mundo salus oriatur, aliis distribuit, cum praesertim, si humana caro sumpta est, non ab alio sumi potuerit nisi unde etiam procreabatur. Si igitur a Maria non est sumptum corpus humanum sed a quolibet alio, per Mariam tamen est procreatuin quod fuerat prae- 70 uai-icatione corruptum, superius dicto repellitur argumento. Quod si non eo homine Christus indutus est qui pro peccati poena sustinuerat mortem, illud eueniet ex nullius hominis semine taleni potuisse nasci qui fuerit sine originalis poena peccati. Ex 75 nullo igitur talis sumpta est caro; unde fit ut nouiter uideatur esse formata. Sed haec aut ita hominum uisa est oculis, ut humanum putaretur corpus quod reuera non esset humanum, quippe quod nulli originali subiaceret poenae, aut noua quaedam uera 80 nee poenae peccati subiacens originalis ad tempus hominis natura formata est? Si uerum hominis corpus non fuit, aperte arguitur mentita diuinitas, quae ostenderet hominibus corpus, quod cum uerum non esset, turn fallerentur ii l qui uerum esse arbitra- 85 rentur. At si noua ueraque non ex homine sumpta caro formata est, quo tanta tragoedia generationis?
Vbi ambitus passionis? Ego quippe ne in homine quidem non stulte fieri puto quod inutiliter factum 1 hii uel hi codd.
a The use of this kind of argument by Boethius allays any suspicion as to the genuineness of Tr. iv. which might be caused by the use of allegorical interpretation therein, 104 CONTRA EVTYCHEN Mary the Virgin as the cause of the conception of the Saviour, he will both be confounded by his own error., and, himself a dupe, will stand accused of stamping with falsehood the very Godhead for thus transferring to others the promise of the sacred oracles made to Abraham and David a that of their seed salvation should arise for all the world, especially since if human flesh was taken it could not be taken from any other but Him of whom it was begotten. If, therefore, His human body was not taken from Mary but from any other, yet that was engendered through Mary which had been corrupted by dis obedience, Eutyches is confuted by the argument already stated. But if Christ did not put on that manhood which had endured death in punishment for sin, it will result that of no man's seed could ever one have been born who should be, like Him, without punishment for original sin. Therefore flesh like His was taken from no man, whence it would appear to have been new-formed for the purpose. But did this flesh then either so appear to human eyes that the body was deemed human which was not really human, because it was not subject to any primal penalty, or was some new true human flesh formed as a makeshift, not subject to the penalty for original sin? If it was not a truly human body, the Godhead is plainly convicted of falsehood for displaying to men a body which was not real and thus deceived those who thought it real. But if flesh had been formed new and real and not taken from man, to what purpose was the tremendous tragedy of the conception? Where the value of His long Passion? I cannot but consider foolish even a human action